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Abstract 
 
Microfinance has grown from a niche development intervention in the 1990s to one that commands 
global influence and donor support. By 2006 microfinance had become part of financial sector 
development policy through the concept of financial inclusion.  At the same time theoretical 
analysis of economic development increasingly focused on the role of institutions and getting 
institutions right - including for the financial sector – which has given rise to attempts to theorize 
gradual institutional change.   
 
This convergence of policy, and theoretical emphasis on institutions, raises the central question as 
to what institutions and institutional changes are necessary for the financial sector to effectively 
serve poor people.  The experience of microfinance sector growth over a decade in two countries 
has been investigated using a ‘micro-ethnographic’ methodology to respond to this question.  
 
The research finds that a focus on institutional functions rather than institutional forms aids 
definitional precision and allows comparability across markets.  Social norms underpinned the 
development of institutional functions, as theories of social embeddedness suggest. These norms 
also became integrated into institutional functions through the process of change, adding to critiques 
of externally imposed ‘best practice’ institutional blueprints.  Further, beyond the widely accepted 
institutional functions which the rest of the financial market needs to operate efficiently, this 
research highlights the importance of a constitutional function (or law) to include poor people in the 
formal financial system, appropriate supervision for microfinance providers and support for the 
development of microfinance. 
 
Recent theories of institutional change offer insights beyond path dependency in identifying spaces 
for change and how changes will ‘stick’. However, to better analyse change at the level of particular 
institutional arenas, greater elaboration is needed of: how to incorporate multiple sets of agents 
(including external development agents) and multiple institutional functions; appropriate time-
frames for analysis and processes of actor engagement.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
From the early 1990s, the microfinance sector grew from a niche development intervention to one 
that commanded increasing influence and donor support, extending its outreach to 100 million of 
the world’s poorest families in 2007 (Daley-Harris, 2009 p.3). The potential of microfinance to 
achieve both financial sustainability and poverty reduction meant it was congruent with the 
prevailing Washington Consensus principles over those years. However, with approximately 2.5 
billion people still excluded from financial services (CGAP 2009), in 2006 donor policy on 
microfinance shifted towards incorporating it into broader financial sector development policy 
through the concept of financial inclusion (Helms 2006, UNCDF 2006).  This signaled the 
recognition that the formal financial sector needed to provide all people, including poor people, 
with financial services, as the microfinance sector had proven this could be done in financially 
viable ways.  Even though rigorous evidence of the poverty reduction impact of microfinance - in 
particular microcredit - has been limited, financial sector reforms that promote inclusive access to 
financial services are still at the core of the development agenda (Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck and 
Honohan 2008 p.2).  
 
At the same time theoretical analysis of economic growth and development has increasingly 
focused on the role of institutions. As Chang notes, “from the late 1990s ….institutions have moved 
to the centre stage in the debate on economic development” (Chang 2011 p. 473) and “getting 
institutions right” (Rodrik 2008a p. 100) has increasingly been emphasized in policy. Financial 
sector development policies have themselves been centrally influenced by this institutional focus 
with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of legal and regulatory frameworks as well as the 
wider institutional environments needed for financial sector development to support economic 
growth. 
 
Given this new policy focus and theoretical emphasis, a key issue that arises is what institutions and 
approaches to institutional development are necessary for the financial sector to effectively serve 
poor people.  This research sets out to examine this issue at the intersection of institutional analysis, 
financial market development and microfinance.  It does this by examining the experience of two 
countries where the development of the microfinance market was relatively successful by 2007 and 
which had been strongly supported by donors for a period of ten years.  The research investigates 
the development of these markets using institutional analysis in order to identify what institutions 
have influenced their development and how institutional change has occurred.  
 
This chapter starts with an overview of two areas of financial sector development policy which have 
converged in the late 2000s. Microenterprise credit was a small corner of international development 
practice twenty years ago, but microfinance in the form of a financial inclusion agenda (as a broad 
range of financial services that poor people need - savings, credit, payments and insurance) has now 
become a focus of the Group of 20 leading economies’ (G20) policy making since 2009. However, 
since many of the origins of poor people’s exclusion lie in key historical challenges and policy 
failures in developing the financial sector, the trajectory of policy in this sector is reviewed in the 
second section.   
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Analysis has made it increasingly clear that the underlying institutional framework is a key feature 
of deficiencies in economic development.  I therefore turn to the role of institutions in the third 
section – introducing and discussing the emergence of this line of theory and analysis and its 
relation to financial sector development. Starting with the role of institutions in economic growth 
the discussion covers the complex relationship between financial market development, economic 
growth and poverty reduction and concludes with the importance of sound institutions for financial 
development. Further, given that attempts at creating institutional change have been a key feature of 
development policy, I briefly assess the dominant method of institutional change undertaken to 
support such development, that is, institutional “blueprints” (Evans 2004 p. 30). This is the practice 
of identifying (so called) best practice institutional forms from developed economies and transfering 
them to developing economies. 
 
This review of financial sector policy development, alongside the emergence of institutions as a 
central analytical approach and focus of much policy implementation, frames the research questions 
of this thesis at the intersection of these three areas which is a gap in current research. A chapter by 
chapter overview of the rest of the study then shows how the research questions have been 
addressed.  
 
1.1 Microfinance policy: from microcredit to financial inclusion 
Microfinance policy originated in Non-Government Organization (NGO) promoted microenterprise 
credit schemes over twenty years ago and now encompasses multilateral statements on financial 
inclusion. This section explains how it grew from a specific niche in international development 
practice to become central to the global development agenda despite extensive debate over its 
effectiveness in reducing poverty.  
 
Poor people in developing economies have a long history of indigenous forms of savings and lending - 
from rotating savings and credit associations, to susu collectors, burial funds and money lenders 
(Rutherford 2000)
1
. Adams and Fitchett (1992) are among those who document the many different 
forms of informal finance and recognize that “informal finance makes an important contribution to 
development” (ibid p.1).  The potential to develop financial services for poor people in developing 
economies (largely based on informal financial mechanisms of group-based financial intermediation) 
was quickly recognized when NGOs in South Asia and Latin America reported that groups of women 
micro-entrepreneurs typically paid back on-time when lent small sums of money (e.g. Khandker, 
Khalily and Khan 1994, Otero and Rhyne 1994). Funders started supporting the provision of 
“microfinance”, based on the logic that access to financial services enables poor and low-income people 
                                                     
1
 Rural and urban moneylenders differ in that, in rural areas, moneylenders tend to accept less regular 
repayments because their clients (usually farmers) earn income in irregular, though larger, increments than do 
urban workers such as market traders. Moreover, the close community ties that exist in rural areas make it 
easier for moneylenders to trust their clients because they know them and their families so well. (Rutherford 
2000) 
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and their families to make everyday decisions about schooling, healthcare, inventory for a 
microbusiness or home repair so they can “chart their own paths out of poverty.” Helms (2006 p.1) 2 3  
 
The two simple ideas that inspired the development of the microfinance sector, were poor households’, 
particularly poor women’s, ability to profit from access to finance and financial institutions’ ability to 
profit from serving poor people (Armendáriaz and Morduch, 2005 p.16). These ideas were consistent 
with key principles of the Washington consensus (Williamson, 1990 and 2003) including: privatization 
- as the private sector would provide the financial services to poor people, and private businesses would 
be funded and poor people would help themselves; liberalization of interest rates - as financial service 
providers needed to be free to set interest rates that would cover the cost of serving poor people and; 
deregulation - as a range of different financial service providers were needed to reach poor people not 
just government or commercial banks. Microfinance neatly conformed to the zeitgeist of bilateral and 
multilateral funders’ policies.4  
 
To bring together best practice knowledge on how to fund microfinance, donors developed guiding 
principles for selecting and supporting microfinance providers, based on business principles (World 
Bank, 1995) and founded the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) in 1996, housed at the 
World Bank. CGAP was an independent policy and research center dedicated to advancing financial 
access for the world's poor.
5
  By 1997 there was an upsurge in donor funding for the microfinance 
sector (Helms 2006) 
6
 with a focus on funding individual microfinance organizations to reach scale and 
sustainability (CGAP 1998).  The World Bank’s revised policy in 1998 for financial sector operations 
referenced the development of microfinance schemes (Weber 2006 p.50) and Robinson (2001) 
documented the paradigm shift from subsidized credit for poor people to the development of sustainable 
financial intermediaries.  Examples of sustainable microfinance include: a government-owned and 
prudentially regulated bank, Bank Rakayat Indonesia - “one of the most successful microfinance 
institutions in the world” (Patten et al  2001 p. 1057); village-level self-reliant savings cooperatives in 
Mali  - providing rural finance in low density regions (Chao-Béroff, 1999); and in Bangladesh the Safe-
Save NGO proved the value of a savings-led approach for very poor clients (Rutherford, 1999, 2004) 
and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) NGO, with 8.4 million depositors in 2009, 
had the largest number of microfinance depositors of any self-selected microfinance organization in the 
world (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 2009). 
 
                                                     
2
 Nancy Barry was President of Women’s World Banking (WWB) between 1990 and 2006 explained “that 
over 500 million poor people, especially women, needed credit and savings services for their tiny enterprises 
(selling milk, mending bicycles or sewing clothes), and could “repay market-based loans, and use the 
proceeds to increase their assets, their living standards and their roles in shaping societies” (Barry 1995 p 1) 
3
 To illustrate the contribution of credit to poverty alleviation, heart-warming stories of women 
microentrepreneurs who used their small loans to increase their income and educate their children were 
frequently used by practitioners. The 1997 Microcredit Summit is one of the leading exponents of this art 
form. (http://www.microcreditsummit.org/video/odette.htm). 
4
 More detailed histories of the origins of microfinance can be found in Helms (2006) and Roodman (2010). 
5
 Poor was changed from poorest and CGAP is now supported by over 30 development agencies and private 
foundations who share a common mission to alleviate poverty. 
6 When funding agencies time horizons are shortened, ‘proven’ approaches (conditional cash transfers, micro-
credit) in one context are expanded and replicated elsewhere and pressures mount for clear metrics of 
‘success’ (because ‘what gets measured is what gets done’). Woolcock 2009b p. 11 
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The early messages on developing regulatory structures for microfinance were that there was no 
need for prudential oversight of credit-only MFIs and that savings, when taken as collateral, also 
did not need to be supervised (Otero, Rosenberg and Rock, 1996, Christen and Rosenberg 2000). In 
my experience with the donor community funding microfinance in the late 1990s, this was a 
commonly held assumption, because their focus was on improving microfinance performance first, 
not developing legal frameworks. However, this hands-off approach to regulation was later 
criticized as being a feature of microfinance’s serviceability to the neo-liberal7 or libertarian agenda, 
emphasising free markets to reduce poverty (Weber (2006 ) Karnani (2009), Bateman and Chang 
(2009)). It was argued that microfinance had become part of the drive towards financial sector 
liberalization and commercialization and, accordingly, there was insufficient emphasis on legal, 
regulatory mechanisms and the role of the government to protect the poor as vulnerable consumers. 
This was a valid critique, but it also missed the pragmatism of Christen and Rosenberg’s (2000) 
caution. Christen and Rosenberg had worked extensively with Central Bankers in Latin America in 
the aftermath of their regional banking crises who did not want to regulate what they could not 
supervise, and regulators had no hope of effectively supervising the many NGO Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs). (ibid p.2)  
 
The convergence of microfinance sector development and broader financial sector policy can be 
seen coming together in 2005.  Armendáriaz and Morduch (2005) noted that the world of the 
microfinance practitioner had largely been separate from that of academic researchers. So when, at 
the UN International Year of Microcredit conference in New York in 2005, researchers had the 
opportunity to explain to practitioners how “overall financial development matters for economic 
success” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001, p.12) and that “that finance-intensive growth (at least 
measured by banking depth) is empirically associated with lower poverty ratios” (Honohan, 2004 
p.30) there was a realization they had a common goal of increasing financial depth, increasing 
access to financial services for poor people and of overcoming financial exclusion
8
. Financial 
                                                     
7
 According to Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) many academic commentators regard the ‘neoliberal’ agenda 
as harmful, exploitative, ‘de-politicised’ and pro-capitalist. A less insidious interpretation is that large 
agencies are primarily following a strong internal logic to render a diverse assortment of problems responsive 
to the instruments, models, assumptions and discourses over which they preside, which in turn are 
predisposed to generating policy/project responses readily amenable to being implemented, administered, and 
assessed by bureaucratic means. ‘Technical’ problems that happen to fall safely within the bounds of this 
logic—building roads, administering inoculations, reducing hyperinflation—will be strongly promoted; those 
that do not - engaging with customary legal systems, negotiating peace settlements, encouraging more 
effective local government—will face a constant uphill battle for resources and legitimacy. This is because 
“careers are sustained, extensive (and expensive) educations are justified, and political needs are satisfied 
when problems can be persuasively explained by the experts, readily managed by the technocrats and safely 
administered by the bureaucrats”. Woolcock (2009b p. 10) 
8
 The term ‘social exclusion’ (attributed to French sociologist Richard Lenoir, 1974) gained popularity in 
Europe in the 80s (Saith, 2001). In 1991 the European Commission established an Observatory on National 
Policies to Combat Social Exclusion and later the UK established a Social Exclusion Unit in the Department 
for Communities and Local Government which also addressed financial exclusion (Fuller 1998). The term 
exclusion was a “polyvalent and ubiquitous concept” (Watt and Jacobs 2000 p.25) so in 2001 the Laeken 
European Council identified eighteen indicators to measure social exclusion, including “social rights” such as 
access to banks and insurance (Siewertsen 2004 p. 7). DFID then commissioned a report on lessons from the 
work on overcoming financial exclusion in industrialized countries which could be applied to developing 
economies (Kempson et al  2004) and started integrating those lessons into its financial sector work. 
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inclusion became a unifying concept both for those whose focus was increasing access to finance 
for poor people and also those whose focus was financial system development
9
 (Helms, 2006; 
UNCDF, 2006; Rhyne & Otero, 2006, Dymski, 2005).  At this time it appears that there was a 
critical moment when the strength of the micro-credit movement, the rigor of financial market 
specialists, and the accepted language of “inclusive” or “inclusion” were joined. Even before the 
Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Prof. Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank in 2006, 
microfinance’s place in the global development agenda had been affirmed, as examples of 
financially profitable MFIs using a range of different methodologies existed in every region (Helms 
2006). Perhaps the evidence that financial inclusion has indeed been accepted as important to the 
global development agenda was the adoption by G20 leaders of the Principles for Innovative 
Financial Inclusion in 2010 (Goodwin-Groen 2010)  
 
However, the meaning of success for microfinance, often referred to as impact, became more 
diffuse as there were several different types of players working for financial inclusion. For the 
Micro-Credit Summit, the key indicator of success was the number of poor women and their 
families with access to micro-credit and other financial services with stories of clients lifting 
themselves out of poverty (Daley-Harris 2009). For those committed to financial sustainability, 
such as CGAP, one of their goals was for microfinance to be “funded mainly from domestic sources 
such as public deposits, bank loans, bond issues, and equity investment.” (Helms 2006 p. 142). 
Those committed to simply increasing inclusion tracked the number of poor people with deposit 
accounts and found at the end of 2008, between 2.5 and 2.7 billion poor people had no such account  
(CGAP 2009p. 23) meaning that half the world was unbanked (Chala, Dalal, Goland, Gonzalez, 
Morduch, and Schiff  2009) 10.  Those who cared about formal financial sector deepening found that 
“financial development disproportionately benefits the poor; improvements in the functioning of the 
formal financial system exert a particularly beneficial impact on the economic opportunities of the 
poor.” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2008a p.2). For those with a women’s empowerment agenda the 
                                                     
9
 It is important to note here that inclusion does have a negative side in developing economies (Wood 2003), 
there can be adverse inclusion. Poor people sometimes have to choose between adverse inclusion within the 
social, political and economic system to meet their immediate short-term needs or not meeting those 
immediate needs. One example is dependency upon patron moneylenders for funding “rites of passage”. As a 
result, land assets, as collateral, become exhausted often via mortgage/high interest conditions which prevent 
any realistic prospect of reclaiming mortgaged out land. In short this means an overall loss of autonomy, and 
a deepening of alienation through the re-affirmation of dependency. Wood terms it the “Faustian bargain” 
“staying secure or staying poor”. (ibid: p.456). Preparation for the future is continuously postponed for 
survival in the present - the Faustian bargain. This example occurred in the informal financial sector but as 
inclusion in the formal financial sector increases the links have been shown to directly affect each other. 
Andra Pradesh, in India experienced a crisis in the microfinance sector in 2010 for many reasons, one of 
which was that clients continued to borrow from money lenders, when simultaneously borrowing from MFIs 
and government programs (CGAP 2010). 
10
 Volumes have been written about the challenges of a common definition of financial exclusion or financial 
access or usage and of collating robust comparable global data.  These volumes include papers by CGAP 
(Kneiding, Al-Hussayni, Mas 2009), the World Bank (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt Peria, 2005 and 2006, Beck 
Demiurguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, de la Torre 2007), academic researchers such 
as Claessens (2005) and Honohan (2008), funders including the UK’s Deparment for International 
Development (DFID) (Stone 2005) and a consortium of funders including L'Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD), United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), DFID and the World Bank 
(Claessens 2005) and financial institutions such as the World Savings Bank Institute (Peachy and Roe 2004) . 
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key to success was changes at the household level. (For example, randomized controlled trials in the 
Phillipines to assess women’s empowerment as a result of saving by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2009) 
found an increase in female decision-making power particularly for women who had below median 
decision-making power in the household.
 11
 ) For each of these meanings of success, there is a wide 
literature and ongoing active debate amongst practitioners on defining success, evaluating different 
measures and also assessing weaknesses. 
 
Despite the “apparent success and popularity of microfinance” (Duvendack et al  2011 p.1) and the 
inspiring individual stories, many policy makers were concerned that there was little rigorous, 
quantitative evidence on how poor people benefited from access to finance. The UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) therefore commissioned a systematic review of microfinance 
impact studies. 3,000 such studies were found but only 58 were deemed rigorous by the consultants. 
They concluded that “we can neither support nor deny the notion that microfinance is pro-poor and 
pro-women” (Duvendack, et al  2011 p. 2)12 and recommended more and better research. Copestake 
and Williams (2011) subsequent analysis of Duvendack (2011) together with other reviews also 
found that the overall evidence of poverty reduction impact of microfinance was “limited - in scope, 
quality and generalizability” (Copestake and Williams 2011 p.27). However, they conclude that 
there is evidence of positive impact on several well being indicators including reduced vulnerability 
through the ability to smooth consumption over time. This was highlighted particularly by 
Rutherford (2001) and Collins, Morduch, Rutherford and Ruthven (2009). In summary then, 
“evidence suggests that financial development facilitates consumption smoothing and investment in 
human capital accumulation..... Small enterprises not only benefit from increased direct access, but 
also from the increased growth opportunities generated by financial development.” (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine 2009 p.39)
13
.  
 
With the framing of a financial inclusion agenda, many saw formal financial services as the only 
long term solution to sustainably reach more clients (Isern and Porteous 2005 p.1). “Microcredit is 
simply “a segment of the broader personal credit market” that will need an institutional framework 
“to promote healthy market development” (Porteous 2009 p. 19).  But with commercial financial 
institutions in microfinance or “mainstreaming” microfinance (Copestake 2007) there was a fear 
amongst other stakeholders of “unproductive” and “usurious” lending to poor clients. This fear was 
not unfounded given the Bolivian experience in the 1990s (Rhyne 2001). Academic work also 
                                                     
11
 Other examples include Swain and Wallentin (2009) who defined women’s empowerment as “when 
women challenge the existing social norms and culture, to effectively improve their wellbeing”), significantly 
increases with membership of a Self Help Group under the Bank Linkage Program in India, and de Haan and 
Lackwo (2010) undertook a gender power relations analysis in Uganda and revealed that in spite of marginal 
well-being gains, women clients achieved more emancipation. 
12
 The full paragraph of their conclusions: “The majority of the microfinance impact evaluations included 
here investigate group lending and credit only interventions which do not reflect the diversity of the sector, 
and hence this does not allow us to reach a conclusion as to the impact of the microfinance sector as a whole; 
individual lending is a more recent phenomenon that has not yet been evaluated widely. Paired with doubts 
about the research designs and analytical methods used by the various microfinance impact evaluations, we 
can neither support nor deny the notion that microfinance is pro-poor and pro-women.” 
13
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) also comment that there is startlingly little research on how formal 
financial sector policies – such as bank regulations – affect inequality and on what changes enable informal or 
semi-formal finance which serves poor people, to become part of the formal financial system. 
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identified behavioural biases that would induce over borrowing (Karlan and Zinman 2009). Careful 
regulation would be required to prevent such abuses. But perhaps a greater challenge was that most 
banks in developing countries were not willing to move into this market, even after microfinance 
was shown it could be financially sustainable almost anywhere in the developing world. They were 
not even lending to creditworthy potential borrowers and so had no incentive to lend to low income 
clients who they regarded as uncreditworthy (Freedman and Click, 2006, Honohan and Beck 2007) 
The primary reasons were: (i) high reserve requirements to manage risk; (ii) significant deficiencies 
in the legal and regulatory environment which make it difficult to enforce contracts and foreclose 
on collateral; (iii) widespread availability of government bonds which crowded-out private 
investment; (iv) lenders often knew little about prospective borrowers; and (v) inadequate skills for 
assessing risk and managing such loans.  These types of barriers for formal sector lending to low 
income clients draw attention to the inadequate policy and regulatory framework for financial 
inclusion and requires an understanding of the history of financial sector policy and why it had 
resulted in such high levels of exclusion.  
 
1.2 Financial sector policies: repression, liberalization and institutions  
This section, therefore, explains some of the key historical challenges in financial sector 
development which have contributed to the exclusion of the majority in developing economies, one 
of which is an inadequate institutional framework.  
 
The financial sectors of developing economies in the 1970s and 1980s were largely characterized by 
the existence of an oligopolistic banking system, (often state owned) with interest rate ceilings, high 
reserve requirements, directed credit policies and discriminatory taxation of financial intermediaries 
- often accompanied by ongoing price inflation which reduced the attractiveness of holding claims 
on the domestic banking system. This was termed financial repression by Mckinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). They both argued that these policies resulted in negative real deposit rates, a 
fragmented domestic capital market, and a reduced size of the banking system in relation to the rest 
of the economy, stifled financial intermediation and a reduced real rate of growth. In other words 
financial repression had stopped or gravely retarded the development process (Fry 1995, Shaw 1973 
pp. 3-4)
14.  The principal form of ‘repression’ in their theory was interest rates ceilings (Shaw, 
1973: 81ff) which distorted the economy.
15
 Shaw and McKinnon agreed that the reliance on 
informal credit markets with very high interest rates in developing economies was due to financial 
repression (Tressel, 2003 p. 224) and used the term “economic dualism” to describe the effect of 
financial repression creating two types of financial markets (Fry, 1995 p. 35 – 38). 
                                                     
14
 Johnson notes that “[o]ne of the underlying ‘stylized facts’ of the analysis of financial repression is that 
financial systems in developing countries are dominated by commercial banks (Johnson, 2005b, p.316, 
quoting Fry 1995 p.4). But she disputes this ‘fact’ because “evidence suggests that the size of flows circulated 
through informal finance within the household and non-corporate sector is substantially larger than flows 
channeled through formal institutions” (Nissanke and Aryetty 1998 p.279). 
15
 Interest rate ceilings distort the economy in four ways: “they produce a bias in favor of present 
consumption against future consumption and so reduce savings; lenders engage in direct investment instead of 
depositing money in the bank; borrowers will invest in capital intensive projects and; it encourages 
entrepreneurs with low-yielding projects who would not borrow at higher rates” (Fry, 1997, p.755) 15. 
20 
 
 
Their simple solution to financial repression was to liberalize interest rates and allow the market to 
operate freely, which, they believed, would increase both savings and investment and/or reduce the 
rate of inflation (Fry, 1997 p.756), and it would also enhance the development of the banking 
system by increasing the volume of bank assets and liabilities (Arestis et al   2002 p. 111) and 
“contribute to higher economic growth” (McKinnon 1986 p.207).  The timing of the publication of 
their theories coincided with the resurgence in popularity of neo-classical approaches in economics 
in the 1970s and 1980s and the Latin American debt crisis (Powelson, 1997 p. 328 - 329). In that 
context, McKinnon and Shaw’s policy prescriptions were compelling and “gained wide acceptance 
at the conceptual level” (Seck & El Nil, 1993 p.1867). They were embedded within the 
“Washington Consensus” document which articulated ten policy elements agreed by the 
international development agencies in Washington (Williamson, 2003 p.10). Financial liberalization 
or financial sector reform became an important component of the structural adjustment programmes 
initiated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the 1980s designed to create stable 
long-run growth in developing countries (Green, Kirkpatrick,and Murinde, 2005 p.4 and Johnson, 
2005b p.248).  McKinnon was even so bold as to say in 1986 (p.205) that his “strictures for 
liberalizing the financial system seem now like mere truisms to most economists”. 
 
Financial repression may indeed have had a negative effect on the long-run growth rate but Roubini 
& Sala-i-Martin (1992) and others showed that governments might choose to repress the financial 
sector in the context of a high budget deficit and significant tax evasion – which was the case in 
most developing economies. The incentives to perpetuate financial repression included “high 
inflation, large deficits, and limited access to foreign capital markets” (Seck & El Nil, 1993 p.1877).  
Regardless, there was wholesale implementation of financial liberalization by the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The possibility that financial liberalization policy could fail 
to achieve its goals was not considered although Arrow had warned that “in a strictly technical and 
objective sense, the price system does not always work” (Arrow 1974, p.22). It was also well 
known that “[e]externalities, whether positive or negative, render the market (at least partially) 
inefficient” (Callon 1998 p.247)16.   
 
Financial liberalization had a serious “destabilizing effect” on financial markets, especially in Latin 
America where “the whole financial system reached a near collapse” (Arestis and Demetriades 
1997 p.790).  In 1998 the IMF recognized that the greater frequency of banking crises worldwide 
since the 1980s “is possibly related to the financial sector liberalization that occurred in many 
countries during this period” (Bird and Rajan 2001 p.889).  By 2006 the analysis was conclusive. 
The World Development Report stated that “rash or premature liberalization in a context of low 
political accountability” resulted in concentrated control of the banking system. “In all these cases 
the rise in low quality liabilities … became a major factor in the subsequent financial crises” (World 
Bank, 2005a p.182).  Typically, economic growth has fallen dramatically in the aftermath of 
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 Stiglitz showed that, fundamentally, because of informational asymmetries, some markets, especially for 
risks, will be missing and many other markets will be thin and imperfectly competitive, there will be market 
failure (Stiglitz, 2003).  
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financial sector collapse, severely affecting the most vulnerable and poorest people, and resulting in 
an increase in poverty levels in the crisis-hit countries (World Bank, 2001a)
17
.  
 
On the available evidence, the removal of controls on interest rates (without other related changes), 
did not increase the volume of savings or access to credit in rural areas either, except by those who 
already had collateral (Mosley 1999 p.382). Formal financial institutions were not lending to the 
rural poor after deregulation of the financial systems, and informal credit markets were still thriving 
in many developing countries (Tressel, 2003 p. 224).  After liberalization, it was not the formal 
financial sector which deepened, but the informal sector which expanded to meet greater small-
scale service and manufacturing activity, itself expanding because of liberalization of markets in 
general (Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige and Nissanke (1997), Nissanke & Aryeetey (1998) Lawrence 
(2006 p. 1001, 1007). Clearly, financial liberalization “could not address the fundamental problems 
facing financial systems” (Nissanke, 2001 p. 348).  
 
Despite these findings, financial liberalization still had its supporters. An analysis by Auerbach & 
Siddiki (2004) concluded that generally financial liberalization enhanced financial development and 
was seen by many “as having an important role in liberating economies from the ‘grabbing hand’ of 
government in financial affairs, most especially in developing nations.” (ibid p. 259).  A consensus 
position in 2002 was provided by Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002) that the results of financial sector 
reform have been disappointing, falling well short of expectations. In many cases, a failure to 
recognize the underdeveloped and imperfect characteristics of financial markets led to premature 
deregulation, with serious adverse consequences for the stability of the financial system as a whole 
(Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000).
18
  
 
An examination of the liberalization-induced crises identified pre-requisites for successful financial 
liberalization (Fry 1995 pp.454 – 460). These included: adequate prudential regulation and 
supervision of commercial banks, implying some minimal levels of accounting and legal 
infrastructure; profit maximizing competitive behavior by commercial banks and a tax system that 
does not impose implicit or explicit taxes on financial intermediation. As Fergusson (2006 p.63) 
summarized “financial liberalization, if adopted without the proper institutions in place, can lead to 
increased macroeconomic instability”. Examples of African and Eastern European regional studies 
that reflect these conclusions are: Nissanke and Aryeetey’s (1998)19 careful empirical analysis of 
four African countries which found that the financial reform programmes did not adequately 
address the underlying institutional and structural constraints, and in particular the resulting market 
                                                     
17
 Arestis et al (2002 p.111) outlined what happened. The intense competition that followed financial 
liberalization lowers profits for banks which in turn erodes their franchise values, increasing the premium for 
external finance, and thus lowering banks’ incentive for making ‘good’ loans. This exacerbates the problems 
of moral hazard and gambling behavior in the banking system, thereby increasing the riskiness of banks’ 
portfolios which in turn may affect adversely the public’s perception of the soundness of the banking system. 
Consequently, prudent bank behavior is undermined with the probability of financial crises being enhanced 
substantially. 
18
 Moore’s (2009 p. 260) more recent quantitative analysis of McKinnon’s theory found it to be invalid when 
“conditioned by factors such as financial development, different income levels across developing countries”, 
19
 Also, Nissanke 2001. 
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structures; and Denizer et al  (2000) finding that there was inadequate regulation and supervision 
during financial liberalization so the elite perpetuated a system of implicit subsidies for themselves 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
20
  So, financial systems with a higher degree of 
institutional development benefited more from financial liberalization than those with a lower one 
(Chinn and Ito 2002).  
 
Therefore, one of the reasons many financial systems in developing economies failed at financial 
inclusion was financial repression followed by financial liberalization without an adequate 
institutional framework. This appears to indicate that an adequate institutional framework is 
essential to building a more inclusive financial sector. Therefore, a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between institutions and financial market development is needed. 
 
1.3 Institutions, economic growth and financial market development  
The significance of institutions - including both formal and informal rules and norms together with 
their enforcement characteristics - is introduced here and explored in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  Starting with the role of institutions in economic growth the discussion briefly covers the 
complex relationship between financial market development, economic growth and poverty 
reduction and concludes with the importance of sound institutions for financial development. 
 
Douglass North in 1990 was one of the first to theorize the role of institutions as rules and their 
enforcement characteristics (as part of New Institutional Economics (NIE)) and their importance to 
economic growth.  
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up 
of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of behavior, 
conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics. Together 
they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies” (North 1994, p.360).  
 
In less than fourteen years the question as to whether institutions matter for economic development 
was not in dispute. 
21
  By 2004, Rodrik, Subramaniam & Trebbi had declared that “institutions 
rule”, trumping geography or trade in the contribution to average national income levels. 
Specifically they found that property rights, whether private or public, were the key institution that 
affects economic performance because when investors believe their property rights are protected the 
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 However, in India, (Arun & Turner 2002) and in MENA (Berthelemy 2004) found that implementation of 
financial liberalization was very slow because of complex political economy issues, and thus they avoided 
financial sector crises. South Korea is the only clear example of a successful liberalization process because, 
ironically, the “government maintained tight control over the interest rate” (Aretis 1997 p.791). 
21
 The 2002 World Development Report (2001b), "Building Institutions for Markets", brought institutions to 
the forefront of development policy and poverty reduction debates. The findings of North (2000), Williamson 
(2000), Meier and Sitglitz (2001), Chong and Calderon (2000) and others had all supported the conclusion 
that the poorer the country the higher the influence of institutional quality on economic growth, although there 
is also reverse causality with economic growth improving institutional quality. 
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economy ends up richer.
22
 Rodrik et al  ’s conclusions were questioned by Sachs (2003) amongst 
others, but since then using a range of different methodologies researchers have continued to show 
that institutions exert a profound influence on economic performance and other measures of 
development, (above and beyond feedback effects).
23
  Therefore, it has now become common 
practice to recognize that “institutions matter” for economic growth and poverty reduction (Johnson 
2009, Jameson 2006, Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2007, Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, 
Savoia 2009, Woolcock, Szreter and Rao 2009).  And “the focus of reforms in the developing world 
has moved from getting prices right to getting institutions right” (Rodrik 2008a p.100). Pande and 
Udry (2006 p.350 ) argue that the findings of this literature are “of fundamental importance for 
development economists and policy practitioners in that they suggest that institutional quality may 
cause poor countries and people to stay poor.”  Governance reform is the more accessible, but less 
precise, “buzzword” used by funders (Rodrik 2008a p. 100). It “deals with institutional process and 
the rules of the game for authoritative decision-making” (Grindle (2007 p. 555) and because it so 
closely mirrors the importance of institutions, governance is considered to be critical for successful 
development.  
 
However, Chang (2011) has identified two theoretical problems with much institutional analysis 
which raise interesting questions for researchers. The problems, he argues, are that the dominant 
discourse “assumes that the causality runs from institutions to economic development, ignoring the 
important possibility that economic development changes institutions” and that “the relationship is 
theorized in a rather simplistic, linear, and static way” (ibid p. 4). The issue of bi-directional 
causality in the methodology was also identified by Honohan (2004), Lawrence (2006) and others 
in the context of financial market development and economic growth and is discussed further 
below. The second problem of overly simplistic theorization of institutional change is addressed 
directly by this research. 
 
Markets at all levels have consistently been considered to be institutions fulfiling specific functions. 
For example, Coase (1988 p.7) “Markets are institutions that exist to facilitate exchange; that is, 
they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out transactions” and Dorward, Kydd, Morrison 
and Poulton (2005 p.1) consider “markets are also institutions fulfiling exchange and co-ordination 
functions in an economy”. Hodgson (1988),24 Pujo (1996),25 Wood (2000), Chang (2002a), 
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 Much of their paper is dedicated to checking the robustness of their findings, but their econometric analysis 
has proven the test of time. For this analysis they used Kaufmann et al’s (2002) institutional indicators of 
strength of property rights and the rule of law, and GDP per capita for national income. The strengths and 
weaknesses of the Kauffmann et al (2002) indicators will be discussed in the Methodology chapter. 
23
 For example, in a comparison of transition economies it was the quality of the legal system, the protection 
of private property rights and the structure and stability of the financial system, with a modest and supporting 
state which was found to contribute to a stable and high long-run economic growth (Redek and Sušjan 2005). 
Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) added income inequality to their growth and poverty reduction analysis and found 
that corruption, ineffective governments, and political instability will not only hurt income levels through 
market inefficiencies, but also escalate poverty incidence via increased income inequality 
24
 Hodgson’s (1988 p.176) institutional definition of a market was “sets of social institutions in which a large 
number of commodity exchanges of a specific type regularly take place and to some extent are facilitated and 
structure by those institutions.” These definitions capture the exchange but not the coordination functions of 
markets as identified by Dorward (2005). 
24 
 
Porteous (2004 p. 8)
 26
  and Hodgson (2008) all take an institutionalist perspective on markets. 
Wood (2000 p. 221) places markets as one of the “four institutional domains of state, market, 
community and household” which, when they fail can reproduce widespread poverty. Even 
Willamson’s (1975 p. 20) well known dictum “in the beginning, there were the markets” recognizes 
that markets were institutions embedded within societies. 
27
 
28
  Fergusson (2006) found that one of 
the channels whereby better institutions may have an effect on economic development is through 
the consolidation of larger and better financial markets
29
. Therefore the relationship between 
financial market development, institutions and economic growth needs some exploration. 
 
One hundred years ago Schumpeter (1911 p.74 cited in Arestis 2005 p.2) argued that the banker is 
“the ephor of the exchange economy” and since then the role of financial markets in the economy 
and particularly the role of financial markets in growth and poverty reduction have been hotly 
debated. Knowledge about the relationship between financial development and sustainable 
economic growth has progressed rapidly in the last twenty years. In 1993 King and Levine found 
uniquely in cross-country regressions of the drivers of economic growth, that financial depth was a 
driver of economic growth (as measured by ratio of liquid liabilities to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 1960
30
 and average GDP growth from 1960 and controlling for other variables explaining 
growth), and growth in turn is a powerful mechanism for reducing poverty (Honohan, 2004). Ten 
years later Levine’s (2005) overview of the subsequent research again suggested that financial 
development could robustly explain differences in economic growth across countries. Honohan 
(2004) however, recognized that depth alone was an insufficient measure of financial development 
and that problems of reverse causality plague the analysis. Lawrence (2006) concurred, 
emphasizing the methodological and analytical problems with the research which showed the causal 
                                                                                                                                                               
25
 Pujo (1996 p. 132) stated “markets should be defined as exchange processes (of commodities services, 
money and labour) which are partially determined, regulated and perpetuated by a wide set of social 
institutions.” 
26
 Porteous (2004 p. 8) identifies three elements of markets, in addition to consumers: 
An institutional foundation, which comprises the laws, rules, regulations and regulatory enforcement 
capacity to establish and sustain the market. (In recognizing the sociology of markets Fourcade (2007) notes 
that it is the institutionalization processes which stabilizes markets); 
Organizations which provide services in the market: although the market structure—in terms of number, 
size and type of organization—will vary greatly among market sectors, based inter alia on their history, their 
stage of growth and the barriers to entry in the sector; 
Support organizations that provide intermediate services to market players and regulators: these range from 
the basic required services (audit, legal, IT) to market research and intelligence. 
This understanding is helpful for practitioners and donors who want to “make markets work for the poor”, 
which was Porteous’ goal, and shows how an institutional approach provides a useful beginning.  
27
 Swedberg (2005 p. 234, citing Weber (1978).) identified trading between communities as the earliest type 
of market, noting that markets soon came to acquire a complex social structure needing political as well as 
legal regulation. 
28
 An institutional approach to markets differs only marginally from mainstream  neo-classical economic 
theory’s view of markets which is “that markets exist in which prices arise from the interaction of supply and 
demand and that prices so generated lead to the efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a whole 
and hence to maximum welfare.” (Johnson, 2009 p. 179) 
29
 It is necessary to point here that out in relation to market formation of any type “that getting the institutions 
right for market-led development offers no guarantee that desired forms of economic practice or desired 
economic subjectivities will emerge”. Rankin 2008 p. 1969 
30
 Honohan (2004) also discusses alternative composite indicators that better measure financial development. 
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relationship is likely to vary by country and time period and that “a large part of the empirical 
literature, actually shows that there is plenty of evidence for causation running from growth to 
finance, and for bi-directionality” (ibid p.1013). Other researchers including Deidda (2006), Mehl et 
al  (2005), Green, Kirkpatrick and Murinde (2006) Luintel et al (2008), Odihambo (2009), Wolde-
Rufael (2009), Gries et al   (2009) also emphasized the complexity and bi-directionality of the 
relationships between financial development and growth.  
 
The connection from financial development to poverty reduction continued to be tested, for 
example, Jahlian and Kirkpatrick’s (2005 p. 636) empirical results found that, “up to a threshold 
level of economic development, financial sector growth contributes to poverty reduction through 
the growth enhancing effect.”  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s (2007 p. 27) landmark paper 
found that “[f]inancial development31 disproportionately boosts incomes of the poorest quintile and 
reduces income inequality.” They found that 60% of income growth was due to the impact of 
financial development on aggregate economic growth and about 40% was due to the long-run 
impact of financial development on the income growth of the poorest quintile as the result of 
reductions in income inequality. Furthermore, “financial development is associated with a drop in 
the fraction of the population living on less than $1 a day.” (ibid).  In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  
(2008 p. 109) found that “almost 30 percent of the cross-country variation in changing poverty rates 
can be attributed to cross-country variation in financial development”. She asserts that the empirical 
evidence shows “improved access to finance is not only pro-growth but also pro-poor, reducing 
income inequality and poverty” although she also recognizes the possible variations in 
interpretation stating that the results are “still far from conclusive” (Demirgüç-Kunt et al , 2008 p. 
138).  Honohan (2008) more specifically analyzes both greater access, (measured by a composite 
access index,) and financial depth (measured by private credit as a percentage of GDP), and finds 
that financial depth has a greater effect on absolute poverty.  Evaluations on a country level of the 
relationship between financial development policies and poverty reduction has been limited 
(McKenzie 2010).  However, in India, Burgess and Pande (2005 p. 791) have provided “robust 
evidence that opening branches in rural unbanked locations in India was associated with reduction 
in rural poverty.” In particular that a one percent increase in share of savings held by rural banks 
reduced rural poverty by 2.22 percent (ibid p. 790) and that  rural branch expansion “can explain a 
14 to 17 percentage point decline” in rural headcount poverty (ibid p.793). This builds on their 2003 
work which found that “rural branch expansion significantly affected economic growth”. (ibid 
p.793) Even allowing for margins of error and lack of conclusiveness, taking all the evidence into 
account Claessens and Feijen (2007) were convinced that financial development can contribute to 
poverty reduction and several other of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
If one accepts, to some degree, that the emergence of financial systems may be a significant factor 
in accelerating economic growth and poverty reduction, “the growth-maximizing mixture of 
markets and intermediaries may depend on legal, regulatory, political, and other [institutional] 
factors that have not been adequately incorporated into current theoretical or empirical research” 
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 As measured by “Private Credit” which captures the amount of credit channelled by financial intermediaries 
to private firms by, divided by GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s (2007 p. 31). 
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(Levine 2005 p.920)
32
. Clearly much more contextual research is needed.  However, if the claims 
that financial development plays the chief causal role in economic growth were to be proved false, 
and “instead all of the causality came from the underlying institutional framework, then at least an 
emphasis on ensuring financial performance is likely to select growth-effective institutions” 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.147). Adjusting institutions in directions that clearly help improve the 
functioning of finance is likely to be a highly effective pro-growth strategy. Demetriades and Law 
(2006 p.245) researched this relationship and concluded that financial development has larger 
effects on GDP per capita when the financial system is embedded within a sound institutional 
framework. They also found that in low-income countries the influence of financial development is 
at its weakest, and so sound institutions are critical to the financial system delivering long-run 
benefits. However, one then has to address the bi-directional causality challenges leveled at the 
relationship between institutions and economic growth (Chang 2011). More research into the 
political economy of institutions for financial development would clearly be highly beneficial 
(Andrianova et al   2008 p. 249).  
 
This introductory chapter started with an overview of the rapid development of microfinance, 
including the challenges it faces. There was great demand for microfinance in part, because the 
majority of economically active people in developing economies were financially excluded. To 
understand that context, the history of financial repression and liberalization which left financial 
sectors without an adequate institutional framework and the majority financially excluded, was 
summarized. This section has now attempted to address the importance of the institutional 
framework to both financial development and economic growth and the relationship of bi-
directional causality between them. 
 
Given this overview, building sound institutions for financial market development will not only 
deepen the financial market and provide access to financial services for those who are excluded, but 
is also likely to contribute to economic growth, at the same time that economic growth will also 
contribute to building institutions for financial market development. This raises the issue of how 
institutional change takes place to support such development, both more generally as part of the 
governance agenda but also for financial market development.  
 
1.4 Institutional change in development practice 
The dominant method of aid donors trying to build institutions in developing economies has been 
institutional transfers (Moore 2001), transplants (Gibson and Woolcock 2008), or the imposition of 
uniform institutional “blueprints” on the countries of the global South without recognition of the 
                                                     
32
 NIE theory suggests that financial systems would  influence growth by easing information asymmetry, and 
reducing transactions costs and thereby improving the acquisition of information about firms/clients, 
governance, risk management, resource mobilization, and financial exchanges. However, too frequently 
empirical measures of financial development do not directly measure these types of financial functions 
(Levine 2005).  Honohan (2004) noted current theories which identify four key functions of finance whereby 
the financial sector effects growth and poverty reduction: mobilizing savings; allocating capital; monitoring 
the use of loanable funds by entrepreneurs; and transforming risk by pooling and repackaging it. 
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role of underlying social norms (Evans 2004 p. 30).
33
  This is largely because of the predominance 
of a “best-practice” mindset at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which presumes it 
is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and that 
those arrangements are inherently desirable (Rodrik 2008a p. 100)
34
.  Chang (2011 p.474) identifies 
these “Global Standard Institutions” as typically found in Anglo-American countries with the 
agenda to maximize market freedom and protect private property. Other negative assessments of 
these institutions are that they are “static accretions of norms and values” (Rankin 2008 p. 1975) 
from the originating economies. In financial markets the practice has been no different. “Much of 
what is held to be good practice for the development of financial markets still amounts to a 
transplant of models that have been successful in advanced economies” (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 
p.147) with minimal regard for cultural norms.  In microfinance there has also been a predilection 
for transplanting supposedly successful models with minimal regard for cultural norms, in this case 
from Bangladesh, for example, the Grameen Bank model (Grameen Trust 1989) and the BRAC 
model (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 2011a,b). 
 
Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) are unequivocal in 
their analysis that the ‘best practice’ approach to institutional change has failed. Their research 
found foreign aid had resulted in institutional weakening
35
  and had a negative impact on 
institutions
36
. Conyers and Mellors (2005), Collier (2006a) Birdsall (2007) and Booth (2011) are in 
general agreement with these findings.  Booth (2011 p.4) specifically states that importing 
institutional ‘best practices’ from the outside, typically fails and in the African context has found 
that “institutions that have been designed elsewhere or with little or no connection to the specific 
factors in play will be unlikely to meet the real needs of the situation.”   
 
Instead, of these largely unsuccessful ‘best practice’ approaches Conyers and Mellor (2005 p. 88) 
suggest donors work through existing recipient country structures and procedures on interventions 
which demonstrate genuine recipient ownership and commitment and are appropriate to the local 
environment. Collier (2006b p.209) wants to make aid conditional upon “processes of governance 
that make them realistically accountable to their own citizens”. However, neither of these 
approaches addresses the fundamental problem that power in still held by the government and their 
experts. As Bastiaensen, De Herdt and D’Exelle (2005 p. 984) observe such a “simplistic 
understanding of power… is incapable of capturing the complexity of local power relations” and 
starting a process of change.
37
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 So, the institutional problems that take years (even decades) to resolve, that have no known solution ex 
ante, and that entail protracted negations, contests and experimentation - as did the formation of most 
institutions in the now-rich countries – never get addressed (Woolcock 2009b p. 12). 
34
 This mindset presumes the primary role of institutional arrangements is to minimize transaction costs 
without paying attention to potential interactions with institutional features elsewhere in the system. 
35
 Bräutigam and Knack (2004) used the ICRG Quality of Governance Index to assess whether volumes of aid 
have improved this Index. This Index includes three elements: Corruption in Government, Quality of the 
Bureaucracy and Rule of Law (ibid p.279). 
36
 Djankov et al  (2008)  found that for political institutions, aid is a bigger curse than oil. 
37
 Bebbington (in Hickey and Mohan (eds) 2004 p. 278) recognizes there is a “tense interface between theory 
and practice…. in discussions of participatory development” as between some who see the need to “theorize 
strategy carefully” and others who view such abstraction as” tyranny that obstructs change-oriented action” 
and “privileges elite form on knowledge” (ibid p.278)37.  Indeed, Bebbington recognizes that “the values that 
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In response to the flaws in the “blueprint” approach (Hickey and Mohan 2004 p.4), a range of 
participatory practices were introduced at both project and policy levels as means of attempting to 
ensure more owned, and locally embedded solutions. Indeed participation became “mainstreamed” 
into development practice (see Hickey and Mohan (2004), Tandon (2008) Morrison (2010) and 
Eversole 2010). There has been some success with this approach to power sharing particularly at the 
local project level as Tandon’s (2008) reflections on 25 years of participatory approaches finds and 
recent successes have also been reported by the Africa Power and Politics Programme (Crook and 
Booth 2011) such as with “‘co-production’ or multi-agency, multi-actor collaboration” (ibid p.97).  
However, Grindle (2007) like Bastiaensen et al , (2005) and Robins et al  (2008)  found that “token 
ownership and participation”, (Grindle 2007 p. 561) were sometimes only window dressing for the 
adoption of changes initiated and pressed upon countries by international agencies. A local 
“participatory” process could still result in endorsement of an expert’s “blueprint” (Bastiaensen et 
al , 2005 p. 984) or “extension of the party political game” (Coehlo and Favareto 2008 p.2937). 
Even with good intentions the experts were the “de facto owners of the institutional terrain” 
(Eversole 2010, p. 35) and it was the government’s or experts’ own “rules in use” (ibid p. 35) which 
determined the set of possible outcomes. Therefore, Eversole (2010) appealed for “remaking 
participation” so it is “multidirectional” (ibid p.38) where learning, engagement and empowerment 
are mutual between all types of institutional stakeholders. This seems highly ambitious, but the 
experience of Crook and Booth (2011) indicates this could be possible in highly localized problem 
solving contexts. 
 
The dominant blue print method is one of the “absurd extremes” that Chang (2011 p.494) identifies 
in donors’ approach to institutional change. He states that most are “hopelessly optimistic” (ibid) 
assuming institutions can be changed easily (and have typically taken a blue print approach to 
institutional change). In contrast, others are “unduly fatalistic”, assuming that “institutions are 
determined by immutable things such as climate and culture” (ibid) so only external shocks like 
colonization can change them. These assumptions of donors about how institutions change are 
based on theoretical views that Chang identifies as “simplistic, linear and static” (ibid p.4). These 
theories will be explored further in Chapter 2, but as yet there does not appear to be a robust 
theoretical debate about institutional change which could usefully address some of the problems 
with the change practices
38
. So with the limited success in institutional change processes and serious 
critiques of the both the practice and its theoretical basis, there is clearly a need for new theories of 
institutional change that can usefully engage development practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
dominate academic assessment push academics away from practice” (ibid. p. 281) but despite these 
challenges he states that “theory workers and practice workers ought never to lose touch” (ibid p.281) and 
particularly in the field of participatory development. 
38
 Bebbington (in Hickey and Mohan (eds) 2004 p. 278) has identified a “tense interface between theory and 
practice…. in discussions of participatory development”, between some who see the need to “theorize 
strategy carefully” and others who view such abstraction as” tyranny that obstructs change-oriented action” 
and “privileges elite form on knowledge” (ibid p.278).  Indeed, Bebbington recognizes that “the values that 
dominate academic assessment push academics away from practice” (ibid. p. 281) but despite these 
challenges he states that “theory workers and practice workers ought never to lose touch” (ibid p.281) and 
particularly in the field of participatory development. 
29 
 
This chapter started with an overview of microfinance policy over the last thirty years which, in 
providing financial services for poor people, was seeking to overcome financial exclusion. Some of 
the historical challenges in financial sector development have contributed greatly to that exclusion, 
an inadequate institutional framework being one of them. Understanding the importance of the 
institutional framework for financial development and financial inclusion focuses attention on 
which institutions are most important for financial inclusion and the practice of institutional change. 
But, unfortunately the dominant methods of attempting to bring about institutional change have 
largely failed. So there is some urgency to progressing the theoretical and policy agenda to provide 
insights into institutional change for financial inclusion.  
 
1.5 The research questions 
This research will address a gap at the intersection of three fields of academic research and policy in 
international development: institutional development, financial market development and 
microfinance, now known as financial inclusion.  More specifically, this gap has three dimensions: 
first the need for understanding the institutions needed to promote inclusive financial market 
development; second, better understanding of how institutions change; and third, the role external 
agents such as donors can play in this process. 
 
Chang (2011, p.494) has asked institutional economists to “pay more attention to the real world” 
and to “recognize the complexity of the nature and the evolution of culture and institutions”. 
Leading institutionalists have also advocated the analysis of country-level institutions (Pande and 
Udry 2006)
39
 particularly highlighting the need for comparative case studies to progress 
understanding of institutional functions (Shirley 2005). Therefore this research undertakes a 
comparative analysis of country-level institutions in two real world microfinance markets that 
expanded significantly over a period of ten years and in which new formal institutions have been 
established.   
 
The criteria for choosing two microfinance markets in which to undertake such a comparative 
analysis included: microfinance markets where the researcher had access to key informants; those 
with significant size, meeting Honohan’s (2004) significance criteria of over 1% of the population; 
rapid growth, so there would be institutional change to study; which had a self-defined sub-culture 
of providers of microfinance and their stakeholders
40
; and which provided useful contrasts to be 
able to start to draw conclusions. The two microfinance markets which met these criteria were 
Uganda and Bosnia and Hercegovina, hereafter referred to as Bosnia. Microfinance only started in 
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 Pande and Udry (2006 p. 351) acknowledge that cross-country regressions have been useful to understand 
the institutions which matter, but argue that work is now essentially complete. 
40
 It is important to note that this self-defined subculture of microfinance providers and their stakeholders did 
not include microfinance clients and consequently neither did this research. Furthermore, given that the 
research was already encompassing two markets, robust client surveys were not practically possible. This is 
elaborated further in Chapter 3, However, to gain a deeper institutional understanding of these microfinance 
markets, further research would be greatly enhanced by including clients.  
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Bosnia in 1997 soon after the war ended and in ten years the microcredit market had grown from 
nothing to reach 294,330 borrowers, or 363,082 borrowers if the specialist small enterprise bank is 
also included (MIX Market 2011). The Bosnian population in 2007 was 3.779 million (UNDESA 
2011) so that means approximately 9.6% of the population were micro-credit borrowers. A 
MicroCredit Organization (MCO) Law had been passed in 2000 and another in 2006 with 
regulations at the end of 2007. Microfinance had started earlier in Uganda but grew slowly at first, 
but with significant donor funding starting in 1997 by 2007 microfinance NGOs alone reached 
385,201 savers. If the savers in the rural development bank, cooperatives and VSLAs (also funded 
by donors) are also included then there were approximately 1,709,778 microfinance savers. The 
Ugandan population in 2007 was 30.340 million (UNDESA 2011) so that means approximately 
5.6% of the population were microfinance savers. A Micro Finance Deposit-taking Institutions 
(MDI) Act had been passed in 2003 with MDI regulations in 2004. Since, I had worked as a 
microfinance consultant in Bosnia between 1998 until 2005 and in Uganda first in 1994 and then for 
longer in 2004, my experience also made these cases particularly appropriate to investigate as I 
knew many of the key stakeholders. Moreover, these two markets in quite different geographical 
regions, with different histories, sizes and challenges, so they provide strong contrasts for analysis.
41
  
 
Therefore, the research questions this investigation set out to answer in the microfinance markets of 
Bosnia and Uganda were: 
 What institutions matter most for increasing financial inclusion? 
 How have rules and norms governing the microfinance markets in Bosnia and Uganda 
changed between 1997 and 2007? 
 What has the role of development agents been in catalyzing this change? 
 
1.6 Outline of the following chapters 
With the policy context outlined, Chapter 2 interrogates the theoretical literature on institutions in 
more detail, discussing the definition of institutions, differentiating between institutional form and 
function and explaining the social embeddedness of markets. A framework for analyzing four levels 
of institutions in markets is chosen and detailed and then the specific institutions considered to be 
critical for financial market development, including social norms, are put into that framework. It 
shows that the relationship between the different levels of institutions for financial markets fills a 
gap in the literature. Finally, recent theories by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and by Boettke, Coyne 
and Leeson (2008) about gradual institutional change are presented and discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the choice of methodology for this investigation.  It makes the argument for a 
social constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology in the analysis of institutions and for 
a micro-ethnographic method to answer the research questions. In this case a relatively short 
‘micro’ ethnography involved semi-structured key informant interviews which allowed the 
stakeholders’ perspective on the effectiveness of the formal institution in the form of rules as well 
                                                     
41 Interestingly both these markets experienced a slowing of their growth after 2007 for different reasons 
which provided an additional opportunity to understand the quality of their respective institutional 
frameworks. 
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as informal institutions such as  social norms to be explored in depth. As a starting point, I asked 
respondents what they considered to be the building blocks (Grindle 2007 p. 567) for the 
development of microfinance since 1997 and this led to wide ranging and free flowing discussions 
about how microfinance had developed.  It is fair to say that all of the respondents were both proud 
of some achievements and frustrated with others. Several were angry with donors, politicians or 
others whom they felt had betrayed their trust. These were often not easy discussions, but very rich 
in understanding of institutional change processes. I am indebted to the respondents for their time 
and honesty.   
 
The body of findings on each of the country case studies is presented in parallel sets of chapters. 
First (Chapters 4 and 7) are the historical political, social and economic contexts within which the 
microfinance markets are operating. This historical perspective is vital to understanding the 
underlying social norms.  The complexity of the history of the former Yugoslavia and the current 
Bosnia is necessary to make sense of the development of microfinance market there. Uganda’s 
complex history also provides important insights into the evolution of its microfinance market.  
Second, (Chapters 5 and 8) I present a descriptive account of the key features in the development of 
the financial and microfinance markets between in these two countries between 1997 and 2007.  
Bosnia struggled with the simultaneous tasks of reconstruction after war and post-socialist reforms, 
and Uganda struggled to find ways to expand access to a largely poor and rural population. Finally, 
(in Chapters 6 and 9) is an analysis of the respondents’ perspectives of the institutional “building 
blocks” that were key to the development of these microfinance markets.  
 
Chapter 10 draws together the findings from these two “real world” cases to address the research 
questions in a comparative manner and examine the implications of these findings for both the static 
and dynamic institutional theories presented in chapter 2.  This comparative analysis reveals some 
fascinating insights into the ways in which institutional development has taken place and also 
makes sense of apparent inconsistencies to challenge technocratic notions of “best” practice 
institutional development.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 11, I conclude with further reflections on the empirical findings and their 
implications for theory, before discussing the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the study 
and then its policy implications.  
  
32 
 
Chapter 2: Financial Market Development: An Institutional Perspective 
 
This chapter interrogates the literature on institutions, institutions for financial market development 
and institutional change introduced in the first chapter. The findings in response to the research 
questions can only be fully understood within the theory and practice discourses of these arenas. 
The chapter starts by describing three different schools of institutional thought, it then proceeds to 
discuss the definitions of institutions and the difference between institutional form and function.  I 
then review literature discussing the role of social institutions in creating market embeddedness, 
which is an essential issue that has been neglected in much analysis of institutional development. 
The chapter then moves onto review research on the role of institutions in financial market 
development and uses Williamson’s (2000) framework, identifying four levels of institutions to 
organize this review. It shows the different levels of institutions found to be important for financial 
market development, filling a gap in the literature. It also provides researchers a framework to map 
institutions in particular financial markets. This framework will be used again in the analysis of 
microfinance markets in Bosnia and Uganda. Finally, two recent institutional change theories are 
presented.  These seek to address the limitations of earlier theories and are examined and critiqued. 
These are an important advance on the current theoretical understanding of institutional 
development.  
 
2.1 Schools of institutional thought 
The three main schools of thought identified are: historical (or old) institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996), a categorization now 
used extensively (e.g. Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Greif and Laitin (2004), Srivastava (2004), 
Campbell (2004)). The ‘new institutionalism’ in NIE is subsumed under the rational-choice 
category. These approaches are briefly outlined below, positioning this research within those 
approaches. 
 
An historical institutionalist (the more common term is old institutionalism, (Johnson 2009)),  
approach to understanding institutions and institutional change, well articulated by Steinmo and 
Thelen (1992), is that institutions are relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and 
that “power instantiated in existing institutions give some actors or interests more power than others 
over the creation of new institutions” (Hall & Taylor 1996, p.21)  Institutions are one of the central 
factors pushing historical development along a set of ‘paths’(e.g. Collier and Collier, 1991) and thus 
change is largely ‘path dependent’ (Hall &Taylor, 1996 p.9)42 . Powelson’s (1997) “power-
diffusion-process” is an example of a theoretical framework firmly within this approach. He defines 
institutions as “an accepted mode of behavior protected by the culture” (ibid p.6) and argues that 
institutions are created slowly by continuous negotiation between mutually-dependent groups over 
centuries in a path dependent process. The idea of dependency between groups is central and “if the 
power diffusion process operates successfully, economic institutions become negotiated by many 
interest groups whose powers become more diffuse over time” (ibid p.7).  
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 Path dependence was short hand for saying that current institutional arrangements in any one place are there 
for unique historical reasons as they are dependent on their particular historical path. 
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Sociological institutionalism, as Hall and Taylor (1996) explain has three aspects: first, that they 
include culture as institutions; second, cultural institutions are considered to “provide  the very 
terms through which meaning is assigned” (ibid p.15); and third, that organizations embrace 
specific institutional practices because they are widely valued within a broader social environment. 
In some cases, these practices may actually be dysfunctional with regard to achieving the 
organization’s formal goals.  Such an approach goes a long way toward explaining much apparent 
inefficiency in social and political institutions.
43
 Campbell (1998) describes it as social 
appropriateness in contrast to the logic of instrumentality.  Recognising Douglas’ earlier work on 
institutional bricolage (ibid p. 383), Campbell (2004) and Cleaver (2002) subsequently focus on the 
role of institutional entrepreneurs, or institutional “bricoleurs” (ibid p. 11) to describe institutional 
change agents within this ‘school’.  The critique of this approach, however, is that while this 
concept can be retrospectively woven into a coherent tapestry, it has no predictive power (Crouch, 
2007).  
 
Rational choice institutionalism as exemplified by North (1990), Williamson (2000), Ostrom (1990) 
and Knight (1992)
44
 has developed a generalizable set of concepts that lend themselves to 
systematic theory-building according to Hall and Taylor (1996 p.18). The defining feature are that: 
it is “functionalist”, focusing on the effects that follow; it is “intentionalist’ in that it is purposive; 
and is is “voluntarist” and “rational” (ibid pp. 19, 20).  Rational choice institutionalists including 
North and Greif  (2006), have produced “elegant accounts of institutional origins” (ibid p.19), 
typically focusing on the benefits they provide. This approach has real strength for explaining why 
existing institutions continue to exist, since the persistence of an institution often depends upon the 
benefits it can deliver. Two critiques of rational-choice institutionalists have been that they did not 
explain institutional inefficiencies, nor adequately recognize that power vests some actors with 
more influence in institutional change. However, more recently Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) and have incorporated the use of power by political 
elites and North (2003) has long moved away from an efficient, rational-choice position.  North 
(2003 p.7) writes that “the rationality assumption …..is a devastating shortcoming in dealing with 
most of the major issues confronting social scientists and policy makers, and it is a major stumbling 
block to the path of future economic progress.” Given that the protagonists are still building theories 
but rational choice is no longer a binding assumption, this approach could, perhaps more precisely, 
be referred to as post-rational choice institutionalism. 
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 Meyer and Scott’s (1983) work on ritual and rationality in organizations might be considered an example of 
this ‘school’. 
44
Knight (1992) has written a critique of classical theories of institutional change by economic theorists, that 
has been summarized by Argandoña (2004). He generally categorizes them into a.) change processes based on 
interest coordination in order to obtain collective benefits, and b.) change based on conflict or competition 
between opposing interests.  Hobbes, Hume, Adam Smith and Spence are considered to be in the first 
category and Marx and Weber in the second. Then Knight classifies the modern theorists into those who 
support a market-driven theory in which institutions reduce transaction costs (North and Williamson); those 
who argue for spontaneously-emergent institutions, (Hayek) and those, like himself, who see the importance 
of conflict. 
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This research is positioned where historical and rational choice (or post-rational choice) 
institutionalism converge, while also recognizing the important of social institutions. The 
convergence is where historical institutionalism’s understanding of the persistence of institutions 
and a power-distributional approach to institutional change, and rational choice institutionalism’s 
concepts that lend themselves to theory building, are used together to build theories for institutional 
change that move beyond path dependency. Two such institutional change theories are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
2.2 The contested definition of institutions 
From these three different schools of institutional thought, the definition of institutions developed 
by Douglass North (1990, 1994) has become the dominant approach (Johnson 2009, Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2008, Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008, Chang 2007, Greif 2006, Ostrom 2005a, Rodrik 
2004, Menard and Shirley, 2005). 
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up 
of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of behaviour, 
conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics. Together 
they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies” (North 1994, p.360) 
 
Richter’s (2005) 45 useful summary of one debate about this definition is that while North agrees 
with Williamson’s approach that institutions reduce the cost of cooperation and reduce uncertainty 
of human interaction, North’s definition recognizes that the rules and norms are humanly devised so 
will inevitably be imperfect and inefficient. Indeed, Stiglitz (2003) showed how information 
asymmetries and transaction costs together explain the persistence of inefficient institutions, 
missing markets and market failure
46
. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008 p. 2) identified the “humanly 
devised” aspect of North’s definition as one of its key features in contrast to other potential 
fundamental causes, (like geographic factors,) which are outside human control. Another key 
feature of this definition is that the institutions’ major effect will be through “incentives”.  The 
notion that institutions define incentives is critical to economists; it means that institutions should 
have a major effect on economic outcomes, including economic development, growth, inequality, 
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 North and Williamson are the two most prominent expositors of new institutional thought according to 
Richter (2005) and Furubotn and Richter (2005). Williamson theorizes that institutions are designed to reduce 
transaction costs and increase economic efficiency but that approach does not provide a way to understand the 
prevalence of inefficient institutions, (Hall and Thelen 1996, Bowles and Gintis, 1993 p.97, North 2003 p.7). 
46
 Information asymmetries and transaction costs in financial market especially detrimentally affect the poor 
and micro and small enterprises that lack collateral, credit histories, and connections. They explain money-
lender interest rates, borrower behavior, informal financial arrangements & microfinance in financial markets 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2005, Johnson 2005b). For example, using a group-lending methodology to lend 
to micro-entrepreneurs in developing economies allows the lender to overcome information asymmetry by 
using the “insider” knowledge members have about each other to screen members, and allows the lender to 
reduce transaction costs by using the members to monitor each others’ behaviour. Compliance is then 
enforced through the use of local social sanctions, such as non-cooperation in other aspects of daily life 
(Johnson (2005b) Ghatak (2000) Stiglitz (1993)). 
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and poverty.  Indeed, markets themselves are institutions fulfiling exchange and co-ordination 
functions in an economy (Chang 2002a, Dorward et al  2005).  
 
Another strength of North’s definition can be seen in contrast to historical institutionalism (Hall and 
Thelen 1996) which assumes that institutions are exogenous and very slow to change whereas 
North’s definition makes no such assumption.  The division between old and new institutionalists 
might be cast similarly to the structure and agency debate in sociology (Chang 2002a, Dolfsma and 
Verburg 2008). The old institutionalists follow Durkheim’s structuralist approach that actions are 
determined by the structure of predefined institutions, not individual actions which is “unwarranted 
structural determinism” (Chang 2002a, p.554). Many of the new institutionalists follow Weber’s 
agency approach that institutions emerge from the agency of individuals.  But this can be 
problematic too if it is interpreted as one-way causation from individuals to institutions. A 
reductionist view based on either of these approaches is clearly inadequate. North and Chang 
recognize that there is two-way causation between individual motivation and social institutions 
(Menard and Shirley, 2005).   
 
But two weaknesses have been identified in North’s definition. The first weakness is that it is a 
vague concept (Sachs 2003, Portes and Smith 2008), without clear differentiation between the rules 
and the players, nor between “formal rules” and “informal norms” (Hodgson 2006) and the second 
weakness is that it has led to a preoccupation with defining “best practice” institutions, which are, 
by definition, non-contextual (Rodrik 2008a p.104, Bardhan 2005 p. 500, Evans 2004). The first 
weakness, the lack of clarity, has meant that the terms institution and organization are used loosely 
and sometimes interchangeably without an explicit understanding of their meaning consistent with 
North’s definition47. For example, in microfinance the providers of financial services to poor people 
are called both institutions and organizations interchangeably. Hodgson engaged North on this lack 
of clarity. They agreed that organizations are both players that follow institutional rules and norms 
and also a special type of institution with internal systems of rules and players.48. Specifically 
organizations have a) criteria to establish their boundaries and to distinguish members from non-
members, b) principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge and c) chains of command 
delineating responsibilities within organizations (Hodgson, 2006 p.18).
 49
 
50
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 North attempted to explained the difference: “If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and 
their entrepreneurs are the players. Organizations are made up of groups of individuals bound together by 
some common purpose to achieve certain objectives. (North 1994 p.361). But this differentiation between 
institutions and organizations was not clear enough for Hodgson (2006) or Portes and Smith (2008). 
48
 Greif (2006 p.31) came to a similar conclusion that organizations have a “dual nature”, they are both 
“components of institutions” and “institutions with respect to their member’s behavior”. 
49
 This definition is also consistent with the Grindle’s (1997) research on organizational culture and Knight’s 
(1992 p.3) recognition that some organizations “can be conceptualized as both an institution and an 
organization, such as a church or a university”. 
50
 This differentiation helps clarify the “institutional arrangements” term used by Dorward  to describe the 
particular sets of rules and structures governing particular contracts (Dorward et al  2005 p.2). With 
Hodgson’s clarification, these arrangements are the rules which operate within an organization.. For example, 
Dorward characterizes microfinance contracts linking borrowers, groups and microfinance providers as 
institutional arrangements - but which we now understand are rules within an organization - and the 
institutional environment as the microfinance policy context of allowing NGOs to engage in these activities or 
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The lack of clarity has also resulted in debate over the difference between “formal rules” and 
“informal norms”.  Ostrom (2005b) and Hodgson (2006) have noted that there is huge variability in 
enforcement of both formal and informal rules. They offer the alternative terms of “working rules” 
and “social rule-systems” respectively. Unfortunately new labels do not solve the problem. While 
enforcement is indeed variable, perhaps one reason is that  the effectiveness of institutions “depends 
crucially on the legitimacy of the institutions in the eyes of those living under them” (Woolcock 
2009b p. 13). In a research context, therefore, when a specific rule or norm is identified, both the 
legitimacy of the institution and the quality and consistency of enforcement in that particular local 
context, would need to be explicitly discussed. The key issue however, is that North’s definition of 
an institution includes both formal and informal rules and norms. 
 
The second weakness is that the application of North’s institutional approach has led to a 
preoccupation with defining “best practice” institutions, which are, by definition, non-contextual 
(Rodrik 2008a p.104, Bardhan 2005 p. 500, Evans 2004).  Rodrik (2008a) argues that no single set 
of any practices will serve the needs of all countries at all times, “as the variety of institutional 
forms that prevail in the advanced countries themselves suggests (Freeman 2000; Hall and Soskice 
2001cited in Rodrik 2008a p. 100).  Evans (2004 p.30) sees this best practice approach of exporting 
legal codes and organizational blueprints on the global South as institutional “monocropping” 
which is bound to fail.  This weakness is not inherent to the definition of an institution but how 
others have interpreted it.  
 
2.3 Institutional form and function  
Building on North’s definition, Rodrik et al  (2004), Sindzingre (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2008) and Chang (2006, 2007) are all clear that it is institutional functions which are more 
important than the institutional form and there is no basis for the importance of any particular 
institutional form, (recognizing the differences even between developed economies). As Cleaver 
(2002) and Rankin (2008) respectively recognize institutions are “multi-purpose” and “invested 
with a purpose” (ibid. p. 1975).  Chang (2006 p. 3) states the same function or purpose can be 
served by different institutional forms in different societies (or in the same society at different 
times). For example, Rodrik et al  (2004) emphasized that the function of property rights was 
important, not the form and so their research did not provide an institutional recipe. A further 
example is the function of a stable political system, found by Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) to be 
important for economic growth, did not necessarily mean its form was a democracy since Decker 
and Lim (2008) found the effect of democracy on growth is insignificant
51
.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
new financial regulations which have followed the new institutional arrangements - which are institutions 
under North’s definition (ibid p.18-19). 
51
Although Bhagwati (2002) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) found that a political democracy provides 
the best prospect of achieving the efficient, dynamic society that allows development to thrive when 
combined with the institutional functions of markets and openness (information flows) (Bhagwati 2002, pp. 
151–152). 
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Highlighting the role of function rather than form reprises the "structural functionalism" of 
anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown
52
 (Radcliffe-Brown 1961) and meta-theorized by 
sociologist Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 2006).  They understood sociological structures in terms of the 
functions they played in maintaining the stability of a society. The shift from a focus on the form of 
social structures and institutions to recognising that it is functions that are critical, therefore, has an 
important sociological history.  
 
However, the recognition of the importance of function in new-institutional theory is relatively 
recent and far from systematically integrated. Chang (2006 p.4) noted there are those with a “form-
fetish” who promote “global standard institutions” which he asserts has led to a dangerous denial of 
institutional diversity.
53
 Likewise, Chang (2007) rues the unfortunate tendency to assign a single 
function to each institutional form and that this is mistaken because there is not one inevitable and 
simple relationship between a desired institutional function and an institutional form. He uses an 
example in the financial market literature where it is generally argued that the function of the 
central bank should be to focus on inflation control, but actually there are many developmental 
functions that the central bank can and does play including the promotion of financial inclusion.  
Also in financial market development Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008 p.2) concur that it does not 
matter who provides the functions necessary for financial development. Indeed they argue that at a 
conceptual level it does not matter if they are formal or informal.   
 
However, it has often been a challenge to “clearly distinguish between the forms and the functions 
of institutions” (Chang 2006 p. 3) which has led to some confusion and this has been the case in 
microfinance too. The more generic term “role” has typically been used instead of function, for 
example, “The Role of Central Banks in Microfinance in Asia and the Pacific” (Goodwin-Groen, 
2000a,b). The “roles” in this case appeared to be institutional functions and the central bank was the 
institutional form. This will also be a critical point for the analysis of the research data because a de 
facto or informal institutional form can perform important institutional functions as well as a de jure 
or formal institutional form. It will therefore be essential to clearly distinguish functions from form. 
The form matters insofar as it enables the key functions required in the financial market to be 
carried out, but this has not been explored in the financial inclusion literature to date.  However, 
recognizing the importance of institutional functions also raises the question of whether and how 
the boundaries of functions can be defined. Cleaver (2002) would argue that for a socially 
embedded multi-purpose institutional “bricolage” (ibid p. 11) the boundaries will be clear to those 
who operate within that cultural context.  
 
North’s definition of institutions will be the basis for the remainder of the literature review and 
research because it explicitly recognizes the importance of both formal and informal rules and 
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 Radcliffe-Brown built on Durkheim’s definition of functions in society by defining social functions as life-
processes. “The concept of function as here defined thus involves the notion of a structure… the continuity of 
the structure being maintained by a life-process,” (Radcliffe-Brown 1961 p. 180) 
53
 Furthermore, in Nelson’s (2007) opinion, the “analyses that purport to identify the “right” institutions are 
superficial and unpersuasive” Nelson (2007 p.313). 
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norms with their enforcement characteristics which means that is can be applied to the multiple 
levels of a financial market. It recognizes that institutions are humanly devised and imperfect and 
allows a focus on institutional function so it can be applied to methodologies which work with 
culturally determined institutional functions and boundaries. This definition also reflects the 
positioning of this research at the convergence of historical and rational choice institutionalism and 
is a useful basis for theories of institutional change that move beyond path dependency.  
 
2.4 Social norms embedded in markets   
 
The importance of informal rules and social norms was clear in the discussion about defining 
institutions.  This section therefore gives an overview of the understanding of social norms and the 
social embeddedness of markets. Social norms have moved from being ignored to being understood 
as essential, notwithstanding the substantial methodological challenges of identifying their multiple 
functions and their boundaries.  
 
It was Polanyi (1957) who first identified the social embeddedness of economies and Stanfield 
(1980) who systematically analyzed the significance of Polanyi’s work for institutional economics 
and economic policy (O’Hara 2006 p.512)). For Polanyi, “markets are articulated through social 
institutions and legal and political strategies” (Slater and Tonkiss, 2001 p. 104), which is Polanyi’s 
notion of institutedness. He fundamentally rejected the key assumption of classical economics that 
there is a clearly delineated socially disembedded sphere of economic relations, He described a 
“double movement” in Europe which illustrated his thesis.  A first movement from a heavily 
regulated and controlled market in the 18th century to a virtually unregulated market in the 19th 
century was, in itself, a planned process rather than the arrival of a natural phenomenon; and a 
second movement in which the market was once more brought under control because people 
resisted the disembedding from their social context and the poverty, unemployment and insecurity 
brought about by the unregulated market (Stewart 2006). In other words, the first movement 
resulted in attempted disembeddeding of the market from its earlier institutional context and the 
second counter-movement which this process catalysed, resulted in social relations being re-
embedded within the economic system or market system. This Polanyian double movement—of 
deregulation followed by reaction to crises— is now recognized as a common feature in national 
and global economies (O’Hara, 2006). Building on Polanyi’s distinctive approach to comparative 
economic analysis (Jessop 2002), researchers such as Granovetter (1985, 1992), (to whom 
Williamson (2000) refers) and Slater & Tonkiss (2001) and Johnson (2005a) have also shown how 
economic institutions are social constructions and how markets are articulated through social 
institutions and embedded in local cultures.  
 
Granovetter’s (1992) understanding of embeddedness is that networks of social relations penetrate 
irregularly and in differing degrees in different sectors of economic life. He concluded that social 
relations are a necessary component in understanding the link between macro-level and micro-level 
theories and that power derived from social relations such as class, gender and ethnicity is not 
limited to the micro-level, but patterns entire sets of market operations and so influences the entire 
economy (ibid, p.370). Institutions in markets are “cultural embodiments” reflecting the value 
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systems and historical antecedents of the societies (Platteau 2000, p. xvii).  It is therefore essential 
for any discussion of rules and norms in financial markets to recognize their social embeddedness. 
 
Even with these insights and with the explicit recognition of social norms in North’s definition of 
institutions, social institutions have until recently, largely been ignored by many institutional 
economists. They have been “taken-for-granted” (Scott and Meyer et al  1994 p.27), considered a 
“black box” (Greif 2006 p.380), there has been a “norm against norms” (Eggertsson 2001 p. 77) 
because values and norms were taken as “given” (Williamson, 2000, p. 596) with no recognition of 
internal differences or sub-categories within the norms (Dequech 2005)
54
. However, institutionalists 
such as Braverman and Guash as early as 1993 (Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz 1993, p. 53) had 
recognized the “apparently large influence of social and cultural factors on the performance of 
financial institutions,” and called for more research, they also recognized that they did not have 
appropriate tools for this task. Granovetter (2005) observed that social structures within which 
institutions are embededed “remain largely unexplored, and pose one of the greatest intellectual 
challenges to the social sciences.” (ibid p.47).   
 
Two barriers to a greater understanding of the social embeddeness of markets are a lack of 
understanding of the way social rules can constrain or enhance economic opportunities and 
methodological challenges of operationalizing informal institutions (defining their functions and 
boundaries) and discerning causality. The methodological challenges are being overcome in several 
ways. They include: the use of proxy indicators for social constraints such as ethnic 
fractionalization (see Easterly et al (2006) and Licht et al (2007) 55); game theoretic approaches 
such as by Hoff and Pandey (2005)
 56
 and Ostrom (2005b); detailed ethnographic and survey field 
work such as by Wood (2003) Tsai (2004) Johnson (2004b, 2005a)
57
 and historical analyses by 
North (2005) and Greif (2006) . Recognition of the importance of informal norms and enforcements 
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 For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) asked why many societies adopt policies that discourage 
investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness. They appeared not to recognize that 
there are informal norms underpinning those formal rules which are more important to the powerful people 
within those economies. 
55
 Licht et al  (2007) have designed a measure of the cultural differences. They characterized the cultures of 
different societies according to three categories:  Embeddedness / Autonomy; Hierarchy / Egalitarianism; and 
Mastery / Harmony. (“Embeddedness” in this paper means embedded within the local group and ethnic 
fractionalization - because ethnic fractionalization increases people’s in-group affiliation).  Using these 
dimensions they found two cultural “mega-regions”. One consisting of the English-speaking and West 
European nations; the other consisting of the remaining regions.  By definition then particular cultural profiles 
in major world regions are less compatible with “good governance,” than the profiles in West European and 
English-speaking countries. This over simplistic conclusion appears to be a clear example of the challenges of 
operationalizing informal institutions, 
56
 Hoff and Pandey (2005) found that a belief system  or social norm that considers a social group as 
inherently inferior is self-fulfiling, because these belief systems lead individuals to expect their efforts to be 
rewarded in a biased way and  mistrust then undermines their motivation. So opportunity is not everything, 
the cultural legacy contributes maintaining a social group in a subordinate position to a degree out of 
proportion to the elite’s actual, contemporary political power and wealth. 
57
 The financial market research of Johnson (2004b, 2005a) and Tsai (2004) found that gender norms 
embedded within the societies of the rural villages in Kenya and China respectively differentiated the 
demand for and supply of financial services. Specifically, gender norms of control over resources affected the 
demand for financial services and the informal norms of interaction between men and women affecting the 
type of services supplied. 
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has also been provided by economists respected for their methodological rigor such as Rodrik, 
Subramaniam and Trebbi (2004 p.158) and also Akerlof (2007)
58
. 
 
The ethnographic research has greatly expanded our understanding of the way social rules constrain 
or enhance economic opportunities in rural financial markets in Bangladesh (Wood 2003), China 
and India (Tsai 2004), Kenya (Ensminger 1992
59
 and Johnson 2004b, 2005a). North (2005) and 
Greif’s (2006) detailed comparative historical institutional analyses of economic development also 
explicitly address the role of social norms
60
. (For example Greif (2006) compares the norms of the 
Maghribi traders’ coalition and the Genoese bilateral contract-enforcement, which can be seen as 
similar institutional functions with different forms.) These and other detailed historical analysis has 
broadened our understanding of the importance of social norms to economic growth. Heydemann 
(2008) and Nugent’s (2008) critique of Greif’s analysis is that it appears to ‘blame’ the prevailing 
cultural norms for the failure of key institutions, such as property rights to evolve amongst the 
traders. This is a thinly veiled accusation of western imperialism which is unhelpful, because it does 
not recognize Greif’s (2006 p.404) explicit acknowledgement that the institutional forms best fitted 
to achieving a particular outcome or function, depend on the contextual norms and can differ from 
those currently prevailing in the West
61
.  
 
Cleaver (2002) finds socially embedded “multi-purpose institutions” (ibid p. 11) elaborated through 
processes lead by agents who are institutional “bricoleurs” with “multiple identities” in different 
economic and social arenas, are robust and enduring institutions. Therefore she recommends that 
institutional change interventions undertake “socially informed analysis of the content and effect of 
institutional arrangements rather than on their form alone”(ibid). Kelsall (2008) has undertaken 
such analysis across Africa and highlights the “complex and sometimes self-contradictory 
subjectivities” in defining them (Kelsall 2004 cited in Kelsall 2008 p. 648). He also brings to light 
their increasing complexity with urbanization, demographic changes, women’s rights (etc.) and the 
contested nature of those norms. Recognizing the complexity of norms embedded in other informal 
norms and in formal institutions which change over time, Ostrom (1990 p.51, 2005a p.842) uses the 
concept of nesting to make sense of this complexity. “All rules are nested in another set of rules that 
define how the first set of rules can be changed.” This concept of nesting allows researchers to 
identify the plethora of connections between norms and between norms and institutions at other 
levels.  Ostrom (1990 p. 52-3) also highlights the complexity of operationalizing the concept of 
social norms, but the key point is that informal norms and their enforcement activities are 
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 Akerlof (2007) recognized that norms are generated and known by a whole community and that these 
norms affect macroeconomic variables. 
59
 For example, Ensminger (1992) describes changes to economic and social institutions occurring between 
1981 and 1987, including institutions that decrease transaction costs such as “the simple notarizing of 
legitimate traders and property rights by third party agencies, security forces that reduce banditry, banking 
facilities that extend credit and reduce the dangers of travel with cash...courts that enforce contracts and 
property rights" (ibid p. 27); as well as the changes to "gerontocracy, clan, lineage, patron-client relations, 
and, marriage." (ibid p.169). 
60
 Cleaver’s (2002) analysis of natural resource management institutions in the Usangu Basin, Tanzania and 
Kelsall’s (2008) analysis of common norms across Africa and how they affect economic decision making 
have also both provided careful analysis of socially embedded institutions. 
61
 Likewise, Kelsall (2008 p. 627) finds that “in general, Western institutions sit ill with these [i.e. African] 
traditions”. 
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foundational and that all institutions are nested within others. This point is essential for any 
framework that provides a heuristic device for research.  As a result of these and similar findings, 
researchers such as Casson et al  (2009 p.138) unequivocally state that “it is clear that informal 
institutions in developing countries play a very significant role in shaping formal institutions and in 
the operation of markets,”  and that “informal institutions must therefore be included in all socio-
economic analyses of institutions” (ibid p.137). However, as yet, there has been no analysis of the 
function of informal social norms in the development of inclusive financial markets.  
 
The first four sections of this chapter have provided the theoretical foundation for this research. 
This research was positioned where historical and rational choice institutionalism converge, (which 
are two of the schools of institutional thought outlined by Mahoney and Thelen (2010)). The 
definition of institutions used in this research is that of North, and the outstanding contested issues 
with this definition were addressed. The importance of differentiating between institutional form 
and function (as Chang and Rodrik have emphasized) was explained and will be increasingly 
important for the research agenda. Finally, the Polanyian insight that economic institutions are 
social constructions and that markets are articulated through social institutions and embedded in 
local cultures will permeate every aspect of this research because without that understanding the 
research questions cannot be adequately answered. The next section considers a range of 
frameworks for categorizing and comparing institutions across markets and chooses one that best 
reflects these issues.  
 
2.5 Framework for institutional functions  
As Ostrom points out, researchers need an institutional framework that is both an aid to expanding 
theoretical understanding and a heuristic device for applied research.  Ostrom (2005b p.22) warns 
that any such framework must be more than a method for imposing superficial order onto an 
extremely large set of seemingly disparate rules, what Bastiaensen et al  (2005 p. 979) called the 
“polycephalous nature of the institutional landscape”. The litmus test is that the enforcement 
mechanisms of formal rules must be a validation of the underlying social norms (a supplement for 
the informal enforcement of norms) Platteau (2000 p.290). 
 
Williamson (2000), Wood (2000) and Ostrom (1990, 2005a) designed such frameworks for generic 
institutional analysis. Rodrik (2005) developed a “market-enhancing” institutional function 
categorization and Fergusson (2006) an institutional analysis approach for financial market 
development. Rodrik’s (2005) market-enhancing institutional function categorization provides a 
four-way classification of institutions: market creating, market regulating, market stabilizing, and 
market legitimizing institutions. These were tested empirically by Bhattacharyya (2009) for their 
relative contribution to growth. For example, strong “market creating” institutions characterized by 
the function of adequate protection of private property and contract enforcement were found to be 
growth enhancing. Or for a “market regulating” institution such as competition, there exists a 
growth maximizing level to promote competition but beyond that it increases red tape and kills the 
incentive for investment. But these categories do not explicitly recognize the role of informal 
norms. This is the same problem with Ostrom’s (1990) categories. She postulates: 1) Constitutional 
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rules in which the collective action and operational rules are embedded.  The constitution in turn, 
has a set of rules about how it can be changed.  2) Collective Choice rules used in making policies 
and the management and adjudication of policy decisions. 3) Operational rules that affect day to day 
decisions regarding access to resource units, monitoring and sanctions and processes of 
appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement. Ostrom (2005) lists at least seven groups of 
“working” rules that “affect the structure of any repetitive action situation including markets” (ibid 
p.834). These are position rules; boundary rules; authority rules; scope rules; aggregation rules; 
information rules and payoff rules (ibid p.835). Ostrom’s working rules classifications would be 
useful for a deep analysis of those rules, but this study is trying to understand the whole set of 
institutions including social norms for the microfinance market and needs a framework that 
specifically includes them. Wood’s (2000) approach has the opposite problem in that is a 
“metaphor” (ibid p. 221) for the institutional governance challenges in Bangladesh and a not 
detailed enough framework for the purposes of this research. He shows how those in poverty are 
“entrapped within the problematic social embeddedness” of four institutional domains of state, 
market, community and household” (ibid). Appealingly he identifies how those entrapped 
“prisoners” can become “escapees” (ibid p.224 ) but unfortunately this metaphor cannot easily be 
translated into a generic microfinance market.  
 
Williamson’s (2000) framework identifies the various levels of institutions and explicitly includes 
informal norms as the foundational incentives of the economy, which is consistent with the 
theoretical progress on social norms in the institutional literature discussed above. Fergusson (2006 
p. 30) includes fundamental institutions (social norms); as well as institutions which provide the 
legal framework; and institutions which are policies and regulations in his approach. He identifies 
key linkages between them but not the nested nature of the different levels of institutions. Since 
these three levels are the same as Williamson’s and, Williamson has more explicit links to the 
norms, this is the framework chosen as the most useful heuristic device for the analysis of financial 
markets available. As Joskow notes “[t]he division of social, political, legal and economic 
institutions into four levels is necessarily somewhat arbitrary” (2003 p.12), but it provides a useful 
framework.  Joskow also notes that Williamson’s framework “makes it clear that the speed and 
direction of changes at these levels is not exogenous or necessarily monotonic” (Joskow 2003 p.13) 
which is important to remember when examining institutional change.
62
 
 
Williamson’s (2000 p.597) first level in Figure 1 below is the “Embeddedness” level which 
includes informal social norms, customs, traditions (including religious traditions) which impose 
constraints on the next levels. The title “Social Foundation” better represents the role of this level 
(Joskow 2003 p.12). For example, there may be a social norm that loans are paid back on time or 
that loans need only be paid back when they can be paid – such norms provide a foundation for the 
financial market. To ensure consistency in languages this paper uses the definition of culture in 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006 p.23) “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, 
and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” Zingales also works 
                                                     
62
 Campbell (2004) argues that researchers must be able identify three dimensions of any institution– namely 
the regulative pillar that constrains it; the normative pillar that prescribes goals and how to achieve them and; 
the cultural pillar of the taken-for-granted-assumptions about reality. (Campbell 2004 p.36, citing Scott 2001). 
These categories do not appear to be substantially different from Williamson’s levels of institutions. 
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within an NIE framework and this definition focuses on those norms that can affect economic 
outcomes and so can be applied to financial markets.   
 
The second level is what Williamson entitles the “Institutional Environment” which Joskow (2003 
p.12) renames the “Formal Rules of the Game” that includes constitutions and laws. This is 
equivalent to Ostrom’s constitutional rules. Constitutional rules will be used as the most appropriate 
title because all levels are “institutions” so that is not a helpful title and operational rules can also be 
“formal” as distinct from informal which is also not helpful. This level includes the rules 
conventionally recognized as institutions critical to economic growth such as property rights and 
contract enforcement as well as laws (rules) on different types of company or financial service 
provider which are enforced by the court system. Fergusson (2006 p. 62) notes that macroeconomic 
stability cannot be considered an institution in this category because “it is more appropriately 
described as a symptom of underlying institutional problems rather than a fundamental contributor 
to financial development or backwardness.”  
 
The third level is what Williamson entitles the “Governance level” or “How the Game is Played” 
(Joskow, 2003 p.12) or “Operational level” (Ostrom 1990 p. 52). The term Governance has 
subsequently become a more general term (Grindle 2007 p. 555) so the term Operation rules will be 
used. This level includes the rules implementing the constitutional rules e.g. regulations 
implementing the laws. In financial markets these regulations are enforced by the Central Bank or 
Bank Supervisor.  
 
The fourth level of “Pricing”, is the domain of neo-classical economic analysis where there are 
adjustments to prices and output.  These are therefore seen to arise out of the deeper institutional 
levels and in a dynamic way will also feedback into sustaining institutional arrangements at lower 
levels as they sustain the incentive structures involved.  Given that it is the limitations of focusing 
on output and prices that has given rise to much institutional analysis, it is the first three domains 
that are emphasized in what follows. . 
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Figure 1 Williamson’s Institutional Framework 
 
 
 
Williamson’s implicit assumption in this framework is that all social norms take from a hundred to 
a thousand years to change in contrast to operational institutions which take from one to ten years to 
change. Roland’s (2004) approach does not put numbers on categories. Instead he recognizes that 
change in social norms is “slow moving” as compared to politically driven institutions which are 
“typically fast moving” as they can even change overnight. More importantly he recognizes that 
they are not independent speeds, rather, the interaction between the different levels of institutions at 
their different speeds will be affected by the other and also that this will vary in different economies 
and cultures.  
 
Williamson’s framework has been chosen, therefore, because it most closely reflects the theoretical 
understanding of foundational role of social norms and that the enforcement of formal rules is 
dependent on the social norms. It also provides a useful heuristic device differentiating between 
Embeddedness: 
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Institutional 
environment: formal 
rules of the game –esp. 
property, judiciary, 
bureaucracy 
Governance: play of 
the game- esp. 
contract (aligning 
governance structures 
with transactions) 
Resource allocation 
and employment 
(prices and quantities; 
incentives alignment) 
Level 
L 1 
L 2 
L 3 
L 4 
Purpose Frequency of change 
(years) 
 
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous 
Get the institutional 
environment right. First 
order economizing 
Get the governance 
structures right. 
Second order 
economizing 
Get the marginal 
conditions right. Third 
order economizing 
10
2
 to 10
3
 
10 to 10
2
 
1 to 10 
continuous 
L1: social theory 
L2: economics of property rights/ positive political theory 
L3: transaction costs economics 
L4: neoclassical economic / agency theory 
Constraints 
Feedback 
Source: Williamson 2000 p.597 
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different levels of institutions in financial markets, which can be used to compare institutions across 
markets. There are an abundance of institutional functions found to be important for financial 
market development so this framework will now be applied in reviewing the literature on 
institutions and financial market development.  
 
 
2.6 Institutional functions critical for financial market development  
 
Rodrik (2008a p. 100) has identified the functions good institutions perform for economic growth: 
secure property rights (or give investors confidence), enforce contracts, stimulate entrepreneurship, 
foster integration in the world economy, maintain macroeconomic stability, manage risk-taking by 
financial intermediaries, supply social insurance and safety nets, and enhance voice and 
accountability. But he is clear that each one of these functions can be achieved in a large number of 
different ways (Rodrik 2007, 2008a).
63
 These are very similar to the institutions Law and 
Habibullah (2009) found were a statistically significant determinant of banking sector development. 
But Grindle (2004, 2007), Bardhan (2005) and Fergusson (2006) (and many national policy 
makers), do not find such long menus helpful and instead ask what institutions “matter most”. 
“Given limited resources of money, time, knowledge, and human and organizational capacity, we 
need to know the best ways to move ….in a particular country context.” (Grindle 2007 p.554). 
Fergusson’s (2006) survey also asked the question ‘[w]hich institutions are important” for the 
financial market (ibid p. 29). One of the reasons that researchers are not able to identify the 
institutions that matter most is that they typically rely on cross-country regressions using general 
indicators of institutional quality. Honohan’s (2004 p. 30) opinion is that “[p]robing financial 
development by means of cross-country regressions has greatly enriched our understanding of the 
processes most likely to be at work” but it does not help us focus. (The strengths and weaknesses of 
this method are discussed in Chapter 3.) The alternative has been a singular focus on a particular 
institutional form, such as an independent central bank, but which may not be appropriate in every 
context (Rodrik 2008a p. 103). Honohan and Beck (2007) are an exception in that they 
recommended “short cuts” (ibid p.194) or priorities for financial sector development that includes 
contract enforcement and credit registries. In the microfinance community, the institutional or 
policy framework has been labeled a legal and regulatory one and is led by lawyers (e.g. Lyman 
2005). There does not appear to be an understanding of the importance of institutions or research 
identifying which of these institutional functions are needed to support the expansion of financial 
sector to reach the excluded. There is a gaping hole in the literature about the institutions that matter 
most for financial inclusion. To begin to address this gap, Williamson’s framework was populated 
with the institutional functions frequently identified as affecting financial and microfinance market 
development in expanding to reach poor clients – see Table 1 below.  
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 Law and Habibullah (2009) used the ICRG institutional indicators discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Table 1 Institutions found to affect financial market expansion to reach low income clients 
64
 
 
Levels 
 
Institutions found to affect financial market expansion to reach low income clients 
 
Level 1:  
The Social 
Foundations 
 
 Gender, age, ethnic group; religion, education; employment largely determine the operational rules and their enforcement 
mechanisms in each of the organizational forms providing microfinance - Johnson (2005b), Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2009). For 
example, in Kenya, women have difficulty borrowing from financial intermediaries that require physical collateral because it is a 
social norm that they do not have property rights. 
 Trust (Fergusson, 2006). Trust increases people’s perception that others will cooperate and is important for financial contracts which 
are “trust intensive” (ibid, p.43) with clear enforcement mechanisms65. For example, in Bangaldesh Woolcock (1999, p.36) found that 
trust between group members and between Grameen Bank staff and group members was a key institutional link that shaped how 
microfinance worked to prevent default and subsequent enforcement of payment rules.  In the Zambian microfinance market Van 
Bastelaer and Leathers (2006 p. 1788) found that “commmunity-based cognitive social capital is shown to be strongly associated with 
repayment performance”.  
 Social norms which support obeying the law, prevent numerous small defections, even when trust is low (Platteau, 2000)  
 Loyalty to institutions and organizations that presently work and deliver livelihoods, whatever the longer term cost”. (Woods 2003 
p.455) This norm can have severe negative implications for poor people. 
 
The researchers above had specifically examined social norms and their enforcement characteristics in microfinance or related markets. 
The researchers below are examples of those have written about the social institutions / norms seemingly accidentally, but none the less 
importantly, either in the context of financial market development or development more broadly   
 
 Regulations on disclosure (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria 2008  p.399) are unrealistic unless clients are literate (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al  2008 p.162) and have the power to hold financial institutions accountable (Honohan and Beck, 2007 p. 198). These require norms 
about transparency and accountability. 
 A “culture” of corruption (together with other higher level institutions) has been found to “escalate poverty incidence” (Tebaldi and 
Mohan, 2010 p. 1063). However,   Wood (2000 p. 222) warns that concepts like corruption can be derived from an assumed 
rationality and used as a critique without understanding the underlying “range of commitments, obligations and therefore motivations 
for behaviour in societies”. 
 Ethical business (Argandoña 2004) “ethical institutions will constrain the behavior and actions of men and women, driving them to 
efficiency and to social stability” (ibid, p.200) 
 Norms around open private-sector led development critical for financial markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) and also norm of 
protecting markets critical for growth (Chang 2002b) 
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 Levels by Williamson (2000 p.597).titles by Joskow (2003 p.12).  
65
Ipso facto, trust is especially important where legal enforcement is weaker, which is the situation in many developing economies.  
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Level 2 
The Constitut-
ional Rules. 
Basic Institutional 
Environment for 
Financial Market 
Development: 
 
 
 
 
 Rule of Law (North 1990, Platteau 2000, World Bank 2004a, Redek and Sušjan 2005, Fergusson 2006, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, 
Tebaldi and Mohan, 2010, Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006)  
For financial markets of all types the “rule of law” function is critical for them to be effective and may need the threat of coercion for 
its effective enforcement (Platteau 2000, North 1990). Rule of law can also be used as a proxy for economic stability (Tebaldi and 
Mohan, 2010) (although Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) treat political stability separately). Households will not give up 
control over their savings for longer time-periods without the rule of law, and financial institutions will not commit beyond short-term 
contracts given funding uncertainties (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2008). Rule of law could also include the private market’s ability to 
discipline banks (Barth et al  2006). The rule of law is particularly crucial when the social norm of “trust” in a society is low 
(Fergusson 2006 p. 44). The two main institutional forms which fulfil the rule of law and stability function in microfinance markets 
are the judicial system and an independent central bank (Honohan and Beck 2007). An independent central bank, which itself is 
financially stable is critical to the rule of law and stability in the financial system (Berger et al  2001, Arnone et al  2006, Kluh and 
Stella 2008) although Rodrik (2008a p.103) argues this may not always be the case.  
 
 Certainty of contract enforcement66 67 Platteau (2000), World Bank (2004a), Armedáriaz and Morduch, (2005), Fergusson (2006), 
Honohan and Beck 2007, Vatnick (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al  (2008 p.147 - 149).  
What all agree is that enforcement of contracts is imperative for financial market development
68
. Security of contracting may include 
legislation that defines the rights and responsibilities of financial market participants, but alternatively writing specific laws for 
financial contracts may improve the functioning of the financial market. (Fergusson 2006 p. 38) For example, commercial courts with 
simplified judicial and asset recovery (Platteau 2000)
69
.But it also may mean improving the basis for relational contracting such as 
information exchange not a major  legal overhaul that is unsustainable (Rodrik 2008a).  
 
 Functioning collateral laws with registries (Platteau 2000, Haselman et al  2006, Armedáriaz and Morduch, (2005), Fergusson 
2006, Honohan and Beck 2007 p.197, and Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008)  
Closely associated with contract enforcement, since collateral is pledged in event of default, collateral laws with functional registries 
(including mobile collateral registries) have been found to be more important than property rights. When bankruptcy codes are 
complex, the collateral regime acts “as a kind of substitute” when there is also security of contracting. (Demirgüç-Kunt 2008et al  
p.151). The value of access to some form of formal collateral (of all forms) by microfinance service providers has also been found to 
improve their financial sustainability (Andersen & Malchow-Moller, 2006) 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, the ICRG institutional quality indicators gives contract enforcement a separate category but WGI indicators includes contract 
enforcement  under its ‘rule of law’ indicator. 
67
 Loan contract enforcement is more important than property rights for financial markets (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.152) see discussion after table.  
68
 The majority opinion is that “countries with stronger creditor protection enjoy deeper financial markets” (Fergusson 2006 p. 37), although the opposing view is 
that strict protection of creditor rights leads to more defaulted loans and insolvent business. But all agree on contract enforcement. 
69
 A new expedited mechanism for loan contract enforcement was implemented in India in the 1990s and this new procedure bypassed dysfunctional court 
procedures and resulted in a considerable increase in loan recoveries (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.152) 
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Level 3  
The 
Operational
70
 
  Rules.  
Institutions of 
Governance  - 
how the game is 
played. 
 
 A regulatory framework to support increased access includes: ensuring independent supervision (Honohan & Beck 2007); 
fostering “transparency and defines clear-cut accountability” (Vatnick (2008 p. 115); providing incentives for competition to 
broaden access (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2008); and ensuring “local financial institutions act in a manner conducive to sustainable 
local economic development and to building and retaining local social capital” (Bateman 2011 p. 4). 
Banking and microfinance regulation and supervision /enforcement can encourage prudent financial market development for poor 
people, or hinder it. For example, Burges and Pande (2005) found it could increase rural outreach, 
71
 and  Nair and Koeplinger-Todd 
(2009), Hirshland, Chao- Béroff, Harper and Lee (2008) and Vogel (2002) found it could improve the financial and outreach 
performance of financial cooperatives. But others find that regulation and supervision had a direct negative effect on microfinance 
institutions’ reaching poorer clients because of the increased costs of supervision Cull et al  (2009),although, Mersland and Øystein 
Strøm (2009) found that average loan size remained static under supervision. Tsai’s (2004) work in China and India and Wood’s 
(2003) in Bangladesh concluded that only when microfinance programs are able to be structured according to local needs (i.e. when 
regulations allow such structuring) will it have the potential to displace ubiquitous usurious forms of informal finance. Marr and 
Tubaro (2010) found the  regulatory environments determined whether microfinance providers were able to access a wider range of 
funding partnerships and so achieve their dual goals of financial sustainability and poverty alleviation. Similarly, Lascelles and 
Mendelson (2011) found that regulation which fails to take account of microfinance’s social role, (i.e. which does not recognize a 
diverse ownership structures and different cost bases of socially conscious organizations) is stopping its expansion. In a global survey 
of microfinance stakeholders they report that “[b]ad or nonexistent regulation was hindering the growth and profitability of 
microfinance, it was stifling MFIs, holding back innovation, preventing it from competing with new entrants, like commercial banks, 
where regulation was more highly developed.” (Lascelles & Mendelson 2011 p.28).72  
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 Some operational institutions for facilitating financial market activity are generally unproblematic from a policy point of view, and their implementation is 
constrained only by government capacity. These measures include putting in place the legislation, taxation, and other rules needed for specific financing tools 
such as leasing and factoring that are particularly suited to small and medium enterprises. So long as the tax arrangements are not unduly generous, these 
improvements will be uncontroversial. (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2008 p.153).   
71
Burgess and Pande (2005) provide robust evidence that banking regulations in India encouraging the opening of branches in rural unbanked locations was 
associated with reductions in rural poverty linked to increased savings mobilization and credit provision in rural areas between 1977 and 1990 (Burgess and 
Pande 2005 p. 791).  They conclude that “the Central Bank’s licensing policy enabled the development of an extensive rural branch network, and that this, in 
turn, allowed rural households to accumulate more capital and to obtain loans for longer-term productive investments. (Although they point out that whether the 
state monies invested in the banking sector would have generated greater poverty reduction if spent elsewhere is not a question they can address.)   
72
 “Microfinance needs to find its place in the global financial system. Either there has to be a clear regulatory environment distinguishing and recognising the 
microfinance sector, or the industry needs to mainstream itself as part of the banking or non-banking segment as the case may be in each country. The risk of an 
unclear regulatory environment is probably the main risk at the moment. Prashant Thakker - Global business head, – microfinance Standard Chartered Bank 
(Lascelles & Mendelson 2011 p.28). Also Scott Richards, an associate at Developing World Markets, a US microfinance investment firm, said that “many 
countries lack microfinance-specific regulations, and in our experience, the regulatory regimes in place to govern deposit-taking banks and other financial 
institutions do not fully or effectively address the specific regulatory needs of the microfinance industry.” (ibid p.27) 
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 Transparent accurate audited financials (Platteau 2000, Rajan and Zingales 2003, World Bank 2004 a p.122, Honohan and Beck 
2007, CGAP 2006, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, Andrianova et al  2008 p.248,  Beck Demirgüç-Kunt and Peria 2008, Barth et al  
2006).) 
An enforced requirement for transparent accurate audited financials that meet international standards, with rigorous audit quality and 
procedures. Such disclosure contributes to accountability for both profit and  not-for profit organizations. Without such disclosure it 
will not be possible to assess whether the organization is working efficiently to serve clients, to compare the relative efficiency of 
different organizations or organizational types or to consistently track performance over time. Transparency in both financial and 
social performance is one means to increase competition and interest rate transparency is an important component of consumer 
protection (see below). 
 
 Credit registries – with as diverse a range of client history as possible (Platteau 2000, McIntosh and Wydick 2005, World Bank 
2004a p.122, Honohan and Beck 2007, Djankov, McLeish and Shliefer 2007, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.153)  
Credit registries, public or private, through which lenders share information about their clients’ repayment records—are an established 
way of enhancing the ability of borrowers to signal a good credit record.  Registries should include not only banks but also 
microfinance providers and utility operators. Credit registries are particularly important in poorer countries and have been shown to 
increase lending (Djankov  et al  2007).  In microfinance, Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick (2007) and de Janvry, McIntosh and Saduloet 
(2010) documented the beneficial effects of credit information systems for lenders, and that these gains were augmented when 
borrowers understood the rules of the bureau. .
73 
 
74
 A uniform personal identification giving very person a unique identity is 
considered one form to make credit registries more effective (Rajan 2006, Mylenko 2007, Demirgüç-Kunt at al 2008 p.154). It can 
dramatically improve the ease and effectiveness of the operation of the credit information industry with regard to individual or 
microfinance borrowers. For example India’s national Unique Identity Document (UID) effort will both enable better targeting of 
government programs and provide the option of a bank account (Gerdeman 2011)  
 
 Financial Consumer Protection: Interest ceilings have in the past been the means by which regulators have attempted to protect poor 
consumers from abusive and usurious practices (Mavrotas 2005).  But they have failed to address the problem adequately and can be 
counterproductive by reducing transparency for clients (Demirgüç-Kunt et al 2008). Substantial research is now underway on 
appropriate rules and enforcement mechanisms to protect financial consumers in low-access environments
75
. To date evidence shows 
three key goals: 1. Transparency: Customers know what they are getting. 2. Fair Treatment: Customers are treated fairly and are not 
sold inappropriate/harmful financial services. 3. Effective Recourse: Customer complaints are resolved fairly. However, it is important 
to note that adoption of laws and regulations from elsewhere is rarely appropriate due to differing social, legal, and economic contexts. 
The capacity of the regulator in question to implement and supervise is also critical (Brix and McKee 2010 p. 1). 
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 In some countries barriers to credit registries include privacy laws or incumbent banks not wanting to share information about good clients, so the government 
may have to make information sharing mandatory (Djankov et al  2007).Some authors have recommended penalties for financial service providers that fail to 
participate in a credit information bureau (Freedman and Click 2006). 
74
 With the advent of extensive mobile phone access in poor communities, if the payment and transaction records of financially excluded clients were included in 
credit registries, these records may indicate a person’s creditworthiness. (Liu and Mithika 2009). 
75
 Karnani (2009 p. 84) argues that a libertarian mindset is the reason there not been an emphasis on legal and  regulatory mechanisms to protect poor consumers, 
romanticising poor people as ‘resilient and creative entrepreneurs’ and ‘value-conscious consumers’ instead of vulnerable consumers needing protection. 
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 Access to Payments System (CGAP 2007, Mendoza and Thelen 2008, Stone 2010 Alexandre, Mas and Radcliff, 2010 ) There are 
typically high barriers to entry for access to payments systems 
76
. Payments are particularly important for domestic and international 
remittances received by the rural poor from relatives in the city or who have migrated and at their Cannes 2011 meeting G20 Leaders 
have now committed to reducing global remittance costs (G20 2011). Mendoza and Thelen (2008) found mobile phone payments have 
many advantages for low income clients over conventional payment systems. Allowing such innovation is critical to expanding access 
(Goodwin-Groen 2010, Stone 2010)  Alexandre et al  (2010 p. 1) outline the banking laws and regulations which need to be adapted 
to these new possibilities of banking beyond bank branches.
77
  
 
 Fostering Competition:  (Rajan and Zingales 2003, Demirgüç-Kunt 2008 p. 179, World Bank 2004a p.119, CGAP 2004). Micro-
credit clients benefit from increased access, improved services and eventually improved prices due to competition (Porteous 2009 p. 
11) However, Porteous (2009)
78 
also notes downsides to competition in this market. For example, it can reduce access to the poorest 
clients by removing incentives for cross-subsidy within organizations (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005)  Regulators must achieve 
balance. Options inclue: permission for foreign-owned banks to enter the financial market, (Freedman & Click 2006), 
transparency in pricing (see consumer protection), mass financial literacy campaigns (such as in Ghana, Goodwin-Groen 2010); 
and undertaking a regulatory impact statement. (Porteous 2009, Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, Cull et al  2009, Lascelles and 
Mendelson, 2011) 
79
.  
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 In South Africa the National Payment System Act was amended in 2004 to force the four tier-one banks to relinquish their monopoly of the national payments 
system so that tier-two and tier-three banks could also participate. The tier-one banks' cartel had created high barriers to savings services for poor people and so 
needed legislation to increase access to savings services (Goodwin-Groen 2006 p. 10). 
77 Alexandre et al  (2010) highlight five areas where sharpened regulatory analysis would help strike a better balance between maximizing the opportunities of 
these models and containing risks: 1. branching regulations which distinguish between pure transactional outlets and full service bank branches; 2. regulations 
which permit banks to engage third-party retail outlets with minimal financial risks for both banks and their customers;  3. consumer protection regulations that 
help customers understand and act upon their rights in a more complex service delivery chain, without burdening banks with unnecessary provisions; 4. tiered 
know-your-customer (KYC) regulations that permit immediate account opening with minimum barriers for poor people, with a progressive tightening of KYC as 
their usage of financial services grows; and 5. creating regulatory space for a class of non-bank e-money issuers authorized to raise deposits and process 
payments, but not to intermediate. 
78
 According to Porteous (2009), (who uses Porter’s (1980) five forces analytic framework,) most of the features of micro-credit markets make it difficult for 
regulators to foster competition include: difficulty for clients to switch lenders; the limited bargaining power of clients; high barriers to entry and; the ease of 
clients finding substitute products in the informal a sector. For example, if group-lending in micro-credit predominates then social norms of the group means 
clients cannot leave their obligations to other members which also increases switching costs and create a barrier to entry. Anothere example is that the  
government may have a direct role in the market (such as though an Apex that controls the supply of funds) which may create barriers to entry so new providers 
find it difficult to enter. The downsides to competition listed by Porteous (2009 p.11) and Chen, Rasmussen and Reille (2010) can include multiple indebtedness 
of borrowers and a breakdown in the internal control systems of microfinance service providers, but not always. 
79
 Many microfinance respondents felt that poor MFI regulation was putting them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis these new entrants, for example in the range of 
products they could offer and in their access to funding, and even their ability to move into new areas like mobile banking. (Lascelles and Mendelson, 2011) 
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Table 1 provides a summary of the research on the institutions which are most important for the 
expansion of the financial market to reach low income clients. It identifies constitutional 
institutional functions of: the rule of law, (with examples of forms for achieving this function 
being the judicial systems and independent central bank); certainty of contract enforcement and; 
functional collateral registries. The operational institutional functions include a regulatory 
framework to support increased access with effective supervision, transparency and competition.
80
 
The basic contents of this Table 1 may be well known to those who work in financial market 
development and microfinance, but it has never been structured and presented in this way before. 
This framework provides a new perspective on institutions for inclusive financial market 
development, for example, it shows there is nothing at the constitutional level which specifically 
addresses inclusion. Indeed, the differentiation between levels opens up challenging questions 
about what are appropriate levels for institutions supporting financial inclusion?  For example, 
does the function of financial consumer protection need to become a constitutional function for 
financial inclusion?  What this framework cannot do, however, is provide insight into the relative 
importance of these different functions for increasing financial inclusion.  
 
On the issues of property rights, it is worth pointing out that the conventional wisdom of property 
rights being critical for financial market development is changing. The form of property rights for 
the financial market is now considered to be less important than the function of loan contract 
enforcement (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.152). After Hernado de Soto’s (2000) book, “The 
Mystery of Capital”, many assumed providing land title would give increased access to credit. But 
land titling has, unfortunately, not fulfiled the hope of enabling poor farmers to use their land as 
collateral (Platteau 2000 p.181, Guirkinger 2008 p. 1448) Farm households still face myriad risks, 
combined with the high cost of formal loan application and the inability of banks to offer low risk 
loans to borrowers. Even though several cross country regressions on key institutions show 
property rights critical to economic growth (Rajan & Zingales 2003. Rodrik et al , 2004, Redek 
and Sušjan 2005,), Rodrik et al  (2004) were careful to point out that it was the function of what 
they termed “credibly signaling that property rights will be respected” (ibid p. 157) was much 
more important. Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008 p. 152) conclude that “the single reform of titling has 
in these documented cases not had the impact anticipated in the literature.” So the options are 
either a comprehensive set of policy reforms or shortcuts to improve the functioning of the credit 
market by improving loan contract enforcement.  
 
The purpose of populating this framework was both to facilitate our theoretical understanding of 
institutions and, at the same time, to test its use as a heuristic device for applied research. On its 
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 On regulation, Bateman (2011 p. 4) argues that the function of microfinance regulation should be to 
ensure “local financial institutions act in a manner conducive to sustainable local economic development 
and to building and retaining local social capital”. In other words, it is no longer adequate for the function of 
regulation to be compliance with the Basel Common Principles (Basel Committee 2011) as required under 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.aspx [Accessed 
on 25 April 2012]), but microfinance regulation should take the next step to actively promote local 
economic development. These ideas are still at an early stage and the pragmatic outworking of such ideas 
has yet to be done, but these proposals are consistent with the broader political commitments to greater 
inclusion. 
 
 52 
theoretical contribution, Table 1 does enable the links to be made between social or local informal 
institutions and other institutions. For example: a culture of transparency greatly facilitates 
enforcement of the operational regulations requiring accurate audited financial statements or; 
gender norms are key determinants in access to payment systems or that; corruption has a 
fundamental effect on the effectiveness of mobile collateral registries. But it is a static framework 
so it cannot define those relationships. It also raises questions about path-dependent approaches to 
institutional change theory because it shows spaces for change between different levels and 
because the constitutional and operational functions are clearly different so will require 
differentiated change processes. On whether this framework is a useful heuristic device for 
framing the institutions for financial inclusion, the examples above show its usefulness and it does 
facilitate the comparison of institutional functions at the different levels across markets. Such a 
comparison will be undertaken in the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets.  
 
The first four sections of this chapter provided the theoretical foundation for this research. The 
subsequent two sections considered a range of frameworks for categorizing and comparing 
institutions across markets and choose Williamson’s (2000) as the one that is best able to 
incorporate the theoretical understanding of social norms, to use institutional functions instead of 
forms and to work as a heuristic device for applied research on institutions for financial inclusion. 
The framework was populated with research data and more than adequately achieved its purposes. 
Interestingly the framework also appears to challenge path-dependent theories of institutional 
change processes which are discussed in the following section.  
 
2.7 Theories of institutional change  
The different levels of institutions forces researchers raises the issue of how institutional change 
might be different for each level, which requires the theoretical question of how institutions 
change to be answered first. In the previous chapter current practices in institutional change 
generally and specifically in financial market development were described and assessed as largely 
failing. So there is a need to step back and find new theoretical frameworks for institutional 
change, which in turn will be assessed to see if they provide more useful practices for institutional 
change.  Shirley (2005 p.631) comments that the “specifics of institutional change fall through a 
gap in the literature”, which is not surprising given the speed with which the field has developed. 
But it is still a gap which must be filled so in the next section three types of institutional change 
theories will be identified and two recent theories are examined and critiqued. These two theories 
were identified because they address the limitations of earlier theories and include important 
advancements on the current theoretical understanding of institutional development. As funders’ 
efforts to undertake institutional change have had many reported failings, an assessment of 
relevant theoretical models is a necessary step to making improvements to institutional change 
practices.  
 
The three institutional schools of thought identified by Hall and Taylor (1996) and outlined above 
provide Mahoney and Thelen (2010) a basis for analyzing more recent theories of institutional 
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change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) find that all three categories of research provide useful 
answers for what sustains institutions over time and cases in which exogenous shocks prompt 
institutional change. They identify some convergence between the approaches, for example, 
rational-choice researchers see the value of including the power dimension of historical 
institutionalism and the institutional entrepreneurship of the sociological institutionalism in their 
analyses. But none of the approaches has, according to Mahoney and Thelen, developed a theory 
of gradual change. This is because each approach assumes that only an exogenous shock to the 
economy, such as war or other crisis or disaster, can challenge basic institutional stability and 
bring about “radical institutional reconfigurations” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p.2)  
 Sociological institutionalists, interested in “non-codified, informal conventions and collective 
scripts that regulate human behavior” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p 5), often point to an 
exogenous entity or force which imposes their alternative scripts on the pre-existing ones.  But 
a framework has not yet been developed for understanding what makes some of the pre-
existing scripts more vulnerable to the imposition of new scripts than others.  
 Historical institutionalists emphasize the importance of historical processes when studying 
institutions “over a substantial stretch of years, maybe even many decades or centuries” 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002, p. 698). But Greif and Laitin (2004) find that the historical 
institutionalist focus on process is “inadequate” to answer questions of how and why 
institutions change. Scholars have tended to frame change in terms of enduring historical 
pathways periodically punctuated by discontinuous shocks. As remarked above, Powelson’s 
power diffusion process falls firmly into this category as he considers it takes centuries to 
change apart from an exogenous shock. 
 Rational-Choice institutionalists also typically focus on the exogenous shock as the trigger to 
institutional change. Williamson states that there are “rare windows of opportunity to effect 
broad reform… such as massive discontent, civil wars, occupation, breakdowns, a military 
coup or a financial crisis” (Williamson, 2000 p.598 ). Greif and Laitin’s (2004 p.633) analysis 
of a typical rational choice approach was that changes in self-enforcing institutions “must 
have an exogenous origin”.81 But Greif and Laitin (2004), like Ostrom (1990, 2000)82 (and 
earlier Hayek) differentiate themselves from other rational-choice institutionalists as they have 
identified the possibility of endogenously emergent institutional change.  
 
Chang (2011) concurs with the historical institutionalists that path dependence “operates at a more 
fundamental level than we normally think”, and that “the constitutive role of institutions, the 
inherent change resistance of designed institutions and the interdependence between institutions” 
(ibid p. 18) means that institutional change does not happen easily. He concludes that the 
dominant practice of institutional transfers approach to institutional change is fundamentally at 
odds with everything we know about institutions. But he does not agree that only exogenous 
shocks can change institutions, a position he refers to as “unduly fatalistic” and “simplistic” (ibid 
p.22). He points to elements in a country’s institutional complex that internally generate change as 
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 Greif (2006) also critiques North’s monolithic and immutable view of cultural norms that does not 
recognize endogenous mechanisms for institutional change. This immutable view of cultural norms is one of 
the reasons for North’s focus on “path dependence” in institutional change discussed below. 
82
 To Ostrom exogenous appears to mean outside the nested set of rules and norms which comprise the 
action arena, which would which gives even greater space for change. 
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well as the effect of economic development and to human agency. He is following Greif and 
Laitin (20004) and others in identifying the importance of endogenous change and following 
Cleaver (2002) in identifying the dynamic human “bricoleurs” (ibid p.11) who create “institutional 
bricolages”, multi-purpose institutions which intersect both economic and social, formal and 
informal, tradition and modern domains. Chang (2011 p.494) concludes: “[o]nly theories that take 
both structural constraints and real human agencies seriously can help us”. Two recent theories 
which attempt to meet this standard are critiqued in the following sections  
 
2.7.1 Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) purpose is to create a gradual theory of institutional change that 
builds on common themes in all three schools of institutional thought but, most importantly, 
moves beyond the theoretical view of institutional change that is is path dependent until 
punctuated by exogenous shocks. They build on Greif and Laitin’s (2004) work which focuses on 
endogenous sources of change. Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) critique of Greif and Laitin’s 
(2004) framework is that it has no predictive power whereas Mahoney and Thelen (2010) claim 
their theory of gradual institutional change, in contrast, has some predictive power.  
 
Their central argument is that the basic properties of institutions contain within them the 
possibility for change, particularly “the power-distributional implications of the institutions” that 
animates the change (ibid. p.14). To support this argument they carefully identify several 
attributes of institutions which allow space for change including: 
 Whether institutions are rules or norms, they will have unequal implications for resource 
allocation and ongoing mobilization of resources is needed to maintain institutions and their 
relative position vis a vis other institutions, so this creates space between institutions for 
change. 
 Actors with different endowments pursue different kinds of institutions and the institutions 
created reflect the relative power of those different actors (sometimes as a result of conflict), 
which creates space for change. For example an independent central bank usually has strong 
veto power in the financial market institutions but not with welfare institutions. 
 Actors face information processing limits and cannot foresee all the future possible situations 
that the rules as written will be asked to address, so new situations will challenge those rules. 
 Institutions represent compromises that are always vulnerable to shifts and are inherently 
dynamic.  
 Formal rules are embedded in social norms that are often only implicit understandings held by 
the relevant community, so leave space for change. 
 The enforcement mechanisms (or compliance) for the rules or norms are a separate variable 
and have their own dynamic of potential change. 
 Enforcement is typically undertaken by actors other than the designers – who may contest or 
be uncertain about enforcement, so this creates space for interpretation and thus change to 
occur in implementation. 
 Rules and norms can never be precise enough to cover all the complexities of life which 
complicates enforcement / compliance. 
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Given that enforcement can be uncertain or contested, the meaning of an institution can be 
undecided, an actor’s interest in continuity may be equivocal and, that institutions are nested - 
there are multiple spaces where change can occur. This approach recognizes that the source of 
institutional change does not need to be exogenous, by any definition of the term.  
 
However, there are two other aspects of institutions which contribute space where change can 
occur, neglected in both the mainstream discourse and also by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). These 
are the multiple functions of institutional forms (Chang, 2007) and the differences in spaces at the 
different levels of institutions. The functional multiplicity of institutional forms may make the task 
of institution building difficult, but with the flexibility to perform multiple functions also comes 
the flexibility to provide some space for change
83
. In addition, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) do not 
appear to have recognized that different levels of institutions may have distinctive spaces or that 
there may be spaces between nested levels. For example, they note that rules and norms can never 
be precise enough to cover all the complexities – but how does the space created differ between, 
say, a law and a social norm?  Furthermore, spaces for change could be expanded if the 
endogenous institutional change involves power sharing. Cornwall (in Hickey and Mohan (eds) 
2004) noted how participatory approaches to development were explicitly “creating spaces where 
there were previously none, about enlarging spaces where they were previously limited 
opportunities” (ibid p. 77) to create “innovations in institutional design” (ibid p.85). So these 
spaces for change identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) are not static as engagement in those 
spaces can generate increased opportunities for change.  
 
Mahoney and Thelen go on to create a typology of four ways institutions change:  Drift - neglect 
of old rules; Displacement - removal of old rules and introduction of new ones; Conversion - 
changed impact of old rules; Layering- introduction of new rules on top of old ones. Institutions 
will change in these ways depending on two key parameters: the possibility of the change being 
vetoed and the level of discretion in the institution’s enforcement characteristics84. This is 
presented in a two by two matrix -see Table 2 below. The matrix shows, for example, that when 
there is a strong likelihood that any institutional change will face a political veto and there is little 
discretion in how the institution is enforced, change will more likely come from adding another 
layer of rules.  
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 Mahoney and Thelen (2010) do not use the terms institutional form and institutional function but in their 
examples they do outline institutional functions. For example, “the laws were designed to ..... bolster the 
voice and power of labour at the plant level” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p. 27) 
84
 Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p.19 are careful to state that this typology applies both to formal and informal 
institutions as there are also social actors with veto power.  In addition to players, veto possibility also 
means veto points. 
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Table 2 Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of institutional change 
  
Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
of the Political 
Context 
 Low level of interpretation/ 
enforcement  discretion  
High level of interpretation/ 
enforcement  discretion 
Strong Veto 
possibilities 
Introduction of new rules on top 
of old ones  
- Layering 
Neglect of existing / old  rules 
-  Drift 
Weak Veto 
possibilities 
Removal of old rules and 
introduction of new ones 
- Displacement 
Active change in functions of 
existing rules  
- Conversion 
 
 Source: Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p.19 
 
When discussing institutional change Chang (2007 p.9) states that “human agents are certainly 
capable of developing ideational discourses that are not totally ‘structurally’ determined”.  
Recognizing the role of human agency, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have created an additional 
typology of human change agents, either internal or external, whom they classify as either seeking 
to preserve the institution or not and either following the institutional rules or not
85
. Although 
useful to identify different types of change agents and their associated strategies Mahoney and 
Thelen only describe this part of their theory as one that “calls attention” to the different types of 
change agents, in contrast to the “crucially important” (ibid p. 31) focus given to the two other 
aspects described above.   
 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory is useful because it describes ways an institution can change over 
time driven by several endogenous attributes (listed above) and they have identified the most 
important factors as the strength of veto power degree and degree of enforcement discretion, 
recognizing human agency.  The typology can provide guidance about what type of change 
process is possible given the amount of veto power and level of enforcement discretion. For 
example, if there little possibility of a veto and low enforcement discretion it would make sense to 
try to remove old rules and get new rules passed instead – the displacement option. Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) give a range of historical examples of institutional change to support their theory 
from the British House of Lords to a package of laws passed in France in 1981. This range of 
examples implies that the authors have an ambition for their theory to apply to an equivalent range 
of situations as they also believe it has the potential for some predictive power. 
 
Two key points appear to be is missing from this theory however; a discussion of time frames 
within which their theory operates and, the link between their theoretical recognition of the power-
distributional implications of institutions and changed institutions. In other words, what are the 
processes which translate their theory into changed institutions? This missing link is hardly 
surprising because, as yet, no consensus on what type of institutional change processes are 
effective in tapping the spaces for change, nor what role external development agents could 
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 The four categories of change agents identified are: Insurrectionaries, Symbionts, Subversives and 
Opportunists. 
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usefully play, although there is some interesting research on the issue (Bastiaensen et al , 2005, 
Eversole 2010, Crook and Booth 2011). 
 
2.7.2 Boettke, Coyne and Leeson’s regression theorem of institutional stickiness  
In contrast, Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008) have focused on theorizing “the missing how” of 
institutional change (ibid p. 331). They too acknowledge the key features of each of the three 
schools of thought (although they do not classify them in this way)
 86
. Coming from the rational-
choice school of thought, they recognize the importance of path dependence, but they also 
embrace sociological and historical institutionalism in their recognition of the importance of 
embedded norms and history to institutional change recognizing that culture and history matter. 
They theorize that institutional changes are more likely to “stick” (ibid p. 343) when the process is 
indigenously developed and endogenous. They consider endogenous institutions as those which 
“emerge spontaneously as the result of individuals’ actions, but are not formally designed. Thus, 
by their nature, endogenous institutions are indigenously introduced.” (ibid p.335)  In contrast 
“exogenous institutions are constructed and imposed from above.” (ibid p.335).  Indigenously 
introduced endogenous (IEN) institutions will “stick” because they are close to the mētis i.e. 
culture, norms, and conventions. In contrast foreign introduced exogenous (FEX) institutions will 
rarely stick because they are so far away from the culture. In between are the indigenous 
introduced exogenous (IEX) institutions which are more likely to stick because they have formal 
authority (e.g. internal policies created by national governments). They recognize that these are 
purely conceptual categories as shown in Figure 2 below
87
 that will change over time and be 
different in different places.  
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 Boettke et al  (2008) consider their work as following that of Hayek in the “spontaneous” institutional 
change category as well as that of Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2000) and James Scott (1998) who have highlighted 
the importance and success of endogenously-emergent institutions (ibid p.5). In addition they recognize 
their work is consistent with the recent work of North (2005). 
87
The labels for their categories IEN, IEX and FEX are confusing and do not help the reader easily come to 
terms with their argument and using the term metis instead of culture appears pompous! However, these 
issues should not detract from their theory. 
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Figure 2 Boettke, Coyne and Leeson’s theorem of institutional stickiness  
 
 
Source: Boettke et al  2008 p. 344 
 
In summary, they theorize that new institutions are more likely to “stick” the closer the design is 
to the existing culture and the greater the degree to which is seen to be endogenous.    
 
This theorem appears to embody Chang’s (2007), Woolcock (2009b) and Booth’s (2011) views 
that “institutions work better when they build on what exists, make use of indigenous institutional 
creativity or are otherwise rooted in their sociocultural context. They work badly when they rely 
heavily on the implantation, without major modification, of models that have worked well in other 
times and places.” Booth (2011 p.2 )  In order to gain legitimacy, “the new institution has to have 
some resonance with the existing culture/institutions,” (Chang 2007 p.30) Chang sees this as 
limiting the possible scope of institutional innovation but it still gives room for innovation within 
these parameters. This recognition that for the institutional change to stick it has to be close to the 
culture also means that congruence with social norms is essential. (However, there is no explicit 
recognition of the different levels of institutions discussed above, the theory is effectively 
demonstrating that the norms in the culture are all important and that institutional change without 
them will not stick.)  
 
By using an impressive range of historical examples, Boettke et al  (2008) show that their theorem 
correctly identifies the stickiness of institutional change.  However, they provide only very general 
guidance to those who want to catalyze institutional change - be they governments or donors – as 
to how to maximize the chances of the institutional change sticking.  In the following section, 
these two theories will be examined in the light of empirical institutional change examples to 
assess whether they can be usefully applied. 
Metis or Culture 
Indigenously designed and 
Endogenously introduced (IEN) 
institutions 
Indigenously designed and 
Exogenous introduced (IEX) 
institutions 
Foreign designed and 
Exogenously introduced (FEX) 
institutions 
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2.8 Applying institutional change theories 
Roland (2000) analyzed what had been learned about institutional change during the transition 
process to a market economy in many of the economies of central and eastern Europe. He 
compares the approaches to transition based on what he terms the Washington Consensus which 
others refer to as the “exogenous shock” approach with the “Evolutionary-Institutionalist” 
approach, similar to Boettke’s IEN category. The Washington Consensus approach was external 
agents designing new institutional rules based on a ‘market economy’. But the political elite either 
did not have the power or did not want to enforce those reforms. The goal was what Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) categorize as the “Displacement” type of institutional change, but their theory does 
not tell us how to assess whether this change would last. Roland (2000) contrasts this approach 
with what he calls the “Evolutionary-Institutionalist” approach to institutional change which 
means working with the existing institutions and enabling them to adapt – not forcing them to 
change. This is consistent with Boettke’s theory of indigenous and endogenous institutional 
change. What Boettke et al ’s theory tells us is that since the adaptations were co-designed with 
local leaders – indigenous - and the design was an endogenous adaptation not an exogenous 
design, (IEN), then it should “stick”. Roland found that the Evolutionary-Institutionalist approach 
was indeed more effective at bringing about effective institutions. 
 
McDermott’s (2007) analysis of institutional change focuses specifically on the responses to 
banking crises in Hungary and the Czech Republic and compares them to Poland. He found that 
the ‘participatory restructuring’ approach used by the Polish authorities fostered innovative, cost-
effective monitoring structures for recapitalization, a strong supervisory system, and a stable, 
expanding banking sector. The process of ‘participatory restructuring’ was based on “distributed 
authority and rules of information sharing” (ibid p.220) and used “collective problem solving and 
mutual monitoring” (ibid p.222).  The keys were: transparency and information sharing; 
accountability; conditionality; mutual evaluation and learning. To use Boettke’s terminology, the 
institutional change was indigenously developed and endogenous because the changes arose from 
the banks themselves so there was a high probability that they will “stick”. To apply Mahoney and 
Thelen’s terminology there was flexibility in how the enforcement was designed and weak 
political veto power so the goal was again “Displacement” but with ability to assess whether it 
would last. 
 
Grindle's (2001, 2007) research focuses on the political economy of institutional change in 
developing economies. Initially in 2002 she realized not enough was known about institutional 
change so urged politicial economists to “consider where the initiative for institutional change 
comes from, how new institutional models are created” (Grindle 2001 p. 372). By 2007, building 
on her 2004 “good enough governance” agenda, she urged that before embarking on a process of 
institutional change good political economy analysis was needed and that analysis needed to bear 
on the change process (Grindle 2007, p. 569).  Also before embarking on an institutional change 
process Grindle states it is critical to “identify domestic sources of leadership and strategic action 
for reform” (ibid p. 571)88. In Boettke’s terminology, the change process advocated by Grindle is 
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 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a,b) have also found that political elites will stop externally imposed 
institutional change when their power is threatened. 
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one that is indigenously introduced, although it may be exogenous in origin, which will give it the 
best chance of sticking. According to Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory, Grindle is suggesting 
that institutional change will be most productive when there is weak political veto power (since 
the leadership supports the change) and yet al so a high level of discretion about enforcement 
(since enforcement is within their discretion). The outcome would then indeed be an active change 
in functions of existing rules.  Therefore, it seems both theories seem to apply to the institutional 
change processes Grindle has recommended. 
 
Before rushing to prescribe solutions without a basis, Chang (2007 p.4) takes a step back. He says 
“[w]e need more case studies on actual experiences of institution building…..from the recent 
experiences of developing countries themselves”. Again in 2011 Chang appeals for more attention 
to be paid to the “real world” and to “recognize the complexity of the nature and the evolution of 
culture and institutions” (Chang 2011 p.494). Similarly Portes and Smith (2008) argue that the 
functions of specific institutions within particular markets over time need to be examined and 
Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom and Shivakumar (2005), advocate for donors to support “research on 
indigenous institutions, norms, and local knowledge systems” (ibid p.232)  to provide essential 
understanding for building contemporary institutions
89
. The value of historical and social research 
is also consistent with Grindle’s (2007) findings.90  The most productive option would be to 
follow Chang’s (2007, 2011) and Grindle’s (2007) recommendations together and undertake more 
developing country case studies, carefully understanding the context and content, with the specific 
goal of testing recent institutional change theories.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
This research is situated where historical institutionalism and rational choice (or post-rational 
choice) institutionalism converge. Deficiencies of current institutional change theories which 
focus on extremes in these institutional approaches were addressed. Two new theories at this 
convergence were promulgated and critiqued. They both integrate rational choice institutional 
concepts, recognize the persistence of institutions and the power distributional aspect of change, 
and include social norms.  These theories are consistent with the definition of institutions chosen, 
and can accommodate the precision needed to separate institutional form and function, which has 
not been adequately addressed before. Institutional changes in the Bosnia and Uganda case studies 
will be used as real world tests of the usefulness of these theories. 
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 It now appears that Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) recommendation to make aid contingent on good 
policies, negates both the accountability of governments to their own people and local institution building-
processes. 
90
 One example of a donor following this recommendation to research indigenous institutions, norms, and 
local knowledge systems is described by Adler et al (2009) in Indonesia and Cambodia.  They took this step 
as part of a process to try to “identify effective strategies for institutional reform that derive their content 
and legitimacy from the historical and cultural context in which they are embedded, and which take 
seriously the need to provide tangible incentives and transparent rules systems to structure and mediate 
interaction between parties when their respective interests, resources and power may be otherwise 
qualitatively different and/or fundamentally misaligned.” (ibid p.25) 
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A survey of the institutional functions identified as important for the financial market to reach low 
income clients was presented. This fills a surprising gap in the literature on institutions for 
financial market development. It was presented using Williamson’s (2000) framework which 
usefully identifies four different institutional levels for institutional mapping. This framework 
shows, for example, that no research was found on constitutional institutions that specifically 
address financial inclusion. It also highlights the social norms which have been identified as 
affecting financial inclusion. This is consistent with theoretical recognition that markets are 
embedded in social norms, a critical issue for financial inclusion which has been neglected in 
much analysis.  This framework will also be used in the analysis of microfinance markets in 
Bosnia and Uganda to compare the institutional functions across markets. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
This chapter makes the case for a social contructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology in 
the analysis of institutions, and for a micro-ethnographic methodology to answer the research 
questions. It argues that ethnographic methods will best enable the role of social norms within the 
microfinance market to be explored in depth, as well as provide the market participants’ 
perspectives on the effectiveness of the formal constitutional and operational rules. The criteria for 
and choice of the two case study microfinance markets are examined and the process of data 
collection and analysis is reported. It builds on the previous chapter’s review of the literature on 
our understanding of the institutions for inclusive financial market development and of 
institutional change theories.  
 
3.1 Ontology and epistemology for institutional research 
Grindle (2007 p.555) states that “Methodological choices about how to study the issue of 
governance and development have considerable impact on findings”. Therefore a discussion of the 
merits of different ontological and epistemological foundations for studying institutions in 
financial markets is an important starting point. Grindle (2007) also highlights the different results 
generated by “large cross-country statistical analyses” as against the “country case studies and 
focused comparisons among a limited number of countries to explore what can be learned from 
their governance and development histories.” (ibid p.555) These two methods reflect differing 
ontological and epistemological world views and addressing them is critical to a robust 
methodological foundation.   
 
3.1.1 Positivist financial markets research  
An objectivist ontology “asserts that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that 
is independent of social actors” (Bryman 2004 p.16); they have the characteristics of an object.  
Even culture “has tangible reality of its own” (ibid).  An objectivist ontology is typically 
associated with a positivist epistemology which applies the methods of natural sciences to social 
sciences. It assumes “an objective external world that exists independently of human perception 
that is amenable to measurement” (Gilbert, 2001 p.32) and uses the experimental method. 
 
Researchers with an objectivist ontology and positivist epistemology studying financial markets 
typically take a deductive approach to the development of theory. They use standard ‘objective’ 
indicators to measure financial market development and undertake quantitative analysis of those 
indicators using experimental methods. As discussed in the previous two chapters, there is a 
substantial body of work on the relationship between financial market development and economic 
growth using cross country studies; panel and time-series investigations as well as industry and 
firm level analyses (Levine 2005).  The cross-country studies test hypotheses about this 
relationship and come to conclusions such as “in countries with better developed financial 
intermediaries, the income of the lowest quintile grows faster than average GDP per capita and 
income inequality falls more rapidly (Beck, Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt 2004 p. 21). Honohan 
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(2004 p. 30) states that “[p]robing financial development by means of cross-country regressions 
has greatly enriched our understanding of the processes most likely to be at work”.   Grindle (2007 
p.555) also considers that large cross-country statistical analyses are “perhaps the most influential 
strand” of recent development thinking (still recognizing the “problems of definition, 
measurement and inference”).  But “one problem plaguing the entire study of finance and growth 
pertains to the proxies for financial development.” (Levine 2005 p.922)91. Too frequently 
empirical measures of financial development do not measure the financial functions deemed 
important by theory. In other words, there are serious challenges with the indicators used for 
financial development in cross-country studies and the inference that they measure financial 
development. 
 
When it comes to a positivist study of institutions in financial markets, Shirley (2005 p.633) 
acknowledges that thanks to the “cross-country studies coupled with increasingly detailed 
databases, we are progressing in understanding how specific institutions affect specific behavior”. 
But the challenges of finding proxies for institutions are also complex. Shirley (2005 p.626) finds 
that “many of the explanatory variables are not institutions” at all and researchers “seldom provide 
evidence that these variables should be seen as proxies”. Furthermore, because institutions affect 
economic performance the analysis of institutions is “plagued by the endogeneity of institutions to 
growth” (Casson et al  2010 p.137 ).  
  
Notwithstanding the challenges, data sets of ordinal indicators of institutional quality have been 
compiled and are used in analyzing causal effects in economic growth and financial markets. For 
example the Institutional Reform and Informal Sector (IRIS) Center of the University of Maryland 
publishes institutional quality indicators monthly in the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG)
92
. The ICRG indicators are: (i) Corruption, (ii) Rule of Law
93
, (iii) Bureaucratic Quality, 
(iv) Government Repudiation of Contracts, and (v) Risk of Expropriation. Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2008) at the World Bank Institute have also developed WGIs where governance is 
defined as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in the country is exercised” (ibid p.7) 
The December 2007 indicators were sourced from thirty five data sources that measure aspects of 
institutional quality.  The six indicators are: 1. Voice and accountability
94
; 2. Political stability and 
absence of violence
95
; 3. Government effectiveness
96
; 4. Regulatory quality - measured by “the 
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 For example, how can “private credit” (which tracks the total amount of private credit from financial 
intermediaries to the private sector, and is used by Beck at al 2007) be an indicator of the development of 
the whole financial sector when it could just be measuring increases in lending to large companies? 
92
 According to Demetriades and Law (2006) these indicators follow Knack and Keefer’s (1995) approach.  
93
 According to Andrianova et al  (2008 p.232) this indicator “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a 
country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes”. Higher scores indicate: “sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an 
orderly succession of power”. Low scores indicate “a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal 
means to settle claims”. 
94
 Voice and accountability - measured by: ability to select government, freedom of expression and 
association and a free media (Kaufmann et al, 2008 p.7).  
95
 Political stability and absence of violence - measured by: “likelihood the government will be destabilized 
by unconstitutional and violent means, including terrorism” (Kaufmann et al, 2008 p.7).  
96
 Government effectiveness - measured by: “quality of public services, capacity of civil service and 
independence from political pressures and the quality of policy formation”. (Kaufmann et al, 2008 p.7). 
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ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al, 2008 p.7);  5. Rule of law - measured 
by “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”; and 6. Control of corruption 97.   
 
The ICRG and WGI indicators are highly correlated (Rodrik et al  2004 p. 138) and have been 
used extensively by donors and policy makers to track aspects of their institutional performance 
over time.  For example, Rodrik et al  (2004) used Kaufman et al ’s (2002) QGI indicators for 
their landmark study showing that “institutions rule”.  Demetriades and Law (2006 p. 250) used 
the ICRG indicators to conclude that financial development has larger effects on GDP per capita 
when the financial system is embedded within a “sound institutional framework”. Andrianova et 
al  (2008 p. 244) used subsets of both the ICRG indicators and the Kaufmann et al  (2006) 
indicators to measure institutional quality, as “the overall quality of regulation or the broader rule 
of law indicator, and stringent disclosure requirements”.98  Although these findings are useful, 
they “cannot tell us which [institutional] arrangements are right for which group of countries at 
which stage in their development process” (Booth 2011 p.3)99 which is why Pande and Udry 
(2006 p.350) have argued that this work is complete.  
 
Furthermore, Chang (2006 p.3) points out that Kaufman’s indicators “mix up variables that 
capture the differences in the forms of institutions (e.g., democracy, independent judiciary, 
absence of state ownership) and the functions that they perform (e.g., rule of law, respect for 
private property, enforceability of contracts, maintenance of price stability, the restraint on 
corruption).” Shirley (2005) further questions whether these are actually measuring institutions at 
all and questions why they might be proxies for institutions
100
. Of particularly importance for this 
study, are the critiques by Williamson (2000) Greif (2006), Casson et al  (2010) and others, that 
social norms in which the institutional framework is embedded, have largely been ignored, treated 
as a black box or taken as given. Without explicit means to include the underlying social norms 
and their enforcement characteristics into this analysis, actions based on this positivist approach 
will be fundamentally flawed.   
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 Control of corruption – is measured by “the extent to which public power is used for private gain 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private 
interests.” (Kaufmann et al, 2008 p.7). 
98
 In addition to the quantitative work on institutions and financial markets there has also been quantitative 
work on the effect of donor interventions on institutions. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) use ICRG 
institutional data and econometric techniques to assess their hypotheses about the institutional impact of 
high levels of aid to Sub Saharan Africa. They find “two major effects of aid: institutional weakening and 
perverse incentives. The high transaction costs that accompany aid programs, as well as the fragmentation, 
poaching, and other direct effects of a large number of donors competing for the typical aid-dependent 
government’s limited number of high-level, skilled officials, can weaken institutions that were not strong to 
begin with. (Bräutigam and Knack 2004 p. 277) 
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 More pointedly, Booth (2011 p. 3) questions whether good advice on governance for development can be 
derived by fitting trend lines to large sets of cross-national statistical data.  
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 Although  Rodrik (2004), exceptionally, argues that the indicator for the quality of property rights more 
accurately measures the degree to which the institutional function of protecting property will be enforced. 
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The cross-country regressions use an ontological and epistemological framework that has 
limitations for studying institutions because they are attempting to measure an “objective external 
world that exists independently of human perception” (Gilbert, 2001 p.32).  Institutions are 
embedded within culture, which is dependent on human perception. We therefore need to move 
beyond cross-country studies to “explore the heterogeneity of institutions in different countries, 
which is best achieved through studies based on micro-data” (Casson et al , 2010 p. 137).  
Campbell (2007 p.561) argues that "If one is interested in determining the degree to which an 
institution as a set of rules, monitoring and enforcement procedures has changed, then tracking 
objective indicators will suffice” But he goes on… “If one is interested in determining the degree 
to which an institution as a meaning system has changed, or whether actors believe that an 
institution is legitimate, then tracking the subjective perceptions of the actors involved is more 
important. It all depends on the dimensions of the institution with which the analyst is concerned.. 
An interpretivist epistemology which allows measurement of “the subjective meaning” (Bryman 
2004 p.13) of what is being researched, would appear better able to identify embedded social 
institutions than a positivist epistemology.  
 
3.1.2 Interpretivist financial markets research 
A social constructionist ontology believes “everything we consider real is socially constructed” 
(Gergen and Gergen, 2004, p.10). In other words, “social phenomena and meanings are 
constructed by the perceptions and actions of social actors and are in a constant state of revision” 
(Bryman, 2004, p.17). They are not independent of human perception. From a practitioners 
perspective, “the world is as we see it and as we construct it through interaction with others” 
(Drinkwater 2003 p.64).  Burr (1995) takes social constructionism a step further and argues it 
should also be an epistemology because “our experience of the world is….intangible without the 
framework of language to give it structure and meaning”.  An interpretivist epistemology, 
however, does not consider language to be the only means of interpreting our experience of the 
world, but rather it “requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” 
(Bryman 2004 p.13).  
 
A social constructionist ontology together with an interpretivist epistemology for institutional 
analysis, means researchers can use a range of qualitative methods in “attempting to makes sense 
of, or interpret, phenomena [i.e. institutions] in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005 p.3).  It takes an inductive approach to the development of theory. The 
two best example of this approach to analyzing institutions in financial markets are by Ensminger 
(1992) and Johnson (2005a,b). Ensminger’s (1992) landmark ethnographic study of the making of 
a market in a formerly nomadic culture is meticulous in its detail.  Ensminger finds that "The 
speed and success of their economic transition are controlled not just by technological innovation, 
the adoption of new governmental institutions, and entrepreneurial ingenuity, but also by the 
process by which the new institutions are legitimized" (ibid p.180).  This process is embedded in 
the social structure. She concludes that “in the real world economist’s predictions falter because of 
the unanticipated consequences of institutional, organizational and ideological constraints, as well 
as the pre-existing distribution of power.” Johnson (2005a) undertook a qualitative institutional 
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analysis of the financial markets of Karatina, Kenya to understand the “the embeddedness of 
financial intermediaries in social relations” (Johnson 2005a p. 357). She systematically analyzed 
how the rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of financial intermediaries are 
“embedded in wider social relations and in cultural and political factors” so that the performance 
of the market could be better explained (ibid p.373). In other words Johnson was able to explain 
how these embedded institutions structured the market. The Ensminger and Johnson studies both 
used qualitative approaches with an interpretivist epistemology to understand institutional change 
in financial markets, and both included social norms and their enforcement characteristics in their 
analyses and also identified the means by which the social institutions effected change.
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Therefore, qualitative approaches are entirely appropriate to use to answer the research question 
about how rules and norms have changed. 
 
Qualitative methods are also appropriate for answering the research question about the role of 
external funders in institutional change.  Birdsall (2007) comments that: “outsiders are unlikely to 
help if they try to push institutional forms and norms that have worked for them, in one place and 
time, as the solution for others at another place and time”. (ibid p.7)  Similarly Shirley (2005 
p.631) observes that “absent a powerful local supporter however there are few instances where aid 
or advice alone has made enduring improvements in another country’s embedded institutions”.  It 
would seem, therefore, that only researchers who are able to understand embedded social 
institutions will be able to assess the relative role donor agencies may have played in catalyzing 
institutional change in financial markets.  
 
These questions require an approach that will make the process of change visible and “make sense 
of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005, p.3). They need the multiple research methods of qualitative research to provide the rich, 
thick and triangulated understanding of the complexity of answers from different social actors. 
Qualitative research is also particularly appropriate for inductive research agendas which seek to 
build towards the theories that will consolidate new institutional economics’ position within 
economics (Furubotn and Richter, 2005), as this study does
102
.  
 
3.1.3 Adopting an interpretivist epistemology - reflexively 
Qualitative researchers understand that “researchers own accounts of the social world are 
constructions” (Bryman, 2004, p.17), that any research which “presupposes an objective or value 
free observer is invalid” (Drinkwater 2003, p.64).  So “research is an interactive process shaped 
by his or her own personal history, biography, gender, social class, race and ethnicity and those of 
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from institutional analyisis which takes on the broad sweep of institutional development in human history 
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2006a) 
102 Wolcott (2001, p.75) urges researchers to “hold off on introducing theory” until it is quite clear how it 
relates directly to what there is to report, which is what has been done in this study. 
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the people in the setting” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.6). Before continuing I therefore need to 
provide a summary personal history to elucidate my cultural context in constructing the research 
design. I am a Caucasian Australian/British/American woman who has worked in the field of 
microfinance for the last eighteen years, since graduating from Harvard Business School with an 
MBA. From 1992 to 1996 I was based in New York at an international NGO network of women-
led microfinance organizations and from 1997 to 2010 I worked as an independent microfinance 
consultant and facilitator. As a consultant my primary client has been the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP), a global resource centre for microfinance housed at the World Bank and 
funded by over 35 development agencies. I have also worked for many of the major multilateral 
and bilateral funding agencies including: Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Australian Agency 
for International Development (AusAID), DFID, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (the 
German Reconstruction Credit Institute), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
the Soros Foundation. After finishing my field research and analysis I was recruited as the 
Financial Inclusion Adviser to the Australian Co-Chair of the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts 
Group. This enquiry reflects my lived experience of the tremendous growth in awareness of 
microfinance and my close working relationship with CGAP; NGOs; G20 government officials 
and retail providers of financial services for poor clients.  I find an interpretivist epistemology 
liberating. I do not have to pretend to be ‘objective’ but more accurately can acknowledge my 
observations are mediated by my own culture, experience and language (Fontana and Frey 2005). 
I can recognize that the actors in the microfinance markets are the experts on the institutions and 
co-construct the findings with them. 
 
Therefore, qualitative methods will be used that reflect a social constructionist ontology and 
interpretivist epistemology to anwer the research questions.  Bryman (2004 p.268) outlines the 
main steps in qualitative research after identifying the research question and appropriate 
qualitative methodology as site selection; data collection; interpretation of data, conceptual and 
theoretical work (and, if necessary, tighter specification of the research question and collection of 
further data) so this structure provides of the remainder of the chapter. The next section is on how 
the methodlogy decision was made. 
 
3.2 Qualitative methods for institutional research 
In categorizing the major methodological challenges of institutional analysis Ostrom (2005a) has, 
de facto, outlined the requirements of a methodology for institutional analysis. They include:  
“Institutions are invisible”– they exist in the minds of participants and are sometimes shared as 
implicit knowledge or mental models, but they can be deeply buried under the regularities of 
observed behavior. Therefore, researchers need to focus on “rules-in-use” rather than “rules-in-
form”. “Institution” has multiple definitions - some scholars use the term “to refer to an 
organizational entity” and others use the term “to refer to the accepted rules, norms, and strategies 
adopted by individuals operating within or across organizational settings” in repetitive situations 
(Ostrom 2005a p.823). As discussed in the previous chapter this research is using North’s 
definition (1994 p. 360). 
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Institutions can operate at multiple levels and can be nested. “The nested structure of rules within 
rules, within still further rules, is a particularly difficult phenomenon to understand for those 
interested in institutions” (Ostrom 2005a p.825). Thus institutional studies need to encompass 
multiple levels of analysis. Combinations of institutions are configural, not additive which makes 
institutional analysis more complex. Cleaver’s (2002) concept of “institutional bricolages”, multi-
purpose institutions which intersect both economic and social, formal and informal, tradition and 
modern domains is useful here as it recognizes that due to human agency (the dynamic human 
“bricoleurs” (ibid p.11)) institutions do not conform to researcher’s categories. 
 
But Jameson (2006) and Grindle (2001) go further and highlight the particular complexity of 
institutional analysis in development. For them a methodological approach must be able to make 
sense of a wide range of unstable and frequently changing institutions. Jameson (2006 p. 373) 
urges researchers to be open to “a wide range of….institutional structures that can characterize a 
society” and Grindle (2001 p. 355) explains that in developing countries “[i]nstitutional change is 
promoted when actors with power perceive that their interests can be better achieved through 
alternate sets of rules” (ibid p. 362). This could include adopting an institutional blueprint 
recommended by an international funding agency or ensuring rules do not change to maintain 
their own power. 
 
Of the many different possible qualitative methods each has its strengths and weaknesses relative 
to the research questions. For example, one strength of Cooperative Enquiry is that “all those 
involved with enquiry endeavor to act a co-researchers, contributing to the decisions which inform 
the research and the action which is to be studied” (Reason, 2003, p.205). But the value of 
cooperative enquiry is primarily in studying action in the present, not reflecting on change over 
time as this study requires, so is not an option for this research.  Another example is Discourse
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Analysis, a strength of which is that in discourse “power and knowledge are joined together” 
(Carabine, 2001, p.280 citing Foucault 1990). But its weakness for this study is that Discourse 
Analysis is dependent on language alone to give meaning and in financial markets there are also 
other indicators of meaning, such as financial statements. 
 
Following Ostrom (2005a) and Grindle (2001) the research requires a qualitative methodology 
that is able to access rules-in use within the society and economy and is also able to track the 
changes in those rules. Willis and Trondman (2000, p.9) state that “no social relation or process 
can be understood without the mediations of culture”. The observation of a culture (as defined by 
the researcher) has been the mainstay of ethnographic research (Angrosino, 2005). The strength of 
ethnographic methods is its focus on the participant’s perspective, seeing it through their eyes and 
understanding the meaning they give to it all (Spradley, 1980). Currently ethnography 
encompasses both the researcher’s reflexive observations and interviews of informants on issues 
not amenable to observations and the collection of documentation about the group (Bryman 2004 
p.292). This methodology appears to be able to serve the purposes of the research question.  
Ethnography also appears to meet the challenges identified by Ostrom (2005a) Jameson (2006) 
and Grindle (2001) outlined above.  The rules-in-use and their changes can be identified by the 
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the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment” (Hall, 2001 p.72) 
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members of the sub-culture, as well as their configuration at each level in the Williamson 
framework. 
 
Ethnography’s major weakness, however, is that it has historically served as “a metaphor for 
colonial knowledge, for power, and for truth”. (Denzin and Lincoln 2005 p. 1) “The observer went 
to a foreign setting to study the culture customs and habits of another human group.” This was 
often a “racist project”. Thankfully, ethnography as a method has been able to transcend that 
history and become part of a “decolonization” process. (Denzin and Lincoln 2005 p. 2)   Lewis 
and Mosse (2006) state that now ethnographic research “is not constrained to privilege authorized 
interpretations, it can throw light on areas of development practice that are hidden or silenced by 
policy, but are critical to understand how events actually unfold in particular settings” (ibid p.15). 
It can also “bring fresh insights into the social processes of policy, offering a “methodological 
deconstructionism” that draws attention to the nature of policy language (or discourse) that reveals 
how particular policy ideas….work to enrol supporters, … forge political connections and create 
common realities from heterogeneous networks” (ibid p. 15 -16). To achieve this, ethnographers 
need to find ways to write that work “against the typifications of communities” so they are not 
made into “distinct and alien” cultures (Abu-Lughod 2000, p. 262 and 2006) 
 
Wolcott (2001, p.90) introduces the term “micro-ethnography” as a branch of his research 
methodology tree and argues that with a tightly focused research question field-work can range 
from two weeks to a few months (Wolcott (1995) in Bryman, 2004 p 293). He also argues that, 
rather than claiming to demonstrate all the nuances of seasoned ethnographers, micro-ethnography 
type research is best represented as “in the manner of” ethnography (Wolcott, 2001 p.92).  
 
In choosing to use a micro-ethnographic approach one key issue is defining the boundaries of the 
culture or sub-culture to be studied, which will then determine the level of analysis of the 
institutions (Campbell 2004).  Bryman (2004, p.17) importantly points out that under a social 
constuctionist ontology, culture is not an inert objective reality but “an emergent reality in a 
continuous state of construction and reconstruction”. For this research the focus chosen was the 
sub-culture of microfinance service providers within the microfinance market. In my experience 
this sub-culture is distinct because of its purpose to serve poor clients excluded by the formal 
sector (and often funded by donors), and also, the members belong to a local microfinance 
association where their identity as a group is reinforced. They typically track both financial and 
social performance in contrast to the rest of the financial market and stakeholders have historically 
come from non-banking backgrounds. Interestingly, this self-defined subculture does not include 
microfinance clients themselves. The clients, low-income, rural and often illiterate, are engaged in 
other ways but were not part of the microfinance associations and consequently were not included 
in this research. Like other cultures, this one “is always in the process of being formed” (Bryman 
2004 p. 18). At the boundaries of this sub-culture in different markets, organizations and 
individuals may define themselves differently. For example, Equity Bank now has a commercial 
banking license in Uganda, no different than any other commercial bank and yet in 2009 was 
named the “Best Microfinance bank in Africa” at the annual African Banker Awards because of 
its commitment to inclusive financial services. Equity clearly defined itself as a member of the 
microfinance sub-culture. From an institutional perspective it is important to identify boundaries 
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that are both meaningful and pragmatic in answering the research question while also recognizing 
that this is a socially constructed boundary. Therefore, I will focus on the self-defined sub-culture 
of providers of microfinance and their non-client stakeholders. However, this choice creates a 
challenge. While the socially constructed boundary around the microfinance service providers’ 
sub-culture is meaningful for the providers and pragmatic
104
 for this research, by exluding clients 
the findings on underlying social norms could be limited.  Therefore, it will be important to 
undertake robust client research in future to expand this aspect of the institutional analysis.  
 
As noted above, currently ethnography encompasses both the researcher’s reflexive observations 
and interviews of informants on issues not amenable to observations and the collection of 
documentation about the group (Bryman 2004 p.292). Therefore I need to examine the nature of 
the interview process as a key part of an ethnographic approach. Fontana and Frey (2005 p.695) 
have declared metaphorically that traditional interviewing has been killed. No longer is the 
interview a neutral tool. Rather an interview is two (or more) equal participants “involved in this 
process and their exchanges lead to the creation of a collaborative effort called the interview” 
(ibid p.696).  This is an active process that leads to a “contextually bound and mutually created 
story”. Indeed there is now recognition of a place for “empathetic approaches”. In this case “the 
interviewer becomes an advocate and partner in the study, hoping to be able to use the results to 
advocate social policies and ameliorate the conditions of the interviewee” (ibid p.696). 
Interviewers are urged to “be reflexive not only about what the interview accomplishes but also 
about how the interview is accomplished, thereby uncovering ways in which we go about creating 
a text” (Holstein and Gubirum 1995 in Fontana and Frey 2005 p.697). This approach to 
interviewing sanctifies the mutually created story by the ethnographer who is a participant – 
researcher. 
 
Therefore, the self-defined sub-culture of providers of microfinance and their non-client 
stakeholders will be studied using a method “in the manner of ethnography” (Wolcott, 2001 p.92) 
to answer the research questions. The next section will explain the site selection process for this 
method of research.  
 
3.3 Site selection 
Booth (2011 p.5) found two methodological extremes in governance studies, “multivariate 
statistical analysis requiring large datasets” or “intensive studies of single cases”. Grindle (2007 
p.555) recognizes limitations in both as “‘large-N’ studies tend to find consistent correlations 
between development and good governance”105  and, in contrast, “‘small-N’ studies tend to 
demonstrate that development is not fully dependent on ‘getting governance right’” and Pande and 
Udry (2006) came to the same conclusion. From their perspective the cross-country data on 
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 It is pragmatic because the research was already encompassing two markets, so additional robust client 
surveys in these two markets were not practically possible in the time available. 
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 Indeed Grindle (2004 p.528) lists twenty one different institutions that scholars have found to be 
important for good governance! 
 71 
institutions has helped us realize that institutions matter – but that the measurement of institutions 
at the country level has necessarily been “coarse” and “typically unable to isolate the causal effect 
of any single institution” (ibid p.360).  As a result “there remain a number of unanswered 
questions about which institutions matter most” (Grindle, 2007 p.554). Grindle (2007 p.555) 
advocates for “focused comparisons among a limited number of countries to explore what can be 
learned from their governance and development histories”. Furthermore, Pande and Udry (2006) 
suggest that a unit of analysis “smaller than a country” will “reveal more about the causal role of 
that institution” (ibid p.398). Therfore, a comparative analysis of institutions in two microfinance 
markets that have established new institutions would be a useful place to begin understanding 
which institutional functions are critical to increasing financial access, the role of social norms and 
how institutions change.  
 
However, Shirley (2005 p.634) warns of the possibility of selection bias when choosing 
comparative case studies for such analysis, and Booth (2011) although he agrees that “a 
systematic approach to small-N comparative studies” was a practical middle way, found that “to 
arrive at a sufficiently plausible set of explanatory variables with which to approach case 
selection” (ibid p. 5) was a challenge.  Therefore the criteria for choosing two microfinance 
markets in which to undertake such a comparative analysis need to be carefully established. 
 
Bryman (2004 p. 294) states that “one of the key and yet most difficult steps in ethnography is 
gaining access to a social setting that is relevant to the research problem”.  Key informants are 
those informants who become particularly important to the research because of their insight into 
the research question; knowledge of the cultural context and; willingness to help make contacts 
for the researcher.  If access to key informants is critical to ethnographic research then it would be 
a tremendous advantage for me to research countries where I already had such access. So the first 
criterion was microfinance markets where I had access to key informants (which largely included 
countries in Africa). The next set of criteria related to size and growth of the microfinance markets 
so there would be institutional change to study. These included: markets which had grown 
relatively fast within a comparable time frame; which met Honohan’s (2004) significance criteria 
of reaching over 1% of the population; which had a self-defined sub-culture of providers of 
microfinance and their stakeholders and finally; which provided useful contrasts to be able to start 
to draw conclusions. The two microfinance markets which best met all these criteria were Bosnia 
and Uganda.  
 
Microfinance only started in Bosnia in 1997 after the Yugoslav civil war ended. The banking 
system had not yet been restructured after the former socialist system. Murinde and Mullineux 
(1999 p. 4) in an overview of bank restructuring in the region noted that the three main problems 
were the accumulation of bad loans, uncertainty about the structure of the banking sector and 
building non-bank financial institutions and markets.  The World Bank and other funders started a 
pilot microfinance project in 1997 which ended in 2005.
106
 In ten years the microcredit market had 
grown from nothing to reach 363,082 borrowers, (or 294,330 borrowers if the specialist small 
enterprise bank is not included) according to their financial reporting to the Microfinance 
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Information Exchange (MIX Market, 2011) which checks the quality of reported data. The 
Bosnian population in 2007 was 3.779 million (UNDESA 2011) so that means approximately 
9.6% of the population were microcredit borrowers. (This number of borrowers equates to 
approximately 30 percent of the 1.196 milion economically active population estimated by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2007 (International Labour Organization 1996 – 
2012a)).  There were several large financially viable MCOs with entrepreneurial leaders which 
dominated the sector and competition between then had brought interest rates down. A 
MicroCredit Organization (MCO) Law had been passed in 2000 and another in 2006 with 
regulations at the end of 2007. The Directors of all the Bosnian MCOs met regularly so there was 
a self-defined MCO sub-culture, even though there was not an effective association. I had worked 
as a microfinance consultant in Bosnia regularly between 1998 until 2005 and knew most of the 
stakeholders.   
 
Microfinance had started earlier in Uganda but grew slowly at first with microfinance focused 
NGOs (MFNGOs) reaching only approximately 50,000 savers by 1999 (MIX Market, 2011).. 
Brownbridge (1998a), writing the Uganda chapter on Banking in Africa, was pessimistic about the 
increasing access to financial services for the majority - “the economy is too underdeveloped, 
incomes too low and lending opportunities too few to provide sufficient incentive for private 
banks to compete for business throughout the country and provide a comprehensive range of a 
banking services.” (ibid p. 142).  However, in 1997 (approx.) several major donors (including the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID); DFID; the European Commission (EC) and 
the International Fund for Agriculatural Development (IFAD)) started focusing on microfinance 
as the way to provide low income clients with access to financial services. (This funding largely 
continued until 2007 when their projects terminated including: USAID’s Rural Support for Private 
Enterprise Expansion and Development (SPEED) Project; DFID’s Financial Sector Deepening 
Trust; EC’s Support to Feasible Financial Institutions and Capacity-Building Efforts (SUFFICE) 
Project). With these significant donor commitments, in the next ten years MFIs alone reached 
385,201 savers but if the savers in the rural development bank, cooperatives and VSLAs (also 
funded by donors) are also included then it had reached 1,709,778. The Ugandan population in 
2007 was 30.340 million (UNDESA 2011) so that means approximately 5.6% of the population 
were micro-savers. (This equates (very) approximately to 15 percent of the economically active 
population in 2007
107
 (International Labour Organization 1998- 2012))
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. An MDI Act had been 
passed in 2003 with MDI regulations in 2004. The Association of Microfinance Institutions of 
Uganda (AMFIU) was an active network of which MDIs and the majority of larger Tier 4 NGOs 
were members, so its membership comprised a self-defined subculture.  I had worked in Uganda 
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first in 1994 and then for longer in 2004 so knew many of stakeholders. These two markets in 
different regions, with different histories and challenges would provide a great contrast.  
 
They were at very different places in their political and economic development in 1997/8. I was 
first in Bosnia in 1998 when there were still landmines in Sarajevo which had not been cleared 
since the end of the war in December 1996 and few refugees had returned to a recovering country. 
It had not undergone the reform phase of other Central and Eastern European countries because of 
the war. Banks were collapsing and there were many engineers, accountants and doctors who had 
no work. In contrast, Uganda was starting to flourish under stable political leadership since 1986 
and there were many opportunities for the few trained engineers, accountants and doctors, 
although the banking sector was moribund.  Such differences in the economic context had the 
potential to generate interesting and useful conclusions because if there were similar findings 
about institutions for microfinance market development and institutional change from such 
different economic and social contexts it would increase the importance of those findings. 
Furthermore, in both these two markets funders have used variations of participatory processes to 
progress microfinance development (as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 8). There is a strong 
argument for “situated ethnographic and historical research... to understand better the 
transformative possibilities of participation” Cornwall (2004 p. 77) recognizing that enthnographic 
engagement with participation throws new light on the course of participatory interventions 
(Bebbington 2004 p. 281). So it would be appropriate to use a micro-ethnographic methodology to 
undertake an institutional analysis of these two markets.  
 
In response to Shirley’s (2005) (and Booth’s 2011) challenge to avoid selection bias one issue 
remains in the choice of Bosnia and Uganda - that they had both experienced “civil” war109 prior 
to the study period.  At face value, these conflicts might be interpreted to be exogenous shocks, 
creating opportunities for institutional change which path dependent processes could not do.  
However, on deeper analysis there are three reasons why the actual situation in Bosnia and 
Uganda is actually more complex. First, the causes of both conflicts were endogenous and deeply 
rooted and in that sense path-dependent, so at the end of the conflicts many of the causes 
remained, as will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 7.  The theorization of shocks as opportunities 
for institutional change in these, and perhaps many other, cases appears therefore to require 
careful consideration as to the nature of shocks as exogenous and their relationship to path-
dependence.  Second, and in a similar vein, in both Bosnia and Uganda the microfinance sector 
was building on pre-existing long-standing social norms which had not been greatly affected by 
the short-term conflict, not on formal institutions that might have been affected more directly by 
the conflict. Finally, in both Bosnia and Uganda although there was new political leadership after 
the conflict, this leadership deliberately constrained the space for political change: in Bosnia the 
Dayton Peace Accords were deliberately designed not to allow great changes (Bose 2002); and, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 7, Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 
Uganda have been in power since the end of the war and have run a virtual one party state to 
ensure stability and to retain their power (Tangri and Mwenda 2008). So the leadership changes 
created some spaces for change, but not fundamental changes. Therefore, it would seem 
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appropriate to consider these as useful case studies from which tentative conclusions could be 
drawn for further testing. Therefore the microfinance markets of Bosnia and Uganda between 
1997 and 2007 were chosen to be the two case study countries for this study.  
 
 
3.4 Data collection and analysis 
The data for this research came from two sources: secondary data from governments, donors and 
retail financial service providers on policy changes and the provision of financial services to low 
income clients from 1997 to 2007 and; primary data from members of the sub-culture of retail 
financial services providers serving low income communities in Bosnia and Uganda.  
 
3.4.1 Research on the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets 
The initial step was to establish the baseline and factual changes in both microfinance markets 
between 1997 and 2007 from secondary data. These included the political and regulatory changes 
that affected the financial markets, as well as the private sector’s expansion and changes in donor 
funding.  Once I had returned from undertaking the field work and additional factors became 
apparent, the original research needed to be supplemented. This data is presented in chapters 5 and 
8.  As part of this process, a possible set of 'a priori' causes of the changes in the microfinance 
market was identified to assist in the field work. 
 
One possible approach to data collection was Ostrom’s (2005a p.827) “Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework” which required identifying the “action arena” (ibid p.828) or “social 
space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one 
another, feel guilty, or fight” (ibid p.829). In this research the action arena would be the 
microfinance market and the actors would be all the participants in that market. Ostrom (2005a) 
identified three clusters of variables that affect the structure of the action arena:  
1. the rules and norms used by the participants to order their relationships; 
2. the attributes of the states of the world that are acted upon in these arenas and; 
3. the structure of the more general community within which any particular arena is 
placed (i.e. the culture). 
One problem with this framework is that it appears to separate the rules and norms within the 
action arena from the culture. This is also not consistent with Johnson and Ensminger who found 
that rules and norms in the market are embedded within the culture.  The other is that, from the 
perspective of answering this research question, despite its level of detail, there does not appear to 
be any additional value over the Williamson (2000) framework discussed in the previous chapter. 
So Ostrom’s IAD Framework was not used. 
 
Ensminger and Johnson’s ethnographic approaches took place with one ethnic group and in one 
region of Kenya and each researcher spent considerable lengths of time in those regions; but I am 
looking at a sub-culture in two markets and looking for comparisons across those two markets.  It 
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is a self-defined group of microfinance providers and their non-client stakeholders in each 
country, but they are often funded by the same international donors and are part of global 
microfinance networks (e.g. there are Women’s World Banking, World Vision and Catholic 
church related affiliates in both Bosnia and Uganda). This context is similar to Grindle and 
Thomas’s (1991) work on understanding policy change across developing economies.  Grindle 
and Thomas (1991 p.11) used an approach in the manner of ethnography by identifying the 
subculture of “participants in the reform process” and asking participants a series of questions in 
each of their case study countries. Theirs is a useful precedent. 
 
Grindle and Thomas (1991 p.11) chose for their respondents, people who had “unique insights and 
access to information”. For this study everyone involved in the provision of microfinance services 
had unique insights and access to information, so in preparation for field work all the potential 
respondents had to be identified. This included the leaders of the MCOs in Bosnia and the MDIs 
and MFNGOs in Uganda, bankers and policy makers who had been involved in regulating this 
part of the financial market as well as technical service providers. Funders currently in the country 
were not included unless they had been actively involved in the development of the microfinance 
market because they were specialists or local staff who had been there some time. Microfinance 
clients were not respondents because they were not part of the “self-defined microfinance sub-
culture” as discussed above. 
 
 
3.4.2 Scoping mission to Bosnia 
The nine respondents selected for the scoping mission were all former colleagues in Bosnia who 
knew the market better than anyone else. They were also willing to help me to develop an 
approach that was both respectful of the time of hard working members of the microfinance 
market and also would provide insights into the development of the market that would lead to a 
contextually bound and mutually created story Fontana and Frey (2005).  
These are the lessons I applied to all future conversations: 
 I would invite microfinance practitioners to lunch or to have coffee to indicate that this was to 
be a relaxed conversation in a setting outside their usual place of work. For government 
officials or bankers it would be at a time that was most convenient for them. 
 At first I had to explain that I was now an independent academic researcher, not a consultant 
funded by a donor or a trainer in microfinance ‘good’ practices, as they had known me before. 
This was for my PhD thesis and would only be used for academic purposes. 
 I then had to guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of our conversation. This was 
important in Uganda where there had been fraud and in Bosnia where there was frustration 
with the way the microfinance market had developed and yet they were all close friends.  
 In compliance with ethical academic practices I would promise to stop at any time on request; 
to exclude from the data anything the respondent wishes; provide a copy of conversation for 
confirmation of accuracy if wanted, as well as a final copy of the thesis.  
 I would explain that I had set aside any pre-existing or partial knowledge of the development 
of the microfinance market and so would need to ask follow-up questions. I would like it to be 
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a free-ranging conversation that allowed the complexity of the market to surface. If 
appropriate during the conversation I might explain again that I did not have deep knowledge 
of how the culture affected microfinance, or the frustrations of what did not happen etc. but I 
was very open to understanding these issues. 
 The approach taken, (following Grindle and Thomas, 1991), was to ask participants in each 
sub-culture the same question and use that as the starting point for a semi-structured 
conversation about the development of the microfinance market over the last ten years. 
Grindle (2004) also recommended a focus on “good enough governance” to refocus research 
on the priorities for reform. I, like Booth (2011), agreed with Grindle and interpreted this to 
mean that I should focus on the most important institutional changes needed for expanding 
access to financial services for the poor.   
 As the respondents would not have come across North’s understanding of institutions I 
decided to use the term “building blocks” instead. This was the more accessible term used by 
Honohan & Beck in “Making Finance Work for Africa” (2007 p.7) when they were discussing 
institutions to create the foundation for a more inclusive financial sector such as 
“rationalization and clarification of laws…. establishment of credit registries” and was also 
used by Grindle (2007 p 567). 
 So I decided to start by asking what they considered to have been the most important 
“building blocks” within the economy and society for the growth of microfinance in Bosnia / 
Uganda since it began around 1997. I would explain that these could include functions of any 
formal rule or informal norm, with a range of enforcement characteristics. If a respondent 
mentioned an institutional “form” such the Bank of Uganda (BoU), I would ask what function 
the BoU performed that he/she thought was critical. I would not take their first set of answers 
as complete but ask many follow-up questions from different perspectives to better understand 
their responses. Consistent with the interpretivist epistemology, I would focus on listening and 
understanding the view point of my respondents, rephrasing or summarizing their words to be 
sure I had captured their meaning. 
 
It was proposed to the scoping mission respondents that they be sent a transcript of our 
conversation for their feedback. But none of them wanted to read a report on what they had said. 
All were too busy, and trusted me to report accurately. It may also have been because they were 
promised the conversation was in confidence and they would not be quoted in a way that could be 
tracked back to them. Instead, I checked a preliminary summary of findings with just a few of 
them. To identify which of the building blocks were institutions, in an iterative process the 
responses were triangulated with other respondents, North’s (1994) definition, the financial 
market literature and my own experience. A similar process was undertaken to identify which 
level in Williamson’s (2000) framework those institutions fit.  
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3.4.3 Micro-ethnographic field work in Bosnia and Uganda 
In total I met individually with thirty five respondents who were the major stakeholders in the 
expansion of the microfinance market in Bosnia in the ten years from 1997 to 2007.This included 
eleven of the twelve MCO leaders, the five leading banks that lent to MCOs and five private 
sector players (such as the micro-insurance provider), eight government officials responsible for 
the oversight of the microcredit sector, and six of the original funders of the microcredit sector. I 
conducted very similar semi-structured interviews with a total of forty-nine members of the 
subculture of retail providers of financial services to low income clients and their supervisors in 
Uganda. This included ten MF NGOs, four MDIs, six bankers, six government officials including 
the BoU, seven funders, ten private sector consultants, investors related financial service providers 
and six representative of networks or related associations. The complete list of individuals I met 
with in Bosnia and Uganda, their organizations and when I met them, is provided in the Appendix.  
In addition to the recorded meetings with respondents, I also observed them at informal dinner 
meetings where association matters were discussed and social gatherings where the microfinance 
community was gathered, which were a natural outworking of the long-standing relationships 
developed over the years of training and meeting together. 
 
 
I found that once basic terms were explained in everyday language, respondents in both markets 
did not need additional clarifications. For example, North’s (1994 p. 360) definition of informal 
constraints – “norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct” provided 
enough information for these respondents to understand the concept as it applied to the 
microfinance market. In many cases microfinance had become their life’s work so they had 
thought long and hard about these issues. The long-standing relationships with these respondents 
and in the countries were invaluable because the interviews were the end of a long relationship 
and observations, not the beginning. The respondents did not need to explain their history all over 
again to a stranger they could focus on the institutional questions knowing that I understood their 
context.
110
 
 
As Bryman (2004 p.292) notes, ethnography includes the researcher’s reflexive observations, so in 
the free flowing discussions I would reflect back to the respondent what I thought they were 
saying to be sure I was not just framing their ideas according to my own cultural frame of 
reference. Quite often personal stories were shared which were very helpful to contribute to 
understanding how cultural norms operated, how rules were enforced and if they had changed 
over time.  However, respondents were sometimes contradictory or inconsistent.  They framed 
their responses according to their own mental models so the conversations unveiled a deeper 
understanding of participants' values, views and meanings and generated rich, detailed qualitative 
data. Sometimes they were very long lunches! It is fair to say that all of the respondents were both 
proud of some achievements and frustrated with others. Several were angry with donors, 
politicians or others whom they felt had betrayed their trust. These were often not easy 
                                                     
110
 This is also why there are not more explicit links between chapters 4 and 6 or chapter 7 and 9 because 
that understanding is was taken for granted by the respondents and myself. 
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discussions, but very rich in understanding of institutional change processes. I am indebted to each 
respondent for their time and honesty.  
 
In these discussions, I was aware that I would need to find a way to write about institutions in 
microfinance that would not make the sub-culture of Bosnians and Ugandans in microfinance into 
“distinct and alien” cultures as Abu-Lughod (2000, 2006) had urged. That this research “in the 
manner of ethnography” would focus on the institutional research questions and not focus on 
telling another story about the otherness of Bosnia or Uganda. Reflecting later on this decision, I 
am aware it strengthened the institutional focus of the findings, but perhaps dimished the cultural 
specificity in my engagement with respondents.   
 
 
3.4.4 Data analysis   
For each market, every respondent’s interview and every single one of the institutions discussed 
was coded into N’Vivo according to the language that respondents used.  
 The first phase of the analysis was to identify the possible set of formal and informal 
institutions. Where respondents were using slightly different language but describing what 
appeared to be the same rule or norm, then these were grouped together. Each of these 
institutions were based on the many hours of taped discussion with respondents that covered 
examples of how it contributed to expanding the microfinance market and its enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 Once that set of possible institutions was drafted, the second phase was to remove from 
further consideration those which, although interesting, could not be defined as institutions 
under North’s definition. For example, several respondents commented on the entrepreneurial 
spirit of Ugandans being one of the building blocks for the rapid expansion of microfinance. 
(In their opinion Ugandans had been traders and entrepreneurs since well before the British 
arrived and this was critical to the success of microfinance.) Although interesting, there is no 
enforcement characteristic for this norm so it could not be considered an institution for this 
study. (It is however, referred to in the context chapter.) Likewise in Bosnia some respondents 
felt that the painful loss of the quality of life for clients was a critical building block for the 
rapid expansion of the sector. But desperation did not appear to be a fundamental social norm 
across the culture with enforcement characteristics.  Also during this phase, points which 
could not be triangulated with any other respondent or with secondary data were removed. For 
example, one respondent said that the Insurance Deposit Agency at the Entity level in Bosnia 
was critical to the development of the financial market, but no one else did. In fact, others said 
the opposite, that people were only prepared to trust specific banks and not the government 
because of the history of the government taking their savings. So with conflicting opinions 
this was not reported as a finding.  
 The third phase was to classify the formal institutions as to whether they were constitutional 
or operational. This was initially challenging simply from inexperience but now that I have 
lived with this data and the literature for years, it is much clearer. 
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 Only at the fourth phase of the analysis were the two markets compared to see where there 
was consistency or not. 
 
Together, the conversations, the secondary data and my own observations of the microfinance 
sub-culture over the decade achieved the goal of a “complex, dense, quilt-like bricolage, a 
reflexive collage or montage” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p.6)111 from which the patterns of key 
institutions for increasing access to financial services have emerged that are reported in the 
findings chapters 6 and 9.  
 
3.5 Criteria for evaluating reliability, validity and ethical issues. 
The criteria of “trustworthiness and authenticity” for evaluating qualitative research as originally 
proposed by Lincoln and Guba in 1985 is now accepted academic practice Bryman (2004 p. 273) 
and Denzin and Lincoln (2005).  Instead of internal validity, establishing the credibility of the 
research was through respondent validation. The first step of respondent validation is first during 
the conversation. When one respondent’s perspective appeared to be significantly different from 
either the secondary data or what others were saying (for example about a particular social norm,) 
the first check was to clarify that I had properly understood what they were saying. The second 
check was to ascertain whether it was consistent with the whole set of information about 
institutions in the market and if so, perhaps it so could be a unique insight but if not it could be 
just an anomaly in their perceptions. It was originally planned that each respondent would be 
provided with an account of the conversation including both what was said and my observations 
on the conversation for any feedback so the findings can be validated.  However, as with the 
scoping mission, other respondents in Bosnia and Uganda were not interested in providing 
feedback on their interview but only on reading the summary findings.
112
 To arrive at the 
preliminary findings a triangulation process was undertaken between respondents, the researcher 
and secondary data.  Once the complete findings chapters were drafted, these chapters were sent to 
key informants who were willing to provide detailed feedback. These key informants spoke both 
English and local languages, had worked with both clients and with international organizations 
and had some academic background to understood the research methodology and its potential 
flaws.  
 
For external validity Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend transferability. Initially I was 
concerned that the rich and thick dataset about institutions for expanding the financial market 
serving low income clients including social norms, might not be comparable between the two 
markets which would have compromised the transferability of the findings. However, I should 
have trusted the methodology.  The external validity of the result has indeed been tested and 
proved in the process of comparability between the two markets. There was similarity in 
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 One of Cooke’s (2004) “rules of thumb” of participatory development is “Data belong to those from 
whom they were taken” (Cook in Cornwall and Pratt (eds) 2004 p. 47).  In this research the findings were 
offered to be sent back to respondents but they only wanted a summary when it was all finished. 
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institutional functions across all levels in both these markets. It would therefore be reasonable to 
find some similarity with other microfinance markets. 
 
Dependability (instead of reliability) can be tested by keeping meticulous notes on every step of 
the research process from selection of participants to transcripts and data analysis so that an 
external auditor is able to track each step and if necessary certify its reliability. Objectivity is 
impossible in social research so a more useful quality is for the researcher to act in good faith and 
not allow theoretical inclinations to sway the research or prejudge the findings.  
 
Conducting research with people I have known for many years, and would probably continue to 
meet in the context of microfinance, presented interesting ethical questions which needed to be 
addressed before the ethnographic research started:  Would former colleagues feel any pressure to 
tell a positive story – leaving out the negative? Whose “side” would they perceive I was on? 
Would “anonymity” still be meaningful given we would all continue to work in microfinance? 
Would my personal relationship with many of those being interviewed bias my ability to listen to 
the participants? Who would have final control over the publishing of the findings? What are the 
possible implications of the findings in their financial market once published? (British 
Sociological Association, 2002) These questions were informally but clearly addressed at the 
beginning of the “interview” at the same time as the guarantee of anonymity or confidentiality; a 
promise to stop at any time on request; excluding from the data anything the respondent wishes; 
providing a copy of research results for confirmation of accuracy if wanted, as well as a final copy 
of the thesis.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has made the case for a social contructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology 
in the analysis of institutions and for a micro-ethnographic methodology to answer the research 
questions. It showed that ethnographic methods will best enable the role of social norms within 
the microfinance market to be explored in depth, as well as provide the market participants’ 
perspectives on the effectiveness of the formal constitutional and operational rules. The criteria 
and choice of the two case study microfinance markets was examined and the process of data 
collection and analysis reported. Furthermore, the checks and balances in place to provide the 
reliability and validity of the research were established.  In the following sets of Bosnia and 
Uganda chapters there is a “complex, dense, quilt-like bricolage, a reflexive collage or montage” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p.6) that will show strong and clear patterns and regularities about the 
key institutions for financial market development including social norms, how they have changed 
- which contributes to theory on institutional change - and the role of funders in that change.  
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Chapter 4: Bosnia: Financial Market Development Context 
 
This chapter commences the analysis of the Bosnian case study by presenting the political, social 
and economic context for the institutional development of the Bosnian microfinance market and 
particularly for its social norms.  Significant aspects of the history of the financial market are 
reviewed, along with key dimensions of social/political and cultural contexts, to present a detailed 
understanding of the ground in which the microfinance market came to be developed.  There is no 
standard approach for undertaking an historical institutional analysis so Grindle’s (2007 p. 567) 
advice is followed - to address what are considered to be the most important characteristics of the 
context. Chronology and view point are very important in describing the complex interplay of 
economic, political, regional, religious and ethnic forces in Bosnia. So this chapter is organized 
chronologically, starting with the political and economic factors that contributed to the founding 
of Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito, continues through Tito’s rule, the break-up of Yugoslavia and 
the 1992 – 1995 war. It seeks to respect and balance the different academic discourses on this this 
history.  
 
The following chapter builds on this analysis.  It will present an original account of the 
development of the financial and microfinance markets after the Dayton Peace Accords, as Bosnia 
struggled with the simultaneous tasks of reconstruction after war and post-socialist reforms. 
Chapter 6 then provides an analysis of the findings of the ethnographic research with microfinance 
stakeholders on the building blocks of the microfinance market, including the social norms.   
 
4.1 Bosnia before WWII 
Bosnia was first recorded as an independent country in 1180, not under the control of the 
Byzantine Empire, the Croats on the Dalmatian coast, nor the neighboring Serbs. It was 
predominantly populated by Slavs. The River Drina was its eastern border. It had “its own 
customs and government” (Malcolm 1994 p.11) although communication was hampered by the 
mountainous terrain (add reference map). From that time on a highly complex set of political and 
economic powers overlapped and combined on that territory including: “the empires of Rome, 
Charlemagne, the Ottomans, and the Austro-Hungarians and the faiths of Western Christianity, 
Eastern Christianity, Judaism and Islam” (ibid p. xix).  In Pre-Ottoman times it was the home of 
three churches, Orthodox, Roman Catholic and an independent Bosnian church (Mahmutćehajić, 
2000). Since Ottoman times (1463) Islam, Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism have largely made 
up the pattern of religious life with Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews also settling in Bosnia after 
persecution, as well as the Roma. Sarajevo was at the centre of this pluralistic culture with 
mosques, synagogues and churches all side by side.  Interpretations vary as to whether its people 
were skilled at navigating the differing traditions and celebrated each other’s traditions (e.g. Sells 
1996) or were deeply segmented, distinct communities which co-existed (e.g. Burg and Shoup 
2000). In both cases, a sense of identify came from community belonging. 
 
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo 
on 28 June 1914, an act reflecting the fierce opposition to the Austro-Hungarian rule in the region, 
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was the trigger that started WWI. The post first world war settlements of the defeated Austro 
Hungarian Empire at Versailles in 1918 resulted in the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
(meaning South Slav) which was ruled by a king and parliament (Crnobrnja 1996). This “epoch 
making unification” (Pavlowitch 1992) joined the regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, with the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. These regions held a common desire to be free from foreign domination. However, the 
communists saw the regime as bourgeois and were looking for an opportunity to create a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” (Pavlowitch 1992).  “Tito,” the nom de guerre of Josip Broz, was 
officially recognized as head of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia by the Comintern
113
 in 
October 1940, because of his allegiance to Stalin and willingness to purge opposition elements. 
He demanded unquestioning loyalty. When Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 it took less 
than two weeks for the Germans to control the country and then it was divided between the Axis 
powers. This created an opportunity for Tito start to organize the communists to eventually take 
power.  
 
During the second world war in Yugoslavia there were many wars “piled on top of each other” 
(Malcolm 1994 p. 174). These are addressed in great detail in histories of Tito and the war period 
(Pavlowitch 1992, Malcolm 1994, Crnobrnja 1996, McFarlane 1998). These wars included the 
war conducted by Italy and Germany on Yugoslavia; the Axis powers’ war effort against the 
Allies; the Croatian Ustašas (fascists loyal to the Nazis and supported by Mussolini, were led by 
Pavelić) against the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia; the Yugoslav Četniks (led by Mihailović, loyal 
to the government in exile) and Communist Partisans (led by Tito and loyal to Stalin), were both 
fighting the Ustašas and; these two Yugoslav resistance organizations were fighting each other. 
Each of these groups were fighting for their futures, committing crimes against civilians not just 
fellow combatants. But perhaps it was the atrocities committed in Croatia against Serbs and other 
minorities (allegedly by both Croat and Muslim forces) in an effort at ethnic cleansing that left the 
most enduring psychological scars. An estimated 600,000 people were killed, of which 25,000 
were Jews. (Crnobrnja 1996 p.66)  
 
The Partisans were the ultimate victors. This was in part, because Tito fought under the radar of 
the major powers and away from other centers of power in Yugoslavia until he was ready to be 
recognized as the best leader for a new Yugoslav state, with the support of both the British and the 
Russians (Crnobrnja 1996). Bosnia was the “bastion of the partisan movement” (Pavlowitch 1992 
p.36) and Tito’s Partisans were also the only group which fought on the basis of the equality of all 
the components in Yugoslavia. Tito successfully tied a popular resistance movement to the cause 
of communism in the struggle against foreign powers and local opponents, with his own 
ascendancy as the new national leader inevitable. After the war, The Socialist Federative Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was established under Marshall Tito with six republics and the two 
autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vovodina. Bosnia was recognised as a historically distinct 
entity and accorded constitutional status as a separate and multinational republic as part of the new 
Yugoslav federal state established under Tito (Ali, 1994). However, there was no specific 
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communist states. It was succeeded by Cominform. 
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agreement on the relative rights of the republics or regions within the Yugoslav economic space. 
(Crnobrnja 1996). 
 
4.2 Bosnia under Tito 1945 – 1980  
Tito’s war was not over once he was in power. Between 1945 and 1946, Tito’s regime put to death 
an estimated 250,000 people (Malcolm 1994 p.193) to ensure there was no ongoing internal 
dissent, including all the returning soldiers who had fought for anti-Partisan forces, nationalists 
and many of the bourgeois. (However, discussion of any of the atrocities committed during the 
Second World War was specifically forbidden in the Tito era. (Sells, 1996 p. 99)). This 
ruthlessness and absolute control set the precedent for the next thirty five years of his rule in 
Yugoslavia so a whole generation of Yugoslavians knew no other kind of leadership. Even at the 
end of his life he continued to be a megalomaniac and despot (Pavlowitch 1992 p.83) But Tito 
was not just the leader of Yugoslavia, he saw himself as the foremost representative of an 
expanding communist world. Comintern’s headquarters were established in Belgrade, the 
Yugoslav capital, indicating Tito’s leadership.  
 
As a communist under Soviet tutelage, his first economic task was attempting rapid 
collectivization of agriculture and high rates of investment in new factories, which were designed 
to both accelerate growth and transform the social structure away from the “class society based on 
agrarian social relations” (McFarlane 1988 p.11, Milenkovitch 1971). For an underdeveloped 
country with goals of modernization and rapid growth a central planning model was effective 
initially in raising output. But centralizing decision-making necessitates huge information 
collection and processing costs and so the growth came at the expense of quality (Milenkovitch 
1971).  
 
The apparent defiance by Marshal Tito of Soviet supremacy in 1948 led to the explusion of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party from Cominform. Tito was not contrite, ordering the security 
apparatus within Yugoslavia to target “Cominformists”. He took it as an opportunity to get rid of 
potential trouble makers. Such repression intensified his dictatorship and increased the power of 
the secret police (OZNa). “In Tito’s own words the purpose of the OZNa was to strike terror into 
the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia.” (Malcolm 1994 p. 193). So people 
lived in fear of the secret police, a fear that became so ingrained it remained long after Tito was 
gone.    
 
This action meant Yugoslavia was effectively isolated from both Soviet and western support. But 
the lack of external Soviet pressure meant Yugoslavia could undertake partial reforms in the 
economy
114
. Between 1950 and 1954 the centralized system was dismantled, eliminating price 
controls and theoretically rationalizing costs by introducing loans with interest payments for 
investments.  Power and decision making was decentralized to workers councils within enterprises 
who could determine what to produce, how to produce it and at what price to sell it, within the 
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limits of existing plant and equipment.  What evolved was a “market –socialist system” that 
allowed, even encouraged, private enterprises alongside the state owned enterprises (SOEs). 
Central planning was abandoned and there were “worker-managed firms competing with each 
other in the market system recycling earned profits for their own needs and expansion or else, via 
the taxes they pay, into collective funds for social consumption” (McFarlane  1988 p.90). The 
larger of these business enterprises in energy and heavy industry were critical to the economy and 
became very powerful. Smaller businesses also had an important role in the economy, for 
example, restaurants serving tourists in Adriatic coastal towns. 
Yugoslav partial planning - decentralizing production while retaining control over investment was 
a complex task because of the significant regional difference in growth rates. The more developed 
regions like Slovenia saw investment planning as a burden that meant high taxes and errors of 
allocation away from productive investments; whereas poorer, less developed regions like 
Montenegro and Bosnia saw it as necessary to their growth, which added nationalistic tensions to 
the mix. (Milenkovitch 1971 p.300, World Bank 2004b OED). For this approach to succeed, the 
country needed to agree on economic objectives, but the nationalistic issues meant this did not 
happen. So starting in 1961 investment planning was abandoned and decisions turned over to the 
market. Effectively this was a defeat for the less developed regions.  Milenkovitch notes that 
partial planning in any context “may well produce a morass from which only two solutions are 
apparent – back to the plan or forward to the market” (Milenkovitch (1971) p.300). This tough 
decision was avoided by reliance on international loans. The British understood that if Tito or his 
economy collapsed, he could be replaced by a regime more subservient to Moscow, so they 
supported Tito and the economy. He was hailed as a patriotic hero of the Second World War who 
united his compatriots against Nazi-fascism and warranted soft loans.(Pavlowitch 1992)  By 1988 
Yugoslavia’s total foreign debt was United States Dollar (USD) 33 billion (with USD 20 billion 
owed to the West) By 1989, inflation was up to 250 percent.
 
 
 
To Yugoslavians, Tito represented a powerful and united Yugoslavia of which they could be 
proud. ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ was his slogan (Pavlowitch 1992). They knew he was autocratic 
but he was not totalitarian and held the country together and enabled everyone to receive a good 
education and jobs. Under Tito between 1960 and 1980, annual GDP growth averaged 6.1 per cent 
(Chossudovsky 1997 p.375) and there was increasing consumption. Bosnia was one of the less 
developed republics with its GNP about 75% of the national average.  But everything was taken 
care of - medical care was free, and by 1981 the literacy rate was of the order of 95 per cent for 
men and 77% for women.  Average life expectancy was 72 years compared to 48 years pre-war. 
(Chossudovsky (1997 p.375) In the cities there were jobs and salaries with good benefits, 71 
percent of the population had a television by 1986.   
 
The Yugoslav government placed many of the armaments factories in Bosnia because it was 
considered protected from potential conquerors so Bosnia benefited from this considerable 
investment (Crnobrnja 1996, Burg and Shoup 2000).  Industry and mining contributed 43% of the 
GNP in 1991 and electricity contributed a massive 9%. (Mahmutćehajić, 2000) The government 
also made great investments in public health, education, technology and social welfare 
(McFarlane 1988 p.18).  Under Tito, Bosnian women were recognized as equals and “aspired to 
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work in the public sector – whether service provision, public administration or in public 
companies – or to set up their own businesses” (Pupavac 2006 p.95).   
 
Tito instituted a vigorous campaign against all public forms of religion to build a secular 
Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1994 p. 193). He largely succeeded in urban areas where 30 percent of 
marriages were “mixed” and only 20% of the populations were religious believers (Malcolm 1994 
p. 222). Bosnia was regarded as an “ethnic scrambled egg” or a “little Yugosalvia” (Crnobrnja 
1996) with its rich intermingling of cultures and civilisations. To some, it was an exotic 
multinational, multicultural, and multireligious mix with its many communities, Muslims, Serbs, 
Croats, Hungarians and Jews, having lived together for generations (Ali 1994). Ethnicity had 
ceased to be the defining criterion of identity for Bosnia's new generation of 'Yugoslavs'. To 
others, although the people shared a common language and lifestyle, the different ethnic 
communities in Bosnia did not create a multi-tradition society but gained their identity from 
external loyalties (Burg and Shoup 2000). 
 
4.3 The banking system in Bosnia under Tito 
The Yugoslav banking system “bore no resemblance’ in structure, function or management to the 
system in Soviet Union. Yugosalvia became a member of the IMF and World Bank in 1945 
(McFarlane 1988 p. 92. Chossudovsky 1997 Borish & Ding 1997). Under Tito the banking system 
reflected his unique approach to socialism, it was more open in trade and investment and de-
centralized, with social ownership. There were three-tiers to the banking system: i) the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia, which held all the citizens’ foreign currency accounts, in addition to 
exercising its responsibilities as Central Bank; ii) the national banks of the eight Republics and 
Autonomous Provinces and; iii) the Associated banks.   
 
The National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) complied with the letter of the Yugoslav law requiring it 
to be independent from government. The three criteria of independence were: institutional 
independence, disclosing the influence of the government (state) on the nomination as well as 
dismissal of the Central Bank’s senior management; financial independence, determined by the 
access of the government to NBY’s credit lines and independence in conduct of the monetary 
policy, which stands for independence in the selection and use of monetary policy instruments 
(Šević and Šević, 2000).  But in practice, the “vague” legal context made it possible for political 
factors to exert a strong and destabilising influence, such as the dismissal of the governor by 
parliament whenever it chose and the appointment of a governor based on his federal origin, not 
skills (Šević and Šević, 2000 p, 383), so the governor was accountable to the government, not 
independent.  Furthermore, the National Bank did not undertake any prudential regulation, and did 
not require international accounting norms such a standard Loan Loss Provisioning. The lack of 
adequate oversight by the Central Bank meant that many lost their savings on fraudulent pyramid 
schemes and other scams. 
 
Major banks seemed modern with correspondent relationships with the west. They channeled 
western funding for projects, managed funds from the tourist trade on the Adriatic coast and 
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received remittances. But the majority of the associated banks were “socially owned” enterprises, 
linked to the worker-managed enterprises discussed above. They had a social role similar to the 
enterprises of ensuring the well being of communities and staff, so were also overstaffed and the 
staff were overcompensated (Borish & Ding 1997 p. 173). They were conduits for directed credits 
from ministries and from the central bank. They did not know how to make commercial credit 
decisions regarding their borrowers and rolling over loans was the norm (Murphy 2006 p. 17, 
Borish and Ding 1997).
115
 Payments functions were the monopoly of the government payments 
bureau.   
 
In summary, the banking system comprised banks owned by the worker-managed enterprises had 
misleading and misguided financial statements and were unable to impose credit discipline. As the 
country’s debts mounted the banking system was unable to either productively lend the 
government’s money, or track their use of government funds (Borish and Ding 1997). It was 
impossible to accurately assess the state of the banking system. 
 
4.4 Bosnia after Tito – rapid economic decline 
1980 was the year of Tito’s death and he had not prepared a successor or even set up a process for 
selecting a successor. A collective leadership was created but there had been such dependence on 
Tito’s leadership, it was unable to “get a firm grip on the economy” (McFarlane 1988 p.138) and 
there was an economic crisis. The cause of the crisis lay in the low level of motivation and 
productivity of the work force, low efficiency in the use of capital, which resulted in both 
inadequate infrastructure and technical backwardness, and the pervasive interference of the state 
in economic decisions (Milanovic (1990), Pjanić 1986 cited in McFarlane 1988 p.146).  These 
trends, endemic to the Yugoslav economy, had been masked by easy and cheap external 
borrowing. Financing from the West subsidized manufacturing enterprises up to 50 percent and 
net subsidies were 15.6 percent of GDP (Kraft and Vodopivec 1992 p,1). As the economy had 
decentralized, powerful coalitions had emerged that represented special interests and many new 
channels to “redistribute” government funds were created (Kraft and Vodopivec, 1992 p.1). 
 
The oil price shock in 1979 and increase in interest rates brought the era of cheap money to an 
abrupt end, but the structure of the economy did not change. In state enterprises there were only 
soft budget constraints which, together with a continued failure to correct indiscipline on wages 
and other spending (Rocha 1991), meant there was de facto permission for misuse (perhaps 
corrupt use) of state resources by senior officials.  As oil prices continued rising in the ‘80s, there 
was hyperinflation, so collapse was imminent. The local currency lost value with the 
hyperinflation so ordinary people’s savings also lost all their value and the banks had severe 
liquidity constraints.  Further redistribution flows were produced by banks holding financial assets 
and liabilities in an inflationary environment, but not indexing financial claims. These flows 
became an even more important source of redistribution than formal taxes and subsidies (Kraft 
and Vodopivec, 1992). The driving force behind these decisions was the pursuit of job and wage 
                                                     
115
 In the early 1950s interest payments were introduced (Milenkovitch 1971 p.293) but were referred to as a 
“tax on working capital” (McFarlane 1988 p. 225). 
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security and accordingly there was no increase in the unemployment rate (Milanovic, 1990). 
These factors, together with hidden losses in the economy due to the lack of transparent accounts, 
meant that the national budget was spiralling out of control (Rocha, 1991). 
 
The only options were to either allow the market to operate freely or face collapse. This lack of 
control was exacerbated by the reforms imposed by the country’s creditors116 to address 
Yugoslavia’s large external debt. State revenues which would previously have gone as transfer 
payments to the Republics and Autonomous Provinces were instead channeled into servicing 
Belgrade's debt. The Republics were largely left to their own devices, exacerbating their economic 
differences and speeding up the disintegration process of the industrial sector and the welfare 
state. “In one fell swoop, the reformers had engineered the demise of the federal fiscal structure” 
and steered the industrial sector into bankruptcy. (Chossudovsky 1997 p.375-6).  
GDP growth per capita which had been at 5- 7 % during the 70s, plunged to less than 1% during 
the 80s. There was almost universal decline in real incomes and increase in poverty with workers’ 
poverty levels doubling from 9% to 20% and farmers’ poverty levels at 45% by 1987. Farmers 
had started at 42% in poverty, so the increase was less apparent. (This official poverty level had 
no welfare implications, it was simply the subsistence minimum calculated by the Federal 
Secretariat of Labor Health and Social Policy (Milanovic 1990)). The doubling of urban poverty 
was much more destabilizing than the rural poverty because it represented a reversal in the 
standard and culture of the last twenty years. The magnitude of the urban poverty increase in 
Yugoslavia is illustrated by the actual number of urban poor which increased from 837,000 in 
1978 to 2,411,000 in 1987. Accompanying this increase in poverty was a pervasive feeling in the 
region that the economic situation would not improve (Milanovic 1990 p.17).  
Despite these economic challenges, in the city of Sarajevo the evening passeggiata continued 
undiminished.  Reflecting its “ethnic and cultural mélange” (Garton Ash 1999), 25 per cent of the 
population in the cities declared themselves Yugoslavs, not one particular ethnic identity. (Burg 
and Shoup, 2000). There was a clear urban – rural divide in that regard.  
 
A damning characterization of the banks’ portfolios at the time included “connected lending, 
excess concentration and distorted classifications” (Borish and Ding 1997 p. 182) which together 
toll a death knell for banks. Technical insolvency is the impartial way to describe their position.  
In March 1990 the last Federal Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (then 
called the ‘Federal Executive Council’) enacted a new Banking Law to facilitate the formation of 
independent profit oriented institutions and more than half the country's banks were liquidated 
(Šević and Šević 2000 Chossudovsky 1997 p.377). But banking reform cannot occur in isolation, 
so as the economy spiraled down, the banks’ portfolios spiraled out of control. By the time of the 
war the banks were in crisis. (Borish and Ding, 1997).  
                                                     
116
 According to Chossudovsky (1997 p.375)” the Reagan Administration targeted the Yugoslav economy 
in a 'Secret Sensitive' 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133), entitled 'United States Policy 
towards Yugoslavia'. A censored version of this document, declassified in 1990, largely conformed to the 
1982 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD54) on Eastern Europe. Its objectives included 'expanded 
efforts to promote a "quiet revolution" to overthrow Communist governments and parties', while 
reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the world market.” 
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In 1990, annual GDP growth was sharply negative at -7.5 per cent. In September 1990 the World 
Bank estimated that there were 2,435 'loss-making' enterprises out of a total of 7,53l. These firms - 
with a combined work-force of more than 1.3 million people - had been categorized as 'insolvent' 
under the provisions of the Financial Operations Act, requiring the immediate implementation of 
bankruptcy procedures. Given that 600,000 workers had been laid off by bankrupt firms before 
September 1990, these figures suggest that some 1.9 million workers (of a total of 2.7 million) 
were classified as 'redundant'. These 'insolvent' firms, concentrated in the energy, heavy industry, 
metal processing, forestry, and textiles sectors, were among the largest industrial enterprises in the 
country, then representing 49.7 percent of the total (remaining and employed) industrial 
workforce. Chossudovsky (1997 p.377) In 1991, GDP declined by a further 15 per cent and 
industrial output by 21 per cent. 
 
The federal government de facto ceased to exist and a strange travelling body consisting of the 
presidents of the federal units became a power centre, as in the middle-ages when the power was 
whereever the king was. (Šević and Šević 2000).  There was an increasingly impoverished, 
discontented, and fractured population in Yugoslavia but within that, the Serb population felt they 
had been the hardest hit economically (Judah 2000). The people longed for decisive leadership – 
remembering Tito with fondness. The west appeared to do nothing to support the disintegrating 
country (Burg and Shoup 2000). It was in this dire political and economic situation in 1989 that 
Milošević became the leader of the Serbian communists. Gathering Serbs into a political unit with 
his decisive vision, he gained control of four of the eight votes in the federal Yugoslav 
government
117
 (Malcolm 1994 p.212)  
 
4.5 Bosnia multi-party elections 1990 
The national feelings strongly suppressed under Marshall Tito’s rule re-emerged as the economy 
disintegrated and politicians tapped into people’s fear. In 1990 all component republics of 
Yugoslavia had their first multi-party elections and nationalist parties won in almost all of them. 
According to pre-polling, people voted for nationalists because they were afraid that if they did 
not, other ethnicities would vote for their nationalists and the outcome would leave them 
disadvantaged (Burg and Shoup 2000 p.56). The already shaky federation began to disintegrate 
(Šević and Šević 2000). The transitional period gave way to a new era of “rival republican 
ethnarchs” who exploited sectional and nationalist frustrations that thrived on declining economies 
(Pavlowitch 1992 p.93). In 1991 the Croatian President Tudjman publicly suggested partitioning 
Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines and the Serbian President Milošević was adamant that 
unless Bosnia and Herzegovina stayed in Yugoslavia there would be war (Crnobrnja 1996). 
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 Milošević had “learnt the methods of Communist power-politics as he worked his way up the system; the 
general economic malaise and discontent and the ideology of Serb nationalism, so long frustrated was now 
finding an expression in a policy which restored Vojvodina and Kosovo to Serbian control. (Malcolm 1994 
p. 212) 
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In 1991 the republics of Croatia and Slovenia (with the active support of Germany) had 
referendums on separating from SFRY. They both then declared their independence
118
. Shortly 
after the referenda Milošević’s Serbian paramilitary groups119  fought the Croat army in the Serb 
majority Krajina region of Croatia (where the Ustašas had been active in WWII). Malcolm 
outlines the three step “blueprint” to ethnic cleansing later used in Bosnia as part of a “rational 
strategy dictated by political leaders….to drive out two ethnic populations and radicalize a third” 
(ibid p.252) 120. Judah (2000 p. 2) explains how impoverished rural Serbs were essentially 
exploited for their leaders’ ambitions. In early 1992, the areas of Croatia which had been 
conquered by Serb federal and irregular forces were declared a UN-protected zone. (Malcolm 
1994 p.238). At the start of these hostilities in 1991, all foreign currency accounts were frozen 
across all of Yugoslavia by the Yugoslav National Bank. No one could access their hard currency 
and for many, this was their life savings, gone. The Yugoslav government then used this hard 
currency to fund their operations (Tesche 2008 p.88). 
 
Bosnia too wanted an independence referendum and followed the instructions of the European 
Community arbitration commission, which determined that Bosnia had the right to secede but had 
to ensure the protection of its minorities (Dahlman, 2005 p.575).  On 6 April 1992, the day 
Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence vote (with 99% support (World Bank 2004b OED)) was 
recognised by the European Community, tens of thousands of citizens drawn from all of Bosnia's 
nationalities gathered before Bosnia's Parliament on the embankment of the Miljacka River. True 
to Sarajevo's long tradition of tolerance, the crowd held signs declaring: 'We Can Live Together'.  
Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian- Serb nationalist leader, who had boycotted the referendum, had 
declared that Sarajevo's streets would 'run with blood', if Bosnia's declaration of independence 
were confirmed by the European Community
121
. As the crowd stood before the Bosnian 
Parliament calling for 'peace' and 'reconciliation' one of Karadžić’s bodyguards opened fire from 
the Holiday Inn. It was the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo. (Dahlman 2005).  
 
4.6 Bosnia at war 1992 - 1995 
The origins of the war in Bosnia have generated a great deal of scholarship from a wide range of 
perspectives, but most scholars now widely dispute the “enduring hatred” explanations of the 
Bosnian conflict with a number of social scientists finding evidence that ethnic relations in Bosnia 
were generally cooperative before the war (Whitt 2007 p, 657). There is surprising degree of 
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  They were not recognized as independent countries by the UN until May 1992. 
119
 The best known of these groups in Krajina were Arkan’s Tigers who then later moved into Bosnia. In 
Bosnia there were also several the paramilitary groups such as the White Eagles and there were also militas 
loyal to Radovan Karadžić and his Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia (SDS). 
120
 The first step was to radicalize the rural Serb population through (sometimes years of) lies and fear 
mongering about their Croatian or Muslim neighbors; second by using the guerilla warfare technique of 
“compromising the villages” and so forcing them to commit to the side of the insurgents and third through 
creating incidents the enabled the Serb-dominated Federal army
120
 to intervene (Malcolm 1994 p.216-7). 
121 Knowing this was likely Karadžić had prepared for a war in Bosnia a year before the referendum on 
independence, seeking to partition the country along the lines of a plan later anointed by the Yugoslavian 
and Croatian state leaders Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman. (Dahlman 2007) 
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commonality in the major external causes of Bosnia’s destruction. These are the political strategy 
of the Serbian and Croatian leadership
122
 and the role of the West.  A common theme on internal 
causes is that the main basis of hostility was economic and institutional as discussed above, not 
ethnic or religious (Malcolm (1994 p.xxi) and Chossudovsky (1997) p. 375, Mahmutćehajić 2000, 
Burg and Shoup 2000) and also that “there were belligerents and victims amongst all three 
communities in the Bosnian war depending on location”123 (Bose 2002 p.21- 22, Whitt 2007). 
Largely Serbian and Croatian political entrepreneurs translated feelings of economic insecurity 
into ethno-nationalist resentment as Yugoslavia disintegrated. The distorted worldview they 
promulgated was that security meant ‘national security’ of a symmetrically converged ethnic 
nation and territory - a pure ethnic homeland. But the different ethnic communities were so 
dispersed across Bosnia that a map of the majority communities looked like “leopard spots” to 
former American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Burg and Shoup 2000). So ethnic cleansing was 
then simply a necessary founding moment of violent action in order to create the conditions under 
which this security could be permanently established and achieved. (Dahlman 2005 p.575, Burg 
and Shoup 2000). 
 
One reading of the action of western leaders is that they were deplorably ignorant believing it was 
a civil war which arose from “ancient ethnic hatreds” (Malcolm 1994 p. 271, Boyd 1998, 
Mahmutćehajić, 2000) without any understanding of the mosaic of Bosnian culture or the 
economic desperation of the population. Another reading is that Bosnia was deliberately 
abandoned by the West because it was perceived to be predominantly Muslim (Ali 1994). A third 
is that there was no perceived threat to the security of the USA, so there was no reason for it to 
intervene.  Whatever the reading it is hard to understand how world leaders first enforced a 1991 
arms embargo on Yugoslavia, which prevented Bosnia from arming itself against those who had 
prepared for war before (Malcolm 1994 p.243) and then defined the war as a ‘humanitarian 
nightmare’ which only required a humanitarian response. In humanitarian discourse there are no 
enemies, just victims, but this was not the discourse of Bosnia’s nationalist warlords. For them 
civilians were the enemy (Approximately 10% of the adult population were armed fighters by the 
end of the war (World Bank 2004b OED)). Humanitarian missions and peace keepers sent by the 
international community were frequently obstructed by the parties on the ground. Combatants 
attacked relief convoys, pirating their contents or redirecting their aid to other areas, jeopardizing 
both the neutrality of their mission and the safety of their staff, as well as attacking safe havens set 
up by the peace keepers
124
. Since the international community chose not to choose between the 
parties, the international community de facto allowed ethnic cleansing to triumph. (Dahlman 
2005) 
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 It was reported that in March 1991 President’s Milošević and Tudjman met to discuss possible ways of 
dividing up Yugoslavia including Bosnia. 
123 Bose concludes that “it is improper to assign the label of ‘aggressor’ or ‘victim’ in a blanket sense on a 
national or collective basis” (Bose 2002 p.21- 22). 
124
 For example, the Srebrenica “safe haven”. 
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From 1992 until 1995 the international community effectively stood by in the face of shockingly 
gruesome ethnic cleansing tactics of torture, execution
125
 and the systematic rape of women
126
. 
Sells (1996) provides a gruesome narrative based on evidence given at the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague as well as the US 
Department of State and Helsinki Watch.
127
 Witness accounts of the brutal terror tactics are 
provided by Vulliamy (1998) Maass (1996) and Glenny (1996). The horror of the explicit 
“testimonies” (Olujic 1998 p.33) of women who had been raped and sexually tortured are given 
voice and cultural meaning in the South Eastern European context by Olujic (1998)
128
.  The detail 
of life in Sarajevo under siege from May 1992 – February 1996 is well described by contemporary 
historians like Garton Ash (1999)
 129
 and former journalists like Maas (1996) as well as in the 
records of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
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 In August 1992 the skeletal figures in the prisoner camps of Omarska and Trnopolje near Banja Luka 
were seen around the world. Vulliamy later wrote about what he saw: “they were alive, but decomposed, 
debased, degraded and subservient” (1998 p.74) but the torture and killing that was not filmed was far 
worse. “The killings at Omarska were personalized entailing prolonged beating and torture frequently by 
former associates of the victim.” (Sells 1996 p.13) “Omarska had been a place where a prisoner was forced 
to bite the testicles off a fellow inmate” (Vulliamy 1998 p. 74).  In contrast there were “killing centres” at 
Visegrad,  Zvornik, Foča, were where the prisoners were brought for immediate execution (Sells, 1996 p. 
19) and there were “concentration camps where killings and torture were common but the majority of 
detainees survived.”(ibid ) 
126
 Olujic (1998 p.4) reports figures released by the Bosnian government in September 1992 that 
approximately 200,000 individuals, had been confined in concentration camps. Individuals of both sexes 
were physically and sexually tortured. Tortures included rape and sexual mutilation. Men were forced to 
watch their female relatives raped multiple times. The same report stated that the number of women who 
had been raped was at least 14,000. The European Community in December 1992 reported that Serb 
soldiers were reported to have raped 20,000 women, mostly of Muslim ethnicity. “The organized rape of 
Muslim women took place throughout the portions of Bosnia occupied by the Serb military as well as in 
areas controlled by Croat nationalist forces” (Sells, 1996 p.22). For example “In Foča a rape centre was set 
up in the former Partizan Sports Hall in May 1992. Muslim girls and women were held there underwent 
continual rape and physical violence and also were sent out to apartments where they were held for several 
days and then returned to the Partizan Hall. ” (ibid p.21/22). Sells argues that the organized rape of Bosnian 
women was “gynocidal” – a deliberate attack on women and childbearers - and that it was also a form of 
“desecration” – closely related to the desecration of sacred spaces symbolized by mosques (ibid p.22). 
Oluja’s (1998 p.41) interpretation is more stark: “The purpose of systematic rape was to "clean" women of 
their ethnic identity and humiliate their male kin.” 
127
 Sells (1996) also provides an analysis of the “ideology of genocide” which allowed a people to be 
dehumanized and justified the use of military power to destroy them. 
128
 Both authors provide grotesque victim and witness accounts too awful to include here. 
129
  “For days on end they sat at home, freezing, in the dark, without electricity, gas, or running water, 
waiting for a mortar bomb to hit them from the hills. Or they forced themselves to walk to work, although 
often there was no work to do, risking death by sniper fire at every cross roads…They saw friends wounded 
or killed. They were degraded in a hundred small, everyday ways. They had to wash themselves and their 
clothes in a couple of buckets of water. They had to scavenge for firewood. They were impoverished by the 
black-market prices and the lack of normal incomes. They were humiliated by having to receive charity 
from foreigners: the discreet envelope, the embarrassed smile. And then there was the noise, early at 
morning, late at night, and death rained gigantically down. (Garton Ash  1999  p.203) 
The siege of Sarajevo started in April 1992 and the official blockade in May and continued until February 
1996. Residents and combatants alike were effectively prisoners of war with no access to essential medicine 
or food and living in fear of death every day. 
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It was the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare. The people were 
reduced to “a state of medieval deprivation” and “constant fear of death.” (UN ICTY 2003 p.5).130 
 
The extent of the tragedy is overwhelming. An estimated 250,000 people were dead, 200,00 – 
400,000 wounded, 1.5 million were refugees, and almost one million persons were internally 
displaced (World Bank 2004b OED p. 1, Dahlman 2005 p, 580.) Industrial output had plunged to 
5% of 1990 levels with 45% of the industrial plant destroyed. Over two-thirds of homes were 
damaged with one fifth totally destroyed (World Bank 2004b OED). The people had no savings 
left because their foreign currency had been taken, money in bank accounts had been lost in 
bankruptcies, and what cash they had could buy little due to hyper-inflation. If they had invested 
in housing with their savings, those assets were decimated too. The dominant feature of the rural 
landscape even in 1998 (when I first arrived in Bosnia) were burned and gutted, roofless homes 
often with graffiti on them, warning of reprisals if the owners returned, In Sarajevo nearly all 
buildings had bullet or rocket marks or holes and a large apartment block on the main road from 
the airport looked like a concrete fountain with the rubble spilling down.  
 
Any interpretation of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the potential to cause some 
ideological offence because of the many competing histories. The view that the ethnic and 
religious identity in Bosnia is complex and fluid, differs from those who view identity as more 
stable, such as the protagonist in Andrić’s 1961 Nobel prize winning novel “The Bridge over the 
Drina”. However in providing this background I have tried to remain true to my own experience 
with colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1998. Whether over coffee or meals during 
training courses or traveling with colleagues (most of whom were working in microfinance), my 
observation is that there is very much more that brings the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
together than separates them
131
.  
 
4.7 The Dayton Peace Agreement and starting reconstruction 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 14 December1995 between  
Croatia’s President Tudjman, Serbia’s President Miloševic´, and the Bosnian parties to the 
conflict. Many say it “stopped the fighting” but according to Boyd (1998 p. 43), what it did “with 
the aid of 60,000 US and coalition troops, was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire”. War and 
ethnic cleansing reordered the human geography of Bosnia and were effectively given 
international approval in the map of Bosnia drawn at Dayton.  It created a de facto partition of 
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 The first convoy of ICRC trucks, which made it through to Sarajevo after the siege was bearing the Red 
Cross flag and carried essential supplies to the besieged city. It was led by Swiss ICRC delegate Frederic 
Maurice. At the gates to the city it came under fire and, Frederic, like many others, was killed by a sniper. A 
plaque commemorates his sacrifice there. 
131
 During conversations in 1998 a small group of friends that included Bosnians of Serb Muslim Croat and 
mixed backgrounds who were colleagues were joking about how they were probably fighting each other a 
few years ago. They were all disgusted with national and international leaders which had put them though 
the war and put their county so far back. Smith has pointed out that it is only through ethnographic methods 
such as in-depth interviews and participant observation that we can observe when interpersonal trust enables 
cooperation in risky environments (Smith 2006 p.331) 
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Bosnia dividing what had once been a multiethnic country into ethno-nationalist entities that 
acknowledged and effectively rewarded ethnic cleansing. (Dahlman 2005) 
 
The flawed
132
 process which led to the DPA is carefully detailed by Bose (2002) based on official 
records and the diaries of Richard Holbrooke, the US negotiator. The complex Dayton 
compromise was modeled on the confederal, consociational structure of socialist Yugoslavia 
during the 1970s and 1980s which was administratively inefficient and could be construed as a 
backward step, not dealing with the issues which led to the war. Yet in that context many believed 
it was the only way forward (Bose (2006 p.22).  The DPA officially established a single multi-
ethnic state (with freedom of movement around the whole state) and with the goal of creating a 
single economic space at state level. But it comprised two entities where most of the power lay: 
Republika Srpska (RS), comprising 49% of the land area with Banja Luka as the capital and a 
majority Serbian community; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) with 51% of the 
country and Sarajevo as the capital of a federation of ten cantons of which eight have majority 
communities of either Bosniaks or Croats and two with mixed populations
133.
  (Bose 2002, 
Dahlman 2005). However, included in the DPA (Annex 7, Chapter 1 – Rights of Refugees and 
Displaced Persons) is the statement that “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely 
to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of 
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any 
property that cannot be restored to them.” (USA Govt. 1996) 
 
The state and each entity have a Presidency and Vice President and an elected Parliament. The 
state level is responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade and customs policies, monetary policy, 
international obligations, immigration, refugee return, criminal law enforcement, common and 
international communications, regulation of inter-Entity and international transport and air traffic 
control. The state was also given responsibility for the central bank and a currency board (Murphy 
2006 p. 14). The state was to manage the Constitutional Court of BiH, but it did not have 
responsibility for defence – that was at entity level.  The two entities were to have any powers and 
functions not explicitly given to the higher level.
134
. In summary there were multiple layers of 
government and short terms in office (elections every two years until 2002). Sixteen political 
parties in the Federation and fifteen in RS were established many along nationalist lines and each 
had a reluctance to cooperate on what should have been issues of common interest (World Bank 
2004b OED). This proved to be a recipe for decision-making paralysis.  
 
The DPA also set up The Office of the High Representative (OHR) with responsibility for 
overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the DPA. The OHR was under-resourced 
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 Malcolm goes further and calls the simplistic analysis that led to ethnic separation “poisoned”. 
133
  With Bose’s detailed analysis of the multi-layered power structures which were established after DPA 
he includes a complex organigram of the political structure of BiH under DPA  (Bose 2003 p. 60). Boyd 
(1998 p.46 is of the opinion that “partition is what exists in Bosnia today”. 
134 This hopeful tone in contrast to what he wrote in 2002 when he drew draws a heartbreaking parallel 
between the bloodshed and grief as a result of the partition of India with the “partition” of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
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(deliberately) because the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
135
 members (especially those 
sending peacekeepers), were uneasy about ceding too much control. The OHR was to coordinate 
(Article II of Annex 10 of the DPA 1996), without the ability to control, the multitude of 
international agencies and commissions implementing the various aspects of the DPA (Dahlman 
2005 p. 581) As a result of that lack of power, the OHR spent more time building consensus 
amongst the international community, than developing consensus building processes with Bosnian 
leaders (Ashdown 2007 p. 242). This was dysfunctional because in the post-war context of 
fundamental distrust, the two entity governments could rarely reach agreement within the time 
frame needed to implement reconstruction actions. But rather than give the OHR the power to 
represent the international community in working with the local leaders, in 1998 the PIC gave the 
OHR power to impose laws in both entities and the state and the power to remove obstructionist 
officials who were not fulfiling the requirements of the DPA. These were known as the “Bonn” 
powers. Examples of important reconstructions actions which needed these Bonn powers include 
the introduction of a single BiH-wide license plate in February 1998 (to prevent cars being 
identified as of RS or Federation origin); the new flag design, the national anthem, and passports 
(imposing a single design in September 2000)  
 
But what the DPA did not do is address the desperate economic plight of the country. The 
economy, which had been in collapse from Tito’s policies before the war, was then decimated by 
the war. Approximately 50% of the remaining adult population was unemployed and in poverty. 
Aggregate production was less than 20% of pre-war levels. The country had “institutional and 
social meltdown”. People were “severely traumatized and shell-shocked from the bloody 
implosion of the regime and society that they knew” (Bose, 2002 p.24).  Pupavac (2006) also 
describes the sheer desperation of people after the war – particularly women - because neither they 
nor their husbands (if their husbands were still alive) had work, nor any prospect of it. Despite all 
they had been through, somehow they were determined to survive, not to give up.  
 
The twin economic challenges were: reconstruction after the war and transition from a largely 
socialist to a market driven economy. Either one would be challenge enough, but for this shattered 
economy with the paralysed political system addressing both simultaneously was asking too 
much. So the focus of the international community was on the easier part - reconstruction. Re-
building blown up bridges, burnt out houses and unsafe schools was the priority. The World Bank, 
European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimated 
the required donor assistance was USD 5.1 billion from 1996 – 1999 (World Bank 2004b OED). 
The World Bank organized donor meetings to mobilize these resources from 50 countries and 14 
international organizations. By 2000 most housing, schools, water supply systems, roads 
telecommunications and electric power supplies had been reconstructed to near pre-war standards” 
(World Bank 2004b OED p. xi), although GDP had only recovered to about 60% of pre-war 
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 After Dayton, a Peace Implementation Conference was held to mobilise international support for the 
Agreement. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) which 
comprises 55 countries and agencies that support the peace process including NATO with a Steering Board 
to advise the HR in BiH comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference, which is represented by Turkey. 
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levels. The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department assessed the World Bank effort in 
reconstruction as “highly successful” (ibid p. 14. But that was the easy part. What would be harder 
was the process of economic transition to a market economy, building the institutions and 
businesses vital to economic growth. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a chronological story of Bosnia that highlights how social norms 
affecting the development of the microfinance market have developed including women’s 
economic activity, the importance of community identity and the lack of trust in banks. Although 
there is much pain in the Bosnian history, the resilience of Bosnians is major theme in this 
chapter.  Starting with the political and economic factors that contributed to the founding of 
Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito, this chapter explained the forces resulting in the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the 1992 – 1995 war. It concluded with the twin challenges facing Bosnia at the 
time of the Dayton Peace Accords, reconstruction after the war and transition from a largely 
socialist to a market driven economy under a structure that was not designed to facilitate change. 
The following Chapter 5 reports on the milestones achieved in the development of the financial 
and microfinance markets after the Dayton Peace Accords.  Chapter 6 then discusses the findings 
of the ethnographic research with microfinance stakeholders on the institutional building blocks of 
the microfinance market between 1997 and 2007, including the social norms.   
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Chapter 5: Bosnia: Financial Market Development for Low Income Clients 1997 – 2007 
 
The previous chapter described the political, economic and social context for the development of 
the financial market in Bosnia and concluded with the dual challenge of post-war reconstruction 
and post-socialist reform at the time of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996. One indicator of the 
chaotic state of the financial system in Bosnia was that five currencies were in everyday use: the 
Bosnian Dinar issued by the National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb Dinar 
issued by the National Bank of the Republika Srpska, the Yugoslav Dinar issued by the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Kuna issued by the National Bank of Croatia, and the Deutsch 
Mark (DM) issued by the German Bundesbank
136
. This chapter now uses grey as well as published 
literature to provide an account of how the newly formed Bosnian government with the support of 
international partners attempted to put the institutional foundations of a new financial system in 
place; deal with the challenges of a financial market in transition from a socialist to a market 
system; build confidence in the financial sector and provide access to finance for those affected by 
war. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the context for and characteristics of the 
microfinance sector, including reaching approximately 9.6 percent of the population or 363,082 
borrowers. This leads into the institutional analysis of the microfinance market in chapter 6. 
 
 
5.1 Microfinance donors start work 1997 
Post war, the banking system was barely functional, had lost all credibility and most people were 
reliant on cash. There were seventy two small undercapitalized banks in the country, twenty three 
of which were majority public banks which had ninety five per cent of total assets. The Federation 
had nearly four times as many banks as the RS, with seventy six per cent of nominal asset values 
(Tesche 2000). RS had fourteen banks and the Post Office was licensed to perform banking 
operation (Banking Agency RS 1998). Furthermore, the banks in RS were linked to both the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, the monetary system of Bosnia (Banking Agency RS 1998 p. 
3). As discussed in the previous chapter, few of these banks had experience making loans other 
than to the SOEs that owned them. It was almost impossible to borrow from the banks even with 
land, cash collateral and a regular international income and they were illiquid. Their financial 
statements were almost worthless. The balance sheets had uncollectible loans and frozen deposits, 
and the true net worth of the banks was difficult to compute and, in many cases, likely to be 
negative. For example Kristal Bank was sold to Hypo Bank in RS for 1 Euro without any attempt 
to estimate its actually value (Pugh 2006). In August 1997, total Konvertible Mark (KM) 
equivalent demand deposits in all Bosnian banks were just 117.3 million KM. In contrast, demand 
deposits in foreign currency amounted to 368 million KM, more than twice the amount of 
domestic currency demand deposits (Murphy 2006 p. 20). With good reason, citizens had no 
confidence in either the banks or local currencies (Murphy 2006 p. 18)
137
.  Furthermore, interbank 
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 The Deutschmark had circulated in that entire region for many years as a sound currency in which 
citizens had great confidence (Murphy 2006 p. 12). 
137
 There might have been a savings culture prior to Tito’s ascension to power according to Sasa Petkovic, 
the Vice Dean for Teaching, Faculty of Economics, University of Banja Luka who writes on SME 
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payments were still processed through three different ethnically based payment systems: the ZPP 
(Zavod za Platni Promet) in Bosniac areas, the ZAP (Zavod za Platni Promet) in Bosnian Croat 
areas, and the SPP (Sluzba za platni promet) in Bosnian Serb areas.  To say the sector had a bleak 
future, was an understatement (IMF 2006). 
 
In this context, the World Bank implemented a Dutch funded pilot microcredit program in 1996 to 
see if there was demand for small loans as part of the reconstruction (Goodwin-Groen 2003). All 
the loans were paid back on time with huge demand for the loans, and so the Bosnia government 
agreed to a World Bank microfinance project called the Local Initiatives Project. INGOs had also 
started microcredit projects as part of the relief and reconstruction including World Vision and 
Mercy Corps in Tuzla, CARE in Banja Luka and Catholic Relief Services in Sarajevo.  And the 
MicroEnterprise Bank (MEB) focusing on small and medium enterprises was founded in 1997 by 
a German consulting company with financing from the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
138
.  
 
The Local Initiatives Project, designed by the World Bank Human Development Unit based in 
Sarajevo, was co-managed with the Federation and RS Government’s Local Initiatives 
Departments. It started in 1997 under the World Bank Priority Reconstruction and Economic 
Recovery Program (World Bank, 2000).  Combined with other World Bank investments, its 
overarching goal was to assist people to “make the transition away from unemployment and 
dependency on humanitarian assistance to active employment and income generation” (ibid p.2).  
Its budget was USD 18 million over three years (under an International Development Association 
(IDA) Credit of SDR 4.9) with funding from the World Bank and seven other donors, including 
the governments of Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria and Japan and “parallel financing” 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (ibid p.1). Its three 
development objectives were to: 
 
1. address the urgent need to assist economically disadvantaged and war-affected groups in 
Bosnia re-start economic activity by disbursing 7 – 10,000 microcredits (up to DM 10,000 
each) for income generating activities. 
2. jump start the process of establishing financially viable microcredit institutions 
3. support improvement of the business environment for self-employment and micro/small 
business development and the legal environment for non-bank microfinance institutions 
(World Bank 2000 p.2, Dunn 2005 p. 1).
139
   
The donors to this project agreed with these goals and allowed the project manager and the World 
Bank to manage the project to achieve the goals, with their regularly being kept informed of 
project progress.  This project specifically “sought to overcome social exclusion by targeting 
                                                                                                                                                            
development in the RS. But in Dr. Petkovic’s view Tito destroyed the incentive to save, and the war 
destroyed any savings that had not been stolen by the National Bank of Yugoslavia. 
138
 The German company later set up the ProCredit Holding Company and renamed MEB to Pro Credit 
Bank. IFC funds were transferred to the holding company.) 
139
 It is worth noting that missing from this list of objectives was the formation of a national network or 
association of microfinance services providers. 
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groups such as war widows, demobilized soldiers, and other uprooted individuals” (Kuehnast 
2001 p.1)
140
 Project Implementation Units were set up in the Federation and in RS. These Local 
Initiative Departments (LIDs) in Sarajevo and Banja Luka were considered by the government and 
by the banking sector to be the supervisor of the MCO’s under the auspices of the World Bank. 
Their mandate was to achieve the project goals. They were separated into two parts, one 
undertaking training of the NGOs and the other monitoring of NGO performance, with a ‘fire 
wall’ between, to avoid a conflict of interest. The two most important functions the LIDs 
undertook were: training local NGOs in the delivery of microfinance consistent with standards of 
international good practice; and to supervise performance and disburse funds based on that 
performance (because demand was high and the supply was limited).  International experts were 
hired to train the PIUs and the NGOs (Goodwin-Groen 2003)
141
. 
 
The project operated on performance based funding right from the start. The first eligibility 
criteria for NGO funding was attendance at a four day “what is microfinance workshop” , writing 
a business plan, demonstrated knowledge of potential clients and a good accounting system (plus 
the consultant’s gut feeling) (Goodwin-Groen 2003). Seventeen NGOS met these criteria (12 in 
the Federation and 5 in RS) and were funded. This comprised a grant to cover 100% of their 
operational costs the first year, which they understood would go down to 25% in the second year. 
The NGOs were initially lent funds for the portfolio at an Annual Percentage Rate of 3%, to cover 
the government’s costs of managing the apex, and so they could learn about paying back loans. 
The local NGOs were only legally allowed to lend because they were under the World Bank 
project, otherwise only banks were allowed to lend. (Two international NGOs that did not join the 
project, were also lending as their credit was desperately needed.) 
 
NGOs funded under the project were required to participate in the training that the Local 
Initatitves Project (LIP) provided. This training ranged from travel to see microfinance 
internationally to bringing in local experts on financial management. No one had ever heard of 
microfinance before but it did not take potential clients long to realize that in a broken economy, 
microcredit might be their only hope (Pupavac 2006). Clients paid back their loans with 
impeccable performance. Within the first year the NGOs had disbursed 5,179 loans (World Bank 
1998 LIP MTR). NGOs were assessed on portfolio quality, management and progress towards 
sustainability. They had to submit bank statements to show how the funds were moving in and out 
and to prevent corruption. They also knew that the project was under the reconstruction program 
so would end in three years and they had to be financially self-sufficient in that time.  
 
In accordance with World Bank practice a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the project was scheduled 
in 1998. As of 31 March 1998 all the MCOs under the project had 3,276 loans outstanding in the 
Federation and 475 in Republika Srpska (World Bank1998 LIP MTR). For being in operation only 
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 It was an achievement to get this small project started with a focus on the excluded, because in post-
conflict situation funds are typically earmarked for larger governmental reconstruction projects (Kuehnast 
2001). 
141
 The project manager personally hired international experts since she wanted microfinance experts, not 
post-conflict experts. Ann Duval a microfinance technical and training expert set up the training and 
monitoring program. 
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about a year this was impressive progress. The MTR recommended a change in strategic focus 
from disbursing loans to building sustainable microfinance institutions that would last beyond the 
project. The choice to deliver microcredit on a sustainable basis beyond the life of the project was 
made by stakeholders who had been part of a participatory process (Kuenhast 2001). The 
development objectives of the project were modified to: 
 
1. Provide access to credit to the economically disadvantages and war-affected, 
specifically low-income entrepreneurs who have no access to credit from the formal 
banking sector; 
2. Facilitate the development of independent, financially viable microfinance institutions 
that will continue to provide credit to low income entrepreneurs over the long term; 
and  
3. Create an appropriate legal and regulatory environment for the provision of credit and 
savings services to low income entrepreneurs.(World Bank 2000, p.2-3) 
After the intensive training and their experience of lending in Bosnia, the NGOs understood what 
was needed to build a sustainable microfinance institution (MFI). So, as part of a transparent, 
participatory process,
142
 performance standards were debated and agreed with NGOs and LIP staff 
for the MTR (Kuenhast 2001).  These performance standards are in Table 3 below. The most 
difficult of these standards for the MCOs was the requirement for 10% of assets to be funded from 
local resources. This was difficult because the banking sector was still being reformed and most 
banks did not have the capacity to assess a small NGO without collateral. But it was included 
because all the stakeholders knew that diversifying funding relationships, especially to have local 
funding relationships, was critical to long term sustainability. The importance of the Austrian 
banks entering the banking sector is discussed later in this chapter. It was an Austrian bank that 
first to lent to MCOs because it understood how to lend based on cash-flow.   
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 The participatory process for determining objectives and standards built on the highly interactive training 
experiences of microfinance practitioners and their understanding of the market. It was conducted over a 
day by a skilled facilitator in English with discussions amongst participants in the local language as needed.  
While less than an ideal participatory process (as set out, for example, by Chambers (1997)), given that 
many of the participants would not have chosen to work together at all so soon after the war, the World 
Bank considered it an achievement to have any degree of participation and consensus. Reflecting on his 
experience of participatory practice over many years Drinkwater (2003 p. 61) recognized that participatory 
methods were “inevitably incomplete”, and that the “dilemma of such partial understanding is how much 
and what part of it can we rely on.” The Mid Term Review team, with local advice, decided there was 
enough consensus to modify the objectives of the project and recommend their standards. 
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Table 3 1998 Performance standards for MicroCredit Organizations 
AREA OF OPERATION STANDARD TO BE ACHIEVED BY END OF PROJECT – 
DECEMBER 1999 – FOR INVESTMENT 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY  
Legal registration Currently legally registered and able to be legally registered as an 
microcredit / microfinance institutions under the appropriate law 
once a capital grant is received. 
Business Plan Strategic plan projecting updated financial and institutional goals 
Accounting and Internal Control 
System  
Accounting system which meets international standards with 
internal controls. Audited financial statements for one year. 
Loan tracking System Loan tracking system able to provide weekly situation on total loan 
portfolio including ageing of arrears 
Financial Projection System System which provides reliable financial forecasting for the 
institution, especially cash flow. 
Governance Statutes which require an independent Board of Directors and give 
clear ethical and operational guidelines. 
Human Resources Staff necessary for prudent management of a financially viable MFI 
within a defined organizational structure 
CLIENTS  
Identify clients Clear commitment to low income entrepreneurs in the business plan 
and statutes 
Loan size First loan < 5,000 DM.  Average loan size < 10,000 DM 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Portfolio Quality  < 5% portfolio at risk after 30 days. <4% write off (of loan funds 
managed) – both for last year of operations. 
Profitability Cover all costs from non-grant i.e. operating income, including loan 
loss reserve and the cost of funds. 
Capital Requirement Minimum of 250,000 DM in capital / equity from any source 
Capital / Asset Ratio Capital /asset ratio not greater than 1:5 
Local Resources 10% of assets funded by local resources other than retained 
earnings 
Soure: World Bank, 1998 LIP MTR 
 
Eight local NGOs met these standards, five in the Federation and three in RS.  The locations of 
their headquarters and the names of Board members provided information about the ethnic focus 
of these NGOs (For example, “Benefit” was based in Sarajevo, but on the RS side of the border, 
so largely served the Serb population and “AMK” was based in Herzegovina, so largely served the 
Croat population.) But in all the training there was a deliberate attempt to focus on the needs of 
clients as people, not their ethnicity. Eight of the others that did not meet the standards were 
required to repay their loans to the project. In order to survive, all but one merged with one of the 
stronger NGOs so they could keep serving their clients
143
. This reduction in the number of NGOs 
helped the project. Training became demand driven with MCOs partially paying for the training in 
which they participated. 
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 One large NGO one was allowed to continue lending with the project funds because it was still operating 
well and had significant international support. 
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In June 2000 the project officially came to an end. Its achievements exceeded expectations 
including (World Bank, 2000 p.5): 
 
 50,261 loans disbursed compared to the original target of 10,000 
 19,361 borrowers outstanding as of 30 June 2000 
 49% of borrowers were women (many of whom were widowed during the war) 
 Of the nine MCOs with LIP funding all but one covered their operating costs144, four were 
financially self-sufficient  
 Average Loan size was approx. USD 1,450 indicating a commitment to low income 
clients 
 Portfolio at Risk (PAR) after 30 days was 0.66% 
 An estimated 65,000 jobs were created or sustained. 
An independent analysis of the benefit of the loans commissioned in 1999 found 79% of clients 
considered that the loan had significantly improved their economic situation. On average 
borrowers experienced a 26% increase in monthly household income (from Bosnian Marks 
(BAM) 351 to BAM 444) and 10% claimed a 50% increase in business production. There was 
also social benefit from the group lending in towns where displaced women were placed in groups 
with local women which helped integrate those different groups. (World Bank 2000 p. 5) 
 
But it did not achieve the goal set by the MTR of creating four options for the delivery of financial 
services to the excluded namely: a not-for-profit MCO; a membership based credit and savings 
association; a for-profit microcredit institution and; a specialized MFI providing both credit and 
savings services. These four options needed to be explicitly identified because one of the legacies 
of a command-oriented economy was that every institution needed to be officially registered to 
undertake its exact activity or business. 
 
5.2 Foundations for the formal financial system
145
  
While microcredit efforts were growing rapidly, progress on the banking side was moving more 
slowly. The DPA had designed a banking system with an independent state level Central Bank 
and Currency Board, entity level oversight of the banking sector, and the payment system run by 
the banks.  (A “currency board” is an arrangement whereby a nation has its own currency but ties 
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 The one that did not perform well had corruption issues. The CEO closed down the MCO, took the 
remaining funds and told the clients they did not have to pay back their loans. He escaped to Croatia and 
could not be prosecuted. 
145
 The governance structure for the Central Bank of Bosnia and Hercegovina (CBBiH) reflects the situation 
in BiH. There is a governing board on which there will be one Bosniac, one Bosnian Croat, and one Bosnian 
Serb. However, the governing board and the CBBiH are run by a single person known as the Governor – 
who cannot be from BiH or adjoining countries and is appointed by the IMF. (Murphy 2006 p. 14) Mr. Peter 
Nicholl, a New Zealander, held the position from 1997 – 2008. 
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it to another nation’s currency - maintaining full convertibility with that other currency146. There 
is a financial benefit to this arrangement since central banks, even under this type of arrangement, 
hold earning assets and they issue liabilities with little or no interest cost, and they receive net 
income from their activities. (Murphy 2006 p. 13)).  The Central Bank and the Currency Board 
were not established until 1997. Both were led by the highly qualified and independent New 
Zealander, Peter Nicholl, from 1997 to 2007 who had no affiliation to any political party or ethnic 
group
147
. These two institutions fulfiled three important functions: keeping inflation in check; 
maintaining the stability of the state level currency, the Konvertible Mark (KM) and coordinating 
the two entity Banking Agencies. The KM was established with full convertibility to the Deutsche 
Mark. The notes and coins, however, were not issued until 1998 because the design of the KM 
bank notes had to be imposed by the OHR using the “Bonn powers” (discussed in the previous 
chapter).  The two entities could not agree on the design because of differences in politics and 
ethnicity (Tesche 2004 p.3).  Finally by October, 1999, all interbank payments were in KM 
(Murphy 2006 p. 15). 
 
The entity Banking Agencies were new organizations established under the Dayton Peace 
Agreement with the function to build a robust banking system. The Law establishing the 
Federation Banking Agency was passed in late 1996 and in 1998 the RS Banking Agency Law 
was passed (Banking Agency Fed BiH 1996, Banking Agency RS 1998). USAID was the main 
funder and brought in expertise from the US Federal Reserve to establish the Banking Agency and 
start enforcing Basel I standards. For example, starting in 1997 in the Federation and in 1998 in 
the RS, all banks had to comply with the 12 percent capital adequacy requirement, to calculate 
their ROE & ROA ratios according to international standards (which they had never done before) 
and to disclose loans to relatives, or lose their license. These standards were strictly enforced. 
Funders such as the German KfW and the World Bank required even higher standards for banks to 
access their long-term credit lines (e.g. for housing). Since these standards were so difficult for 
local banks and the banks had no experience making loans, the international funders provided 
technical assistance on how to meet their higher standards and how to design a mortgage and other 
products. Access to this long term credit from the international funders was much needed liquidity 
for the banks; so they would whatever was needed to get it. As the banks were forced to meet 
funders’ standards, this supported the work of the Banking Agencies in requiring Basel I standards 
(e.g. Banking Agency Fed BiH 2002).  
 
It took time to get the Banking Laws passed because politicians were trying to hold on to their 
influence over the old system (Tesche 2000 p. 322). (They would not have control over a modern 
competitive banking system, nor would ethnic interests be served.) But once accomplished, the 
focus became the privatization of the banks and related steps to improve confidence in the banking 
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 This means that all central bank liabilities (in the domestic currency) are set equal (at some fixed 
exchange rate) to central bank assets in the chosen foreign currency. That is, the central bank’s ability to 
create money is exactly limited by the amount of foreign currency assets it holds. This is a monetary policy 
that severely restricts central bank discretion. Note that the central bank cannot extend credit to commercial 
banks under this arrangement nor can it underwrite the government deficits by investing in domestic 
government securities. (Murphy 2006) 
147
 Kemal Kozaric has now taken over from Peter Nicholl and that transition has gone smoothly. Peter 
Nicholl is now Chair of the Governing Board of the Indirect Taxation Administration. 
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system. The first step was consolidation so that a viable, competitive banking system could 
develop. Officially state owned banks had to go through a process of determining the exact value 
of assets, liabilities, and net worth – although this did not always happen (Pugh 2006). Those with 
a positive net worth were privatized while those with negative net worth were liquidated. 
Privatization was aimed at breaking the link between enterprise managers and the banks 
mitigating the conflict of interest problem. This was supplemented by regulations regarding bank 
dealing with related parties. Foreign banks were then encouraged to enter the market to provide 
effective competition for domestic banks, improving both prices and service availability. The 
credibility of the Banking Agencies in particular spurred the advent of the foreign banks, which, in 
turn benefited the MCOs. 
 
USAID and other international donors viewed the three payments bureaux not only as an obstacle 
to the development of a free market and the entrance of foreign banks, but also as source of 
corruption and illegitimate finance for the political parties who controlled them (Zaum 2006 
p.45)
148
. They argued that an efficient payment system was crucial because, amongst other things, 
it reduced transaction costs for businesses. So funders put a lot of pressure on the BiH entity 
governments to reform the system. In RS resistance to the reform was very high as “politicians 
preferred to remain in control over financial flows” (Zaum 2006 p.47). The law eventually had to 
be imposed by the OHR on 20 December 2000 before the 31 Dec deadline. This process was 
driven by the international community. The reason it succeeded was because the international 
community was coordinated; had the authority and used it. But the downside is that they failed to 
develop local capacity to manage the process of agreement and there was a lack of accountability 
in the process (Zaum 2006 p. 53-54) as will be discussed further in the institutional change section 
following.  
 
The establishment of the Central Bank, the Currency Board, the Banking Agencies a reformed 
Payments system and laws governing banks were important foundations for the financial system. 
But this took five years until the end of 2000. Meanwhile, the only real source of working capital 
for ordinary people was microcredit from the World Bank Local Initiative Project and INGOs, 
which had set up their own independent and effective supervisory and accountability structures. 
Having the basics in place was an essential part of the reconstruction; the next step was the 
transition from a socialist to a market economy. 
 
5.3 Challenges of a financial market in transition  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the importance of building a sound institutional framework for 
economic growth is now taken for granted and this is a particular important aspect of the 
reconstruction process.  Coyne (2008 p.9) defines reconstruction as “the rebuilding of both formal 
and informal institutions”. In order to build that institutional framework in Bosnia the OHR relied 
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 As noted at the beginning of the chapter interbank payments were processed through three different 
independent payment systems based on ethnicity: the ZPP (Zavod za Platni Promet) in Bosniac areas, the 
ZAP (Zavod za Platni Promet) in Bosnian Croat areas, and the SPP (Sluzba za platni promet) in Bosnian 
Serb areas. 
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on the “Bonn powers” to push through actions that were politically sensitive, but everyone knew 
were needed to implement the DPA. For all political parties in Bosnia, allowing the OHR to make 
the tough decisions allowed them to “save face”; no one had to look weak, which was culturally 
very difficult. Indeed, Ashdown (2007) frankly discussed the need to create face-saving devices to 
allow parties to agree or, at least, not oppose OHR action. But the downside is that the Bonn 
powers created a “culture of dependency” on those powers, among both Bosnians and the 
international community, rather than undertake the long-term processes that build consensus 
(Ashdown 2007 p.238)
149
.  These powers also created a fundamental contradiction.  The 
contradiction was that in an effort to set up democratic and accountable
150
 institutions the OHR 
was using a process that was not democratic or accountable, and in fact the OHR could largely 
disregard democratically elected officials if he so chose (Caplan 2006).  Such an artificial 
approach to institutional development, “where the international community assumes executive and 
legislative powers, makes the development of trust impossible as this process lacks transparency 
or accountability.” (Chandler 2006 p.97).  Coyne (2008 p. 56) agrees in an analysis of several 
different reconstruction process after war, is unequivocal about the vital importance of integrating 
local norms in the establishment of formal institutions, arguing that formal institutions must build 
on the informal institutions otherwise there will be dysfunction and reconstruction will fail. 
Ashdown, a former politician, describes how he personally respected the results of the ballot box 
and worked with local political leadership, but he used the powers when there was no alternative 
to get things done (Ashdown, 2007)
151
.  An alternative interpretation might be, therefore, that 
since 1945 Bosnia had little history of consensus building because Tito was an authoritarian 
leader. The HR was able to get things done when he behaved like another authoritarian leader, 
fulfiling that norm. This will be explored more in the findings chapter. 
 
However, there were success stories. For example, the public-private partnership to change in the 
business environment: There were a myriad of laws from the Tito regime which were unfriendly 
to businesses, including many taxes (with the threat of the financial police behind them). So the 
OHR had identified removal of these laws as a priority for economic reform.  A committee of 
businessmen called the “Bulldozer Committee” was formed in November 2002 (Office of the 
High Representative, 2003) With the support of technical experts their task was to call on the 
business community to identify the most egregious laws preventing business growth and then take 
action to remove or change those laws. The initial target was 50 laws in 150 days which they 
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 This recognition of a culture of dependency on the powers of the international community was also 
addressed by participants when looking back at developing the microfinance laws. 
150
 “Accountability” refers to the “norms practices and institutions whose purpose is to hold public officials 
(and other bodies) accountable for their actions and for the outcomes of those actions” This includes vertical 
and horizontal accountability. Accountability requires answerability and “transparency about decision 
making and mechanisms of enforcement” (although not always sanctions) (Caplan 2006 p.158). The 
minimum requirement is transparency about how decisions are made. 
151
 By using his powers to sack obstructionist politicians Ashdown succeed in abolishing the two entities' 
ethnically separate armies and police, creating unified, state-level Bosnian forces. In contrast, his successor 
Christian Schwarz-Schilling lost the support of the international community after just a year, and had to 
leave his post as the OHR because he chose not to use the Bonn powers and as a consequence little progress 
was made on implementing the DPA. (Ashdown 2007) 
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met!
152
 Their work continued and the bottom-up consultative process with the entrepreneurs which 
had been set up was considered global good practice in public-private partnerships (IFC 2007) 
Despite this success there were high obstacles remaining and it was going to take longer for the 
mindset of lawmakers to devolve some of their power and to allow greater business freedom.
153
  
 
Another success was on property rights. Property rights are considered a corner stone of the 
formal financial sector but the challenge of establishing property rights after a combination of a 
socialist economy and a bitter war was (and still is) daunting. The land registry was started 100 
years ago but much of the land was still legally owned by worker-owned enterprises, property 
records from before the war were complicated and incomplete and the problem of who owned 
what land was compounded by the more than 800,000 internally displaced persons who were 
occupying residences belonging to other displaced or missing persons, creating a knock-on 
displacement problem. Many of the areas where squatting was common had been ethnically 
cleansed and the local war-time councils had sanctioned the reassignment of what was 
euphemistically described as ‘abandoned property’ to co-ethnic persons displaced from other 
areas. (Dahlman 2005 p, 584)  In 2002 the OHR imposed the Law on Land Registry in both 
entities in keeping with Annex VII, and set up the Commission for Real Property Claims. Its 
function was to provide a register of land ownership across Bosnia and the liens on that property. 
Hundreds of international and local legal and technical professionals created a computerized 
database of cadastral and occupancy records taking until 2003. This meant that the banking sector 
had a sound basis to begin tracking land ownership. 
 
Unfortunately, the local (opština) authority was the agency responsible for repossession of 
property. This meant that if a minority returnee wanted to get her/his house back, the returnee was 
required to return to a place of fear and request the local authorities (who might be hard line 
ethno-nationalists who had sanctioned her/his original removal) to evict co-ethnic squatters (who 
had nowhere else to go) from her/his house,. That is almost asking the impossible. Even if the 
authorities were not antagonistic, they could simply be corrupt and so obstruct the process 
endlessly if they did not get some benefit from the process. However Dayton does not provide 
displaced persons the right to illegal occupation, Annex VII offers a ‘choice of destination,’ 
including the right to stay put (Dahlman 2005 p. 585) which meant that there could also be 
protracted legal processes. As a consequence, despite the OHR action, there is still great 
uncertainty around land ownership issues and banks now get an ‘expert’ legal opinion to check 
liens on property etc. before taking it as collateral and still there are problems.  The “inescapable 
conclusion was that there was not yet significant expansion of bank credit to the formal sector” 
(World Bank 2004b p.24). 
154
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 For example the Bulldozer Committee actions slashed statutory capital requirements when registering a 
LLC from $ 6. 500 to $ 1. 300. This increased number of registered companies (doubled in some areas) . 
Also registration of foreign companies which had previously required 3 different institutions, 3 sets of 
applications and took more than 3 months to complete was changed to 1 institution - 1 set of application –1 
month long process (Herzberg 2006). 
153
 It is important to note, however, that there was no specific objection to the work of the Bulldozer 
Committee because even though there were barriers to business, the private sector was accepted. 
154
 Another example of the OHR’s work was the Medium Term Development Strategy (Govts of BiH and 
RS, 2004), also known as the Poverty Reduction Support Program (PRSP). The World Bank, OHR and key 
 106 
5.3.1 Corruption 
The problem of corruption, particularly economic corruption, is common to many transition 
economies, but it was greatly exacerbated in post-war Bosnia because of the vast sums of donor 
funds for reconstruction being given to the country without a functional institutional framework in 
the financial sector. Misappropriation of funds was almost inevitable.  Misappropriation was 
compounded by asset stripping of SOEs, illegal arms trade, corruption at customs and border 
posts, the trafficking of women by organized crime, and a network of petrol stations that sent 
money to support war criminals, as Ashdown’s (2007) memoirs graphically report. But it was the 
level and depth of corruption at all three energy generating companies that had really shocked  
Ashdown (2007). These companies were national assets that had contributed to 9% of GDP but 
were now haemorrhaging funds to private individuals. Pugh (2006) also illustrates how criminals 
(including those who allegedly conducted war crimes) and elites corrupted the privatization 
process for their own ends, including in the banking sector, with one bank being privatized to an 
offshore company in the Cayman Islands. Corruption in the political sphere had also been 
inadvertently facilitated by a DPA provision which gave politicians immunity from prosecution so 
it had become “advantageous for criminals to get themselves elected to evade prosecution 
(Ashdown 2007 p.245). The World Bank estimated that approximately Euro 250 million was lost 
to smuggling per year and that tax evasion was a very serious problem (World Bank 2004b p.22 ) 
The honest officials who uncovered high level corruption often received death threats to them and 
their families. Some commentators argued that corruption became a bigger barrier to economic 
recovery than ethnic nationalism (Chandler 2006).  Bosnia corruption has been deconstructed into 
three types: mafia rackets and trafficking; corruption and fraud in business life and; survival or 
shadow economies (Pugh 2006 p.151). The shadow economy although officially illegal, is simply 
a survival mechanism for many people, enabling them to exist just above the poverty line when 
there is negligible social protection provided by the government (Pugh 2006). Once the 
institutions for a viable economy are in place this part of the economy will slowly become 
formalized. 
 
Broadman and Recanatini’s (2001) research on corruption in a cross section of transition 
economies found “that a well-established system of market institutions – one characterized by 
clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances, including strong enforcement 
mechanisms, and a robust competitive environment – reduces rent-seeking opportunities and, in 
turn, the incentives for corruption.”155 Bosnia does not even approximate these conditions. So 
when Ashdown became the HR in 2002 he agreed with the PIC Steering Committee that his first 
priority would be “the rule of law” (Ashdown 2007 p.242). His two goals were to tackle high level 
crime and clean up the political space since “huge sums of government money had been lost in 
                                                                                                                                                            
members of the Bosnian governments had engaged in a process of wide consultation with different arms of 
government and civil society stakeholders in developing the Medium-Term Development Strategy. The 
focus of the strategy was enticing business and investment to BiH, because that process had largely failed to 
date, rather than direct poverty reduction (Pugh 2006). But this view was contested as critics claimed there 
was actually no room for negotiation as it was the strategy the World Bank chose for the country, not a real 
engagement process. 
155
 Similarly Easterly (2001) found poor institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth when 
ethnic diversity is high. 
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scandals” to the knowledge of the government and Ashdown decided that “relevant government 
ministers must be held responsible” (Ashdown 2007 p.235).  
 
Unfortunately, the old laws inherited from the former Yugoslavia were not able to be effectively 
used to prosecute corruption in Bosnia. The whole criminal code needed to be re-written 
(Ashdown 2007 p.249). Also in 2002 OHR set up “Anti-Crime and Corruption and Criminal 
Intelligence Units” worked work with local Bosnian prosecutors to uncover high level corruption.  
Anti-corruption efforts, however, were hampered by powerful interests and in 2004 the World 
Bank (2004 OED) reported that corruption remained a serious problem. For example, another 
major source of corruption was the “complex, inefficient and corruption generating tax system” 
(Ashdown 2007 p.245) and reform of the system was strenuously resisted.  The World Bank 
(2005b) noted that to enact reforms enabling the State Level Value Added Tax (VAT) will require 
“difficult and protracted consensus building” (World Bank 2005b p.x). This is partly because of 
the complexity of the administrative arrangements agreed at Dayton compounded by weak 
technical capacity and policy coordination failures across the various levels of government but 
also because it benefited those in positions of power. However, the OHR was eventually able to 
reach an agreement with both entities on State Level VAT to come into effect in January 2006. 
One face-saving device used by the OHR to get agreement without having to use the Bonn 
powers, was that State Level VAT was necessary to comply with eventual European Union (EU) 
accession –which all parties agreed was a goal. 
 
The OHR’s use of its Bonn powers because political leaders cannot agree, the pervasiveness of 
corruption and the dysfunction in dealing with conflicting property claims discussed above, are 
common discourses in Bosnian public life post Dayton. These dysfunctional elements, however, 
are not the whole story as the positive steps in the financial market are discussed below and they 
need not be the final story as inclusive change processes are discussed in the following chapter.  
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5.4 Building confidence in the financial market
156
  
The importance of Austrian Banks’ role in building confidence in the Bosnian banking system is 
unequivocal (Bray 2005). The major four Austrian Banks were Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich 
AG
157
  and Volksbank
158
 (both entered in 2000), Hypo Alpe Adria Bank (HAAB)
159
 (entered in 
2001) and Bank Austria Creditanstalt 
160
 (entered in 2003) (Bray 2005 p.35) The dominant 
position of foreign-owned bank subsidiaries by 2006 transformed the financial sector (IMF 2006). 
“The financial system is now more robust to traditional banking solvency crises, as these 
subsidiaries can typically draw capital and liquidity from their parents as needed, and now risks 
are primarily to the sustainability of foreign exchange (FX) reserves.” (IMF 2006 p. 1). One 
Austrian banker in Sarajevo was quoted (by Bray 2005 p. 35) as saying that, “banks are among the 
‘building blocks’ that are needed by other international investors. First, it is important to have a 
clearly defined regulatory environment. Then you need the financial institutions, and then other 
investors will follow.” 
 
As of December 2007 approx 50% of the banks were Austrian owned, followed by 22% Italian 
banks with other countries less than 10%.(BA FBiH 2008 p. 3) approximately 70% of the assets in 
the banking sector in the hands of “foreign” investors and 60% of the savings of citizens in four 
foreign owned banks (Raiffaissen; VolksBank; Hypo Bank and UniCredit). They are increasingly 
important as sources of loans for local businesses and domestic customers.  
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 This section does not include insurance because it was not a significant part of the financial market. 
There was no tradition of insurance before the war because the government took care of everything. Even 
private real estate was not insured. As a result it was a slow moving business.  Entity Level Insurance 
Supervisors (and a State Level coordination body) were not set up until 2005 with functions of issuing 
licences for car, life and property insurers; collecting insurance data and assessing the insurers. All cars 
were required to have insurance but most did not. Only about 10 – 12 % of the population officially have 
life insurance. It is higher if you include those insured by Austrian based insurers but they are officially 
illegal. Most insurance is business property insurance. Most Insurers do not see an opportunity in the ‘mass 
market’. An exception is the Mikrofin Insurance Company registered in the RS December 2007 (with the 
first policy being issued on 11 Jan 2008). In 2007, it only operated in RS but next year will be the 
Federation too. Their first product was an accident insurance policy for Mikrofin clients. If clients die or 
cannot pay their loan then the insurance pays out. The cost is 45 KM per policy for one year. Now Mikrofin 
Insurance offers ten different non-life insurance products for property; car; travel; and workers/accident 
insurance. 
157
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG entered the market in 2000, when it acquired a controlling share 
of Market Banka, and then purchased 100% of the Mostar-based Hrvatska Postanska Banka in May 2001. 
Initially it focused on the Federation, but since 2003 has expanded its network to RS. Among other services 
it offers Internet banking, and has its own securities brokerage firm— Raiffeisen Brokers. (Bray 2005 p.35) 
158
 Volksbank set up in Sarajevo in 2000 and has expanded by setting up two offices in Sarajevo and seven 
in other parts of the country. (Bray 2005 p.35) 
159
 Hypo Alpe Adria Bank (HAAB) based in Klagenfurt, Austria, and—as its name suggests—aspires to 
expand throughout the Alpine and Adriatic region. It began in 2001 by acquiring Auro Banka in Mostar. In 
2002 it acquired a controlling share of the loss-making Kristal Banka in Banja Luka, the capital of RS, for 
one Euro. 
160
 Bank Austria Creditanstalt acquired Central Profit Banka in Sarajevo in 2003, and has since merged it 
with HVB Bank, its local subsidiary, to form HVB Central Profit Banka. With 33 branches, this is the third-
largest commercial bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Bray 2005 p.35) 
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These Austrian banks have had a long-term interest in the region and Bosnia-Herzegovina fitted 
into their wider regional strategic plans along with similar moves into neighbouring countries. 
Many clients from the former Yugoslavia were working in Austria and Germany and sending 
remittances back to Bosnia through the banks.  They knew Bosnia had cheap labour but an 
educated workforce and access to western markets. They had also seen a rapid rebuilding of the 
infrastructure of roads electricity etc. after the war.  The visible evidence of their impact took the 
form of smartly refurbished office buildings and a proliferation of Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs) which, were taken as a welcome sign of recovery. Their refurbished office buildings also 
convey a sense of commercial professionalism which goes beyond ethnic particularism. Aura 
Banka and Kristal Banka, arguably were Croat and Serb banks respectively and now they are part 
of a national and international network, which were both acquired by HAAB, they can claim that 
they are not ethnic banks, but professional banks
161
.  But they also brought a fresh perspective to 
the banking market (Murphy 2006)
 162
 
 
The private credit registry (LRC Kreditni Biro) was set up in 2000. It keeps all the credit 
information submitted to the registry from all sources including the 3,956 participating 
organizations with which it has information agreements, so it has a comprehensive clients’ history 
(LRC 2008). Most MCOs are members and use it to check whether clients keep paying on time, 
(not whether the clients might have too much debt).  The Central Bank set up a state-operated 
Central Credit Registry (CKR) in 2006, managed by the banking agencies, which was not initially 
mandatory. During the financial crisis and due to over-liquidity many MFIs and banks lent to 
over-indebted clients and were not using the LRC information, so the state imposed mandatory 
reporting to CRK. It is more comprehensive and is cheaper, but keeps no client history. CRK data 
was updated monthly but will move to daily updates so financial institutions can better curb over-
indebtedness. 
 
In 2005 USAID set up a Mobile Collateral Registry in the Dept of Justice. If a vehicle or business 
equipment is given as collateral for an individual loan it will be registered immediately. The 
collateral obligation will also be documented on the vehicle’s registration papers so it cannot be 
sold. With the mobile collateral registry MCO loan officers can register collateral of whatever is 
appropriate for individual loans, depending on the loan size. 
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 Some are less convinced by this professional non-ethnic banks argument claiming that when UniCredit 
bought Zagrebachka Banker it also inherited the Croats fondness for that bank (B3). 
162
 To further develop the BiH banking system the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was established at the 
State level. The BiH Parliament (State level) passed the DIA law in 2002. All banks operating in BiH 
became members of the DIA. Coverage is limited to 5,000 KM per depositor in each insured bank. (Murphy 
2006 p. 23) The Governor of the CBBiH is an ex officio member of the Management Board of the DIA, 
and, in addition, the CBBiH appoints one other member of that Board. (Murphy 2006 p. 22). The outcome 
was one of cautious optimism indicating that the arrangements were prudent and that the DIA was ‘‘—a 
promising start to a viable institution and a positive influence and a positive influence in the continuing 
repair of confidence in the banking sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina.’’ (Murphy 2006 p. 24) 
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5.5 Legal and regulatory changes and MCO law 
The legal system still included some laws from the former Yugoslavia. There were two sets of 
entity laws some harmonized and some not. Even when there was just a single law which applied 
to a case, the judges had wide discretion on how to apply it depending on the context. This legal 
uncertainty between entities, created a difficult environment for the financial sector that needed to 
be able to enforce contracts and also created difficulties for a harmonized MCO Law. 
 
A proposal for four categories of financial institution to serve low income entrepreneurs was 
submitted to the Federation and RS Governments in 1999. These four were an NGO Micro-Credit 
Organization, a Finance Company (privately owned, credit only), a Savings and Credit 
Association (member savings based) and a Microfinance Bank (that could accept deposits). But 
this was not a high priority for the governments and there was no MCO network or association in 
the Federation, RS or State wide which could lobby the state or entity governments to be able to 
provide better services to excluded clients. It was, instead, left to the World Bank to get the 
regulations passed. Lyman (2005 p. 6) reports that as the draft legislation progressed “it became 
clear that only a more limited legislative agenda would have any hope of adoption by both Entity-
level parliaments. A choice was therefore made to focus only on legislation to clarify the legality 
of NGO microcredit of the type already widely in practice throughout the country.”  (The choice 
was also made not to allocate the resources to undertake a lobbying effort to get these four options 
passed and also not to request the use of the “Bonn powers” to get them passed.) 
 
In 2000 both entity governments passed the Micro Credit Organizations (MCO) Law. This law 
had two functions: to give permission to NGOs to legally lend amounts less than 10,000KMs and 
by doing so, to facilitate access to loans for the majority who were excluded from the formal 
sector. Local NGOs that were making these small loans were required to register with the 
Department of Social Affairs in Sarajevo and the Ministry of Finance in Banja Luka as MCOs. 
They were then legally permitted to undertake their lending. Taking deposits was not permitted. 
The only reporting requirement was to use the NGO Chart of Accounts when sending in an 
Annual Report to the respective ministry. The Ministry of Social Affairs in the Federation was not 
required to and did not exercise any form of supervision over the fast-developing sector 
(permitting, for example, numerous phantom MCOs that had fulfiled the minimal prerequisites for 
registration to remain on the registration books, even though they never became operational). The 
Min. of Finance in Republika Srpska took a more proactive approach but had no legal backing to 
enforce MCOs to share information about their financial performance.
163
  The main reason for this 
lack of supervisory requirement is that microcredit was clearly seen as an NGO activity as part of 
post-war reconstruction, it was not banking, no savings were involved, and there was little 
supervisory capacity anyway.  What this law did not do, was provide a way for clients’ savings to 
be safely collected either within a cooperative or banking structure as originally planned. This was 
a major blow for the sector and further reasons for this outcome are discussed in the following 
chapter. 
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 The MCOs under the World Bank LIP project had much more rigorous reporting requirements to their 
funders, which were then accepted by the sector as discussed below. 
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The Law on Deposit Insurance was passed at the State Level in 2002. After progress was made in 
dealing with privatization and liquidating insolvent banks, a deposit insurance program was 
implemented. (Murphy 2006 p. 18-19) The initial amount insured was 5000KM per person per 
bank backed by a 100 million KM unified deposit insurance fund (funded by USAID and KfW).  
The amount insured increased to 7500KM and the amendment was before Parliament in May 
2009 to make it 10 000 KM. (The goal is 20 000 Euros.)  Deposit insurance is managed by the 
State Level Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). All the 10 banks in the RS are member of the DIA 
and 23 of the 31 in the Federation are members, who all pay an insurance premium to the DIA. 
Member banks hold 98.4% of the total Bosnia savings. In 2005 authority was given to the DIA to 
monitor the business operations of banks (like the Banking Agencies) to ensure the safety of 
deposits and they have to comply with requests if they are admitted to the DIA. The Law was 
harmonized with the Law on Banking at the entity level and with the European Directive on 
Deposit Insurance. The DIA is a member of the International and the European Associations of 
Deposit Insurers, so complies with international good practice. Deposit Insurance was obviously 
important to the government agencies and funders who set it up but the bankers who participated 
in this research considered that depositors trusted their banks and did not think deposit insurance 
made much difference. 
 
In the former Yugoslavia, everyone was required to have an Identity Document (ID) card and this 
requirement for government issued identification continued after the war. In December 2001 the 
State level Law on Identity Cards which requires a uniform card for everyone in Bosnia which 
shows where they live. The ID cards provide standard government verified identity information 
about all clients. This means that MCOs, leasing agencies and banks can establish the identity of 
the person requesting an account and use it to cross check client information at credit registries 
and elsewhere. 
 
5.6 Continued growth of microcredit 
As the first Local Initiative project was ending in 2000 the economy had not recovered as 
expected by the World Bank. “Many Bosnians remain worse off than before the war.” (World 
Bank 2001b, p.2)  The commercial banking sector did not provide loans to those without 
substantial collateral, so there was still huge demand for micro-loans. 72% of the population was 
in poverty. The majority of those in poverty had some kind of employment but not enough money 
to keep the household above the poverty level, so they tried to supplement their income (Govts. of 
BiH & RS, 2004 p. 23). Furthermore, although the MCOs were financially sustainable they were 
not quite strong enough to stand alone. So a USD 27 million second LIP project was agreed in 
2001 with World Bank/IDA financing of 20 million and the remaining co-financed by entity 
governments and other donors (World Bank, 2001b).  Its purpose was to build on the first project 
and increase the scale, financial viability and social impact of microfinance services in Bosnia. Its 
specific development objective to: Finance the growth and institutional development of high 
performing MFIs so they could sustainably reach significant numbers of clients and support the 
transition to sustainable forms of financing. 
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This included four components, funding and capacity building of MCO (but not supporting the 
establishment of a network or association of MCOs or undertaking financial education for clients 
or public information about how microfinance could best be used), client impact assessment and 
legal and regulatory reform. The legal reform was designed specifically “to enable MCOs to 
expand their sources of financing and the types of services they could provide” (World Bank 
2005c p.3). Training was opened up to all MCOs in Bosnia, not just those funded under the 
project. This helped in bringing the MCOs together (so there were not two classes of MCO). A 
consultancy firm specializing in banking was hired to provide demand driven services. This 
project also used performance based funding and again there was again a transparent participatory 
process of establishing performance standards for the project
164
.  One of the key performance 
standards was the requirement to have 15% commercial financing. After desk reviews and field 
visits, seven MCOs qualified for this funding. 
 
The LIP II funded an independent impact evaluation of microcredit on clients using a quasi-
experimental
165
 design and a combination of a longitudinal survey and interviews from a sample 
of eleven MCO clients. A total of 4,117 enterprises were in the sample. First a baseline study of 
clients was undertaken in 2002 (Dunn and Tvrtkovic 2003). This found that 43% of clients were 
below the national poverty line and 11% were in extreme poverty. Using the Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (LSMS) survey the national poverty rate was 19% of the population. (This 
shows MCOs were targeting poor clients and comparable people in similar locations starting small 
businesses would also have been similarly poor.)  In the client group there was an approximately 
even gender balance in those who managed the business but in the non-client group 63% were 
managed by men. Women tended to predominate in trade and animal husbandry businesses 
whereas men dominated in production, services and agriculture. Only 1.2% had ever received a 
loan from a bank. The baseline survey also showed that 36% of clients were displaced by the war 
compared to 29% in the population and 81% were demobilized soldiers compared to 73% of non-
clients. The report concluded that MCOs were reaching their target clients of economically active, 
financially excluded poor, who had been detrimentally affected by the war. (ibid p. 42 – 43) 
 
At the time of the Mid Term Review in 2003, it was estimated that 43% of the population of 
Bosnia lived in rural areas in communities with up to 2,000 people (according to market research 
firms) (World Bank, 2003).  Few banks have branches in such small communities, and none of the 
larger banks intend to move into this market. The Mid Term Review recommended that there be 
consolidation and mergers within the sector because the goal of the project was to ensure 
sustainable long term provision of financial services and size was essential for long term 
sustainability and reaching rural communities. To this end, after much debate, the commercial 
funding criterion was increased to 25%. It also recommended focused action on the regulations 
since that aspect of the project was not progressing as planned. Financing for the MCOs that met 
                                                     
164Hickey and Mohan (2004 p.4) observe that the “mainstreaming of participatory approaches to 
development” has resulted in a “broadening of the participatory agenda to encompass. development policy 
and practice”. The participatory approach to setting LIP standards in 2001 appears to have been part of this 
broadening agenda. 
165
 The consultants had planned to conduct a randomized control trial, but none of the MCOs were 
comfortable selecting clients as meeting their criteria and then randomly not approving some of them. So 
alternative approximations had to be used.) 
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these criteria was long term to attract additional long term financing and so the MCOs could plan 
their financial structure. Restricted Purpose Loan Agreements with 15 years repayment term and 5 
years grace period were signed with the MCOs. The interest rate was fixed at 5% per annum on 
the outstanding balance. 
 
The second stage of the LIP Impact work was conducted in 2004 (Dunn 2005). This answered 
questions about whether the microcredit had improved household welfare, promoted business 
development and eased post-conflict recovery. (The challenge of “selection bias” was addressed 
through a range of quantitative techniques (Dunn 2005)) Although only undertaken with a two 
year time frame, the research found that “microcredit helps the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to improve their household welfare, develop their businesses, and contribute to 
national economic growth and development” (Dunn 2005 p.35) Specifically, those households that 
accessed microcredit had a per capita income 900 KM more than households with similar incomes 
in 2002 but who did not access microcredit. (Dunn 2005 p. 25). This is particularly significant 
given that the national poverty line is households with less than 2200 KM per capita income. With 
a national unemployment rate of between 20 – 40% self-employment is sometimes the only option 
to earn an income but those who accessed microcredit invested more in their business and were 
more likely to register their business than those who did not. Sadly those who were displaced by 
the war continue to struggle, earning less income, lagging their peers in business indicators such 
as registering their business and hiring paid employees. (Dunn 2005 p. 36)  
 
Several other independent studies have been undertaken on the impact of microcredit in Bosnia. 
Matul et al  (2004) found that for most clients, microenterprise credit provided an efficient and 
long lasting coping mechanism for households after the war helping to sustain their household 
self-employment activities. Income generated from micro-enterprises was perceived as the most 
efficient coping mechanism among households affected by conflict so as to fill some of their most 
important needs over the reconstruction period. Their conclusion was that “microfinance and 
related services could play a more substantial reconstruction role in post-conflict” reconstruction 
(ibid p. 429), because there was a significant need for other credit and business development 
services. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007 p. 3) also found microfinance services providers 
“alleviated microbusinesses’ financing constraint” based on comparing investment sensitivity to 
internal funds of micorenterprises in municipalities with significant presence of MFIs to that of 
micorenterprises in municipalities with no (or limited) presence of MFIs using LSMS and MFI 
branch location data. However, Bateman (2006 p.43) found that while microfinance in Bosnia 
“possibly helped to facilitate a number of poverty reduction impacts” in the short-term for those 
who had no formal sector jobs, it was not translating into long term formal sector employment. 
One reason for this limited impact was the limited credit product allowed to be tailored for low 
income clients. For example, appropriate and affordable savings products, remittance based 
lending, or leasing for small businesses were not permitted.  
 
By 2005 at project completion, there was no new legislation for microfinance in Bosnia, there was 
no MCO network or association which could lobby on behalf of MCOs and their clients for new 
legislation and there had been no financial education to help clients or public information to help 
the general public better understand the purposes of microfinance. Furthermore, the draft new law 
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did not achieve the project goals of providing MCOs with a structure that allowed deposits and the 
ability to provide a wider range of services to their clients. According to Lyman at the time (2005 
p. 11) a“ broad consensus has emerged ........to permit the current MCOs to “transform” into a 
commercial legal form or retain their nonprofit form, should they so choose” but it is not clear 
who was part of this consensus or how it “emerged”. The draft new law had been prepared by the 
local lawyers with full cooperation of the international legal advisor, some representatives of the 
microcredit organizations and project team – but had not been discussed with stakeholders in the 
government. The draft law was planned to be sent to the relevant ministries for further procedure, 
and this process was to be monitored by the ongoing LIP which continued with the monitoring 
function. With the project completed, the World Bank was no longer involved in the legal process 
for oversight of the sector. Eventually the new law on microcredit organizations was enacted in 
2006, with responsibility for oversight given to the Banking Agencies (who had no experience 
with microcredit). The MCO regulations were promulgated in 2007 by the Banking Agencies. 
Meanwhile, the MCOs, however, continued to share their quarterly reports and to regularly meet, 
informally.  
 
5.7 Context and characteristics of the microfinance market in 2007 
Ten years after Dayton the Bosnian economy still suffered from the legacy of the conflict that had 
not only destroyed a significant part of the country’s physical productive capacity, but also 
depleted human resources and “shattered institutions and social capital” (World Bank 2005b p.i)  
Bosnia’s economic situation was precarious because of the “dire condition of the economy and 
mass unemployment; the emigration of highly educated and qualified citizens …the poor quality 
of post-secondary education; the low calibre of the political class. (Bose 2006 p.24)  An estimated 
two thirds of official formal employment was still in the public sector (World Bank 2004b OED), 
and official unemployment was 40% (Dunn 2005) However this percentage is misleading because 
“evading the registration and taxation of labor is a major industry” (Pugh 2006 p.150). There was 
continued popular opposition to privatization in general and privatization of the SOEs in particular 
because many Bosnians still hoped for a return to the Tito era where SOEs had large numbers of 
employees and looked after the communities. Within these companies the focus was on short-term 
privileges over sustained output expansion, there was “inadequate managerial behaviour” that 
included “asset stripping” and this was continuing even in 2005 (World Bank 2005b CEM p.i) 
Potential investors were discouraged because of the lack of clarity of ownership inherited from the 
Tito era and the liabilities of unpaid wages. Furthermore, Bosnia’s future was not going to be in 
heavy industry as it had been under Tito. Bosnia “could only be rebuilt on the basis of small 
businesses and individual enterprise” (Ashdown 2007 p.254). Its comparative advantages included 
tourism, forestry and wood products, organic agriculture and electricity generation, as outlined in 
the 1999 BiH General Framework of Economic Development. But businesses, especially export 
businesses, were still hampered by the “unfriendly” environment for private sector development 
(World Bank 2004b OED p.23). The report card found that legal and regulatory burdens and high 
taxes on enterprises continued to discourage economic activity in the formal sector.  
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This lack of formal business growth had serious implications for the labour market. Krstić and 
Sanfey (2007) finding that those in informal jobs are much more likely to suffer from poverty than 
formally employed people, earnings inequality is more pronounced in the informal sector than 
elsewhere and the informally employed report lower levels of life satisfaction compared to most 
other labour market states. Krstić and Sanfey (2007 p.311) conclude that, while the informal 
sector helps people cope, the formal sector provides better prospects for prosperity and well-
being.”  Pupavac (2006) argues that when policy makers chose not to expand public sector 
employment post war they put unwarranted responsibility for employment on the shoulders of 
individuals and reinforced the reliance of the poor on the shadow economies. Women were 
typically surviving in microenterprises financed by microcredit in the shadow economy, and did 
not have access to government jobs (Pupavac 2006 p.92).  
 
The achievements in the ten years post war included: macro-economic stability
166
 and low stable 
inflation thanks to the work of the Central Bank; a competitive banking market including largely 
robust regulatory and supervisory functions; promising small and medium sized businesses that 
have adopted a business culture where contracts are honoured and suppliers and workers are paid 
(in contrast to the corporate sector) and potential for a dynamic labour market (World Bank 
2005b). It has been underpinned by the currency board arrangement which contributed to low 
inflation and confidence in the KM currency. Economic growth had been impressive with GDP 
tripling since 1995 (albeit from a devastatingly low base) with GDP per capita at USD 4,703 (IMF 
2006)
167
. Its Human Development Index at 0.725 (UNDESA, 2011) was only a little below the 
regional average of 0.740, which is remarkable considering its recent history.  
 
The banking sector had recovered well and expanded rapidly over the last few years and the 
nonbank financial sector had also grown rapidly. Banking assets were around 75 percent of GDP 
driven largely by the entry of subsidiaries of reputable European banks. As of December 2007 of 
the 22 banks in the Federation 18 were profitable and 3 were in provisional administration. Of the 
10 banks in RS all but one was profitable. The total assets in the Federation banking system were 
KM 14.2 billion and KM 5.48 billion in the RS
168
 (Banking Agency Fed of BiH 2008, Banking 
Agency of RS, 2006).  The IMF considered the development of institutions providing oversight of 
the financial sector was positive, but was concerned they had not kept pace with the growth of the 
private sector and they need strengthening if risks to financial stability are to be adequately 
contained. (IMF 2006). Specifically the World Bank / IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP) (ibid) recommended unifying the entity bank supervisors so there was a single financial 
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 This economic stability had been hard won. In 2002 the IMF had reported to the OHR that no country 
other than Weimar Germany has such post-war debts as BiH and the Balance of Payments deficit was as 
high as Argentina’s before its collapse and so BiH was in danger of collapse. So to come back from those 
dire consequences was an achievement. 
167
 According to the World Bank website Bosnia and Hercegovina’s GDP per capita in 2007 was USD 4,033 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD [accessed 10 May 2011]. But this World Bank data 
is not directly comparable with the IMF which uses different data sets. 
 
168
 Using the same exchange rate as the MIX Market (2011) uses for the MCOs of KM/USD of 1.33, that is 
a total of USD 14.74 billion assets in the national banking system. 
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space across Bosnia; upgrading the enforcement of the insurance supervisor to combat fraud and 
address weaknesses in bank governance.   
 
However, there have clearly been real achievements in economic stability and financial market 
development Boettke (2007 p.23) has concluded that “post-war reconstruction had failed to 
succeed in developing self-sustaining institutions that facilitate economic development”. There are 
serious structural problems to developing a consensus on the institutional foundations for 
economic and financial market growth. The interests of members of the Bosnian governments, the 
OHR, other international organizations, corrupt officials, the private sector and the ordinary 
person in the street, appear to be in conflict and there is no obvious process to resolve them.  
 
Despite or because of these challenges the microcredit market thrived. The sector grew from 
nothing at the time of Dayton to over 360,000 loans outstanding (i.e. loans in the hand of clients) 
as of 31 December 2007 as can be seen in Table 4 below
169
. This means that approximately 9.6% 
of the 3.779 million population, or 30% of the 1.196 million economically active population 
(International Labour Organization, 2007) 
170
 were borrowing from MCOs. Although this is a 
simple estimate, is still indicates phenomenal success in microcredit terms – but it is only credit, 
and does not include other financial services. The portfolio volume of USD 637,211 (without Pro-
Credit Bank) indicates the MCOs are effectively managing about 4% of the total assets of the 
banking system
171
. The top MCOs all have strong positive ROAs, ranging from about 3% to about 
8% showing profitable management of portfolios of between USD 7 million and USD 145 
million. The consistent high quality of the portfolio as indicated by the low PAR ratios is world 
standard.  This means the MCOs are sustainably serving hundreds of thousands of clients 
excluded by the formal sector banks in the current economic context. As a note of caution, 
however, MCOs were aware of some multiple borrowing, but had no system in place to track it or 
prevent it, so the actual numbers could be lower.  
 
As a result of this high quality performance and the demand from clients the MCOs are each 
successfully managing portfolios of between USD 7 million and USD 140 million. These assets 
are funded by the commercial banks in Bosnia; by international commercial and socially 
responsible microfinance funds and by their retained earnings. The leading MCOs each had up to 
fifteen different sources of national and international lenders and they are priced at only 7.25% to 
8%, which is concrete evidence about the willingness of international investors to put money in 
Bosnia as a result of the financial stability and functional financial infrastructure.  These 
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 Unfortunately one of the original MCOs failed because of a corrupt CEO who took what funds he could 
and told his clients not to pay back their loans to the World Bank. If this MCO had succeeded the numbers 
would have been even higher. 
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 This data is from the ILO Labour Force Survey (2007) reported in the ILO’s Labour Stats Database 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/  accessed on 29 March 2011. Table 1A reports on the economically active population 
by age and is described at: http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c1e.html [accessed on 29 March 2011.] This 
probably significantly under-represents the labour force participation because of businesses that work in the 
cash economy. 
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 Assuming an exchange rate of USD to BAM of 1.33 http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/ 
and the total assets of the banking system of the Federation of BAM 14.2 billion (BA FiBH 2008 p.2) and of 
the banking system of the RS of BAM 5.5 billion (BA RS 2008 p.6 ) 
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international funders were the “who's who” of microfinance lenders including Triodos Bank, 
Dexia Blue Orchard, International Finance Corporation, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, European Fund for Southern Europe, Deutsche Bank, Oikocredit, Calvert and 
CordAid. 
 
The annual yield on portfolio for these MCOs is a good indicator of effective interest rates and 
fees. These are very competitive between 20% and 29%, roughly equivalent to credit card 
providers. They all started with effective interest rates around 1.5% per month which is about 31% 
and two had extremes at 44% and 57% so most reduced their rates by 30% and others up to 50% 
which is rare in microfinance. According to the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
Market the quality of all the MCOs data reported in Table 4 below has been rated at four or five 
stars – which means that transparency of the data cannot get better. These are world class in 
transparency in contrast to many other sectors in Bosnia. Not only do all MCOs report to the MIX 
Market but they share their quarterly financial performance information with each other. (Partner 
MCO also had a global Standard and Poors rating of B/stable/B which for an NGO in a country 
recovering from war is remarkable.)  In addition, the MCO leaders all know and respect each 
other and meet regularly even though there is no functional network that speaks on their behalf.  
 
Based on average loan size, clients were typically poor and working in the informal economy. 
Average loan sizes range at the low end around 30% of GNI for those MCOs focused on women 
and their small enterprises, up to nearly 75% of GNI for those with more focused on men’s 
businesses. This is in contrast to ProCredit Bank which specializes in small business formal sector 
loans and has an average loan size of nearly 100% of GNI. The three MCOs with 100% women 
clients have a specific mission to work with women. Mi Bospo started as a psycho-social project 
in Tuzla for women whose husbands had been killed during the war. MIKRA was started by the 
international NGO Catholic Relief Services which has a focus on serving the most vulnerable 
populations. The other was also started by an international NGO, Women for Women. The three 
MCOS with women leaders are Mi-Bospo, Women for Women and EKI. EKI is one of the largest 
MCOs in the country with over 50,000 clients and the Director is simply the best person for the 
job and she happens to be a woman. 
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Table 4 Key Microfinance Indicators for Bosnia, 31 Dec 2007 
2007 Borrow-
ers 
Avg 
Loan 
GNI/ 
Cap 
Savers % 
Women 
PAR >  
30 
days 
Yield on 
Portfolio   
ROA Portfolio 
USD 
‘000 
Pro Credit 
Bank 
68,752 91.7% 84,126 n/a 1.6% 18.44% 0.69% 238,379 
Partner – 
MCO 
51,982 59.7%  42.5% 0.63% 19.81% 4.5% 117,393 
MICKROFIN 
MCO 
51,508 74.3%  35.2% 1.3% 19.8% 5.09% 144,578 
EKI – MCO    44,459 69.8%  38.1% 0.4% 21.15% 6.81% 117,319 
MI-BOSPO – 
MCO 
   30,565 36.8%  100% 0.87% 25.14% 7.02%   42,546 
PRIZMA- 
MCO 
   29,308 33.4%  82.8% 2.4% 26.13% 4.31%   37,012 
LOK – MCO    26,968 64.7%  43.0% 1.3% 27.5% 7.77%    65,950 
Sunrise – 
MCO 
   23,275 55.1%  38.0% 2.4% 29.01% 6.30%    48,315 
MIKRA – 
MCO 
   12,403 47.5%  100% 1.51% 28.62% 4.57%    22,264 
 SINERGJIA 
MCO 
     9,778 71.2%  34.1% 0.4% 19.74% 2.94%    26,327 
Women for 
Women MCO 
     9,235 24.8%  100% 1.4% 27.24% 4.91%       8,677 
LIDER MCO     4,849 37.3%  39.9% 0.98% 23.1% 7.44%      6,830 
TOTAL 363,082  84,126      
 
Key: Highlighted cells indicate the best performers in that category for reaching low income 
clients  
Source: MIX Market, 2011 
 
The 2006 MCO Law eventually enacted in both the Federation and the RS was problematic. 
MCOs had to choose between becoming a Microcredit Foundation (an NGO with a maximum 
loan size of KM 10,000) or a MicroCredit Company (a Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI)) 
with a maximum loan size of KM 50,000 (Banking Agency RS 2006, Banking Agency Fed BiH 
2006), neither of which could take savings.
172
. There was no option to take deposits other than 
becoming a bank or the unofficially member based “village banks”; no cooperative or a deposit-
taking institution option or leasing company option or other services clients might need to grow 
their tiny businesses. The Banking Agency had been given responsibility for supervising MCO 
NBFIs but, unfortunately they had little experience in supervising this sector focusing on low 
income clients. However, even though they cannot take deposits they are regulated like banks, 
with all the associated costs. MCOs recognized that in an emerging market it is sensible to have 
maximum loan sizes to prevent money laundering, but the combination of no deposits and 
maximum loan size under banking regulations means that they are unable to compete against 
banks. It created an unfair market because they had the costs of banks and yet they could not take 
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 A type of savings and credit organization had been approved under RS law in 2007 but none had yet 
been registered. 
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deposits so did not have access those lower cost funds. Furthermore, there was still no 
representative MCO network or association which could undertake advocacy for them or their 
clients, no system in place to track over-indebtedness, no financial education to help clients or 
public information to help the general public better understand the purposes of microfinance. 
 
5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter started with the chaotic state of the financial market at the end of 1996 with a cash 
economy, five currencies in everyday use, bankrupt banks which were not trusted, no effective 
national payment system and no financial services for the hundreds of thousands impoverished 
and displaced by war. Ten years later there was a stable financial system, trusted international 
banks leading the banking sector with a standard national payment system, credit reference 
bureaux and mobile collateral registry. There were ten financially viable microcredit 
organizations, performing very well by international standards, reaching almost 400,000 clients 
and continuing to grow fast as they served the credit needs of the low income population. By any 
standards that is a remarkable achievement. In ten years the foundations of a new financial system 
was put in place while ensuring access to finance for those affected by war and dealing with the 
challenges of a financial market in transition from a socialist to a market system.  This is a 
positive story in a context where many of discourses are about dysfunction.  But there is also a 
negative message here from a low-income client’s perspective. The microcredit market in Bosnia 
was not meeting her savings needs or providing other tailored financial services. There were also 
no checks or balances in the system to see if she was getting over-indebted. Furthermore, because 
there is also not a single economic space MCOs cannot merge their Federation and RS operations 
and improve their efficiency and expand services. In the next chapter the institutions which 
provided the foundation for the expansion of this microfinance market and how they changed, are 
explicated from the perspective of market stakeholders involved in the micro-ethnographic 
research.  
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Chapter 6: Bosnia: Institutional Analysis of the Microfinance Market 1997 - 2007 
 
This chapter provides an institutional analysis of the development of the microfinance market in 
Bosnia based on the micro-ethnographic research findings. It is the third in the set of Bosnia 
chapters and builds on Chapters 4 and 5.  Chapter 4 presented the political and economic context 
for the institutional development of the Bosnian microfinance market and particularly for its social 
norms, prior to the Dayton Peace Accords. Chapter 5 reported on the milestones in the 
development of the financial and microfinance markets, as Bosnia faced the simultaneous tasks of 
reconstruction after war and post-socialist reforms. It concluded that the MCOs had grown fast, 
were profitable, had gained the trust of international and local lenders and were ranked among the 
best in the world: a considerable achievement in ten years, having started from nothing. Chapter 6 
now provides the findings of the micro-ethnographic research with microfinance stakeholders on 
the institutional foundations of the growth of the microfinance market, including the social norms, 
to answer the research questions: How have rules and norms
173
 in the Bosnia financial market 
changed between 1997 and 2007 to enable increased delivery of financial services to poor people? 
What has the role of development agents been in catalyzing this change?  
 
This chapter starts with the constitutional institutional functions in Williamson’s (2000) 
framework, because that is where respondents started. It moves on to the operational institutional 
functions for the expansion of microcredit and then the social norms which provided the 
foundation for all the others. The social norms then, in turn, became embedded in the new 
institutional functions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a deeper examination of the 
institutional changes that took place during this time. 
 
6.1 Constitutional institutions - building blocks of the microfinance market
174
  
Respondents did not differentiate between types of institutions for the sector, which was the task 
for subsequent analysis, according to Williamson’s framework. It was what I have classified as the 
constitutional or formal rules that respondents typically thought of first when asked about the 
building blocks for financial market expansion to the poor and how they have changed.  Table 5 
outlines the institutional form and enforcement mechanism(s), and its intended functions as 
understood by respondents, which are then subsequently discussed in detail, including the 
relationship with the social norms (described below) and the effectiveness of the enforcement. The 
most important were:  the MCO Law which gave legal recognition to providers of microfinance; a 
stable state-level independent central bank and currency board with no interest rate cap and 
functional payment system; a competent banking supervisor and; the courts being functional as a 
last resort for contract enforcement. The findings reported in this chapter focus on why 
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 “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up for 
formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and 
self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive 
structure of societies and specifically economies” (North 1994, p.360) 
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 These are Williamson’s Level 2 institutions 
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respondents considered those institutions fostered the growth of microfinance and also note, 
several cases where institutional functions were ineffectively enforced or simply missing. 
 
Table 5 Constitutional institutions - building blocks of Bosnian microfinance market 
 Form Functions Comments 
1. Micro Credit 
Organizations Law 
(2000 in the Federation 
and 2001 in RS)  
under Min of Social 
Affairs in the 
Federation and Min of 
Finance in RS 
---------- 
Replaced by the Law on 
Microcredit Organizations 
of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and in 
Republika Srpska (2006) 
enforced by the Banking 
Agencies. 
 
 
 
 Legal basis for NGOs to legally lend 
amounts less than 10,000KMs and; 
 To expand access to loans for those were 
excluded from the formal sector (which 
was the majority of the population after 
the war). 
 
 
----------- 
 Legal basis for two organization types: 
microcredit companies/associations (for-
profit max loan KM 50,000) and 
microcredit foundations (not-for-profit 
max loan KM 10,000.)  
 “Improving financial position of 
microcredit beneficiaries, increasing 
employment and development of 
entrepreneurship and and acquisition of 
profits” (MCO Law 2006) 
 Transparency and accountability of the 
sector in the requirement to disclose 
effective interest rates and to publish in 
newspapers the audited financial 
statements  
 Function of legal 
registration fulfiled for 
World Bank project 
 No enforcement for 
those not under the 
World Bank LIP 
 
 
 
--------- 
 Missing from both 2000 
and 2006 laws was the 
provision of savings 
services for those 
excluded from the 
banking sector. 
 
 Enforcement by 
banking agencies 
problematic due to lack 
of experience with 
microfinance. 
 
2. An Stable Independent 
Central Bank and 
Currency Board 
enforced by OHR:  
      no interest caps  
      functional payment  
      system  
 
 provide confidence to international 
investors  
 maintaining the stability of state level 
currency Konvertible Mark (KM),  
 coordinate the two entity Banking 
Agencies. 
 keep inflation in check; 
 ensure freedom on interest rate setting;  
 provision of basic financial infrastructure  
 Functions undertaken 
as intended due to 
effective enforcement 
by OHR 
 Political stability also 
needed but that cannot 
be enforced by OHR. 
3. Competent Banking 
Supervisor – the Entity 
Level Banking Agencies 
 
 build a robust banking system 
 risk based supervision using international 
standards 
 enforcement of standards 
 Functions effective for 
regular banking but not 
for microfinance. 
4. Courts for contract 
enforcement 
 to demonstrate the rule of law  
 contract enforcement for commercial 
contracts  
 Courts subject to 
political interests, not 
effective 
5. Land registry - enforced 
by OHR 
Mobile collateral 
registry – Dept. Of 
Justice 
 register of land owners and liens on the 
property  
 register of mobile collateral to encourage 
loan payment 
 Functions of land 
registry only patchy  
 Functions of mobile 
collateral also patchy 
 
 
 122 
6.1.1 Micro Credit Organization laws  
All types of respondents identified the 2000 MCO law as critical to the growth of the financial 
market for low income clients
175
. The MCO Law was a building block because it meant that 
NGOs could lend money legally. When the MCO Law was passed there was huge relief on the 
part of MCOs and the banks lending to them. The Banking Law clearly stated that only banks 
could lend, so officially until this law, MCOs were conducting illegal banking activities. MCOs 
were afraid that the financial police would close them down and were convinced it was only the 
political clout of the World Bank which stopped the government from taking action against them. 
For example, their loan agreements clearly stated “on behalf of the World Bank” to be clear they 
were operating under the World Bank’s authority.  (This fear of the financial police and the 
dependency on the international community is discussed further under the social norms below.) 
With this law the commercial banks were also greatly relieved. They could now lend with 
confidence to an independent legal entity not just a donor project, which gave them both more 
confidence and freedom to expand their relationship (MCO7).  
 
Without this law, microfinance would have stopped after the post-war projects ended, developed 
informally through village saving or had to undertake the long process of establishing a bank. The 
MCOs provided small simple, fast loans with minimal paper work to those who needed them – 
regardless of background, ethnic identity or use of the loan. MCOs did not want Bosnia to be 
labeled by Americans as ‘poor’ and so were careful to say they were working with low-income 
clients (MCO7) or more simply did not exclude anyone. (MCO4, MCO1)   
 
Even though all respondents recognized the 2000 MCO Law as an important first step of 
legitimacy for microfinance they also noted it was far from perfect. In particular, there was no 
way for low income clients’ savings to be legally collected. Savings may not have appeared to 
lawmakers to have been a high priority for low income clients post-war (especially given the 
number of times that savings had been lost) but looking back, this limited view of microfinance in 
the 2000 MCO law set the stage for also the very limited 2006 MCO Law and the lack of diversity 
in providers of financial services in Bosnia. One respondent regarded the law as a waste of time 
and money because it did not address savings. In his opinion the World Bank should have started 
one or two banks with a mission to serve the poor that could have collected savings and been 
under the Banking Agency right from the beginning.(MCO1) Although it was recognized that 
informal savings groups in rural areas saved together and lent to each other without needing legal 
status – they were still not integrated into the formal sector from which they were excluded.  
 
Also missing from the 2000 MCO law was effective supervision for those not under the LIP Apex 
in either entity. As discussed in the previous chapter the MCO Laws did not set up any form of 
effective supervision in either entity. Officially it was the Ministry of Social Affairs in the 
Federation and in RS it was the Min. of Finance who had supervisory responsibility. In the 
Federation, the Ministry of Social Affairs failed to exercise any form of regulation over the fast-
developing sector even though several sizeable Federation registered MCOs were not participating 
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 In the region they were aware that microfinance in Bulgaria had not grown because they did not have a 
legal framework within which to work. 
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in the LIP project. (It also permitted, for example, numerous phantom MCOs that had fulfiled the 
minimal prerequisites for registration to remain on the registration books, even though they never 
became operational). The sector in the Federation therefore depended exclusively on monitoring 
and reporting by the Local Initiatives Project (see section below). Meanwhile in the RS, the 
Ministry of Finance (who wanted to supervise MCOs) complained that its supervisory 
responsibilities were too vaguely defined (indeed they were not defined at all), that the Ministry 
lacked the personnel to carry out any meaningful form of supervision, and that the law failed to 
give them appropriate enforcement powers with respect to problems they did find (such as the 
phantom MCOs that also existed on the registration rolls in RS). Many MCOs noted this as a 
positive for the beginning of an industry, because it allowed them to experiment, with different 
types of loans under 10,000KMs within the parameters of their particular projects. (MCO3, 
MCO6) Others were afraid that MCOs not under the World Bank project and without supervision, 
would use MCOs legal structure inappropriately and reduce the credibility of the sector. To have a 
sector that was unsupervised in this way made many nervous since under Tito there was always 
supervision of some sort. 
 
The 2006 MCO Law enacted in both the Federation and the RS was also problematic. MCOs had 
to choose between becoming a Microcredit Foundation (an NGO with a maximum loan size of 
KM 10,000 or a MicroCredit Company (and NBFI with a maximum loan size of KM 50,000 
(Banking Agency RS 2006, Banking Agency Fed BiH 2006), neither of which could take savings. 
The 2006 law was important in recognizing that larger loans were needed by clients and to allow a 
for-profit business, but it was fundamentally flawed because it required the MCOs to meet the 
same standards as banks without allowing them to take deposits (forcing dependence on 
international financing) which would have enabled reducing costs to clients. 
 
6.1.2 Central bank and currency board  
Respondents considered that the central bank and currency board fulfiled three important 
functions: keeping inflation in check; maintaining the stability of the state level currency, the 
Konvertible Mark (KM) and coordinating the two entity Banking Agencies. In fulfiling these three 
functions effectively they saw that the central bank gave confidence to international banks 
investing in Bosnia (B1) and international lenders to the MCOs. One reason the foreign banks 
came in was because of the financial stability, despite some inflationary pressure (MCO9, 
MCO10, MCO6). This stability has become so accepted that ‘we don’t think twice about using 
KM now’ (F2). No one is worried about stability of the financial system and the currency, despite 
the political challenges. The fact that there was an effective central bank and currency board 
which fulfiled its functions to keep inflation under control and the currency stable, meant that 
MCOs could afford international funds. As of December 2007 Moody’s Bosnia Country Rating 
ran at 6% (MCO10). As noted in the previous chapter, the leading MCOs each now have up to 
fifteen different sources of national and international lenders and they are priced at only 7.25% to 
8%, which is concrete evidence about the willingness of international investors to put money in 
Bosnia as a result of the financial stability and functional financial infrastructure.   
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Some respondents also noted that the central bank has been important in ensuring that interest 
rates could move freely. For an economy used to direct government involvement in banking, it 
was important that they did not have the onerous obligation of interest rates caps and the rates 
could come down as a result of competition, not due to supervisory requirements.  
 
The building block of political stability for economic growth was missing. From bankers to MCO 
leaders to government officials all were concerned that the political situation had not been stable 
which had negatively affected GDP growth and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). An international 
banker spoke bluntly about the political risk. ‘The country is still associated with war and the 
uncertainty over the country’s future. Will Herzegovina go to Croatia and RS go to Serbia? The 
price of the risk factor is about 1.85% which has not changed much over the past three years, 
although over that time LIBOR [London Inter-Bank Offer Rate] has gone down.’ (B1) Of course 
this is much better than in 1997, but the expectations for greater stability and growth have not 
been realized. An international official was more blunt ‘without economic growth what are you 
offering the people as an alternative to reverting to ethnic issues? When the average citizen does 
not see the benefit of reform there becomes a role for extremists.’ (G3) An government official 
commented that banks have 30% of their Assets in cash which is more than the 23% required by 
regulation – hence they clearly perceive there is some risk in operating in Bosnia. (G4). For the 
older generation who remembered Tito, the lack of political stability was more disturbing and is 
discussed further under the norms. 
 
6.1.3 Competent banking supervisor 
All types of respondents understood the function of a banking supervisor was to build a robust 
banking system and all banker respondents commented positively on the competency of the entity 
level Banking Agencies in fulfiling this function. The MCOs understood the Banking Agencies 
were important for the banks and that the MCOs were dependent on banks for funding, so 
recognized the Banking Agencies importance. However, that recognition did not extend to their 
supervision of the MCOs under the 2006 MCO Law. Those in the microfinance sector considered 
that the Banking Agencies had little understanding of low income clients nor understanding of the 
nature of risk in lending to such clients, because they were supervised in the same way. (This issue 
will be discussed further below under the operational institutional functions.)  Despite the 
considerable collaboration between the two entity agencies, most respondents thought it would 
have been better for the financial sector to have one State Level Banking Agency
176
 like the State 
Level Central Bank. At the moment there is no opportunity for a state level financial institution.  
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 There was opposition in Banja Luka to a State Level Agency because it did not want Sarajevo to be the 
“financial centre” for Bosnia. Also because there might be Chinese or Russian banks who would come in 
only to the RS not to the Federation. So it opted to wait for the constitutional negotiations to discuss a state 
level agency. 
 125 
6.1.4 Courts function for contract enforcement 
MCOs and banks were in agreement that a functional court system was essential to demonstrate 
the rule of law and to fulfil the function of contract enforcement. But in practice MCOs and banks 
tried to stay away as far as they could from the courts since they found the courts to be completely 
unpredictable. The legal system still included some laws from the former Yugoslavia and there 
were two sets of entity laws. Even when there was just a single law which applied to a case, it 
could easily take from six months to three years to get it settled, and in the end the judge might 
give a political judgment not a just one
177
. All these factors make it a highly expensive and risky 
process for the banks. So for small amounts the banks do not go to court, they just write it off. 
This appears to call into question whether the courts are demonstrating the rule of law or not. 
 
The MCOs also did everything they could not to put a client on the court register or take a client 
to court. By taking a client to court they have not only lost the client but a lot of time and money 
too. For MCOs, the time and cost of taking a person to court is not worth the few hundred KMs 
owed to them (MCO 2). The use of the courts is most effective as a threat because clients do not 
want their reputation tarnished by their neighbors seeing the court police coming to their house or 
their good name in the courts. So the power of the courts as a deterrent to delinquency is build 
upon the foundation of the social norm of shame at not being able to pay back loans (see norms 
below). Clients also do not have the money to hire a lawyer. Despite these major constraints all 
MCOs have taken a few clients to court in the last ten years (those who had no intention to pay 
and refused to cooperate), to show other clients that those who do not pay will not get away.  As 
one MCO leader said clients have to trust that we will keep our word too. ‘We have to take them 
to court because if we didn’t, how many others would not pay back? (MCO9). If they do go to 
court, getting the decision is easy compared to executing the court order.  For example if trucks 
were the collateral, they have probably been driven out of the country and the court order will not 
bring them back (B3). There is estimated to be 4 billion KM of internal debt in Bosnia – 
everybody owes somebody something! (MCO8).  
 
6.1.5 Land registry and mobile collateral registry 
The function of the land registry is to provide a register of land ownership in Bosnia which could 
be taken as collateral and the liens on that property. Most recognized that it was necessary to the 
formal sector but not so for the microfinance market, although there was great doubt expressed 
over whether its function was being effectively fulfiled. Even a government official noted that 
when someone defaults on a loan and that house is up for sale ‘No one wants to buy the house. 
They think there will be a problem – someone else will come and claim it!’ (G4)178 (There is 
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 One banker said it was easy to bribe the judges and that there were great regional differences in 
judgments. For example, the courts in Mostar will judge the case differently whether it is a Croat or non-
Croat. 
178
 There were lots of land collateral horror stories. One where USAID was directly lending before the banks 
were functional - criminals borrowed money with land as collateral, but they had taken the land at gunpoint 
as part of ethnic cleansing, so when they did not pay on their loan and their cases reached the courts,  they 
were found not to be the rightful owners so USAID could not claim the collateral and lost their money (B5). 
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another problem altogether in rural areas, where it is locals who would be most interested in 
buying the house, but no-one wants to buy the property of someone they know who went 
bankrupt.) This means there is no market for foreclosed properties so banks cannot liquidate the 
asset taken as collateral. The land registry cannot effectively perform its function for the financial 
sector.  
 
The Mobile Collateral registry has a similar function to register cars, trucks, business equipment 
even TVs that can be taken as collateral for a loan. Some MCOs take mobile collateral for their 
loans, not so they can liquidate the asset but for the purpose of encouraging repayment - so they 
have “something to hold on to”.  If they have to liquidate it the client will be lost to the MCO 
forever and everyone loses. MCOs want a winning situation where even if the client is failing then 
they do positive things to help her succeed and find a solution– not to take her collateral. It works 
well for low income clients who do not want to lose face (see norms below) but for larger 
businesses determined to defraud a bank they can simply drive their asset out of the country 
before defaulting on the loan.  
 
Together these institutions provided the constitutional basis for the development of the 
microfinance sector but each one is dependent on underlying social norms for effective 
enforcement. The social norms which respondents identified as supporting the enforcement of 
these institutions are explained in detail after the following discussion of the “rules of the game” 
or operational building blocks for the sector. 
 
6.2 Operational institutions - building blocks for the microfinance market
179
   
Ostrom (1990) and Williamson (2000) theorized that in addition to the constitutional or formal 
‘rules of the game’, there are more specific operational institutions for different sectors which 
determine ‘how the game is played’.  For example, in Bosnia the MCO Law is a formal rule which 
needs an Act of Parliament to change, whereas the standards of the Local Initiative Department 
are rules about how the ‘game’ is played and after an appropriate process, these rules could be 
changed. However, respondents did not differentiate between types of rules that applied to the 
sector, so it was my task to analyze the data to see if any common categories or patterns were 
revealed using an inductive iterative process.  (Particularly challenging given that institutions are 
“nested” (Ostrom 1990)) Table 6 below summarizes the three institutional forms, functions and 
enforcement mechanisms (whether effective or not) which respondents identified for the operation 
of the microfinance sector.  
  
                                                                                                                                                            
In another example, a bank was holding title deeds to land but in court the judge returned the land title to an 
owner from 30 years before so the bank did not have a claim on the land. (B3) 
179
 These are Williamson’s Level 3 institutions. 
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Table 6 Operational Institutions – building blocks of Bosnian microfinance market 
Forms 
 
Functions  Comments 
 
1. Local Initatives 
Department (LID) - 
government’s microfinance 
apex which supervised the 
MCOs it funded: 
 
 
 
 
 
Standards included: 
International Accounting 
Standad (IAS) Compliant 
Financial Statements required 
for LIP MCOs 
 
 
 Training in performance, standards, 
transparency, accountability  (according to 
international good practice) 
 Disburse funds to develop sector 
 Supervise MCOs and set standards for 
governance, and performance high enough 
to encourage international lenders, 
including sanctioning non-performers.  
 Internationally standardized, independent, 
transparent and comparable information 
about financial performance published in 
newspapers 
 Consistent reports on financial 
performance over time to track trends 
 
 The LID enforced 
standards with 
‘carrot and stick’ 
approach backed by 
the international 
community  
 All these functions 
effectively fulfiled 
 
2. Banking Agencies 
regulation and supervision 
of MCOs enforced by 2007 
decrees  
 
 
 Registering MCOs – MCFs and MCCs  
 Regulating MCOs – MCFs and MCCs 
Supervising MCOs – MCFs and MCCs. 
Only coming into effect in 2008. 
 
 These function 
fulfiled but no 
capacity building 
function defined for 
this institution 
 
 3. Regulation of Foreign 
banks  enforced by Banking 
Agencies 
 
 Encourage competition in the banking 
sector and expansion of safe and sound 
financial services  
 Function effectively 
fulfiled 
4. Credit Registries: 
 - Private registry; not 
enforced 
 - Government registry not 
for MCOs 
 
 information about borrowers from a 
complete range of current lenders  
 to show clients’ payments history 
 to show clients character in loans 
outstanding 
 to reinforce the social norm of shame in 
public knowledge of loan non-payment 
 Functions not 
effective for MCOs 
had to go through 
banks (who took good 
clients) to participate 
in Govt. registry, or 
not assess clients. 
5. Law requiring ID Cards 
for citizens  
 standard identity information about clients, 
 government verification of identity, 
  use ID number to cross check client 
information elsewhere 
 Functions effectively 
fulfiled 
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6.2.1 Microfinance market development 
As described in the previous chapter the World Bank Local Initiatives project undertook two key 
functions, to develop the microfinance market through training
180
  and funding, and to supervise it. 
I joked once with a colleague at the World Bank that the Local Initiatives project had behaved like 
Tito – telling the people that if they followed his way they would be led into a glorious future.  
“Of course!” was the response. Those under the project learned and followed and were rewarded 
with a degree of success. 
 
The intensive training in good practice microfinance, standards with performance based funding, 
started before any funds were disbursed. From Day 1 there was the expectation of the MCOs 
reaching financial sustainability within three years because the grant funding would then stop.
181
. 
From Day 1 the MCOs learned that if a loan was a day late, it was a problem for their 
organization. From Day 1 they tracked the number of clients who were women, returnees, 
demobilized soldiers and the number of jobs created. MCOs made their own three month 
projections and were required to submit weekly reports of plan against actual and match that with 
their bank transaction statements and these were carefully monitored. As one MCO leader put it 
‘We felt the responsibility of managing someone else’s money” (MCO7). This sense of 
accountability and expectation of meeting financial and social performance targets became part of 
the DNA of the sector and was still apparent in the quality of the MCOs financial and social 
performance ten years later. (It also fitted very well with the common practice before the war of 
the financial police tracking all transactions as discussed below.)  
 
Partly because expectations were set so high right from the beginning, the project attracted people 
with an open mind, willing to learn, not trapped in ideology of the past. As the DFID Governance 
Coordinator commented: “You have no idea how different the MCO leaders are from typical 
government officials. When we try to train public administration officials some of them say “What 
is wrong with the way we did it in the former-Yugoslavia?” People even say “What is wrong with 
the Austrian (as in Austro-Hungarian) way?”  It is not related to the age of the person but their 
mentality. 
182 These open minded people were nonetheless challenged by their training 
experiences together. 
 
The World Bank consultant hired to manage the training program, created an intensive, demand-
driven training program for MCOs and was uncompromising in ensuring MCOs learned the 
fundamental microfinance good practices in starting, managing and growing an MCO over three 
years. The program arranged international field trips, group workshops with world renowned 
specialist consultants, as well as individual consultations to ensure they were fully equipped to 
manage on their own once the project closed. Their first field trip to Bangladesh to see Grameen 
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 About US$900,000, or 4.3 % of total initial project costs, was spent on technical services in three years. 
181
 MCOs knew they would need commercial funding after three years when the post-war project stopped, 
so World Bank staff assisted the MFIs by facilitating introductions to international socially responsible 
investors such as Triodos in the Netherlands. 
182
 As an example of most people’s lack of openness to learning he explained that even though there were 
40 political parties in Bosnia there are all still structured like the communist party! 
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Bank in action was a defining moment. They were Europeans who had lived through a war, but 
nothing prepared them for the poverty: “Out in the village it was a real shock – we learnt how to 
survive together. It was like Big Brother or Survivor!”  From our trip to Bangladesh “I learnt that 
to be an entrepreneur and start a business you do not need anything! I thought you needed a room 
and desk and telephone but you don’t! I learnt that you can earn money even if you are poor and 
that they can earn money from lending to the poor. It was the same for us lending to refugees and 
returnees – it was just a matter of scale – for them it is five chickens for us it is five cows. I learnt 
that loan officers can even be illiterate too!” (MCO11)  
 
For the second World Bank Local Initiatives Project, training was opened up to all the MCOs in 
the sector for a fee – not just those funded by the project – to develop the sector, not just a few of 
the leading MCOs. Through this joint technical training a common understanding developed on 
the importance of keeping high performance standards. One smaller MCO commented: “There 
was seriousness to the sector and a desire to follow good practice that was hard not to follow”.  An 
example of this in practice was when one MCO was advertising “no-interest loans” but was still 
charging an up-front fee. Other MCOs were concerned this would tarnish the reputation of the 
sector, so friends of that Director talked to him about their concern and that MCO stopped the 
advertisement.
183
 
 
A practice of publishing comparative financial data started as compulsory financial discipline 
under the World Bank project. But such transparency is meaningless unless the data is accurate so 
as part of the financial discipline of the project MCOs were required to have a robust portfolio 
information system and accounting system. (Initially they had to submit weekly portfolio reports 
together with bank statements so that the numbers could be reconciled because the honest LID 
officials wanted to keep tight control so there was no temptation for corruption.)  All MCOs under 
the project also had to submit their data to the MIX market which provided an external assessment 
of the quality of their data. This practice of publishing quarterly data soon spread to the whole 
sector. MCOs not under the project, also tracked similar good practice indicators, seeing the value 
of benchmarking their performance against their peers
184
. The smaller MCOs also followed suit: 
“we followed them because we knew it was proper procedure to track our indicators and 
benchmark ourselves against the others.” (MCO9)   
 
Even today, all the MCOs in Bosnia share their quarterly financial performance indicators through 
the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Bosnia – an informal network of MCOs. This is 
almost like the market discipline of quarterly reporting to a stock exchange (F1) (although it is 
internal to the MCOs, not public information). Every quarter the MCOs want to know how they 
are doing compared to each other. As one leader put it “We have always shared quarterly financial 
performance reports. We look at the others’ expenses and see what they are doing. This pushes us 
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 However, this concern about tarnishing the reputation of the sector did not appear to be consistently 
upheld after the end of the project. In 2011 the largest monthly salary in the country at KM240,000 (approx. 
GBP 95,000) was published and it was earned by an MFI CEO (Radio Sarajevo, 2011). The only positive is 
that it was transparently available! 
184
 The were only two main differences in the reporting requirements:  the LIP required monthly reporting 
whereas other funders only required quarterly reporting and; some other funders required more detailed 
social impact reporting. 
 130 
to do better. We have reduced cost per KM lent by 0.04 in the last year! (MCO7) “Transparency 
has become the culture of the microfinance sector.” (F1) MCOs report that this transparency has 
been one of the main contributors to microfinance interest rates coming down across the sector 
and making microcredit more accessible.  MCOs have also found that by being transparent with 
each about their challenges they have developed in parallel and all got higher standards. For some 
MCOs another benefit of the culture of transparency is that loan officers in the same town or 
region but from different MCOs talk freely with each other about ‘bad’ clients and how to 
overcome the challenges of difficult regions
185
.(MCO 4) This helps everyone keep their portfolio 
quality high.  
 
It appears that several MCOs attribute the strong performance of the microfinance market in 
Bosnia (described in the previous chapter) to the “culture” of transparency in the sector developed 
by the LIP training and the history of competing against each to access funding – the carrot and 
stick approach discussed below. If this is the case, then it is also dependent on some of the social 
norms discussed later in this chapter such as the respect for strong leadership, the desire not to 
lose face and recognition of the importance of the private sector.  
 
6.2.2 Supervision that enforces performance standards 
The LID’s other function was to supervise the performance of the MCOs to ensure they met 
performance standards. The project implemented what one MCO leader called a “carrot and stick” 
approach. It proved to be very effective. The carrot: MCOs that kept to the standards and would 
get more money and training, and would survive. The stick: if you did not keep to the standards 
then you would not get additional funding and in some cases your funds would have to be returned 
and the MCO would not survive. Clients were an additional motivation.  Every MCO knew they 
were making a difference in the clients lives and wanted to keep helping them. For some this 
meant more than for others. (MCO7.) As discussed in the previous chapter, if any MCO protested 
at the standards they looked weak because they had agreed to the standards beforehand. The apex 
had all the significant funds so there was nowhere else for most MCOs to go. No other sector had 
an apex or this level of coordination between funders and between funders and the government
186
.  
 
Disbursing of limited funds based on performance meant that MCOs were competing against each 
other with each one wanting to be the best. They believed this high standard of competition got 
five of them into the Forbes top 50
187
. But they are clear they always compete within the context 
of mutual respect for each other. “I have observed ethical behavior in the way that they compete 
                                                     
185
 For example several MCOs spoke about the challenges in Gorazde where a weapons factory was closed 
down and the people were so used to a government sponsored life that they have difficulty adjusting to 
paying loans on time. In contrast Western Herzegovina had no Yugoslav government subsidy so had to 
work hard to survive and now even the loan officers grow tomatoes as well as work for us. 
186
 A former OHR staff member noted that coordination was limited for all the other sectors because there 
were no agreed priorities other than increasing returnees. In his opinion, the UN was corrupted and had no 
credibility. The OHR was not officially responsible for coordination – but should have taken the lead. 
187
 Swibel (2007) published a list of the Top 50 MFIs in the world in Forbes Magazine based on a composite 
index. Bosnia had five on that list. Only India had more than Bosnia’s five. 
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amongst each other. There is no undercutting the market for others which some of the larger ones 
could do. When I have asked them why they say they respect each other; they are friends and they 
share a similar mission.” (F1) 
 
These performance standards were also de facto enforced by the local banking system which 
started lending money to the MCOs. The local market the banks required the World Bank 
reporting standards from all MCOs together with their audited financials. When international 
socially responsible investors enter the market (such as the Dual Return Fund) and the more 
commercially oriented lenders (such as the European Fund For Southern Europe (EFSE) and 
Credit Suisse) they also required the LIP standards. 
 
Even when the LIP office was closed in 2006 the MCOs had no supervision until the Banking 
Agency took over in 2008, much of this focus on performance standards continued.  They were 
still accountable to their funders and investors, they still had audits and ratings, they still shared 
their quarterly financial reports with the MIX Market and with each other (but did not share the 
information publicly as a sector) and they still competed with each other. Indeed, when the 
Banking Agency looked at the MCO’s portfolios they were astonished that the quality and the 
rigor of the standards that the MCOs kept to were higher than the banks. 
 
6.2.3 Banking agency supervisor after 2007  
Appropriate supervision for MicroCredit Companies, Associations and Foundations after 2007 
was largely missing, as the Banking Agency was not trained in assessing MCOs and the 
supervisor did not have responsibility for supporting the sector as the LID had previously. Most 
felt that the Banking Agency has no idea what serving the excluded meant, nor about a non-profit 
approach to financial services (MCO8). “We are much better skilled at assessing our clients – we 
are now growing together with our clients and increasing loan sizes.’ (MCO3). Knowing how 
much training it took for the LID to learn how to supervise MCOs, several expressed the opinion 
that the World Bank made a mistake when it did not make sure that the Banking Agency, who had 
ultimately taken over supervision of the sector, had technical assistance on how to monitor the 
MCOs. (MCO11)  As an example, MCOs were very disappointed that the Banking Agencies put a 
ceiling on loan size in this market when some of their clients need larger loans to grow businesses 
and did not have relationships with banks to turn to. Nor was there a function of on-going support 
(such as capacity building) for the sector which was still very much needed. 
 
As of 2007 the international agencies were no longer engaged in this sector and could not provide 
any leadership on these issues. As a result, the wisdom of the international community was also 
challenged in the way they had left the sector. The MCOs had carefully developed but the limited 
the law and supervisors were at risk of seriously damaging the sector. It was felt that, at a 
minimum, the international community did not have a clear long term financial inclusion strategy 
(MCO10). Furthermore, there was no recognized MCO network or association of MCOs which 
had the responsibility of undertaking advocacy on behalf of the sector (either with lawmakers or 
the general public), so the MCOs were powerless to challenge that regulation.  
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6.2.4 Foreign banks allowed 
The decision by the Banking Agency to allowing foreign commercial banks into the financial 
market unintentionally fulfiled five important functions for expanding access to financial services 
for low income clients. 
 They initated lending to MCOs and became partners. In the late 90s local banks 
distrusted the MCOs and did not understand their cash-flow based business. The foreign 
banks (in particular Raiffaisen) understood cash-flow lending but also understood that the 
MCOs were effectively supervised by the World Bank and they could rely on the 
supervision reports.(F1) The excellent performance and accountability to the Bank meant 
that the foreign banks were prepared to lend to them. 
 They taught MCOs about working with the formal financial sector188. (As a result of 
what MCOs learned about working with banks, when SRIs came looking for investment 
opportunities the MCOs already had good working relationships with local banks and 
knew how to prepare reports for these lenders. Thus they were able to expand their 
services with the significant additional funds available for strong transparent performers.  
 They helped MCOs manage liquidity. When international socially responsible investors 
are slow disbursing funds as promised or even change their mind - the banks will lend 
quickly and ensure the MCOs can fulfil their promises to their clients. As one MCO put it 
“The local banks are the best financiers. They are good lenders – as long as we repay we 
can keep getting funds. They just need seven days notice and it is there. Other subsidized 
funders can take months and then change their mind when a disbursement is due in three 
days! They clearly do not understand the financial market like the banks do. 
 They were very competitive and moved down market. There was very fast growth in 
the banking sector between 2003 to 2007 with many new entrants into the market. The 
new international banks would try to take market share by lowering prices and moving 
downmarket. For example in 2004 the smallest loan from a bank would be 25,000KM 
with the MCOs dealing below that - but by the end of 2007 they lend 2,500KM, and have 
debit cards and LOCs – directly competing with MCOs. They are also lending long term 
for housing reconstruction and lots of building is going on. This is all good news for the 
clients who have become price sensitive. So the business is not as profitable but it is much 
better for clients! (B5)  They were strong competitors, keeping downward pressure on 
interest rates.  Their standards forced everyone to keep up! (B3) This is good for clients 
(but not for margins). However, some MCOs considered their competitive practices as 
unethical including: spreading misinformation that the MCOs would be closed so clients 
would leave them; hiring credit officers from MCOs with the expectation that they would 
bring their clients to the bank; giving those credit officers a 500 KM bonus if they brought 
other loan officers and then firing the ones they didn’t want. Finally what infuriated the 
MCOs most was the bank’s willingness to over-indebt these new clients (and potentially 
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 They lent to the MCOs as early as 1999 because of their strong financial performance, their audited 
financials and the support of the World Bank. The locally owned private banks had a very bad reputation 
and took a while to change. 
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bankrupting the MCOs) by lending more to clients that joined the bank in addition to the 
MCO.  
 They brought an image of trustworthy financial services with their shiny new HQ 
offices and ATMs. This improved the general attitude towards all financial service 
providers - including MCOs - in a context where the banks had a bad reputation (MCO2) 
it made it easier for clients to take loans (MCO9). People had lost trust in banks because 
their savings had been lost through mismanagement before the war.  
 
With twenty two banks in the Federation; ten in RS and ten strong MCOs in a market of 3.5 
million people it is inevitable that there will be increasingly intense competition. Managing it with 
respect will be even more important.
189
  
 
6.2.5 Credit registries 
MCOs and banks expressed a diverse set of opinions about whether the two credit registries 
undertook essential functions for reaching low income clients or not. A usual function of credit 
registries is for financial institutions to check a potential client’s credit history before making a 
decision on a loan
190
 Before the national credit registries, MCOs exchanged lists of bad clients, 
which served their purposes and some were not convinced that the credit registries added value to 
their sector . But with the intense competition, by 2007 all major MCOs used at least one of the 
registries for individual larger loans.  
 
Those who expressed reservations about the benefit of a credit registry for low-income clients, 
acknowledged that knowing a client’s other loans and credit history (if any) is useful information 
but the client’s character and cash-flow were better indicators of whether they would pay back a 
small loan or not. Therefore, some MCOs use the government credit registry as a means to 
understand the client’s character, by seeing if the client is telling them the truth about their other 
loans outstanding. Others were more direct stating that even if the client has four other loans if 
s/he has the cash-flow to pay them all back, they would give him/her the loan because if they did 
not, someone else would. (Another challenge for MCOs with the Government Credit Registry is 
that they could not use it independently of the banks. MCOs had to use the banks to submit their 
clients’ information rather than doing so directly. As a result, the banks were unethically 
approaching their good clients. This dissuaded some from participating.) 
 
Those who were more convinced about the importance of credit registries for expanding the 
market used the two registries for different purposes, listing their bad clients with the private 
registry and using the Government one for new clients. What is perhaps the most important aspect 
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 In a recent move the Italian bank - Banka Intesa - bought local bank UPI Banka and have borrowed 
EBRD money to downscale. 
190
 In RS before the advent of the Credit Bureau the banks just looked at cash flow and took 130% – 200% 
of the loan in collateral on long term loans. But with the Credit Bureau they now only require 110% 
collateral because with their more affluent client the risk profile has been reduced. 
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of the credit registry is that clients know the MCOs will report them to the credit registry if they 
are late payers. In the RS the Credit Bureau will put the name of consistently late payers in the 
newspaper - and no one wants their name in the newspapers. So the power of the Credit Registries 
as a deterrent to delinquency is build upon the foundation of the social norm of shame (discussed 
below) at not being able to pay back loans.  
 
6.2.6 Law requiring identity cards for citizens 
ID cards meant that MCOs and banks can establish the identity of the person requesting an 
account and use it to cross check client information at credit registries and elsewhere. MCOs 
noted that they were more flexible about ID immediately after the war because it was an uncertain 
situation - but now if people don’t have one it means there is a problem and MCOs do not lend to 
them. Having ID cards have been a fact of life in Bosnia since Tito took power so it is simply 
accepted as the norm. 
 
 
The constitutional institutions provided the framework for the formal financial and microfinance 
market and these operational institutions provided the rules of the game for those under the World 
Bank project. Underlying each one of the constitutional and operational institutions is one of more 
the social and cultural norms, discussed below, which has proved an essential foundation for the 
strong performance of the microcredit sector.  
6.3 Social norms - building blocks for microfinance market 
The term ‘everyday life’ norms will be used, (as in Chapter 9), because they were described as 
part of everyday life as long as respondents could remember, (as were the enforcement 
characteristics,) regardless of background or status. A particularly important point to note here is 
that all of these norms preceded the war and several preceded Tito, which reinforces the point 
made in Chapter 3 that the war did not fundamentally change social norms. In discussing these 
with respondents, no value judgments were being made about the culture or society; this was 
simply an analysis of the development of the sector. The NVivo analysis of the respondents’ 
descriptions generally clustered around seven ‘everyday life’ norms which are part of the way 
people behave, regardless of community background or status. Each of these norms is a 
distillation of many hours of taped discussion with respondents that covered examples of the norm 
and how it contributed to expanding the microfinance market together with its enforcement 
mechanisms. To represent particular voices I have tried to include a quote or incident that typifies 
the discussion of the norm. It is fascinating to see how these norms which were noted in Chapter 4 
became embedded within the society and, as described in Chapter 5, many of these social norms 
are reflected in the characteristics of the sector in 2007. Even more so, that several of these norms 
have themselves now become embedded within the constitutional and operational institutions. 
Without these norms the sector would have very different characteristics. 
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6.3.1 Economically active women 
The relevant everyday norm about women’s economic participation had several facets around 
equality, surviving and not accepting defeat. During the Tito period in urban Yugoslavia women 
had the same educational opportunities as men. Women in towns expected to work and were 
expected by the society to work. There were senior women in every aspect of government and the 
financial sector
191
. For example, one of the women leading an MCO was a former senior banker. 
As another woman leader put it “The discipline of socialism was good. Women were recognized 
as equals.”  (MCO9) However, in rural areas the more traditional gender roles continue to 
predominate. In rural areas, one MCO was establishing informal Women’s Associations (which 
did not need a legal status), run like village banks where rural women could save and lend to each 
other. These women are closely connected to each other and form groups or village banks to save 
and borrow. They are very committed to paying on time because they do not want to embarrass 
themselves, or their family, or their husband’s family in front of their neighbors.” (MCO8) As of 
2008 there was approximately 2 million KM of savings in the internal accounts of the rural 
women controlled village banks.  One MCO which has 100% women clients estimated women’s 
economic role across all their clients as: 30% of the women clients are the main breadwinner 
(even if they have a husband); 30% of women clients are partners in a family business. 30% of 
women had no initial involvement with their husband’s business but after receiving the loan and 
being given the responsibility to pay back the loan, the women starts to figure out how to pay it 
back – she then starts to do the accounts (which her husband does not like doing anyway) and then 
she becomes a vital partner in the business. (MCO8)  Respondents concurred that in Bosnia 
women were considered to be more responsible with loans and do not take unnecessary risks - 
“that is perhaps cultural but everyone knows it”.  
 
In addition to active economic participation, it was commonly recognized that women typically 
had an attitude of “not giving up”. This has been reinforced in Bosnia after the war with high 
unemployment. In one former factory town in which the majority of men became unemployed 
after the factory closed, many men “gave up”, even though they had the opportunity to do other 
things. They had survived a war but were defeated by the economy. In contrast the women did not 
give up – even though they were scared, they took loans and made their own work. Probably the 
ultimate (but most tragic) example of women not “giving up” was also demonstrated after the war, 
when women whose husbands, fathers and sons had been killed or they themselves had been 
violated, went to work or took loans to start businesses, so their remaining family could survive.  
 
A unique characteristic of the microfinance sector in Bosnia, noted in the previous chapter, is that 
three of the top twelve MCOs serve 100% women clients and there are three women Directors. 
This is not just due to the war but pre-existing social norms about women’s economic 
participation that women are equal to men and an attitude of “not giving up” that were brought to 
the surface by the war.  
 
                                                     
191
 USAID requires gender analysis as part of its projects. According to USAID gender has never come up 
as a big issue because women are running businesses and NGOs and are workers in banks etc. 
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6.3.2 Loan repayment and loss of social status  
Very high social importance is placed on maintaining one’s standing with family, friends and 
community in Bosnia. Identity is inextricably linked to community so relationships are fiercely 
protected. Defaulting on a loan can jeopardize those relationships either because guarantors who 
are your family or friends are called on to pay for you or the court police serve you with a 
summons at home, so the community can see. These are powerful mechanisms to ensure people 
pay back. How this norm works is probably best expressed in the words of key stakeholders. 
“Small people rely on their reputation. In the country their reputation is more important because 
they are very connected to each other. They help each other.
192
 They will give services to each 
other on credit- fix plumbing and even groceries on credit. The do not want the Court Police to 
come to their house and for others to see it. Their good name will be gone and it will affect their 
family and their kids.” (MCO10) “Delinquency is low in the banking sector as well as MCOs and 
this is not because of contract enforcement. This is because they have two friends or family 
members guaranteeing their loan and for the sake of some KMs they are not prepared to risk 
losing face in front of them by not paying back their loan. This keeps people honest. They will not 
take out a loan unless they are sure they can pay it back and if there is a problem they will do 
everything to keep up the payments.”(F1) “No one wants to look weak” (MCO2)  
 
Several respondents pointed out that although this social norm was a major incentive to the high 
portfolio quality, all clients understood the basic dynamic incentives of microfinance - if they 
want another loan they had to pay this one back on time. When there was 90% unemployment 
immediately after the war and people had nothing, ensuring access to future sources of funding 
was a very powerful incentive for repayment. By 2007 with unemployment still officially at about 
40%, many clients depended on microcredit to smooth their consumption.
 193  To be sure there 
were no problems having access to further loans, some clients would even go into further debt to 
pay back on time.
194
  Together this norm, the fear factor noted below and the economic context 
contributed to very high portfolio quality that was a hallmark of the microfinance market in 
Bosnia 
 
6.3.3 Fear of prosecution by the financial police 
In the former-Yugoslavia the colloquially termed “financial police” oversaw the transfer of money 
through the government controlled payment system and checked that all relevant laws were being 
followed, all taxes paid correctly and there was no fraud. This powerful government agency was 
effective at finding and prosecuting illegal financial practices. Any business and particularly one 
                                                     
192
 Research undertaken by Whitt (2007) found a shared norm of treating others fairly (even if they are 
disliked), is widely held in the population. He found this norm of fairness is remarkably strong in Bosnia 
across ethnicities. 
193
 One respondent noted an exception to this norm for a subset of people who delight in “cheating the 
system” when paying back is not associated with members of their community. 
194 I was told about a shopkeeper who took many bank loans but could not manage his business so the banks 
tried to repossess his house. As a result, he unsuccessfully tried to take his life. He was not an MCO client 
but this has disturbed all lenders. 
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where there was substantial cash-flow, wanted to be certain that they did not fall into the hands of 
the financial police. They were afraid of the financial police.  As one MCO leader explained 
“Before the war the government was very strong and people were afraid of the financial police. If 
people were threatened with the police they were very scared. Before the war the courts could shut 
down the electricity and phone and they can still do so now!” (MCO10).  
 
However, this attitude was reinforced by a related norm that it was indeed the government’s job to 
regulate financial transactions. In Yugoslav socialism it was the government’s role to regulate and 
oversee financial transactions for everyone’s benefit. Yes, there was a role for the private sector, 
but within the rules set out by the government. So in addition to the fear of the financial police 
there was also some respect for the government clamping down on people breaking the law. 
 
A remarkable characteristic of the microfinance sector in Bosnia in 2007 is the very high portfolio 
quality. This was not just due to the desperation of unemployment after the war but also due to 
pre-existing social norms about losing social status by looking weak if you cannot pay back a 
loan, as discussed above, but also the fear of the financial police. Even though the “financial 
police” officially no longer exist, the police and tax authorities continue to be powerful and  
enforce their power, so the fear remains.
195
  
 
6.3.4 Corruption in big business and politics 
The social norms of low income people with microenterprises are radically different from the 
‘owners of large businesses who are often considered as thieves’ (MCO7) and to politicians who 
are generally perceived as corrupted. As discussed in the previous chapter, a lot of money was 
seen to be made by corrupt business people and politicians in the Bosnia privatization process 
(G3). Also money continues to be made on the Bosnia Stock Exchange where, apparently, insider 
training is not unusual (G3). It is not just politicians but also the organs of government that are 
perceived to be corrupt. For example, the government decides to whom the State Bank gives its 
loans, it does not make strictly business decisions and it is easy to pay off the police if cars 
without insurance are asked for evidence of insurance (G1). When one of the early MCO leaders 
associated with one of the political parties, disappeared with much of the money from his 
organization (MCO11) no one was surprised
196
. Respondents noted that it was not unusual for a 
politician who wanted to be elected to buy a village 100 cows so he/she will get their votes 
(MCO11), again reinforcing the corruption.  During conversations in the late 90s with a small 
group of MCO friends that included people of Serb, Muslim, Croat and mixed backgrounds - they 
                                                     
195 One respondent noted that there was a different effect of the rules under the old Yugoslav system on a 
small subset of people. That small subset took delight in “cheating the system”. There was a sense that in 
order to get ahead you had to figure out ways of getting around the rules. For this subset they felt totally 
comfortable in evading their financial responsibility to pay back. Perhaps this is what was behind another 
respondent’s comment that Bosnia was very different from the culture in Kosovo where they simply do not 
pay! 
196
 These findings are very similar to those of Smith (2006) who documented that people in Bosnia will trust 
a person in a familial or personal role, but not trust the very same person in a political or public role. She 
found that this arises from an understandably deep mistrust of public officials. 
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expressed their disgust with national leaders who had put them though the war and were now 
personally profiting from kickbacks as part of the reconstruction efforts. 
 
One MCO leader (MCO 10) reflected common sentiment that this political corruption is in stark 
contrast to the “regular” people in Bosnia who, after the war, have few possessions and only their 
personal integrity and values to lose. So they do everything to keep those values. They prefer to 
take small size loans because they are easier to repay and they diversify their sources of income so 
they can be sure to be able to pay. (MCO10). This difference in values meant that microfinance 
was able to succeed without political interference because no one thought there would be enough 
money in microfinance to be worth corrupting (G3). They only supported it half heartedly because 
of the World Bank (MCO4). Officially the LID project was a government project, but there was 
also consensus that the authority of the World Bank kept political influence out of the project 
(MCO11). The initial selection by the government of a World Bank project leader was a person 
known to be politically motivated and less than scrupulously honest. The World Bank therefore, 
undertook informal late night negotiations to request an alternative. To the huge relief of all, the 
new appointee was basically honest and open-minded and led accordingly.
197
   
 
The World Bank project was then allowed to operate independent from politicians, which was 
very rare in Bosnia. For some respondents, “the local leaders - Tinjic, Bogunovic and Ribic, were 
honest” (B2) and the leaders of the local MCOs - Mi-Bospo, Lok; Sunrise and Sinergjia were 
honest too. But even accepting that some have a broad definition of honesty, this was not a 
universal opinion. Some remembered the MCO leader who left the country with MCO funds, 
others saw one combining his MCO leadership with being a politician and others asked questions 
about why MCO leaders needed such expensive cars? (B5) 
198.  Particularly “the leaders of the 
MCOs with international NGO support, saw money as a business and did not take a percentage for 
themselves. This was unusual for this country.” (B2)199    Because there was no political agenda 
the sector was able to expand based on demand. Respondents considered that if the project had 
been influenced by politicians, it would have been politicians who decided who got the small 
loans and the project would have failed. Some evidence to support this position is that now the 
sector is so large there is increasing interest in it by politicians. “The government could not have 
cared less before! But now that we are bigger the government is taking an interest.” (MCO4)  This 
lack of systemic corruption (compared to the diversion of funds in Kosovo (F1)) is a characteristic 
of the microfinance sector in Bosnia which has contributed to its strong performance indicators. It 
was a combination of the lack of interest in small loans for poor people by those who were 
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 Sarah Forster the Project Leader emphasized the lengths to which the World Bank was prepared to go to 
protect the project’s political neutrality. “The two World Bank resident representatives believed in the 
importance of financial services for microentrepreneurs. On several occasions, they fought for this project 
with the Minister of Finance and even the Prime Minister.” (Goodwin-Groen 2003 p.4) 
198
 During the Global Financial Crisis the MCO leaders came under great pressure for not being honest 
about the extent of their lending to over-indebted clients which tarnished their image. 
199
 However, once the project finished and there was no further support for reaching low income clients, 
unethical practices have started to occur such as Board members and management being given new BMWs 
as their Christmas bonus. This was occurring in a context where there had been no effort on the part of the 
LIP projects or MCOs to build strategic friendships, to promote the image of the sector generally, or even to 
undertake financial education for clients who would be facing economic hardship in the GFC. (Natasa) 
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corrupt, the power of the World Bank to keep political influences out of the project, as well as the 
values of the clients that kept the sector relatively clean until 2007.  
 
6.3.5 Private sector role in the economy 
Most participants noted that the private sector was well established in Bosnia before the war. 
There were private restaurants, bars, taxi-drivers and dentists etc so after the war they could be 
“jump-started”.  The history of the former Yugoslavia in chapter four explains how Tito moved 
his country away from the Soviet system and what this means is encapsulated in the story by one 
MCO leaders of his reaction to visiting Moscow and Lodj.“I was a Finance Manager in a business 
since 1984 and we had standards that had to be followed and had relationships with international 
suppliers. We bought and sold goods and made profit and workers made decisions. The big 
companies exported. In the agricultural areas there were both private and state farms. This is in 
contrast to Lodj (in Poland) where there was a big textile mill – the people were all waiting for a 
job – for something to happen. In Moscow there was a street with a view of the city not one 
restaurant to sit and look at the view! Here there would have been at least one. Likewise the state 
ran the agriculture sector. This did not happen in any of the former Yugoslav countries – all have 
had successful microfinance like in Montenegro etc.” (MCO11).  
 
This norm of private sector business prepared the MCO leaders because they understood a 
business approach meant that microfinance had to make money to be sustainable. This norm also 
helped MCO clients understand why they were given loans not grants and had to pay back on 
time. One MCO explicitly told their clients that there was a limited supply of funds and their 
MCO needed to stay in business, so please could they pay back on time so other women could get 
loans (MCO7). The clients understood and wanted to help other women so paid on time. The 
result is that unlike other transition countries there was ready acceptance of financially sustainable 
microfinance and recognition of the importance of international lenders.  
 
However, there is another side to the historical acceptance of a private sector approach and that is 
the lack of a well accepted role for non-profits. Under Tito there were few charities other than 
those run by religious organizations and, as discussed in chapter 4, Tito provided everything that 
was needed. Two MCOs (MCO6 MCO8) commented that the lack of understanding of social 
services other than commercial credit (such as financial education) was one of the reasons the 
2007 MCO Law only had the option of becoming a for-profit NBFI and why oversight by the 
banking agency was problematic.  
 
6.3.6 Lack of trust in banks  
As discussed in chapter four, before the war there was a lack of oversight of the financial system 
and people lost money in pyramid schemes, most of the banks were linked to SOEs and many 
SOE workers had their pensions in these banks so they lost all their employer-linked savings when 
these banks failed. Furthermore, anyone with foreign currency held at the National Bank of 
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Yugoslavia had it frozen then stolen, and those claims are still outstanding. So there is now 
extreme mistrust of local conventional banks responsible for the loss of most families’ pre-war 
savings. So there was continuous enforcement of this norm. After the war the banks were either 
bankrupt, did not have the liquidity to lend, did not have the technical capacity to undertake cash 
flow lending, or were simply not interested in low income clients. To give an example of how 
difficult it was for anyone to get a loan from the formal financial sector, in 2000 a salaried 
government worker, who knew the manager of the bank still required the following to get a 
20,000 KM bank loan: two personal guarantors; a salary bond; a promissory note and title to her 
house. There is very low savings rate in banks because, in addition to the impoverishment of war, 
no one will trust them again for a long time.   
 
Only when the foreign banks came in with the credibility of the Austrian banking system, were the 
people able to consider trusting banks again quickly. The Banking Agencies are also able to do 
their job of over sight of the banking systems because there is also the basic attitude that the 
government’s job is to regulate and protect the people’s interest. Meanwhile the MCOs were 
providing low income clients with credit products and cared about them, so it was hardly 
surprising the MCOs grew so fast, even though they did not offer savings services! 
200
 
 
6.3.7 Tito’s legacy of strong leadership 
Several participants commented on the longing expressed by older people for the time when Tito 
was alive. For them Tito represented a powerful and united Yugoslavia they could be proud of. 
They knew he was flawed but he held the country together and gave everyone a good education 
and jobs. Some of the older generation have not been able to deal with the loss of the Tito-led life 
and are spending their life waiting for something to be given to them
201
. But most are not. The 
financial services sector is now growing fast because people gave up waiting and started 
something themselves. But what has remained is a cultural norm of respect for strong leadership. 
Where there is a clear vision and a path to get there explained by a strong leader to whom people 
can relate people will work for that goal. This can be used for negative purposes as it was in the 
lead up to the war. But it also could have a positive side with respect to the role of the OHR. Many 
in the international community complained that Ashdown was too activist in his role as the OHR, 
but after he was gone and his successor achieved very little in his first year they realized that 
perhaps his approach may have been the most appropriate in the Bosnian context and some 
Bosnians made similar comments (MCO1, F1). I joked that the World Bank was like Tito for 
microfinance setting a clear vision for financial inclusion with financing to make it happen, but 
there was enough truth in it that no one disagreed. 
 
Respondents identified these seven social norms as building blocks for the sector. Together in a 
post-war context, they provide a set of powerful explanations for the characteristics of the 
microfinance market in 2007 and the shape of the constitutional and operational institutions 
                                                     
200
 Interestingly MCOs do not appear to have not addressed the public realtions issue of how clients lack of 
trust for banks as financial services providers, has affected clients relationship with MCOs. 
201
 Another respondent jokes with new clients – OK “Tito died” - now what? 
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developed over these ten years in Bosnia. The fast growth of microcredit with high portfolio 
quality and the reduction in interest rates have been hallmarks of Bosnian microfinance and yet 
the essential connection between these hallmarks and underlying social norms has not been 
identified before. Neither has the connection been made between the shape of constitutional and 
operational institutions and the underlying social norms. One possible interpretation of these 
findings is that almost all the effective constitutional or operational institutions are dependent on 
the international community or social norms for enforcement. The government has played only a 
limited role in the development of the microfinance market. To illustrate: the effective operational 
and constitutional institutions were enforced by the Central Bank (which is accountable to the 
OHR) the Banking Agencies which are accountable to the Central Bank, the World Bank or social 
norms. Only the MCO Laws were passed by the government and then in a less than satisfactory 
form and ID cards are managed by the government.  But this is a static analysis. To understand if 
this is actually the case, the processes of institutional change also need to be analysed to find out 
how they built on the social norms. 
 
6.4 Institutional changes in the Bosnian microfinance market  
As discussed in the Literature review North recognizes that “[w]e cannot change the informal 
constraints, at least not in the short run; and even our ability to control enforcement is very limited 
so all we can change quickly are the formal rules (North 2003 p.15) so he argues we need to  
“understand[ing] the process of economic change” as “an essential prerequisite to improving 
economic performance” (ibid p.1)  As discussed in the Literature review Boettke et al  (2008) 
provide a framework that identifies three key types of the institutional change process. They 
postulate that new institutions will ‘stick’ best when endogenously designed (emergent) and the 
introduction process is indigenous (IEN), but, if institutions are exogenously designed they can 
also stick if the process of introduction is indigenously led and is endorsed by local formal 
authority (IEX).  (They argue that exogenously designed institutions, imposed by foreigners 
(FEX) have little hope of ‘sticking’.)  Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also provide a framework for 
institutional change processes and they focus on two axes; the possibility of veto and level of 
enforcement. To interrogate these theories in the context of the microfinance sector in Bosnia, two 
different institutional change processes will be examined one which led to the 2000 MCO Law 
and other, in contrast, which led to a financially viable microfinance sector within three years.  
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6.4.1 Institutional change process for 2000 MCO law
202
 
The donor sponsors of microcredit in post-war Bosnia, thought the NGO legal form the most 
useful to serve as post-war lender to displaced people, demobilized soldiers etc. because: 
mainstream financial institutions were largely insolvent and widely mistrusted; wartime NGOs 
had proven their capacity to reach the targeted populations of those displaced and traumatized by 
the war and; NGOs had been the pioneers of microcredit in other countries. This was a pragmatic, 
short-term post-war choice and little consideration given to the long-term shape of the financial 
sector. But NGO law was not well-developed in the former Yugoslavia because NGOs were not a 
significant part of the Yugoslav socialist economy. Several new microcredit NGOs were quickly 
set up in various forms, including registered offices of foreign NGOs, citizens’ associations and 
humanitarian organizations. The World Bank as the lead donor agency, tried to discuss the 
specific legal underpinnings of non-profit organizations which could implement microcredit with 
the Entity-level governments, but failed. There were much higher priorities for the governments 
and the World Bank. Gradually the Entity-level governments grew acquiescent with the use of 
Foundations as vehicles for carrying out lending activities. (Lyman 2005) 
 
The LIP project realized that this ad hoc arrangement would not provide the regulatory pre-
conditions for a strong microfinance sector at national level. The legal reform component of the 
Local Initiatives Project, therefore, recommended the development of four new legal forms that 
would provide the basis for a robust microfinance sector:  
• a form of nonprofit, NGO microcredit organization; 
• a form of commercial finance company capable of serving as a vehicle for specialized 
commercial microlending, but not restricted to this activity; 
• a form of member-owned and governed savings and credit association203 and 
• a specialized form of microfinance bank  
 
But the legal and regulatory aspirations of the Local Initiatives Project proved grandiose in light of 
the political realities of early post-war Bosnia. The draft banking law for the Federation initially 
included a provision that would have permitted these four proposed legal forms, but the provision 
did not pass. Next the USAID-financed Banking Supervision Project drafted proposed 
amendments to the new banking law. But that was also over ambitious and it became clear that 
only the most limited legislation would have any hope of adoption by both Entity-level 
parliaments.  There were several reasons why alternative legal options were not successful. The 
parliament was so divided and dysfunctional that little legislation got passed at all - as is 
evidenced by the need for the OHR to impose a national driving license and currency using the 
                                                     
202
 The following description of the process to develop the 2000 MCO Law is derived largely from Lyman 
(2005) balanced by input from other respondents. Tim Lyman is a US lawyer specializing in microfinance 
law, who speaks and read the local language in Bosnia, and was a legal adviser to both the World Bank and 
the Government of Bosnia at different times between 1998 and 2005. 
203
 Theoretically cooperatives were a good idea but there was no general acceptance of the value of 
cooperatives in Bosnia because“they always think someone will cheat them” (MCO 5). So it is unclear why 
this option was part of the package. 
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Bonn powers
204
. Only those with political connections could lobby effectively for legislation and 
none in the microfinance sector had or wanted to have those connections and there was no 
association of MCOs which could have lobbied on behalf of the microfinance sector and its 
clients
205
. In contrast, the banks had very good connections with politicians and were effective 
lobbyist and were against any potential competition in a small market. That said, everyone thought 
the World Bank and the donor community would get the four options passed and so did not see 
the need to take action themselves. But it was apparently not a high enough priority for the World 
Bank to bring to the attention of the OHR. If the World Bank had placed it as a higher priority and 
requested the OHR to use the Bonn powers to force them through, the four legal options would 
have been signed into law. One MCO leader (MCO 1) stated it clearly - the World Bank was 
“project oriented and did not have a clear long term strategy for the financial sector” and so did 
not understand the national importance of getting these four options passed. The attitude of 
expecting the World Bank to have taken action is consistent with the role in which the World 
Bank placed itself - as the technical leader on microfinance which others should follow - as the 
“Tito” for microfinance. 
 
A choice was made by the World Bank, therefore to focus only on legislation to clarify the 
legality of NGO microcredit of the type already widely in practice throughout the country. The 
goal was a law that could be adopted in substantially identical form in the two Entities, with 
provisions for reciprocity between the two Entities and; a simple system of registration and 
minimal ongoing non-prudential regulation of MCOs.  The MCO law passed the Federation 
parliament in 2000 and the RS parliament in 2001. During parliamentary debate in the Federation, 
parliamentarians replaced the Ministry of Finance with the Ministry of Social Affairs as the 
regulatory body responsible for MCOs. Also, Ministry of Finance personnel in the RS added 
features not included in the version adopted in the Federation. In particular, the version adopted in 
the RS reserved for the Ministry of Finance unspecified supervisory jurisdiction over MCOs 
operating in that Entity, as well as the power to adopt regulations further defining such important 
concepts as loan size maximums. Despite these differences, the two MCO laws jointly 
accomplished something pioneering for the country at the time: a system of reciprocity that made 
it possible for a legal entity formed in one Entity to be registered also to carry out business in the 
other Entity.  
 
When discussing both the 2000 and the 2006 MCO Law a former government official noted that 
neither addressed savings. ‘What we should have done was to have savings and credit associations 
like in Germany, to allow small savings and loans, leasing etc. – but the combination of the World 
Bank bureaucrats, the Government bureaucrats and the power of the banks - the banks did not 
want any other type of organization to be able to take savings - this did not happen. We did the 
minimum but that was it.’ (B2). Other respondents thought that the World Bank left the sector too 
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 In Chapters 4 and 5 examples of use of the Bonn powers included a national driving license and national 
coinage. A more recent example was in 2004 when the Bonn powers were used to revoke the banking 
license of a corrupt RS bank and institute bankruptcy proceeding at the request of the Banking Agency of 
the RS.. 
205
 When asked why such as association was not set up to undertake lobbying, respondents noted that Bosnia 
was still a very divided place. Even though MCO leaders undertook training together and were colleagues, 
to ask them to set up a joint association so soon, seemed premature. 
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early, that change processes take a long time and that it should have stayed engaged longer to 
specifically build the constituency for a regulatory option for poor people’s savings (MCO1, 
MCO8). 
 
This institutional change process was consistent with both Boettke et al ’s (2008) and Mahoney 
and Thelen’s (2010) theories. To use Boettke’s language, the new institution of the basic MCO 
law ‘stuck” because it combined exogenously designed elements of microfinance good practice 
with already existing indigenous practices, endorsed by local formal authority (IEX).  (The other 
three legal options, exogenously designed by the World Bank did not get approved because there 
was not widespread indigenous support and no local formal authority to endorse it.)  According to 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory this was a situation with a strong veto possibility (by the 
parliament) and a low level of enforcement (because it was not a priority for the government) so 
“layering” of the new institution on top of the old ones is the best approach. This is indeed what 
happened because there was just a minor amendment to the banking law allowing MCOs to lend. 
 
6.4.2 Institutional change process for MCO performance standards.  
After eighteen months of intensive training, by mid 1998, the MCOs had learnt about their clients, 
how to maintain a high portfolio quality and manage their costs, they had seen microfinance 
internationally. Confident of their skills and knowing the importance of this new sector being 
“owned” by the MCOs, the World Bank initiated a participatory decision making process with 
MCO leaders on what standards should be applied to qualify for the next tranche of funding.
206
 
The process started with discussing a common vision for a strong sustainable future in 
microfinance and then there was a facilitated process of discussion on standards. MCO leaders 
participating in the discussion knew that there was not enough money for everyone in the next 
round of financing, so they had the incentive to suggest as high standards as they could reach to 
ensure others could not. As one MCO leader put it “Sarah was not a nice lady asking us what we 
thought. She understood that including us in the decision-making process was the best way to 
lead” (MCO7) 207. By including us in the process we would agree with the standards” It resulted in 
high performance standards being agreed by all parties
208
. Such extensive stakeholder involvement 
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 Cornwall (2004), using Habermas’ concept of public space, argues that an essential part of  providing 
“spaces for participation” (ibid p. 78) is to also provide “some form of capacity-building in order to make 
use of the opportunity to take part” because such spaces are “permeated with relations of power” (ibid p.79). 
Therefore, the World Bank’s approach of intensive capacity building of MCO leaders before inviting them 
to engage in the participatory space appears to have been consistent with theoretical good practice. 
207
 The project was awarded a “2005 Good Practice Award” by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation 
Department for “strong Bank performance in program design, implementation, and monitoring and 
evaluation that contributes to positive development outcomes”. 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/awards/2005_winners_bosnia.html 
208
 Drinkwater (2003 p. 62) in his reflections on participatory processes, considers that for a participatory 
process to be worthwhile, as many of those participating as possible should be gaining personal growth and 
learning from the process. In this case, this MCO leader’s reflection shows that at least one was learning 
about the power of a participatory process! In addition, as discussed in the following paragraph, MCOs were 
learning about what was needed to participate in the formal financial sector. 
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at design and implementation phases enabled the project to benefit from local leadership, 
experimentation, diversity, and mutual learning. (Kuehnast  2001 p.4). 
 
For example, one of the agreed standards was International Accounting Standard (IAS) compliant 
audited financials prepared by internationally accredited auditors for the year ending December 
1998, after only two years in operation. MCOs explained that they agreed to this standard because 
they knew audited financial statements by quality auditors were critical to showing their 
seriousness as legitimate providers of financial services. But the big problem was that an 
international standard audit for one organization would cost 15,000 KM. Four MCOs (Sinergija, 
Sunrise, Partner and Mi-Bospo) decided to reduce their individual costs by asking auditors to bid 
for their audit work as a group, thus generating economies of scale for potential auditors. When 
their first audited financials were published they were so proud they wanted to show everyone! 
(MCO7)
 209
 This set the precedent in the market. Another difficult standard was the commercial 
financing requirement of 10% of assets funded by local resources other than retained earnings. 
Again the MCO leaders knew it was important to build relationships with local banks but they had 
not done it before so this forced then to learn how to manage those relationships. Every other 
MCO had to follow these “rules” too – However the smaller MCOs used local not international 
auditors. These standards (at Annex 2) became the benchmark against which the rest of the market 
al so measured itself because of the competition for funding210. From then on MCOs felt they 
were listened to and their views respected.  Interestingly, one MCO leader commented that while 
these financial performance standards were unambiguous and strictly enforced, the rules about 
products and clients were “fuzzy” and open to interpretation (MCO3). This mean there was 
enough flexibility to allow product experimentation and some risk taking with clients, which was 
a good thing. In the light of the subsequent rigidity of the Banking Agency – it was particularly 
valued. 
 
The participatory process with MCO leaders to set standards was also undertaken by the World 
Bank for the second project in 2001
211
. It was agreed by the World Bank and MCO leaders that 
these would be ‘stretch’ targets with incentives built in to prepare MCOs for financial 
independence. For example, one of the standards was to plan for commercial funding liabilities 
ratio of at least 25% (“market” rate liabilities / average gross loan portfolio) by end 2004. To get 
to 25% would be a real stretch. There had been substantial discussion about this standard. One 
MCO remembered “I felt a participant with the standards. I knew the 25% commercial was a 
difficult task but I knew it was essential to help us move to other sources of financing and to build 
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 Only three years later when they had three years of IAS compliant audited financial and international 
lenders were taking them seriously did they fully understand  the importance of their IAS compliant audited 
financials . Now the MCOs have years of experience with auditors and can talk to the senior auditors about 
how to reconcile IAS and with local practices. Other have learnt from that experience and one MCO was the 
first local company in the whole of the country (as distinct from an international bank) to be to be rated by 
Standard and Poors. They got an impressive rating of BB Stable! 
210
 For example Raiffaisen knew the agreed performance standards (rules) too and asked for the MCO’s 
reports on their performance. 
211 This is an example of the established practice of “‘invited participation’” discussed by Robins, Cornwall 
and von Lieres (2008 p. 1070) in which selected representatives are invited to help shape specific plans and 
policies. 
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the trust from the local financial market.” 212 Most MCOs however, even though they understood 
it was good for their long term viability, claim they have no recollection of agreeing to it!
213
  
 
The IAS compliant statements, the 25% commercial financing and the rigorous transparent 
reporting standards meant that when SRIs came looking for investment opportunities the MCOs 
already had three years of financial statements, good working relationships with local banks, knew 
how to prepare summary reports of their financial performance and were looking for “market” rate 
liabilities. Thus they were able to expand their services with the significant additional funds and 
reduce their dependence on the World Bank funds. 
 
What ensured that these standards were enforced is that all the donors stood together on enforcing 
them. No donor undermined the market. With so much donor money in the country, why did the 
donors stand firm in Bosnia when they did not elsewhere? Goodwin-Groen (2003) provides four 
key points: First, the Government and all donors to the microfinance sector were participants in 
the project. All had agreed to the dual project goals of disbursing loans to the war affected to 
develop small businesses and to jump-starting the microfinance sector. The performance standards 
were clearly essential to achieving the goals of the project and the donors had ceded decision 
making to the project. There were no international donors who did not support the project, directly 
or indirectly. Donors not in this project such as USAID, focused on building the formal sector 
institutions such as the Banking Agency. Second, since clients matter to all stakeholders, the 
benefits to clients of performance-based financing in building strong institutions were explained to 
all stakeholders, especially donors.  Third, donors who contributed to the project had confidence 
in the World Bank technical staff supporting the project: The strong technical staff on the ground 
backed by the credibility of the World Bank meant that the smaller donors trusted the Bank. 
Finally, there was no pre-set disbursement plan and unrestricted funds from donors were 
encouraged. These two meant that financing could be based on MCOs meeting performance 
standards not based on a disbursement schedule or on geographic location. Funds restricted to 
certain geographic areas were allocated first, so that funds with no such restrictions could be lent 
to others.   
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has built on the historical context for the microfinance market in Chapter 4 and the 
description of the microfinance market’s evolution in Chapter 5 to present the findings of the 
micro-ethnographic research on how rules and norms in the Bosnian microfinance market have 
changed between 1997 and 2007 and the role of development agents in catalyzing this change.  
The most important constitutional institution which changed was the promulgation of the 2000 
MCO Law which had the function of providing legality for lending by non-banks, namely MCOs, 
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 This MCO leader knew the head of Raiffaissen so had no problems getting the funds which was why he 
supported the standard. But he also helped the others to get the financing too. Now that bank has 50 million 
KM in the sector!! 
213
 By 2001 one of the MCOs without World Bank funding had already had a Microfinance Rating and was 
borrowing international funds so this was not an unrealistic requirement 
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for the first time. This was the minimum change possible to provide the function of a legal basis 
for microcredit but did not allow for any form of deposit taking organization that served low 
income clients.  The change process was not a transparent or inclusive participatory process, but 
the law was, none the less, important.  Other constitutional institutions which have changed and 
which function to support the expansion of the microfinance market have included the 
establishment of an independent central bank, entity banking agencies, and a mobile collateral 
registry with limited functions. The private sector has set up a credit registry which MCOs can use 
to assess the credit worthiness of potential borrowers (and the government has set up one which 
MCOs cannot use directly).  
 
At the level of operational institutions the most important change was the establishment of the 
World Bank’s Local Initiative Project (LIP) which had the dual functions of supporting the sector 
though training and disbursing funds to MCOs, as well as de facto supervising the MCOs under 
the project. This highlights another important finding that it is not the form of the institutions but 
the functions they play and their enforcement characteristics which are critical for market 
development.  The participatory change processes used by the LIP to establish MCO performance 
standards, as respondents reported, were transparent and inclusive ones. 
 
What has been importantly identified is how social norms are not only foundations for the 
microfinance market but also became embedded in the constitutional and operational institutions 
which respondents identified as critical to the expansion of the microfinance market. These 
include women’s economic activity, the importance of maintaining community status, the lack of 
trust in banks and respect for strong leadership. This Bosnian case study has shown that social 
norms are indeed the foundation of the market. Furthermore the constitutional and operational 
institutions in microfinance which have successfully contributed to expanding the market are 
those congruent with social norms. 
 
Both of the two institutional change processes interrogated were catalysed by development agents 
Although they “stuck” according to Boettke’s framework, they also had flaws for the long-term 
development of the microfinance market. The MCO Law and the de facto supervisor were 
effective short-term solutions to post-war NGO lending but they were not an adequate institutional 
foundation for financial services that meet the diverse needs of low income clients. But the MCO 
law has became the only foundation for the sector and the de facto supervisor has gone leaving a 
long-term supervisor without training. Looking back, respondents are questioning the 
development agents’ decisions.  
 
This is the final chapter of the Bosnia case study and the next three chapters comprise the Uganda 
case study in a similar structure. Then the findings from both Bosnia and Uganda will be 
compared. 
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Chapter 7: Uganda: Financial Market Development Context 
 
This chapter commences the analysis of the Uganda case study by presenting the political, social 
and economic context for the institutional development of the Ugandan microfinance market and 
particularly for its social norms. Significant aspects of the history of the financial market are 
reviewed along with key dimensions of social/political and cultural contexts, to present a detailed 
understanding of the ground in which the microfinance market came to be developed.  There is no 
standard approach for undertaking an historical institutional analysis so Grindle’s (2007 p. 567) 
advice is followed - to address what are considered to be the most important characteristics of the 
context. Colonialism and the subsequent central role of government are integral to the complex 
interplay of economic, political, regional, religious and ethnic forces in Uganda. This chapter, 
therefore, weaves the fluctuating development of the financial sector into the story of Uganda 
since the imposition of British colonial power, through Independence, the Obote and Amin years, 
the explusion of the Ugandan Asians, civil war and Museveni’s election as President in 1996. It 
tries to be a balanced story, respecting each of the academic discourses in telling this history.   
 
The following chapter builds on this analysis.  It will present an original account of the 
development of the financial and microfinance markets starting in 1997 when many donors 
entered the market. Chapter 9 then provides an analysis of the findings of the ethnographic 
research with microfinance stakeholders on the building blocks of the microfinance market, 
including the social norms.   
 
7.1 Uganda before and during British rule
214
 
Prior to the 16
th
 century, the Kingdom of Kitara is believed to have included much of current 
Uganda and territories in the current Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and 
Burundi, but it broke up as the Kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda and Toro became independent. The 
Buganda kingdom proved expansionary and became the most powerful in the region. Under the 
Buganda monarch, known as the Kabaka, there was the equivalent of a Prime Minister or Chief 
Justice, ten chiefs at court who managed the finances and a spiritual leader. There was also a 
hierarchy of district and village chiefs accountable to the Kabaka. They were responsible for 
maintaining roads and bridges and sending taxes to the Kabaka as well as exercising judicial 
functions. In addition to subsistence agriculture, labor was differentiated, including iron workers 
and potters, and there was vibrant trade across the kingdom. The structures of accountability to the 
Kabaka were an important part of everyday life and were strictly enforced. (For example, if 
anyone borrowed money, it was paid back as soon as possible because the borrower was 
ultimately accountable to the Kabaka.) Gender relations were complementary not hierarchical. 
Men generally built houses hunted, tended herds, fished and fought. Some traded across the 
region. Agricultural produce was controlled by women.  Women needed to be entrepreneurial as 
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 The pre-colonial summary is based on Mukherjee 1985 (p.54 – 89) unless otherwise stated and is 
consistent with Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza (2005).  Mukherjee’s analysis is based on 
accounts from Baker - the first explorer (published 1913) and Roscoe - the first ethnographer (published 
1915 and1923) in the region. 
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they cultivated, processed and marketed crops; collected fuel and water; cared for children; as well 
as made pottery, cooked, cleaned and washed (Tamale 1999 p.7).  
 
The slave trade began in 1680 and reached its peak in the late 1700s. During that period there 
were 192 British slave ships carrying approximately 47,000 Africans between them on each trip. 
British and French missionaries, however, did not arrive until 1877, more than 200 years after the 
slavers (Watt, Flanary and Theobald 2000 p.38). British colonialists first arrived in 1890. In 1894 
Uganda was declared a British Protectorate, which included the Kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, 
Ankole and Bonyoro (ibid). In 1990, the Independence Constitution (negotiated in London,) 
allowed the King of Buganda to continue ruling “in a manner approved by Her Majesty’s 
Government” (Mukherjee 1985, p.25) in a federal relationship with the central government. The 
Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro had quasi-federal powers and the rest of the country was 
to be administered centrally and through district governments (Mutibwa 1992 p.26). But Uganda 
was not annexed by the British for the sake of slaves or faith – it was annexed to grow cotton and 
to trade.  
 
British demand for cotton was very high as was the demand for rubber, coffee, tobacco and tea. 
To meet this demand, the British “indirectly forced” Ugandans to grow cotton as a cash crop on 
their own land (Mukherjee 1985, p.172). The government managed incentives by distributing free 
cotton seed so cotton was the best cash crop for farmers to pay substantial taxes and buy essential 
items (ibid 1985, p.185). The pastoralist communities had no idea how to grow cotton or rubber, 
(cultivation being an antithetical to pastoralist traditions), so the British sent Baganda “agents” to 
these communities to teach them how to grow cotton and rubber and also to “establish British 
Rule” (Mukherjee 1985 p.172). The result was that the Ankole and other chiefs were subject to the 
Baganda ‘chiefs’ sent by the British to impose their economic and political rule215. The cotton was 
sold locally to British or Asian ginneries for a pittance. The cotton lint was baled and then sold to 
British exporters. About 20,000 Ugandans were also pressed into effective “slavery” working on 
the road and rail system to support the export of cotton. At least 180 per thousand of them died 
annually from their harsh treatment (ibid p.193) 216   
 
7.2 Uganda at independence  
At Independence in 1962 Uganda had a population of 7 million people. The country’s 
development indicators at that time compared favorably with those of, for example, South Korea 
(Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza 2005a p. 13) The British had brought some 
economic prosperity, developed an efficient civil service and there was a lively free press. But the 
economy was dominated by foreign interests with one view being that “foreign interests thrived 
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 For a more detailed account of how the British managed the agricultural economy through the Baganda 
‘agents’ and increased the divisions within the society see Mutibwa (1992). 
216
 Furthermore, during the Second World War approximately 79000 Ugandans fought for the British in all 
branches of the forces and returned home with little or no benefit. Their service was however understood by 
ordinary Ugandans. Around 1944 in the South-Western region amongst the Banyankore Bahima nomadic 
pastoralists (in what was the Ankole Kingdom) a child was named Museveni after the ‘Abaseveni’ who 
served in the 7
th
 Battalion of the King’s African Rifles during the Second World War. 
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mainly by plundering the natural resources and labor of Uganda without putting in anything 
substantial in return” (Mukherjee 1985 p.195)217  There were also extreme inequalities. 
 
Inequalities were based on ethnicity, religion, region and gender (Watt, Flanery and Theobald 
2000). Ethnic inequalities were evident across government and the private sector. Europeans 
dominated the top positions in the state sector and banking. Asians dominated commerce, private 
agricultural processing (including cotton ginneries), and the small number of large agricultural 
estates
218
. The local rural population was successful at growing cotton
219
. 84% of the acreage 
under cash crops was cotton ear-marked for export by 1951, but the farmers still lived in poverty. 
In an attempt by local farmers to regain some control over prices, cotton and coffee marketing 
cooperatives were formed. By the end of 1961, there were 21 registered co-operative unions, 
including the Uganda Co-operative Alliance (Uganda Cooperative Alliance, 2009) which had a 
critical role in giving farmers some power in the economy
220
.  Gender inequalities amongst 
Ugandans were shaped by this new agricultural structure because as men grew cash crops, women 
had to cultivate food crops for the family. As a result, women were largely excluded from the cash 
economy and the market places where cash crops were sold. This was a significant change to their 
previous roles in cultivating, processing and marketing crops (Tamale 1999 p.8- 9) 
221
.   
 
Regional and religious inequalities were also exacerbated. High productivity land, access to 
education and health services and infrastructure were far better in the south than the north (Brett 
2005 p.3). And the south was also predominantly Christian (Collier and Reinikka 2001 p. 17). The 
British used the southern, educated Baganda as agents to implement their policies across the 
country and the Baganda came to see themselves as “the natural leaders of the country”. (Mutibwa 
1992 p.9) 
222
. This divide and conquer approach by the British sowed the seeds of future 
retribution (Watt, Flanary and Theobald 2000).  
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 Museveni’s particular perspective was that “millions were walking barefoot, underfed and suffering from 
worms without adequate medical services; and their mental world was still dominated by superstitions 
(Museveni 1997, p.35). 
218
 According to a Uganda Asian commentator who experienced the expulsion of the Ugandan Asians in 
1972 “The vast majority of Indian traders were really only interested in making money and recreating India. 
But the Raj educated professional Indians (some of whom arrived much later than the pioneering merchants, 
whilst others had come early in the 20th century to work as civil servants for the White Master,) often 
looked down on these moneymaking traders. Some went a step further in trying to recreate British India, 
complete with a British class system.” (Siddiqi, 2011) 
219
 In 1927 the British administration forced the parliament to give farmers permanent use of their land and 
simultaneously reduce the tribute owed to their chiefs, to provide incentives for growing more cotton 
(Mutibwa 1992 p.7). This significantly changed rural society, reducing the power of the chiefs and 
marginalizing women. 
220220
 This included 1,662 primary co-operative societies with a membership of 252,378 (UCA 2009) 
221
 “Gender analysis in the African context must incorporate a critique of imperialist imposition of Western 
notions of gender and the effects of neo-colonialism on gender relations” (Tamale 1999 p.3).  For example; 
suppression of a peasant Catholic Sabiny woman in Eastern Uganda includes: Indigenous culture - e.g. 
clitoridectomy ; Catholicism - which places her value below men , Capitalism - which places her bottom of 
the hierarchy; Imperialism - with imposes structures that dictate her existence. 
222
 For example, when Makerere University was founded in 1922, all the first students were Baganda. 
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There were three largely British banks in Uganda at Independence which served British interests 
(Barclays Bank of London; Standard Chartered Bank of South Africa and ANZ Grindlays) and a 
fourth, Bank of Baroda, which dominated commercial lending (Brownbridge 1998a p.127). These 
banks were under the oversight of London or South African regulators (Akampurira 2008). The 
East African Currency Board had been established in 1919 but it had no control over the 
commercial banks. Its purpose was to issue the East African Shilling and convert it to the British 
Pound at a fixed rate. There was also the Uganda Credit and Savings Society (UCSS) which had 
been created by the government in 1950 to extend credit to entities without access to loans from 
commercial banks. (Akampurira 2008) i.e. to Ugandan businesses which were excluded by the 
British banks.  
 
Saving among rural Ugandans was an integral part of life (Deshpande, Pickens and Messan, 2006) 
and almost “every person” saved at home for emergencies (Gifford 2004 p.81). Informal savings 
mechanisms included building assets that held a reliable store of value (livestock, land); 
participation in ebibiina - Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), Accumulating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) and similar groups used more by women than men); 
using a money guard (a family member or other trusted individual); and saving in cash at home, 
often in clay jars or mukandala (money belts worn under clothing).  These savings methods were 
the primary means people had to mitigate risk because they “reduced the utility cost of saving for 
a lumpy expenditure” (Gifford 2004, Kimunyu 1999 p. 1306) People joined schemes with large 
memberships and waited for their turn. (ibid p.1307).  Gifford (2004) describes the wide range of 
ways poor people managed their limited funds to compensate for the lack of access to finance. 
This and several other studies which documented savings mechanisms were not undertaken until 
after 2001 but they were reporting what had been happening for decades so it is appropriate to 
cover them here (Wright & Mutesasira 2001, Musoke 2005, Pelrine and Kabatalya 2005, Gifford 
2004, Deshpande et al  2006). These studies consistently found that most Ugandans value savings 
more than loans.  57 percent of respondents in one study said a secure and convenient place to 
save money was more important than the ability to obtain a loan (Musoke 2005) and a survey by 
Pelrine and Kabatalya (2005) of rural households found 80 percent of respondents had saved some 
money in the past year using a combination of formal and informal mechanisms and that for 60% 
of them security of their money was the highest priority. 
 
A.M. Obote was elected Prime Minister at Independence in 1962 and the Buganda King, Sir 
Edward Mutesa, was honorary President (Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza 2005a). 
But the election process had highlighted some of the religious, ethnic and regional differences. 
The first political party was the Uganda National Congress (UNC) - largely Baganda and 
Protestant. Then the Democratic Party (DP) was formed which was primarily Baganda and 
Catholic. But there were regional differences. For example, the Bahima chiefs in Ankole made an 
alliance deal with the Catholic leaders in Ankole against the Protestants (Mutibwa 1992 p.36). 
Then the Uganda People’s Union (UPU) which was ‘anti-Buganda’ and majority Protestant, 
merged with the anti-Buganda and Protestant wing of the UNC, led by Apollo Milton Obote to 
form the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Then in an astute political move, he formed a 
 152 
coalition with the Kabaka Yekka Party - a Baganda national party - against the DP
223
 and this 
coalition won the democratic multi-party general election (Hansen and Twaddle 1998). Obote 
took the helm of a country created and ruled by the British for their own ends and whose economy 
was still largely controlled by foreign interests. 
 
7.3 Obote and General Idi Amin 1966 – 1979 
Continued foreign domination of the banking system after Independence led to deep discontent 
over bank lending policies. Approximately 90% of commercial bank assets were held by foreign 
banks (Gershenberg 1972 p. 505-6). It became a widely held belief that government intervention 
was necessary to ensure that the banking system played a more supportive role in the development 
of the economy, to support Ugandan development, not foreign interests (Brownbridge 1998a p. 
127) To promote indigenous interests and extend access to financial services to a wider set of 
clients, UCSS was converted into the wholly government owned Uganda Commercial Bank 
(UCB) in 1965 (Gershenberg 1972 p. 506, Clarke, Cull and Fuchs 2009 p. 1508).  The UCB 
focused on financing indigenous businesses and administering government agricultural and rural 
lending programs.  
 
To get more power over the economy Obote issued a new constitution in 1967 which abolished 
the country’s kingdoms and named him executive president with increased and centralized 
powers. The Obote government expected the banking sector to fulfil developmental objectives and 
this was not happening so in 1969 Obote’s government took the extreme measure of requiring the 
banks and insurance companies to register locally and have paid in capital of UGS 20 million held 
in government securities (Gershenberg, 1972, p. 514). The purpose of this measure was to “better 
serve” ordinary Ugandans. At the same time, the government was supporting co-operatives as 
policy instruments for rural development (UCS 2009). The Bank of Uganda Act was also passed 
in 1969 which established the BoU to defend the value of the Ugandan Shilling and make loans to 
the government. (Akampurirar 2008). There were direct monetary controls including fixed interest 
rates, stringent exchange controls and directed credit.  Controls over agricultural markets and 
foreign trade were also imposed (Brett 2005 p.4, Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza 
2005b). In other words, there was financial repression.   
 
In May 1966, Obote’s ally, General Idi Amin had stormed the Bugandan king’s palace, killing 
2,000 people. The army, mostly northerners, then “unleashed a savage slaughter of Baganda” 
(Museveni 1997 p.40).
224
  According to Mutibwa (1992 p.40) a “precedent had been set for 
atrocities” and Obote’s rule was a violent one with summary arrests and imprisonment of many 
dissident leaders and opposition politicians. So much so that when Major-General Idi Amin 
launched a successful military coup in Jan 1971, he was initially celebrated (Watt, Flanery and 
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 From President Museveni’s perspective (1997 p.35) this was seen as an “unprincipled marriage of 
convenience” but as an election strategy it proved successful. 
224
 According to Museveni, Obote “was intent on exercising dictatorial powers over the people of Uganda 
through the sectarian control of military power” (Museveni 1997, p.32) He deepened the northern monopoly 
of the army – a process started by the British” 
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Theobald, 2000) especially as he released the many political detainees (Museveni 1997). Within a 
few months, however, Amin’s troops were killing Obote’s supporters in the army and were also 
soon killing other opponents and perceived opponents. (Mutibwa 1992 p.88).  
 
There was great economic hardship. Taxes remained high and there were fewer jobs so the people 
felt that Amin was not delivering on his promises of a better life. Ugandan Asians probably 
controlled half the country’s wealth at the time and there was a traditional distrust of the Asians 
who maintained separate lifestyles from the Africans. So Amin turned to them as an immediate 
source of financial gain which he knew would be supported by the majority. On 4 August 1972 he 
ordered the expulsion within three months of the approximately fifty thousand South Asians – 
citizen and non-citizen alike - from bank tellers to industrialists en masse. In one act this was 
perhaps the single event that wrought the greatest change in Uganda (Mutibwa 1992 p.92 -3). He 
wanted to teach the British “a lesson they would never forget” because most of the Ugandan 
Asians would go to Britain. In December he also nationalized all British interests in Uganda from 
tea estates to the Kampala Club. In a long statement later that year at Makerere University he 
declared that he did these things “to make the ordinary Ugandan master of his own destiny and 
above all to see that he enjoys the wealth of his own country” (Mutibwa 1992 p.97) and there is 
little doubt that the majority of the population supported the strategy. (Brett 2005 p.5)   
 
As part of Amin’s 1972 program of asset expropriation, all banking activities of government 
bodies, parastatals and cooperative unions were transferred to the government owned UCB. 
Foreign banks were forced to either close up-country branches or sell them to UCB so they were 
each left with only one branch in Kampala. (They ended up lending mostly to the parastatal crop – 
particularly coffee - marketing boards which had crops as collateral and some of the better 
managed co-ops.)  UCB then expanded its branch network rapidly to fulfil the government’s goal 
of additional upcountry branches to encourage domestic savings.  UCB thus became the sole 
provider of banking services in many locations, particularly in rural areas and was used to perform 
a variety of functions in rural areas such as paying taxes and school fees. Financial repression 
continued with high inflation and excessive government borrowing. (Clarke, Cull and Fuchs 2009, 
Brownbridge and Harvey 1998) 
 
Many potential political opponents were eliminated, even the Protestant Archbishop, Janani 
Luwum was assassinated early in 1977. With the continuous horrific violence and expropriation – 
social norms were changing (Collier and Reinikka 2001 p.21). The young were learning that 
violence was an acceptable way to resolve conflict, pre-emptive violence was rational and 
plundering others’ wealth, not earning it, is the way to prosper. “Violence and murder were 
virtually institutionalized” (Museveni 1997, p.93). 225 What also became clear is that morality was 
debased. Violence and death were so prevalent that people were no longer horrified by it. 
Education was devalued because you did not need it to survive in the economy – to get money you 
needed influential allies in the government, the ability to be violent, or steal. (Mutibwa 1992, 
p.122)  Professional ethics utterly collapsed. Corruption erupted and the black market became 
                                                     
225 Amin’s reign of terror from 1971 to 1979 has been well documented (Mutibwa 1992) together with the 
attempts of exiles, including Museveni, to overthrow him. Museveni’s perception was that “With Amin you 
could not even make limited progress using the system because he was a killer” (Museveni 1997 p.33). 
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pervasive (Tangri and Mwenda 2008). The guiding principle was that “the end justified the 
means” because people were so desperate to beat inflation and to survive.  Mutibwa (1992 p.122) 
has noted that this attitude still pervades today and many respondents agreed. Amin’s legacy is 
that he took over a viable economy and eviscerated it with negative impacts lasting for generations 
with corruption becoming endemic
226
. 
7.4 Obote returns to power 1980 
Unbelievably, and many say fraudulently, Obote was returned to power in a controversial election 
in 1980 (Hansen and Twaddle 1998, p.2, Okidi et al  2005a p.13). He started to implement a 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in return for IMF lending. This included floating the 
exchange rate (which resulted in heavy devaluation) and dismantling of some price controls. But 
there was no reduction in government expenditures and no controls on inflation and an attitude by 
government ministers of “milking the cow” (Mutibwa 1992, p.153) which resulted in the need for 
further devaluations and the collapse of SAP lending in 1984. Corruption did much to further 
discredit Obote and to increase support for the NRM (Hansen and Twaddle 1998, p.2). In rural 
areas the government continued to use co-operatives as policy instruments, with the cooperatives 
receiving subsidized funding from the government marketing boards for crop and marketing 
finance (Uganda Cooperative Alliance, 2009).
227
 But “excessive” government involvement 
“virtually turned them into government parastatals.” (Uganda Cooperative Alliance, 2009 p. 3).  
When the SAP came into force the cooperatives simply did not have the skills “to seize 
opportunities that the liberalization policies offered” and rural people did not benefit as had been 
expected (ibid p. 4).  
 
In 1983, Centenary Rural Development Trust was established by the Catholic Church to serve the 
rural poor by providing savings services
228. In 1984 the Uganda Women’s Finance Trust (UWFT) 
was started by a group of educated women who wanted to help poor women micro-entrepreneurs 
with credit and business development skills
229
. Local banks were also able to be set up in the mid 
to late 1980s including Sembule Investment Bank (starting in 1984 which later became Allied 
Bank) and Nile Bank (starting in 1988, which was taken over by Barclays Bank in 2007). The 
minimum capital requirements were negligible, so they were severely undercapitalized. Licenses 
                                                     
226
 Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. 
(Transparency International 2007 p.xxi) The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and 
politicians. It is a composite index drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys 
carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. The surveys used in compiling the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) TI ask questions that relate to the misuse of public power for private 
benefit, for example bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public 
funds or questions that probe the strength of anti-corruption policies, thereby encompassing both 
administrative and political corruption. 
227
 Although not well documented the government’s subsidized funding of rural co-operatives through the 
government marketing boards meant that farmers could borrow cheaply against future harvests which had 
proved a lifeline for rural communities. 
228
 It has not always performed well, but has the capacity to deal with its problems and refocus on its clients. 
229
 But without the capacity and financing to manage expansion UWFT remained small with only a few 
hundred clients until the mid 1990s. 
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were given by the Minister for Finance without proper consideration of the expertise of managers 
and directors, so they were not well managed and the framework for their prudential supervision 
was seriously deficient (Brownbridge 1998a p.134).  
 
The National Resistance Movement led by Yoweri Museveni took to the bush in 1982 to take up 
the fight to remove the corrupt and repugnant system of government based on violence. The civil 
war compounded the economic woes of rural communities, disrupting both agricultural production 
and the functioning of the cooperatives which had been an economic lifeline for farmers. The 
NRM gradually received more support as atrocities committed by Obote’s troops – particularly in 
southern and western Uganda multiplied and were publicized. (ibid p.2-3).  Some of the worst 
atrocities were committed in the area known as the Luwero Triangle (west of Kampala) between 
1981 and 1986 (Furley 2006). Most of the women were tortured in some way during the war. 54% 
suffered sexual violence including rapes, being abducted as sex slaves, forced marriages to 
abductors and other violations (Liebling-Kalifani, 2007 p.2). The NRM slowly expanded the 
“liberated zones” of the country, but not quickly enough for these women.  
 
 
7.5 Museveni and NRM rule  
The NRM finally entered Kampala on 27 January 1986, but the country was on its knees. 
Museveni promised that the people would be in charge of their country’s governance and 
promised the security of person and property. As many as half a million Ugandans had died from 
the civil wars since 1971, 7% had been displaced and per capita income had declined by 40% 
(Collier and Reinikka 2001p. 16). The economy had been exploited by despotic leaders and 
decimated by war since independence and the cooperative movement, which had been an 
economic life line for the rural folk, was all but destroyed. GDP had declined by 40% from 1971 
to 1986 (Okidi et al  2005a p.15). Most of the country was inaccessible; the communication 
system did not work; utilities were barely functional there was only one functioning power station 
(built in 1956). The economy had retreated to subsistence (Collier and Reinikka, 2001 p.20) and 
become completely informal. Basic goods like soap and sugar had to be smuggled into the 
country. Inflation was very high over and when Museveni took over there were only three weeks 
of foreign exchange reserves left and further devaluation was needed - to highlight just a few of 
the problems (Furley 2006). 
 
The elimination of corruption and the misuse of power was part of the Ten Point Plan of recovery 
outlined by Museveni (Tangri and Mwenda 2008) to increase the tax and customs revenue, reduce 
constraints on business development  and ensure that services reached intended recipients (Watt, 
Flanery and Theobald 2000). To address these and other challenges, twin processes of 
reconstruction and liberalization were needed simultaneously (Collier and Reinikka, 2001 p 15). A 
constitutional commission was set up in 1988 to draft a new constitution based on extensive 
consultations with citizens across the whole country. 
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Initially, Museveni favored a closed economy model going against IMF / World Bank Paris Club 
recommendations. For example, the Finance Minister attempted to freeze the value of the 
Ugandan Shilling against the USD and Sterling and then to revalue it upwards (Hansen and 
Twaddle 1998, p.7). These efforts failed within months and so Museveni had two options: accept 
the advice and funds of the IMF/World Bank quickly or accept them less quickly (ibid). He chose 
quickly. In May 1987 the Economic Recovery Program was launched, immediately followed by a 
sequence of Structural Adjustment Programs. These included credits from IDA and other 
multilateral and bilateral assistance to stimulate economic growth, financial stability, trade 
liberalization and lowering interest rates (Okidi et al  2005a p. 15). Inflation was brought down 
from 190 percent in 1986 to 28 percent in 1991 but there were negative real interest rates, the two 
dominant banks were insolvent and the credit to GDP ratio at 4 percent less than a quarter of its 
1970s level (Gulde, Pattilo and Christensen 2006 p.22). Financial Sector Reform was desperately 
needed.   
 
7.6 Financial sector reform 1991 - 1997 
Financial Sector Reform (or financial liberalization) started in 1991 with the support of a World 
Bank financial sector adjustment credit (Hauner and Peiris 2008, Brownbridge and Harvey 1998). 
The reform package comprised three elements: reform of the BoU and public sector banks; 
legislative changes to the Banking Laws and the BoU Act; as well as liberalization of markets, 
interest rates and monetary instruments (Akampurira 2008, Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998). This 
was typical of many African government reform programs (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998). With 
liberalization, new banks were started including Centenary Rural Development Bank (changed 
from a Trust to a full service bank in 1993), Orient Bank (started in 1993), Crane Bank (started in 
1995) and there were new investors in Allied Bank (starting in 1996) which is now Bank of 
Africa.  
 
The Financial Institutions Statute was passed in 1993 and gave the BoU more independence and 
power over prudential regulation and their capacity was upgraded. This was critical as Uganda’s 
banks were ‘riddled with nonperforming loans” (Hauner and Peiris 2008 p.2704) Interest rate 
liberalization took place in the context of reduction in government domestic borrowing and 
reduction in inflation which enabled positive real lending rates to be achieved without a sharp rise 
in nominal rates and bank deposits rose from 4% of GDP in 1989/90 to 5.8% in 1993/4 
(Brownbridge 1998a, p.139, Akampurira 2008).  
 
In the early 1990s, UCB had 190 of the total 237 bank branches in the country. It held around 50% 
of commercial bank deposits and 22% of the total system deposits (Brownbridge 1998a p. 130). It 
was the dominant provider of financial services in the country and had a virtual monopoly on the 
provision of financial services to the rural poor. A 1992 analysis of the availability of credit for 
livestock in rural areas, (Jabbar et al  2002) found the government-owned UCB was the most 
important source of formal credit for smallholder livestock farmers. But, it did not have sufficient 
funds to meet the demand for livestock credit because its loans were subsidized and there was 
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significant political influence on lending policies
230
 (Jabbar et al  2002 p. 1029, Brownbridge 
1998a p.131). Credit wasn’t reaching those who needed it because of “inappropriate screening 
procedures and criteria to determine creditworthiness” (Jabbar et al  2002, p. 1029).  Repayment 
discipline on the part of borrowers was low because they often regarded loans as reparations for 
war damage or rewards for political support (Brownbridge 1998a p p.131). This was exacerbated 
by politicians who publicly told their constituents that the loans need not be repaid.  Due to such 
political influence on lending policies as well as poor loan procedures; lack of proper accounting 
procedures and corruption, UCB’s non-performing loans were about 75% of its outstanding loan 
portfolio (ibid  p.130). 
 
UCB first tried to reduce its costs by closing over 100 out of its 190 branches, but by 1995 it was 
declared insolvent and could not avoid radical restructuring. The government established the Non- 
Performing Asset Recovery Trust (NPART), which assumed UCB’s nonperforming assets. The 
government also sold noncore assets, reduced staffing levels, and invested substantial amounts to 
upgrade computer systems (Kasekende (2004) cited in Clarke et al  2009 p. 1508). Closure and 
liquidation were not options because of UCB’s dominant position in the market, because it was 
the backbone of the payments system, especially in rural areas and, because the deposit insurance 
program was not fully capitalized, (meaning that liquidation or failed privatization would have 
imposed a heavy fiscal burden on the government) (Hauner and Peiris 2008, Clarke et al  2009). 
To preserve confidence in the payments system, the government took a cautious approach towards 
restructuring UCB, keeping the bank open throughout the process and maintaining its majority 
shareholding. The government also restored and clarified property rights, an important step for the 
banking sector, by handing back assets expropriated by Amin, to the former Asian owners (Collier 
et al  2001). 
 
But it was not just UCB which was facing difficulties, between 1994 and 1998, half of the sector 
faced solvency problems (Clarke et al  2009). The smaller local banks were also in financial 
distress with high nonperforming loans (NPLs), due to moral hazard compounded by insider 
lending (Brownbridge 1998b p.179) and reckless lending. In 1994 The BoU closed down a small 
local bank and took over two more for restructuring in 1995. Even Centenary Rural Development 
Bank had to be restructured with international assistance and new international investors brought 
onto the Board. After examining the leading causes of the “dramatic increase” in NPLs during the 
economic and banking crises across many sub-saharan African countries during the 1990s Fofack 
(2005) came the conclusion that the increase was “largely driven by macroeconomic volatility and 
reflects the vulnerability of undiversified African economies which remain heavily exposed to 
external shocks” (Fofack 2005 p.1). This finding may reflect the whole of sub-saharan Africa, but 
there is no Ugandan researcher who takes that position. Undoubtedly the economic climate for 
banks in Uganda was very difficult as a result of the protracted economic crises, the disruption 
caused by war and the weak legal system, but the majority opinion is that the primary cause was 
internal lending practices rather than exogenous factors (Brownbridge 1998a, p.131).  
 
                                                     
230
 The government’s Rural Farmers Scheme (RFS), first launched in 1987, was one such political source of 
credit for farmers. 
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By 1995 there were eight local banks and NBFIs in Uganda. (Brownbridge 1998b p.175) These 
local banks in contrast to the British banks brought two advantages: they served “small urban-
based businesses, which face difficulties in securing credit from the established banks” and; they 
offered better services in order to attract customers. Opening hours were longer, queues in 
banking halls shorter and depositors were offered higher deposit rates and lower minimum 
balances. The local banks provided a more personalized service and loan applications were 
processed more quickly than in the established banks. (Brownbridge 1998b p.176). 
 
7.7 The beginnings of microfinance 
The early 1990s saw the start of donor funded microfinance, particularly for women, as both a 
replacement for and complementary service to commercial banking (de Haan and Lakwo 2010) 
and in response to the significant unmet demand for credit (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2010). The 
financial lives of the urban poor in Kampala were complex with many different types of informal 
credit services being used to reduce their vulnerability to risk e.g. pawnbrokers, store credit, 
landlords allowing tenants to pay rent in arrears, “munno mukabi”231, “cash rounds”, as well as 
loans from family and friends (Gifford 2004). Many of the initial microcredit initiatives were 
started in Kampala and were subsidized because it was deemed the poor were ‘too poor to save’ 
and needed subsidized loans (Tumusiime-Mutebile 2010). However Governor Tumusiime-
Mutebile considered this approach ill-suited to both Ugandan agriculture and to indigenous culture 
more generally quoting a proverb: ‘Any wealth that takes only a market week to acquire is sure to 
contain in it things for which the gods will surely come to make claims’. But the Governor also 
recognized that despite these serious shortcomings, the services were embraced by 
microentrepreneurs, because of the dire need for financial services. 
 
Leading international microfinance networks which started operations in Uganda around this time 
included: Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) in 1992, Faulu (meaning 
‘to flourish’ in Swahili) and the Ugandan Agency for Development (UGAFODE) in 1995 with 
PRIDE and the Foundation for Credit and Community Assistance (FOCCAS) starting in 1996 and 
UML in 1997. These microfinance NGOs (registered under the NGO Act) were known for 
proximity to clients, speed and flexibility of service, mutual reciprocity, but with hidden 
transaction costs (de Haan and Lakwo 2010). Many MF NGOs used a Grameen type methodology 
with a requirement to save and the savings were not able to be accessed by the clients, effectively 
being held as collateral, which was one of those hidden costs (Goodwin-Groen, Bruett and 
Latortue 2004).  Hulme (2000) dubbed the 1990s the ‘Decade of Microcredit Complacency’ and 
in Uganda it appears he was right as funders focused on supporting replication of the Grameen 
microcredit methodology, not the design of better more appropriate products, nor impact studies, 
nor to challenge MF NGOs to reach much larger number of clients . AMFIU was launched by 
governor of the Central Bank in November 1996, and became the primary collaborative 
                                                     
231
 “Munno Mukabis” translates to “friend-in-need associations” in Uganda. These  provide an opportunity 
for members to collect funds over time in order to amass sufficient resources to aid their members should a 
specific pre-agreed upon financial shock occur, such as deaths in the family, weddings, children’s 
graduations, etc. (Gifford, 2004). 
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mechanism among MFIs. It was the principal representative of MFIs in collaborative efforts with 
other stakeholders such as the BoU and with the Donor community. Centenary Rural 
Development Bank was the major provider of financial services for the rural poor at the end of 
1996 with 60,125 savers of which less than 20% were women (Goodwin-Groen 2006). 
 
7.8 Economic growth and Entandikwa 
The 1992 to 1997 period was characterized by high growth rates that peaked at 10% in 1994/5 
(Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza 2007) when coffee prices were at a peak. It was 
broad based and accompanied by significant poverty reduction and declining income inequality 
(Kappel, Lay and Steiner 2005, Okidi et al  2007).  This pro-poor growth was due to growth in 
commercial agriculture, particularly high coffee prices, together with structural changes and 
diversification into non-agricultural activities. Deiniger and Okidi (2003) also identified the 
importance of improving access to basic education and healthcare as a key part of achieving this 
pro-poor growth in Uganda, along with electricity and reduction in civil strife. As a result Uganda 
has often been seen as “an African show case for the beneficial effects of structural adjustment”, 
specifically market liberalization (Dijkstra and van Donge 2001). However, Collier and Reinikka 
(2001) are careful to point out that this was a twin process of liberalization with reconstruction 
after the wars and the two processes cannot be de-linked. Okidi et al  (2005b p.1) use the term 
“recovery-based economic buoyancy” to emphasize the point that the initial growth was rooted in 
the reconstruction process. Not just reconstruction but also the massive inflows of foreign aid 
estimated at “an annual average of 12 percent of GDP” (Okidi et al  2007 p. 179) of which about 
28% was budget support in the 1990s rising to 52% in 2001 (Atingi-Eto 2006  p.354).   However, 
for the approximately 75% of Ugandan women who were involved in agriculture and did about 
70% of the work (Banthia, Greene., Kawas, Lynch and Slama 2011 p.5), the economic growth in 
the early 1990s did little to change their economic or social status. Their husbands still controlled 
that income and furthermore, men typically also controlled the income from women’s micro-
businesses such as selling eggs or basket weaving (Banthia et al  2011). 
 
It became clear to the government that financial reform on its own would not be sufficient to 
expand financial sector development (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998 p.9), so it decided to 
supplement the problematic banking sector with its own financing to the rural poor through the 
Entandikwa Credit Scheme in 1995. Originally targeted at Luwero, because of its suffering during 
the war
232
,
 
the Parliament decided it should be for all rural Ugandans. Designed to be a revolving 
fund, it did not revolve. In Parliament on 3 December 1998 the Minister for Gender, Labour and 
Social Development responsible for the scheme, gave an assessment of the Entandikwa program: 
                                                     
232
 Although Luwero is now relatively peaceful, research has shown the women still suffer physical and 
psychological effects. Of the women screened 54.2% had post traumatic stress, as well as physical and 
gynecological health difficulties as a result of their experiences. Women also experienced physical aches 
and pains, headaches, genital and abdominal pains, palpitations, chest pains, anxiety, lack of appetite and 
ulcers. (Liebling-Kalifani 2007 p.2) 
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“When entandikwa was introduced, some people thought that this was a gift from the President - 
this is how they conceived it. So, many people who received entandikwa did not pay back the loan. 
Then we have had climatic changes in this country, and in most cases, these climatic changes 
affected the peasants who got this entandikwa. So, their crops were destroyed and they had no 
capacity to pay back. However, some peasants who borrowed this money established some firms, 
small firms in the villages and this money remains in the counties. Some of this money is there, 
especially where recovery rate is very high….. But in most cases, the recovery is not encouraging. 
So far, the recovery is 55 per cent and 45 per cent of the people who got this entandikwa 
defaulted.”   
 
Goodwin-Groen et al  (2004) reported the government’s conclusions from the Entanikwa 
program’s performance were that: government credit programs could often be politicized; clients 
do not feel obliged to repay subsidized loans; the government has neither the human nor the 
financial resources to run a nationwide loan program; and interest rates must be set at market 
levels by private service providers or costs will not be covered.  
 
 
7.9 Museveni elected president 
After a long and open public consultative process to draft the new Constitution (Hansen and 
Twaddle 1998), presidential elections were held in 1996. The new Constitution was based on a 
framework of rights, including recognizing the status of women (GoU 1995). Seats in the 
Parliament were allocated to specific groups, including women and persons with disability, to 
ensure that there was an inclusive approach. Museveni also mainstreamed women within the 
NRM (Tamale, 1999). The Electoral Commission was dominated by NRM supporters and 
everyone considered the result a foregone conclusion (Watt, Flanery and Theobald 2000).  
Museveni was elected President by a large majority and appointed women to important posts in 
the Cabinet and the Supreme Court (Waring 2010).  However, despite the NRM’s commitment to 
women it has not been able to progress the right for the rural women to equal ownership of the 
family residence (Waring 2010 p.8). Even with women in prominent positions in the NRM and 
Parliament and an in-principle commitment to co-ownership of land for women, when the Land 
Act was actually passed in 1998 co-ownership was missing and nothing has subsequently changed 
(Waring 2010). For example, women still own only 7% of farmland Banthia et al  2011 p.5).  
 
Museveni believed that a multi-party democracy had only served to bitterly divide Ugandans. 
Much of the terror of the previous regimes was caused by sectarian violence -violence based on 
religion; tribe; geography or politics.  As a result the NRM set up “Resistance Councils” at the 
village level where leaders were openly elected by their fellow villagers. There was then a five tier 
system of councils going up to the district level. The combination of economic support for a 
reforming regime, and a very slow and partial introduction of democratic institutions has been a 
major element in sustaining the successful shift from the politics of disorder to order in Uganda 
that took place since 1986. (Brett 2005, Collier and Reinikka 2001). With this stability and 
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commitment to reform, the tide of private capital flight had been turned by 1997 (Collier and 
Reinikka 2001).  
 
One downside has been that Uganda was a “virtual one-party state” since 1986 (Tangri and 
Mwenda 2008 p. 181). Opposition parties are permitted to exist but operated under such severe 
restrictions that they would not present a political challenge to Museveni and the NRM regime 
(Mugaju & Oloka-Onyango, 2000).  Another downside is that with power unequivocally with the 
NRM, there would be the traditional pressure requiring leaders to “share their wealth” (which 
would not be seen as unreasonable or corrupt) (Cammack 2007 p.601). Accordingly by 1998 the 
World Bank was reporting the existence of high level corruption and the use of “corruptly 
acquired monies to ensure the Movement government remains in political power” (Tangri and 
Mwenda, 2008 p. 179). 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
Some of the more difficult aspects of Uganda’s history bring into focus Uganda’s economic and 
political achievements in the early 1990s.  But what is important to note for this study is the 
integral place financial services have had in the everyday lives of Ugandans: from the multiple 
indigenous forms of savings; to direct political intervention in the banking system; to access to 
financial services becoming government policy. Financial services are deeply interwoven into the 
fabric of Ugandan life both urban and rural. Unfortunately the banking sector has never effectively 
served the majority of ordinary Ugandans, and particularly not women, neither British banks 
during colonization nor mismanaged local banks. The history of the development of the financial 
market to this point has been one of disappointment for the poor majority. The following Chapter 
8 builds on this analysis, reporting on the milestones in the development of the financial and 
microfinance markets as Uganda struggled to both reduce poverty and consolidate national unity. 
Chapter 9 then discusses the findings of the ethnographic research with microfinance stakeholders 
on the institutional building blocks of the microfinance market between 1997 and 2007, including 
the social norms.   
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Chapter 8: Uganda: Financial Market Development for Low Income Clients 1997 to 2007 
 
The previous chapter described the political, economic and social context for the development of 
the financial market in Uganda, particularly for the social norms, and concluded by noting the 
important role of financial services in the life of ordinary Ugandans.  This chapter now examines 
the way the government attempted to put the institutional foundations for the financial and 
microfinance markets in place following the momentum of the Presidential election, significant 
economic growth and the substantial support of international partners. Both grey as well as 
published literature is used to chart this course. The chapter begins with the launch of donor 
funded microfinance projects, recognizing the demand for access to finance in Uganda and the 
response to that demand by the government. There was significant growth in microfinance, and 
clients benefited from access to finance, although many providers were not financially sustainable. 
The MDI Act and regulations sought to bring some rigor to the microfinance market. As the 
formal financial sector was also facing regular crises, the Financial Institutions Act sought to bring 
some rigor to the formal financial sector too. But there were major challenges in neo-patrimonial 
corruption
233, including corruption within the microfinance market, and challenges with the GoU’s 
direct intervention in microfinance. The chapter concludes with the characteristics of the 
microfinance market in 2007 including reaching approximately 11% of the adult, economically 
active population or 1,709,778 savers. This leads into the institutional analysis of the microfinance 
market in following chapter. 
 
8.1 Microfinance donors start work 1997 
The US Agency for International Development (USAID), launched the Private Enterprise Support 
Training and Organizational Development (PRESTO) in 1997. It established a Centre for 
Microfinance (CMF) which offered training in micro-lending to all interested organizations, 
primarily the Grameen model of joint liability lending with savings required. The purpose of the 
CMF was to support the development of the microfinance sector. It then offered technical 
assistance and access to a grants program to help the institutions that implemented these “good 
practices” (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004  p.4). Many other donors increased their funding of 
microfinance about this time too including DFID; EC; German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) / 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Stromme and Norwegian Agency for 
Development (NORAD). No standards were enforced before or after funding nor was there any 
rigorous monitoring of their activities to check whether they complied with good practices in 
microfinance or even maintained high portfolio quality. The goal according to agreed principles 
donors agreed in 2001 was simply to expand access (Uganda Donors, 2001). This was the 
beginning of a massive donor effort in microfinance in Uganda with 62 financial access programs 
                                                     
233
 The concept of neo-patrimonialism has been useful in identifying a key common feature of post-colonial 
arrangements across Africa. It is not by definition negative but in common usage it has negative 
connotations (Booth 2011 p.3). In this paper it is simply used as a descriptive term, it is the corruption 
which has negative implications for financial market development.  Factors reinforcing neo-patrimonialism 
evident in Uganda include the legacies of colonial rule, cultural values of relianace on the Kabaka or King 
and input of large volumes of aid which can be used to ‘grease’ the clientelist machine.(Cammmack 2007 p. 
601). 
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and total funding exceeding USD 75 million over the next ten years. It was the largest 
microfinance donor effort in sub-saharan Africa (CGAP 2007). 
 
As part of this introduction of microfinance in 1997, leaders from the BoU, the Ministry of 
Finance, local MFIs, and donor agencies attended a World Bank/World Bank Institute training 
workshop in South Africa on microfinance followed by other workshops and international study 
tours. These participants became the early champions of microfinance in Uganda. Individuals 
involved in the process cite the exposure to what was happening elsewhere and the ability to 
network with a small group of practitioner and government leaders as critical to eventually 
developing microfinance in Uganda. (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004)  Informal contacts among 
donors, MFIs and representatives of the Ministry of Finance were channeled into a more formal 
mechanism for collaboration - the Micro Finance Forum (MFF) in 1997 chaired by The Ministry 
of Finance, Planning and Development (Ledgerwood and White 2006). The MFF became the most 
important mechanism for learning about what was happening in microfinance in Uganda, and no 
one wanted to miss its early meetings.   It met almost monthly and acted as an information 
clearinghouse and, to some degree, a gatekeeper. It grew and developed several committees 
(working groups) to deal with specific issues, including finance, capacity building, lobbying and, 
most recently, consumer affairs.  It was at the MFF that stakeholders discussed how to develop a 
legal framework for microfinance and because of this process the “culture of consultation became 
deeply rooted among microfinance stakeholders in Uganda” (Ledgerwood and White 2006 p.23),  
 
To illustrate the importance to donor focus on increasing access to finance, more than 
sustainability of the MFNGOs, by 1999 outreach of reputable MFNGOs had expanded to almost 
50,000 borrowers, but none were even approaching financial viability as shown in Table 7 below. 
Only Centenary rural development bank which started in 1983 was profitable. What is also 
particularly noticeable about Table 7 below is that for any MF organization that provides both 
credit and savings services, savings is much more popular. Centenary Bank is exceptional because 
it has a large rural network but even the small MF NGOs have attracted more savers than 
borrowers. 
 
 
Table 7 Key Ugandan Microfinance Indicators after two years of donor funding 
1999 Borrowers: Savers % Women PAR after 30 
days 
Profit Margin   
Centenary Rural 
Development Bank 
 14,168 
 
192,534 
 
27% 4.24% 10.73%. 
 
FINCA Uganda  18,634 - 100% 0.4% -7.68% 
Uganda Women’s 
Finance Trust 
   8,022     13,393 90% 7.47%   -58.02% 
Faulu/Opportunity 
Uganda  
   3,000     5,070 72% - -41.54% 
PRIDE 19,137   24,319 60% 0.0% -84.63% 
 
TOTAL 62,961 235,316    
Source: MIX Market 2011   
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8.2 Demand for and impact of financial services in Uganda 
Microfinance started to grow as economic growth was slowing down and the formal financial 
sector was contracting. Growth had declined to around 5% per annum from 1997 to 2000 and 
there was increase in poverty, especially in rural areas, together with increasing inequality (Okidi 
et al  2007).  In 1999/2000 the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) undertook the Uganda 
National Household Survey, and found an ongoing significant unmet demand for lump sums of 
money. It found that 90% of those surveyed had not applied for credit in the past year but 56% of 
them indicated that they needed credit (Okurut et al , 2005).  Less than 0.5% of the total sample 
had applied for such credit from banks.  The others had applied for credit from NGOs, Savings 
and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) and other “informal” lenders.234.  Okurut et al  (2005 p. 483) 
concluded that there was a large unmet need for credit due to “the failure of the formal financial 
sector to serve the poor”. According to analysts, this was because the liberalization program could 
not address the problems of information, risk management and contract enforcement, nor the 
colonial legacy of a focus on export-led projects, unhelpful staff attitudes; inconvenient opening 
hours; relatively complicated transaction forms (Steel et al  1997, Mutesasira, Sempangi, Hulme, 
Rutherford and Wright 1998). Another survey undertaken around that time (Wright and 
Mutesasira 2001) found that ninety nine percent of respondents in the survey who saved in the 
informal sector had lost some money in the past year, as had twenty six percent of savers in 
semiformal institutions (MFIs and SACCOs). This shows the relative safety of even semi-formal 
institutions for saving and the high risk of informal saving. 
 
These findings on demand for financial services and the failure of the formal sector to meet that 
demand, came as the Co-operative Bank and three other banks were closed by the BoU due to 
mismanagement in 1998 and 1999. The Co-operative Bank had had a long history of financial 
distress, including insolvency, and had already been recapitalised by foreign donor agencies. It 
was discovered to be insolvent again by the BoU in September 1998, but remained open in the 
hope that it could be re-capitalised by further financial support from donors, but that was not 
forthcoming so was closed in May 1999. UCB’s balance sheet which was again showing high 
NPLs had been cleaned up and in 1998, 49% was privatized
235
. Collier et al  (2001 p. 25) 
comment that these problems probably occurred because the Government of Uganda (GoU) at the 
time placed too much emphasis on liberalization and not enough on supervision as it did not 
adequately recognize the challenge of the high levels of “opportunism”. (“When opportunism is 
                                                     
234
 These findings contrasted with an assessment of the change in the percentage of rural households who 
have access to financial services (savings or credit) between 1992 and 1997 (Mosley, 1999) which found an 
increase from 9 to 21 percent in the sample surveyed. Furthermore in some districts like Nebbi District only 
2 per cent of the adult population had access to financial services (de Haan and Lakwo (2010). 
235
 In 1998, UCB was recapitalized and a minority shareholding block (49 percent) was sold to a Malaysian 
Company, Westmont Land Bhd. Unknown to the government, Westmont had borrowed money from 
Greenland Bank to purchase its equity stake in UCB. Greenland had signed an agreement with the Bank of 
Uganda (BOU) in that same year to remedy insolvency and correct violations of insider lending and single 
loan exposure limits (Brownbridge, 2002). After the transaction, UCB began lending to Greenland and its 
related companies despite the inherent conflicts of interest. Greenland Bank was eventually closed in 1999. 
Evidence from other developing countries indicates that post-privatization performance improvements are 
smaller when the government maintains a substantial shareholding (Fuchs et al  2007). The privatization of 
UCB was no exception. 
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high it implies that many aspects of government will function badly because the professional 
ethics that normally govern conduct will have eroded” (ibid p. 25))  Together, Cooperative Bank 
and Uganda Commercial Bank had held 70 percent of assets in the Ugandan banking sector. This 
need to have another major restructuring of the banking system eroded public confidence 
(Deshpande et al  2006 p.4) but it “did not reflect a systemic banking crisis” (Brownbridge 2002 
p. 279)  
 
Many heartwarming stories of clients were told by microfinance practitioners in Uganda of 
women who were able to earn more income from their micro-enterprises thanks to saving and 
borrowing. Two of the more robust studies on microfinance  Lakwo (2006 p.243-4) and de Haan 
and Lackwo (2010) however, found only marginal well-being gains although the financial asset 
portfolio of clients relative to non-clients improved and access provided a favourable opportunity 
for clients to improve their financial, human and political assets. Likewise Grimpe’s (2002) study 
of FINCA Uganda clients found that ‘loans simply help in muddling through as a short-term relief 
of securing livelihood” (Grimpe, 2002, p. 14) These findings are consistent with more recent 
global studies that show clients often use access to financial services to smooth consumption and 
manage risk (Collins et al  2009). 
 
But de Haan and Lackwo’s (2010) research included an analysis of  women’s empowerment236 
and they found it improved dramatically in three ways. At the self image level, they no longer see 
themselves as ‘mere women’ rather as those who also have recognized status in their marital 
homes. Their ‘power within’ reflected in their self- image and self-evaluation has improved. Also, 
through their microenterprises women are gaining the power to change their household livelihood 
strategies, access better social services, and own and decide about assets in both their marital and 
natal homes. By so doing, they have established a change in marital relations towards 
interdependency that reflects a power transformation associated with gains in assuming power 
over their own lives. This reflects a power transformation associated with gains in ‘power over’ 
their lives. CARE’s (2009) analysis of their Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) 
program found similar positive social outcomes including improved power relations at the 
household level, with more consultation between wives and their husbands in addition to increases 
in children going to school from 75% to 86% to and (CARE 2009 p.96)  
 
8.3 GoU action to meet demand 1999 - 2001 
In 1999 the BoU Policy Statement on Microfinance Regulation established the role of the 
government as an enabler, rather than provider, of microfinance.  The BoU supported the view of 
“micro-finance as a line of business,” and foresaw the creation of a four-tier financial system that 
included (1) banks, (2) credit institutions
237
, (3) micro deposit-taking institutions (MDIs), and (4) 
all other financial service providers such as NGOs, SACCOs, and private companies, Savings and 
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 de Haan and Lackwo’s (2010 p. 538) used Rowland’s (1997) four-dimensional power analysis to assess 
women’s empowerment. 
237
 These institutions are similar to finance companies in other countries, but are allowed to intermediate 
deposits 
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Loan Associations and community-based organizations. The BoU undertook to supervise the first, 
second and third tiers only.  It would not supervise MF NGOs 
 
The decision to enact a separate law for MDIs was to avoid overly burdensome requirements on 
microfinance business for institutions that were going under prudential regulation for the first time 
(Tumusiime-Mutebile 2010). To be able to supervise MDIs the Government established a 
Microfinance Unit under the non-bank financial institutions department and the newly appointed 
staff were sent to international microfinance training (Ledgerwood and White 2006).  Tier 4 was 
left out of prudential oversight because the institutions were; i) non deposit-taking and unlikely to 
cause systemic risk to the financial sector; ii) just emerging experimental initiatives that could 
easily be constrained if legislated too early; while at the same time iii) BoU’s principle was to 
regulate what it could supervise (Tumusime-Mutebile 2010).   
 
The government kept to this decision not to provide funding at the retail level, although it set up a 
wholesale funder to the sector, the Microfinance Support Center, Ltd (MSCL). The MSCL was a 
government-owned company but was governed by an independent board, and was funded through 
African Development Bank (AfDB) loans and grants from the GoU. It was formed with the 
mission of funding sustainable partner organizations which could serve economically active and 
productive Ugandans (MSC 2007). 
 
A presidential statement in 2001 was issued that the GoU would inject US $5,000 in each of the 
5000 parishes in Uganda. This statement appeared to contradict the role of the government as an 
enabler not provider of finance and provoked an immediate fear within the microfinance 
community that such cash disbursement would undermine the sector and a fear of entandikwa 
redux (described in the previous chapter). Microfinance stakeholders responded quickly, urging 
the GoU to remember the failed Entandikwa program and to allow the private sector (MFIs) to 
take responsibility for increasing the outreach of financial services. Eventually the GoU decided 
not to hand out money and the Microfinance Outreach Plan (MOP) was established (funded by 
IFAD, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and other donors), to massively 
increase the outreach of microfinance in rural areas by MFIs, not the government.
238
 Other 
objectives soon were added, including focusing the government’s efforts on improving the 
enabling  environment for microfinance and supporting capacity building, as well as increasing 
rural outreach
239
. The MOP was controversial amongst some donors because of concerns that 
unsustainable institutions would benefit from significant funding, thus distorting the microfinance 
market. But other donors were fully supportive of the government’s approach. 
 
These differences had been in evidence when the Microfinance Donor Committee discussed 
possible joint donor agreement on good practice guidelines for microfinance. The major 
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 Uganda has a population of nearly 24 million and 86 percent of its working population is self-employed. 
Close to 1.5 million people—nearly 90 percent of the non-farming active population—are employed in 
micro- and small enterprises. (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004) 
239 Many donors felt sidelined during the development of the MOP and felt that the close collaboration in 
the MFF which had been central to Ugandan microfinance to date, had been abandoned and some donors 
did not engage further with the MOP (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004) 
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microfinance donors, including the Austrian Development Co-Operation, DANIDA, DFID, EU- 
SUFFICE, GTZ, Rural Microfinance Support Project (RMSP) (an AfDB project) and USAID, 
agreed to “promote a shift from donor-dependent microcredit to microfinance with flexible 
financial services for low-income people” (Uganda Donors 2001p. 2) and to expand outreach but 
as can been seen in Table 8 below, there were no reporting or enforcement mechanisms to 
implement this goal or principles. 
 
Table 8 Uganda Donors’ Principles for Support to the Microfinance Sector 
 
Within this framework of support to the microfinance sector, a set of specific principles of 
good practice are set out here.  These include: 
 
 Transparency and sharing of information on projects, programmes, and other support 
mechanisms 
 Adherence to sound practices of international standards for support to the microfinance 
sector 
 Joint funding or other collaboration with other donors where feasible 
 Ensuring that supported stakeholders or MFIs provide a business plan or budget 
showing all funding sources  (MFIs’ own transparency and use of the CGAP guidelines 
on disclosure should be encouraged.) 
 
Uganda Donors (2001 p.3) 
 
 
Components of the MOP plan were implemented through existing programs and agencies of 
donors that supported the government’s approach, such as SUFFICE managing the capacity 
building unit, the Microfinance Competence Center (MCC) (housed at the Uganda Institute of 
Banking and Financial Services), and AMFIU setting up a Tier 4 performance monitoring system. 
By using agencies with appropriate technical expertise and political independence, the MOP 
hoped to avoid undermining the market for sustainable microfinance providers. But unfortunately 
these agencies did not themselves have the capacity to implement. The SUFFICE Capacity 
Building for both SACCOs and MF NGOs, was in operation from 1999 to 2007 but suffered from 
weak (and allegedly fraudulent) management and their capacity building typically comprised 
buying computers and motorcycles, so had made little difference to capacity in the sector 
(Goodwin-Groen, 2007). The MCC did not have adequate skills or funding to make a big 
difference to capacity building for the sector. As a result, apart from the top-tier MFIs which 
accessed some training from their global networks, there was no other strategic development of 
new training content available to help MF NGOs keep pace with the increasing complexity and 
growth of the sector, (such as portfolio and accounting systems for a large branch network, 
internal controls, or maintaining a high-quality portfolio while expanding and cutting costs), and 
there was no mechanism to ensure depth of training among the various respondent groups. 
 168 
8.4 Overcoming challenges in financial and microfinance sectors  
The BoU recognized it needed to reprivatize UCB to more competent owners and in late 2001 
Stanbic Bank of South Africa acquired 80 percent of UCB’s shares240  (Clarke et al  2009 p. 
1508). The remaining 20 percent were transferred to a trust to be held for sale to Ugandan 
residents. Stanbic was also required to combine its existing operations in Uganda with UCB’s 
operations within six months of closing. This privatization led to an improvement in service 
quality, outreach and efficiency in the banking system (Gulde, Pattilo and Christensen 2006).  In 
2002, the BoU ordered the restructuring of Post Bank as well - including a reduction from 91 to 20 
service locations! (Post Bank is a member of the World Savings Banks and had chosen to 
indirectly engage with microfinance through lending to sustainable and promising retail 
microfinance institutions (WSBI 2009)). Unfortunately many member ‘owned’ rural savings and 
credit cooperatives (SACCOs) fell victim to poor management, compounding the economic stress 
on members, but the BoU was unable to take action (Deshpande et al  2006)  
 
By the end of 2002 there were more than 1,300 microfinance organizations operating through 500-
plus branches, including a specialized commercial bank (Centenary Rural Development Bank), a 
regulated credit institution (Commercial Microfinance, Ltd., or CMFL), several limited 
companies, hundreds of NGOs, and over a thousand cooperatives and other community-based 
organizations (Goodwin-Groen et al  (2004 p. 4). In 2003, several hundred more SACCOs were 
founded, bringing the total to over 1,500. Together, these institutions served approximately 
935,000 savers and more than 395,000 borrowers. The poor savers of commercial banks like Post 
Bank would greatly increase this number as would the members of informal ROSCAs. However, 
only the largest service providers Centenary Rural Development reaching 316,650 savers; Uganda 
Women’s Finance Trust (now Finance Trust (FT)) with 82,220 savers and Uganda Microfinance 
Union (UMU), (now Equity Uganda) at 47,529 savers were financially sustainable (MIX Market, 
2011), all the others, even FINCA and PRIDE which would become MDIs, were still subsidized. 
 
This multitude of microfinance organizations were registered with the government as NGOs and 
they choose to either specialize in providing financial services or include credit as a component of 
their development activities. There was no difference in registration. Barr, Fafchamps and Owens 
(2005 p.676) found that Ugandan NGOs were generally well perceived in the country, but there 
was no official means of assessing the financial performance of these NGOs.  Typically financial 
statements/reports were of “dubious quality”.  With 3,000 such NGOs operating in Uganda in 
2000 (Collier et al  2001) this is alarming. This is an understatement because in 2006/7 two of the 
larger MF NGOs, considered successful by the sector and which had regularly been submitting 
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 The BoU did this only after conducting market surveys to gauge interest and preferred sale options. “The 
government announced that it would prefer to maintain a 20 percent shareholding although it would 
consider selling its entire stake.” (Clarke, Cull and Fuchs 2009 p. 1508). Under any sales option, 
recapitalization was again necessary given the extent to which UCB’s balance sheet had deteriorated (64 
percent of its assets were nonperforming).  The effect of ownership on bank efficiency in Africa was 
examined using 2001/02 data by Figueira, Nellis and Parker (2006). They found that “in Africa, on average, 
privately-owned banks do not appear to out-perform state-owned banks” (ibid p.37) but foreign-owned 
banks tend to be more efficient than domestically-owned banks.  So in finding a foreign owned bank with a 
good track record to take over UCB the BoU was giving UCB the best chance possible.  
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audited financial statements to government and financial reports to funders, were discovered to 
have fraudulent accounts. Ugandan NGOs are exempt from filing a tax return and in Barr’s survey 
“less than 60% of NGO survey respondents were able or willing to provide any data on their 
revenues and expenditure” and “for those that did provide accounts, figures on revenues and 
expenditures seldom agree” (Barr et al  p.676). This means that the data on provision of financial 
services by the myriad of small NGOs is highly questionable.
 241 
 . 
 
Recognizing this problem with reporting in 2003 AMFIU
 
 agreed a common MFI reporting tool 
with donors, called the Performance Monitoring Tool (PMT). Its purpose  was to reduce the 
administrative burden on MFIs, enable donors to apply consistent definitions and good 
microfinance practices in tracking the performance of their MFI partners and for there to be 
comparable data across the sector. Unfortunately it was hardly used because the quality of the data 
was questionable and AMFIU was not able to get all its members to use it on a regular basis. 
(Duval 2003). The top tier MFIs would have provided detailed financial performance information 
to their funders. 
242
 
 
The 2003 revisions to the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
243
 
244
 identified challenges in 
the microfinance industry, including capacity building, outreach, product mix, agriculture finance, 
regulation of unregulated and unsupervised microfinance providers (known as “Tier 4” 
institutions), savings mobilization, commercial bank down-scaling, interest rates, credit 
references, impact assessment, and industry consolidation.(Goodwin-Groen et al  2004) The 
inclusion of such a thorough analysis in the national poverty eradication plan illustrates the 
seriousness with which financial inclusion was treated by the government in Uganda (Okidi et al  
2007). 
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 Barr also found that only 12% of surveyed NGOs have an overdraft facility, and only 15% have ever 
borrowed. This shows that even if they do provide credit they are not serious financial service providers. 
This kind of data is evidence of the challenge in tracking down all micro-credit providers. 
242
 However, three of the leading MFIs and two of the networks in Uganda were five successful bidders out 
of just twenty organizations selected to participate in a study to explore ways to improve measurement of 
poverty reduction - Centenary Rural Development Bank, UMU and FOCCAS with the BRAC and FINCA 
networks (Copestake 2007). 
243
 The three major government policy documents that were meant to drive the pro-poor national economic 
agenda were the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), the Poverty Eradication and Action Plan 
(PEAP), and the Medium-Term Competitiveness Strategy (MTCS). In the previous decade it was the 
agriculture sector which drove pro-poor growth since the poorest Ugandans are crop farmers and there were 
high coffee prices in the mid 1990s. But, two main factors prevented improvements in agriculture. First 
inadequate funding for agriculture (less than 4% of the national budget when 96% of the poor live in rural 
areas) which inhibited implementation of innovative aspects of the PMA (Okidi et al  2007) And second the 
focus on decentralization (including the“decentralization of corruption” (Watt, Flanary and Theobald, 2000 
p.48)) in the PMA so local power structures, not the poor determined priorities (Baghiigwa, Rigby and 
Woodhouse 2004). 
244
 The original PEAP was more strongly owned locally than the later PEAP iterations, which were 
recognised as PRSPs. The recognition of the PEAP as a PRSP has made the PEAP more development-
partner-focused, which has undermined local ownership. When domestic stakeholders sensed that 
participation was an end in itself, this undermined national ownership. In addition, the political ownership 
that was a hallmark of Uganda’s first PEAP waned in more recent versions of the PEAP. (Goodwin-Groen 
et al  2004). This supports the claim by Cooke (2004 p.44) that the participatory aspect of PRSPs had been 
co-opted to support the World Bank’s “neo-liberal prescriptions”. 
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The IMF’s FSAP in 2003 found that the financial system was small underdeveloped and 
dominated by commercial banks (IMF 2003). Selected indicators of financial depth were 
significantly lower than Kenya or Zambia. (In other words only the rich could access the formal 
financial sector.) The financial system is not interconnected – meaning that the banking system’s 
lending to nonbank financial institutions is negligible. Lending to the Private Sector is limited in 
size and short in tenure. Credit to GDP ratio, although having increased to 7%, is much less than 
the 12% median of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ellis, Manual and Blackden, 2006 p.45). Distribution of 
credit is lopsided. Agriculture is 40% of GDP but receives only 10% of the private sector lending. 
Furthermore, it found that non-bank financial intermediaries including microfinance organizations 
and insurance companies to be “limited in number small in size and relatively ineffective” (IMF 
2003 p.7) This was a negative assessment of the performance of both the formal and informal 
financial sector and its regulators.  
 
By the end of 2004 IMF economists (Hauner and Peiris, 2008) were more positive about the 
banking sector. Their analysis found that with the closure of distressed banks, privatization of 
UCB in 2002 and substantial improvements in supervision, “the health of the banking system has 
improved remarkably” (Hauner and Peiris 2008, p.2703). )  Non-Performing Loans (NPL) had 
fallen from a high of 29% of the portfolio in 1998 to 2.6% as of September 2004 and high interest 
rate margins underpinned bank profitability. (Hauner and Peiris 2008). The 7% credit to GDP 
ratio is almost double where it had been in the early 1990s and the financial sector was one of the 
most profitable and well supervised in the whole of Africa (Gulde, Pattilo and Christensen 2006). 
There were 133 commercial bank branches in Uganda at the end of 2004 in 50 of the 55 districts 
of the country (Deshpande et al  2006, Hauner and Peiris 2008 p. 2705). Hauner and Peiris (2008) 
documented 1.5 million commercial bank deposit accounts also at the end of 2004 which they 
interpreted as 30% of households which is “good coverage by African standards” (p.2705). In 
contrast Deshpande et al  (2006) documented a total of 1.94 million deposit accounts in all forms 
of financial service providers, calculating an estimated 12.5 per cent of economically active adult 
Ugandans have direct access to a deposit account, which is “extremely low”, especially among 
rural Ugandans.  
 
Once Stanbic had turned around the former UCB it wanted to capitalize on the branch network 
inherited from UCB
245
 . This resulted in increased competition with large MFNGOs into the lower 
/ middle income market place – which was good for clients (Wright & Rippey 2003). It focused 
on retail savings
246
 and to attract small savers from commercial banks it reduced or eliminated 
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 As of September 2004, Stanbic had closed only one of the rural branches it inherited from UCB and it 
was increasing its lending to agriculture (Fuchs et al  2007 p. 7). Cihak (2005 p.22) found “international 
banks lend more overall, measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio, and lend more to agriculture— as measured 
by the share of total loans—than large domestic banks; they have as short a maturity profile of loans as 
other banks; have lower spreads; and do not have excessive profits as compared to other types of banks. 
246
 Most commercial banks lent to top-tier MFIs (which became MDIs) rather than develop their own loan 
products for poor clients, both because the Banking Act does not allow group collateral and because of the 
time and cost involved in developing new technologies to reach this market segment. Moreover, guarantee 
facilities available from the EC’s Support to Feasible Financial Institutions and Capacity Building Efforts 
(SUFFICE) project and USAID’s Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and Development (SPEED) 
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minimum deposit balance requirements and offered chequebooks with the savings accounts and 
also started making salary loans for low wage earners. (This is similar to Johnson’s (2004a) 
findings in Kenya 
247
). This competition was resulting in better services for MF clients such as 
longer loan terms, reduced collateral requirements, moving beyond the rigid working capital 
group loan product. But competition had not yet reduced costs of borrowing and with increased 
availability of credit, there was also a trend of clients taking loans from multiple MFIs (Wright & 
Rippey (2003) McIntosh and Wydick (2005)). 
 
8.5 The Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions Act and regulations 
A long process of technical consultations on appropriate microfinance legislation with a wide 
range of stakeholders started around 1997, led by the MFF, chaired by Ministry of Finance 
Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). The consultative or participatory process
248
  
was remarkable because of the willingness of the government to include stakeholders in this 
process, in other words, for the government to share power with stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
ability of those stakeholders - government, practitioners, and donors - to work together toward a 
common goal was also remarkable (given the donor’s failure to agree on other issues). This 
process is discussed and analyzed in detail in Chapter 9. AMFIU played a pivotal role, leading an 
initiative to educate politicians and the public, particularly on the issue of high interest rates, as 
reported in Ledgerwood and White (2006)
249
. (AMFIU received technical and financial support 
from GTZ and SPEED). The MDI Act passed in 2003 was considered exemplary because rather 
than concentrate on legitimizing microcredit or other narrow aspects of microfinance (as is 
common in other microfinance regulation), it focuses on protecting poor people’s savings 
(Mwenda and Muuka 2004, Ledgerwood and White 2006).
250
   (At the same time as this Act was 
passed the Parliament requested a new Tier 4 Act to be submitted to them within six months, but 
this had not occurred by the end of 2007.)   
 
After the euphoria of getting the MDI Act passed the funders were of the opinion that 
microfinance in Uganda would probably evolve into a dynamic market that was fully integrated 
                                                                                                                                                            
reduced the risk of lending to MFIs. While this capital is not cheap (annual interest rates of around 1520 
percent, with a lien on an MFI’s receivables), it can be easily accessed and integrates MFIs directly into the 
financial system.  (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004) 
247
 Johnson (2004 p.515) found in Kenya that the formal sector financial intermediaries are changing their 
strategy and considering how to tailor their products to the middle and lower income market. 
248
 This acceptance of a participatory process by all the technical participants would be an example of 
Tandon’s (2008) observation of the mainstreaming of participation in the development discourse. 
249
 High interest rates are a legitimate concern because there are no alternative risk-hedging mechanisms 
available to farmers  (Okidi et al  2007) 
250
 Mwenda & Muuka (2004 p. 156) argue that “an effective and efficient regulatory framework for MFIs 
should focus on regulating MFIs that accept deposits from the public. …..The argument supporting the view 
that MFIs engaging in deposit-taking should be regulated and supervised is premised on the need to protect 
the public from risk should such MFIs default. The objective of regulating MFIs is to let only the most trust-
worthy institutions operate for the good of the community while leaving them enough flexibility for adapted 
operations. While sound practices of micro-finance call for interest rate deregulation and a freedom for 
MFIs to adapt to local conditions, regulators must ensure that barriers to entry into the micro-finance sector 
are not so low that un-viable (or even dishonest) financial institutions flood the market.” 
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into the financial system and provide a wide range of financial services to most of the population, 
but if not, it would remain a successful, but marginal, development niche (Goodwin-Groen et al  
2004).
251
 
 
The Regulations were gazetted by the BoU in 2004, and were very similar to the regulations 
governing regular banks in the requirements for branches, reporting and management. These 
regulations paved the way for the incorporation of larger MFIs into the formal financial system. In 
contrast to the Act, the BoU did not lead a consultative, participatory process to develop the 
regulations. The process is not discussed in Ledgerwood and White (2006) because it was an 
internal one. Licensing of the first Microfinance Deposit Taking Institution, FINCA, according to 
the regulations, occurred in November 2004 and the other three MDIs, UMU; FT; PRIDE were 
registered in 2005 and became able to legally provide savings services. It cost the specially 
formed committee of donors a combination of USD 4.7 million to turn these four former NGOs 
into formal financial institutions (a fifth transformed into an NBFI). It was such an expensive 
effort because the NGOs had very few of the systems needed to register. To illustrate the 
magnitude of the problem, one of the NGOs considered to be on-track to become an MDI was in 
the following position. It had no information system to track and monitor portfolio performance 
(e.g. PAR) daily, nor the ability to prepare financial reports daily for management on efficiency or 
profitability. (It had billions of shillings lent out and several branches and did not have an 
information system that could provide daily updated reports – it took a week to get base payment 
information!) Its audited financials were not high quality and it did not report regularly to the MIX 
Market. It had never had an external rating undertaken of its strengths and weaknesses. It did not 
have a “Fit and Proper” Board with fiduciary responsibility and no Internal Auditor to report 
independently to the Board. The leadership was not skilled, competent and had no integrity. There 
were no standardized procedures across the organization, understood by everyone so that credit 
officers could move branches and follow the same procedures. (Without this it is impossible to see 
where there are gaps and where non-compliance is happening.) Finally, there was no organization-
wide performance incentive system so everyone could feel as if they were contributing to the goal 
of the NGO.  This was evidence of the failure of effective accountability and capacity building by 
its international agency and by the donor community in Uganda. It is not surprising that the BoU 
erred on the side of strict regulations. 
 
Initially, there was intense criticism within and outside Uganda that the regulations were too 
stringent to be sustained (Tumusiime-Mutebile 2010)
252
. However, the BoU saw improved loan 
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 The review did not, however, seriously look at the formal or informal providers of financial services or 
undertake any analysis of the underlying institutions which were driving the development of the financial 
market for the underserved. It also did not address the issue of corruption. In May 2003, the donors issued a 
statement which argued forcefully that ‘corruption is pervasive, institutionalized, and on the increase’ in 
Uganda and that ‘large-scale corruption and embezzlement at the top is carried out with impunity’ 
(Uganda’s Development Partners, 2003). 
252
 Some of the regulations have also been problematic for INGOs that want to ensure the ongoing social 
mission of the MDI. The maximum ownership requirements are 30%, but if the founding International Non-
Government Organization (INGO) wants to protect the social mission of original organization in the new 
company that is too limited if another investor does not share the same mission. More than one INGO has 
needed to negotiate with the BoU for a specific exemption from the maximum ownership limit based on the 
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portfolio management with the MDIs asset quality consistently improving from 2005 to 2009. 
Starting with a PAR of 5.5% in 2005, the overall PAR had, by the end of December 2009, reduced 
to 2.4%. Also with regulation MDIs can now access long term finance for their loan portfolios, 
and most MDIs have arrangements for banks to provide liquidity in case of liquidity constraints. 
MDI credibility has been further boosted by the “Best Bank in Kenya”253, Equity Bank acquiring 
one of the MDIs. (Other MDIs have since then, also been approached for acquisition, but they 
seem to have more confidence that they can transition into Tier 1 without being taken over.)  The 
negative consequence of the regulation was the very slow expansion of access points. The number 
of MDI branches was 83 in 2006, and had only risen to 88 by end of December 2007 (Bank of 
Uganda 2008a). 
254
 However the amount of savings deposits significantly increased by 47% in 
2007/8 compared to the previous year (Bank of Uganda 2008b p. 40) AMFIU has argued that the 
sector has changed rapidly and the factors which determined the regulations in the late 1990s need 
to be reviewed in a consultative process (Baguma 2006). 
 
8.6 Financial Institutions Act and preparation for Tier 4 regulation 
In an attempt to systemically address the insolvency of banks in the late 1990s, there was a review 
which recommended a much tougher Financial Institutions Act which complied with international 
standards. Indeed, because it was much tougher and took away the right to issue banking licenses 
from the Minister and Parliament, it took a long while for the Act to be passed (Hauner and Peiris 
2008). Key aspects of the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) and Regulations include the power of 
the Central Bank alone to license and regulate banks and that  financial institutions’ accounts must 
be IAS compliant (BoU 2006 p.35). The standards of the FIA 2004 are enforced with penalties 
ranging from fines to, ultimately, removal of the banking license. At the same time as this Act was 
passed and its regulations promulgated the BoU initiated a moratorium on licensing new banks. 
The priority was to ensure that the banks and MDIs operating met the standards of performance 
that were now required. 
 
The MDI Act has seen a substantial investment in extending secure deposit services, although 
“stakeholders are increasingly aware of remaining challenges to rural outreach, including slowed 
                                                                                                                                                            
NGO’s track record as a successful owner of financial institutions (e.g., FINCA Uganda). However, this 
was not easy and is likely to depend on the success of the financial institutions owned by the NGO (Lauer 
2008) Another challenge was that some donors required grant funds for loan capital either to remain with 
the original NGO or to “stay in the country”—which typically means that the NGO must, on transformation, 
own a percentage of the company equal to the grant funds divided by the total initial capital of the 
transformed institution and be required to retain such ownership position indefinitely. This is what happened 
to the Ugandan Women’s Finance Trust. (Lauer 2008) 
253
 At the 2007 Euromoney Awards for Excellence because of Equity’s achievements in reaching out to the 
unbanked. (Equity Annual Report, 2007) 
254
 Another problem with the regulations is that savings used as collateral is not recognised as a deposit in 
conventional law, there have been cases of illegal deposit taking. Bank of Uganda is currently reviewing 
these definitions to bring them in line with the special features of microfinance deposit taking business. The 
benefits of reviewing these definitions is that unsuspecting public can be better protected from being misled 
into putting money into unlicensed institutions and pyramid schemes that has led to loss of savings. To 
protect its image as ‘protector of savers’, it is important to Bank of Uganda that all attempts to take deposits 
illegally are minimised. (Tumusiime-Mutebile 2010) 
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pace of MDI expansion, inadequate regulation and supervision of SACCOs, and lack of clarity on 
regulation for new high- and low-tech delivery channels.” (Deshpande et al 2006 p.1) Furthermore 
at “the micro level, the primary obstacle is lack of secure deposit-taking institutions in rural areas 
and extremely low density of financial service access points throughout the country. Linkages 
between SACCOs and regulated institutions offer promise in this area; incentives and competition 
could also draw banks downmarket. At the meso level, resources for communicating institutional 
soundness, consumer education, and access to the payment system are under-developed.  The 
report provides these conclusions based on a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of savings for 
low income Ugandans from the clients’ preferences to the financial intermediaries that attempt to 
serve them.  
 
The GoU then realized that it had standard information from formal financial intermediaries but it 
did not have adequate information about the NGOs MFIs and SACCOs. So the MoFPED 
undertook a census with the objectives of establishing the geographical distribution of MFIs by 
institutional type; the extent of outreach and financial performance based on basic indicators; the 
governance, affiliations, and institutional practices, including sources of funding; understanding 
the extent of competition (MoFPED 2006) . The main findings of this Census are in Table 9 
below: 
 
However there were more SACCOS and MFIs legally registered than were found by the census 
team. Apparently 57.1% of the “missing” SACCOs and 40% of the “missing MFIs” were 
currently not operational” (Friends Consult 2007a p.iv)  In addition about 1 out of every 3 
SACCOs that were considered missing were found to exist but were not open during the time of 
the census owing to low business activity.
255
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 The SACCOs and MFIs that were no longer operational may be the cause of the 6% of respondents in the 
Census that said they had lost money in SACCOs and MFIs (The Steadman Group 2007 p. viii) or the 26% 
of respondents who said they had lost money in a semi-formal financial services provider in an earlier non-
government survey (Wright and Mutesasira, 2001). 
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Table 9 Results of 2006 GoU census of financial institutions in Uganda 
Number of financial service outlets: A total of 1263 institutional outlets (headquarters and 
branches) covering all districts in Uganda were found of which 1207 were found active or eligible1. 
Of the eligible outlets: 
 676 (56%) were Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) (Tier 4); 
 104 (8.6%) were private companies (Tier 4); 
 73 (6.1%) were NGOs (Tier 4); 
 52 (4.3%) Sub-County Integrated Development Associations (Tier 4); 
 97 (8%) were Micro Finance Deposit Taking Institutions (MDIs) (Tier 3); 
 38 (3.1%) were credit institutions (Tier 2); and 
 168 (13.9%) were commercial banks (Tier 1). 
 
Location: The Central and Western regions account for 879 (72.8%) of all the eligible institutional 
outlets. The Eastern region accounts for 221 (18.3%) while the Northern region accounts for 107 
(8.9%). 
 
Depositors: The total number of clients with deposits with SACCOs and other Tier 4 MFIs as of 
December 31, 2005, was 389,479,. The total number of clients with deposits with the regulated 
sector as of June 30, 2006 was 2,161,274 
 
Borrowers: The total number of reported loans outstanding from SACCOs and other Tier 4 MFIs as 
of December 31, 2005, was 272,637. The total number of loans outstanding with the regulated sector 
(commercial banks, credit institutions and MDIs) as of June 30, 2006 was 339,170. 
 
Disbursements: MDIs disbursed UGX 167,995.268 million or 15% of the total amount disbursed, 
and had share capital of UGX 17,848.412 million or 6.9%. Credit institutions had an outstanding 
loan portfolio of UGX 83,944.994 or million or 8.0% and value of savings of UGX 32,859.172 
million or 2.9%. SACCOs disbursed less than UGX 53,860. 073 million in 2005 or less than 5%, and 
had a loan portfolio of UGX 30,754.241 million or 2.9%. 
 
Source: MoFPED (2006) 
 
A Tier 4 Regulation Sub-Committee published a report on principles for a regulatory framework 
for Tier 4 and in 2006 AMFIU made recommendations to this committee (Baguma 2006). They 
urged for no regulation of interest rates, not to give powers to a member-based apex organization 
and not to promise supervision where there was no capacity to provide the supervision. 
 
8.7 Corruption and re-election 
In May 2003 Uganda’s donors had issued a statement which argued forcefully that ‘corruption is 
pervasive, institutionalized, and on the increase’ in Uganda and that ‘large-scale corruption and 
embezzlement at the top is carried out with impunity’ (Uganda’s Development Partners, 2003).  
Thus it was hardly surprising that members of parliament were openly bribed to alter the 
constitution so Museveni could be reelected president in 2006 (Rotberg 2007 p. 46). This has been 
interpreted or even justified as being due to a cultural practice of “neopatrimonialism” or 
patronage (Cammack 2007, Robinson 2007); or the need for ongoing political stability after recent 
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wars (Museveni 1997)
256
.  Others simply see it as corruption by the elite to continue to hold power 
(Tangri and Mwenda 2008). In its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2007 Transparency 
International (TI) ranked Uganda 111 out of 179 with a score of 2.8 out of a possible 10. It was 
comparable to Eritrea and Rwanda (Somalia being the lowest in Africa). Such a low score in the 
CPI indicates that public institutions are heavily compromised. TI estimates that half of the 
government funds, approximately USD 950million vanish corruptly and the Public Procurment 
and Disposal of Public Assets Authority estimates that 70% of the government’s proceurement 
budget (over USD 184 million) is lost each year due to corruption in the procurement process 
(Rotberg 2007). Tangri and Mwenda (2008 p.177) provide evidence “that state elites – cabinet 
ministers, senior civil servants, and army officers – have abused their positions for personal gain”. 
They also argue that part of the corruptly obtained monies have been channeled “to ensure the 
Movement government remains in political power.” (ibid p.179). These NRM elites are not 
necessarily connected to the President by ethnicity or kinship but were appointed by him to 
represent different regions, religions and gender balance. (Watt, Flanary and Theobold, 2000)   
 
Tangri and Mwenda (2008 p.186) argue that elite corruption is not systemic, but ad hoc. They 
argue that it involves a minority of politicians, civil servants, and military officers, with some 
political and personal connections to the top political leadership who engage in individually 
determined ways of accumulating resources
257
. But the corrupt senior officials are still accountable 
to the President due to both “neo-patrimonalism” and the desire to maintain power for the NRM 
(Watt, Flanary and Theobald 2000, Francis and James 2003, Mwenda and Tangri 2005, 2008, 
Robinson 2007). The interpretation of high-level corruption as “ad hoc” belies the donors’ 
experience of endemic corruption. The evidence from Transparency International highlights the 
corrosive effect of corruption on all aspects of life in Uganda, including in the microfinance 
market.  
  
Under President Museveni, the management of state institutions is subject to his personal 
influence and patronage politics and he has used those state institutions to build political support 
and sustain his power. In the civil service appointments are largely made on patronage networks 
which are deeply embedded in the social structure (Watt, Flanary and Theobald 2000).  Public 
resources (including foreign aid), have been used in unaccountable and non transparent ways to 
help the NRM government maintain its political dominance (Tangri and Mwenda 2005, 2008). 
Furthermore, the slowing of the reform momentum up to this point also lies in the “neo-
patrimonal character of Ugandan political culture” (Robinson 2007 p.472) where personalized rule 
and patronage relations take precedence over reform.  Museveni has also relied on authoritarian 
means, military force, and political manipulations to maintain political control (Tangri and 
Mwenda, 2008. p.182) 
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 As the state was previously synonymous with violence and oppression, it is hardly surprising that people 
depend on the relationships they can trust instead (Watt et al  2000) 
257
 Accordingly large numbers of honest senior officials have co-existed with corrupt politicians (usually 
ministers of state) within government ministries. 
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Patronage is also central to Uganda’s decentralization program, a key pillar of the NRM agenda 
since it took office (Francis and James 2003 p.325 – 326) 258. Its five-tier structure of local 
councils (formerly Resistance Councils) starting at the village level and going up to the district 
level draws on “the language of participatory planning” (ibid p. 326) but is widely regarded as 
NRM’s attempt to widen its support base or the “decentralization of corruption” (Watt, Flanary 
and Theobald, 2000 p.48)
 259
. It should be noted that the use of decentralization as a vehicle of 
state patronage is not unique to Uganda as Robins, Cornwall & von Lieres (2008 p. 1077) found 
“[d]ecentralisation may, in practice, serve to extend and further embed the logic of state 
paternalism and patronage.”  
 
NRM leaders have also, in various ways, disabled the anti-corruption institutions they have been 
required by aid agencies to establish to stamp out corruption. Although appearing resolute in 
confronting corruption ills, they have shown little commitment to act effectively to curb practices 
which could affect their material and political interests.  There has been a close and cooperative 
agreement between the GoU and the IFIs with the GoU implementing reforms and the IFIs 
providing large infusions of funds. But aid agencies have not called the GoU to account for the 
creation of specialized agencies, the expansion of the military
260
 and of district level bureaucracies 
and political appointments to public position all of which have supported the patronage-based 
government (Mwenda and Tangri 2005, Robinson 2007).  Transparency International notes.  “In 
countries where public sector institutions were historically based on patronage ….rather than 
merit, reform takes time and can require a substantial investment of resources, as well as technical 
assistance.” 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an acceptance of pervasive corruption beyond 
patronage, with many aid projects suffering from misappropriation of funds and funding 
“irregularities”. This included two leading MF NGOs that had international partners which were 
supposed to be exercising oversight, namely FOCCAS (with Freedom from Hunger) and The 
Micro Enterprise Development Network (MED-Net with World Vision). In the case of FOCCAS 
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 Francis and James (2003 p. 326) found decentralization in Uganda had “no real success stories as far as 
improved development performance at the local level is concerned”  because of inadequate capacity at the 
local level, insufficient fiscal decentralization along with the other responsibilities decentralized, and a lack 
of accountability to citizens.  Decentralization justifies the President’s insistence on a “‘‘no party’’ 
democracy” (ibid p. 327) to both the highly politicized population and the international donors, who see 
multiparty democracy as the hallmark of good governance.  Francis and James (2003) contrast the patronage 
system with the “technocratic”  (ibid p. 334) mode of local governance in Uganda which prioritizes poverty 
reduction, is driven by national targets, and is closely associated with poverty reduction strategy plans 
(PRSPs). 
259
 Hickey and Mohan (2004 p.5) argue that because the notion of participation has become so ubiquitous, 
“understanding the ways in which participation relates to existing power structures and political systems 
provides the basis for moving towards a more transformatory approach to development”. Therefore, it is 
critically important in this context to understand that the language of participatory planning is being used to 
widen the NRM’s political support base (Francis and James, 2003). This is not a unique situation as “abuse 
of the term ‘participation’ abounds and although is understandable, it is highly dangerous.” (Drinkwater 
2003 p. 63) as it debases the work of those who are methodologically rigorous. 
260
 So called “ghost” soldiers are created by commanders who then draw the wages of these phantoms. It has 
been estimated that ‘ghost’ soldiers could comprise as many as one third of Ugandan army strength 
amounting to as much as $30 million per annum in recent years (Tangri & Mwenda 2008).. 
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an internationally recognized audit firm was also compromised for providing false financial 
statements (Goodwin-Groen 2007, Rozas 2009)
261
. Respondents were greatly disturbed by this 
pervasive corruption and it is discussed at length in the following chapter. Cammack (2007) 
argues that donors must have an understanding of deep social structures, to address institutional 
weaknesses and to support processes of positive social change and processes that promote 
government accountability to the people.  
8.8 “Bona Bagagawale” – Prosperity for All 
On 7th October 2007 “Prosperity for All” was nationally launched to implement President 
Museveni’s 2006 campaign promise that the government was going to do something more 
effective to solve their long-standing poverty related problems and provide access to finance 
(Akandwanaho
262
 2006). The “Bona Bagagawale” program or “Prosperity for All” program was 
designed to alleviate poverty in rural areas, since peasant farmers make up the majority of the 
most poor. Bona Bagagawale was to join the existing government efforts (such as the PMA) to 
transform poor farmers, both men and women, from producing predominantly for the household 
(subsistence farming) to producing for the market (commercial agriculture). The initial plan was 
not to disburse the micro-finance Bona Bagagawale development funds directly to the people, (as 
was the case with the failed Entandikwa scheme). But instead, Bona Bagagawale would “fund the 
re-establishment of cooperatives [that had been operating in the 1970s,] through the provision of 
development grants and loans. Then work with other government agencies and the micro-finance 
sector to provide a range of other needed complimentary integrated services” (Akandwanaho 2006 
p. 12) 
 
This plan was based on the analysis that in “1971 every part of Uganda had strong and vibrant co-
operative societies. There were over 2,000 primary co-operative societies. By 1986 there were 
3223 Agricultural Marketing Co-operative Societies, 38 District Unions and seven National 
Unions”. (Akandwanaho 2006 p.7) By collectivizing production, combining it with modern 
management strengthened by information systems for monitoring and decision making processes, 
it was hoped that the Unions would prove to be cost effective, have a wide spread and penetration 
while at the same time ensure that the implementation of modernization of agriculture has a 
peasant focused approach. As the majority of farmers in Uganda were small holders with an 
average of just two hectares, it was anticipated that the scale of farming operations will be 
increased substantially by pooling of resources in farm cooperatives that will offer facilities that 
otherwise would be inaccessible to peasant. (ibid p.8) That was the hope. 
 
But the reality was very different. The Uganda Cooperatives Savings and Credit Union Limited 
(UCSCU) was appointed by the GoU as the lead agency to implement the formation, 
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 One way corruption occurred was that “ghost” clients were created by loan officers in collusion with 
bank staff. 
262
 General Caleb Akandwanho SS (rtd) (whose nom de guerre was General Salim Saleh) was the Minister 
of State for Microfinance. A charismatic and decorated military commander, he is a half-brother of 
President Museveni who sacked him from the army for corruption and drunkeness. Allegations of 
impropriety have swirled around him from plundering natural resources from the DRC to corruption in 
privatization deals. 
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strengthening and development of SACCOs under the “Bona Bagagawale” program263. The other 
SACCO coordinating body was the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) and they collaborated 
with UCSCU in the implementation. However, UCSCU required no formal performance standards 
that SACCOS must achieve to become or continue being registered and it had no enforcement 
mechanisms for lack of reporting or incorrect reporting to UCSCU. As a result, there was little 
standardized information about SACCOs financial performance, it was not transparent, 
comparable, consistent over time.
264
 The Microfinance Support Centre had a track record of 
funding SACCOs but in its 2007 Annual Report it stated that the Portfolio at Risk > 90 days was 
22% for existing SACCOs under GoU funding. This is poor performance was due to poor 
governance and treasury management with inadequate internal controls (MSCL 2007 p.18). This 
is a polite way of stating that the SACCOs were vulnerable to corruption and mismanagement of 
funds.   
 
This lack of enforcement of performance standards was based on the ethos of SACCOs, that they 
are primarily accountable to their members
265
. But this assumes that the members have both the 
technical capacity and power to hold the board members to account which is rarely the case in 
rural Uganda. To address this problem, the government and donors jointly worked on “Minimum 
Standards of a Good Sacco” which includes PAR at 30 days a maximum of 10percent. (Roberts 
2007). These standards would (in theory) be enforced during the annual SACCO Audit by 
UCSCU/UCA.  However, this was recognized to be inadequate supervision and so an independent 
regulatory agency will be set up to “regulate, supervise and lisence SACCOs” (Mbaguta 2007 
p.10) UCSCU’s goal was to establish 328 new SACCOs and support a further 620 that were 
already established within an unidentified timeframe. They estimated that per new SACCO 
formed it would take approximately two years and UgSh 24 million (Weikeh, 2008). It was 
originally planned that these SACCOs would receive low-interest loans via the Government 
owned Post Bank for productive investment for SACCOs. Doubt was expressed, however, about 
the capacity of Post Bank with just 21 branches countrywide, to reach all 964 sub counties in the 
current 80 districts within one year, as is expected by the government (Sharma 2007). So 
responsibility for lending to SACCOs was given to MSCL (see above) which has adequate 
experience in lending to SACCOs across the country (Mbaguta, 2007). 
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 UCSCU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Government of Uganda and on behalf of 
Government undertakes the following mandate:  Mobilising communities and train them to come together 
as co-operators in order to start SACCOs or to join existing ones and become members;  Install a culture 
of savings by encouraging members to own shares and also put savings into SACCOs.;  Provide training 
to SACCOs, and equipment, goods and services, for example, depending on the needs of SACCOs they will 
be provided with safes, office furniture, counters, filing cabinets, contribution to staff salaries and rent, 
among others. For the SACCOs which are already in existence and wish to grow and become stronger, they 
are provided with items like motor cycles, computers, strong rooms and refurbishment of office premises.  
(http://www.ucscu.co.ug/index.php?ucscu&as=29  accessed on 25 March 2011.) 
264
 IFAD had funded a Programme Administration Unit (PAU) charged with provision of Financial and 
Technical services to UCSCU to support its capacity building efforts for members. 
265
 But when members and board members do not understand how the saving or lending business operates 
or, are indebted to village leaders, are unable to understand financial statements or, do not have the time to 
help the management, then there cannot be effective oversight. 
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8.9 Context and characteristics of the microfinance market in 2007  
By 2007 Uganda’s economic success in the 1990s was “old news” (Rotberg 2007). Agriculture 
was contributing 42% of GDP (PMA 2007) and approximately 85% of the workforce were in rural 
areas (GoU 2006) but insufficient resources were being allocated to improve agricultural 
productivity.  Corruption was rampant, electric power was short, democracy illusive with 
Museveni still the President and the war in the north still not resolved. However, criticism from 
Washington and likeminded donors had been muted because Uganda cooperated in the ‘War on 
Terror’ and in 2007 deployed troops to Somalia (Tangri and Mwenda 2008 p. 191).  By the end of 
2007 Uganda’s GNI per capital had reached just USD 370 (up from USD 240 in 1986) as the 
population reached 30.339 million in 2007 (UNDESA 2011). 76% of this population was still 
living under the poverty line of USD 2.00 per day (World Development Indicators, 2008). Its 
Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.42, just below the SSA average (UNDP 2012).  
 
Despite these multiple negative indicators Standard and Poors had rated Uganda as a “frontier 
market” i.e. a market that is smaller and less liquid than those in the more advanced emerging 
markets but with strong supervision that promotes financial sector stability and effective 
intermediation. In their opinion Uganda has political stability and a strong independent Central 
Bank which also rigorously supervises the financial sector. Such a market offers institutional 
investors the prospect of good returns and a means to diversify risk through investments in 
financial markets.(Nellor 2008). Uganda was ranked 118 out of 178 on the World Bank/IFC’s 
2008 Doing Business Indicators (2007)  
 
As the MDIs were being launched Nile Bank (one of the smaller local banks) made a strategic 
decision to move quickly and gain the first mover advantage in the expanding Small and Medium 
Enterprise (SME) market. It needed an IPO to finance branch expansion but Barclays offered to 
buy the bank before the IPO happened. The announcement was made in December 2006 and by 
March 2007 the BoU had given its approval and the merger was done.  Nile had 18 branches and 
25 ATMs and Barclays 7 branches and 9 ATMS. Barclays supported Nile Bank’s strategy and 
decided to aggressively pursue the SME market with the aim of growing to a total of 65 branches 
within a year. It can be expensive to serve the SME market – since it requires good risk 
management and underwriting, excellent marketing and sending sales agents out to where the 
businesses are, but it was an untapped market so there the potential for high margins. 
 
The most comprehensive analysis of financial access in Uganda (based on 2006 data) used the 
FinScope methodology (The Steadman Group, 2007). It found that 71% of the population saved 
in some form, the most popular being saving in a secret hiding place by 90% of the savers 
266
. 
27% save with an informal group (this includes ROSCAs
267
 ASCAs and VSLAs
268
) and 22% save 
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 Pelrine and Kabatalya (2005) found that 81% of rural Ugandans save in cash or in kind (based on a 
nation-wide survey). 
267
 Ambec & Treich (2007) provide a fascinating analysis of the reasons why ROSCAS are efficient and 
“sometimes better than organizing a credit market” (ibid. p.133) 
268
 See Kibombo (2007) for a summary of how VSLA’s (Village Level Savings and Loan Associations) 
function in Uganda 
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with a formal financial institution. The main purpose for this saving is to meet basic household 
needs; emergencies, including medical emergencies, and for school fees
269
. Saving was more than 
twice as important to Ugandans than borrowing, with only 33% borrowing in some form. Of 
those, 54% of them choose to borrow from friends and family or retailers.  Even those who have 
access to microfinance, may not have access to other financial services their small businesses 
need. For example, women entrepreneurs have access to small, short term loans but not to larger, 
longer term loans to significantly expand their businesses. Women also face a clear gender bias in 
access to formal sector credit receiving only 9% of all available credit and 1% in rural areas (Ellis 
et al  2006 p.45). The FinScope study also found that 62% of adults over 18yrs are “unserved”, or 
excluded from any form of financial service which rises to 79% when only formal and semi-
formal access is counted. (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2009 p.11).  At face value this seems to be 
very high levels of exclusion, but Uganda’s is considered to be a success in microfinance donor 
circles (Ledgerwood and White 2006).  These findings about the importance of saving and also 
the limited access, correspond with the public data on the performance of microfinance 
organizations presented in Table 10 below. 
 
In the ten years since donors started funding microfinance in Uganda, MF NGOs, MDIs and 
Centenary Bank have grown to approximately 310,000 borrowers outstanding. That does not 
include borrowers in SACCOs and VSLAs - also supported by donors - who have loans which are 
not publicly recorded. However, what is much more significant, is that this is just a third of the 
number of savers. Nearly a million people excluded by banks have a safe place to save. When the 
approximate number of savers under UCUSU and VSLAs are added the total, micro-savers 
increase to approximately 1.71 million. That means approximately 5.6% of the population not 
served by banks had a safe place to save.  This equates (very) approximately to 15 percent of the 
economically active population in 2007
270
 (International Labour Organization 1998- 2012))
271
. 
The importance of savings is consistent across many different types of financial service providers 
and the different market niches this is the hallmark of the Ugandan microfinance market. It is 
important to note, however, that the expansion of savings services by the MDIs is significantly 
less than originally projected in the planning for the MDI Act. This is because the MDI 
regulations imposed huge additional costs on the transforming NGOs which stopped expansion. 
These costs included meeting bank standards for security and IT etc. and also prohibited 
intermediation of savings which imposed huge financing costs.  
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 Pelrine & Kabatalya (2005) also found these three were the main reasons people gave for saving. 
270
 The Ugandan Labour Force Survey used by the ILO and by Ugandan Government publications was 
dated 2003, so there are not accurate numbers for 2007. Its estimate of for 2003 was that 38% of the 
population was economically active, which, assuming approximately consistent percentages, would equate 
to 11.529 million in 2007.  
271
 To improve the quality of data on financial access Finscope has been undertaking household surveys in 
selected African countries to assess the extent of financial service usage. In Uganda the 2006 Finscope 
found: 18% use formal services; 3% use semi-formal and 17% informal. (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2009) 
The 5.6% of the population as micro-savers estimated here would include the 3% semi-formal plus some of 
the formal service that focus on low income clients. 
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Table 10 Key indicators for Ugandan microfinance, 31 December 2007 
2007 Number 
of 
Borrow-
ers 
Avg.  
Loan 
size % 
of GNI/ 
Capita 
Number 
of  
Savers 
%  
Wo-
men 
PAR > 
30 
days 
Yield 
on 
Port-
folio   
ROA Portfolio 
USD  
‘000 
Centenary 
Rural 
Developt. Bank 
  81,346  
  
378%   391,577 
 
<20% 1.72 39% 5.4% 113,855 
PRIDE MDI 
2008 numbers 
  60,589   89%   148,634 41% 1.9% 50% n/a    22,739 
FINCA 
Uganda  MDI 
  45,313   59%    36,019 74%  3.6% 68.6% 4.7%      9,939 
BRAC Uganda 
NGO 
  37,543      34%    37,543
272
 100% 0% 47.4% 3.4%      4,717 
UML / Equity 
Bank 
  29,604 221.5%     54,679 48% 3.4% 53.3% 5.4%     24,263 
Finance Trust 
MDI 
  16,908 148.6%     86,185 70% 4.17% 56.7% 2.8%      9,298 
Opportunity 
Uganda NBFI 
  16,885 
 
  88.4%    18,370 38% 1.6% 54.7% 3.2%      5,519 
Hofokam   12,202   41.8%               0 n/a n/a 49.1% -0.4%      1,887 
MED-Net NGO     3,771   66%       3,771 73% 7.2% 22.5% -85.1%         921 
Ugafode NGO     7,670   96.2%             0 51% 7.3% n/a n/a      2,730 
Total 311,831    776,778      
UCSCU 
estimate 
    806,000      
Est. Savers   1,582,778      
CARE VSLA  
estimate. 
    127,000 70%     
Total 
Estimated 
Savers 
  1,709,778      
 
Key: Highlighted cells indicate the best performers in that category for reaching low income  
Sources:  MIX Market, 2011, Werikhe 2008, CARE Uganda 2007 
 
MDIs, Centenary and BRAC have strong financial performance with positive ROAs ranging from 
2.8% to 55.4% showing that the leading providers are sustainably serving poor clients. In 
microfinance the PAR is the best indicator of whether a lender knows how to make good loans 
that get paid back. PARs after 30 days higher than 5% indicate serious problems. The difference 
in performance between the few top MFIs and others is best indicated in their PARs. Furthermore, 
high yields on portfolios but not high ROA (as is the case for the struggling MFIs) typically 
indicates that efficiency needs improving. Wholesale lending funds are available from funders like 
Stromme, SUFFICE and AfDB – but there are now few strong MF NGOs and SACCOs able to 
                                                     
272
 BRAC did not report savers to the Mix Market (2011) for 2007 but did report amount of deposits in 2007 
and number of savers in 2006 and 2008. In both 2006 and 2008 the number of depositors was exactly the 
same as borrowers so I assumed it was the same for 2007. 
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manage it (MSCL 2007). As one long-time practitioner noted “microfinance has become a 
banking business for the poor” as previously soft-hearted donors have become hard headed 
investors (Okaulo 2006). BRAC NGO is now the largest of any NGO in Uganda and it has 
differentiated itself by using a low cost approach to microfinance, (using local transport not 
4WDs) and focusing on rural women who have showed a significant unmet demand for financial 
services.   
 
Like the performance indicators, the average loan sizes in Table 10 above also show a wide range 
from BRAC’s 34% of GNI to UMU’s 222% of GNI. This reflects the different niches each 
operates in from rural women to urban micro and small businesses – although all clients are 
excluded from the formal sector banks. As discussed above, for those living in rural poverty, 
access to a safe place to save and small loans has enhanced the mechanisms they have 
traditionally used to smooth consumption.  
 
But, looking at the lists of top MFIs over the past ten years there are some notable ones missing 
from this 2007 list due to fraud. FOCCAS is no longer there – it was liquidated due to a network 
of corrupt Chief Executive Officer (CEO), loan officers and even bank clerk. MED-Net’s numbers 
of clients have plummeted due to the removal of fraudulent “ghost” clients which corrupt loan 
officers had fabricated. The Support Organisation for Micro Enterprise Development (SOMED) 
has also collapsed due to the CEO leaving, taking substantial funds out of the NGO and not being 
found. In addition Wright and Rippey (2003) report that SACCOs (under UCUSCU) were 
frequently losing members’ money and the smaller MF NGOs were struggling with adequate 
information systems and fraud was not uncommon (Goodwin-Groen 2007).  Transparency is not 
the norm in Ugandan microfinance which has left the sector open to fraud.. Nearly all MF NGOS 
and MDIs are members of AMFIU, whose goal is to serve its members (AMFIU 2008) It played 
an important role in getting the MDI Act passed but it has proved ineffective in improving 
transparency in the sector. 
 
The BoU had responsibility for supervising the four MDIs along with the banks. But as of 
December 2007 there was no effective supervision of Tier 4 NGOs even though the parliament 
had asked for Tier 4 regulation in 2004 when it passed the MDI Act. The MDIs were each 
successfully managing portfolios of between USD 9 million and USD 24 million. The loans are 
from socially responsible microfinance and investment funds and include Hivos – Triodos and 
Triodos – Doen, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Netherlands Organization for 
International Assistance (NOVIB), AfriCap and Kiva. With the MDIs having similar regulations 
to banks, and the BoU recently licensing several new banks, there is increasing competition 
between MDIs and Banks. This has put added pressure on MDIs costs since they are not allowed 
to intermediate savings and have to borrow more expensive funds to lend.  Partly to respond to 
this competition UML looked for a bank partner and was glad to merge with Equity Bank of 
Kenya which is also committed to low income, formerly excluded, clients. However, the banks’ 
high interest margins mean that competition has not yet brought down those interest rates margins 
(Okidi et al  2007) and there is still limited access to credit especially in rural areas. 
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8.10 Conclusion  
This chapter started as the influx of donor funding for NGO microfinance was beginning in 1997. 
Ten years later the types of microfinance organizations had changed significantly, but their 
services were still in great demand. By 2007 two new forms of microfinance providers were 
dominating Ugandan microfinance, Micro-Deposit taking Institutions (MDIs) and VSLAs, and the 
number of SACCOs was also increasing. There were four regulated and supervised MDIs which, 
together with a regulated commercial bank, were the leading formal sector providers of safe places 
for poor people to save, together reaching over 700,000 clients. The sustainability of microfinance 
as a business had been proved to a sceptical financial sector.  At the opposite end of the poverty 
spectrum VSLAs, village based (mostly) women’s savings groups, were not even registered, but 
were meeting the financial service needs of over a hundred thousand of the rural poor. The 
Government’s major effort was underway to provide rural Ugandans with access to financial 
services under its “Prosperity for All” programme, so SACCOs were being rapidly set up across 
the country. The growth and diversity of microfinance service providers in Uganda from formal to 
semi-formal to informal, is a very positive story.  
 
This positive story is important to draw attention to in a context where it is easy to focus on the 
fraud in NGO and SACCO microfinance, corruption more generally in the political sphere and 
how much more the sector could have grown. Furthermore as Tier 4 organizations are still not 
supervised there remains the danger of low-income clients continuing to lose their savings in 
semi-formal organizations. The next and final chapter of the Ugandan trilogy will explicate the 
micro-ethnographic findings about the institutional functions which provided the foundation for 
this expansion of the microfinance market. 
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Chapter 9: Uganda: Institutional Analysis of the Microfinance Market 1997- 2007 
 
This chapter provides an institutional analysis of the development of the microcredit market in 
Uganda based on the micro-ethnographic research findings.  It is the third in the set of Uganda 
chapters and builds on Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 presented the political and economic context for 
the institutional development of the Ugandan microfinance market and particularly its social 
norms, prior to Museveni’s Presidency. Chapter 8 reported on the milestones in the development 
of the financial and microfinance markets, as Uganda tried to bring rigor to the formal sector and 
respond to the strong demand for microfinance. The new Micro Deposit-taking Institutions were 
profitable, had performed well and gained the trust of international lenders. They had not 
expanded as fast as hoped, but still dominated the sector. VSLAs numbers were growing, as were 
SACCOS with the support of the Government, and there were many small microfinance NGOs 
too. This diversity of providers was an achievement. However, without Tier 4 regulation there was 
a lack of transparency and accountability for the non-MDIs, and there had been cases of fraud. 
Chapter 9 now provides the findings of the micro-ethnographic research with microfinance 
stakeholders on the institutional foundations of the microfinance market, including the social 
norms, to answer the research questions: How have rules and norms in the Ugandan financial 
market changed between 1997 and 2007 to enable increased delivery of financial services to poor 
people? What has the role of development agents been in catalyzing this change?  
 
This chapter starts with the constitutional institutional functions in Williamson’s (2000) 
framework, because that is where respondents started. It moves on to the operational institutional 
functions for the expansion of microcredit and then the social norms which provided the 
foundation for all the others. The social norms then, in turn, became embedded in the new 
institutional functions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a deeper examination of the 
institutional changes that took place during this time. 
 
9.1 Constitutional institutions - building blocks for microfinance market
273 
 
Institutional development for microfinance in Uganda was in a state of flux between 1997 and 
2007 and respondents did not differentiate between types of building blocks for the sector. 
However, it was these constitutional or formal rules that respondents typically thought of first 
when asked about the building blocks for financial market expansion to the poor and how they 
have changed.  Table 11 below outlines the form and enforcement mechanism, and its intended 
functions as understood by respondents, which are then subsequently discussed in detail, including 
the relationship with the social norms and the effectiveness of the enforcement.  
 
 
  
                                                     
273
 These are Williamson’s Level 2 institutions 
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Table 11 Constitutional institutions - building blocks of Ugandan microfinance market 
 Form Functions Comments 
1. The MDI Act (2003) 
of Parliament – 
enforced by law and 
the BoU 
 
 
 officially include poor people in the formal 
sector;  
 provide safe access to savings services for 
poor people due to BoU oversight;  
 give MF NGOs that transformed into MDIs 
access to commercial financing. 
 All these functions 
were fulfiled by the 
Act  
2. Stable Liberalized 
Policies and Rule of 
Law - enforced by 
legal and political 
system 
 stability for investors – stable inflation & 
stable policies  
 freedom on interest rate setting;  
 security in rural areas 
 provision of basic infrastructure 
 Stability for 
investors 
compromised by 
some corrupt 
officials 
3. An Independent 
Central Bank and 
Bank Supervisor - 
the BoU  
 
 provide financial sector stability and 
confidence to investors  
 risk based supervision and clear  
management guidelines  
 enforcement of banking standards 
 BoU perceived to be 
rigorous and 
fulfiling functions 
effectively  
4. Kampala 
commercial court  
 
 contract enforcement for commercial 
contracts in Kampala (not for criminal cases)  
 perceived to be 
quick and effective 
enforcement 
5. Land Registry - not 
effectively enforced 
 
 register of land owners and land users for 
specific purposes including as collateral for 
loans 
 functional exchange of title – this is most 
easily undertaken for condominiums  
 functions of land 
registry - missing 
 function of 
condominium title 
exchange fulfiled 
 
9.1.1 Micro Finance Deposit-taking Institutions (MDI) Act  
By far the most important formal building block within this timeframe to every type of respondent 
was the Micro Finance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Act, known as the MDI Bill passed by 
Parliament in 2003. It formalized microfinance as part of the financial system. The MDI Bill was 
the key formal building block that all types of respondents identified as contributing to the 
building the sector. Recognition of the importance of the bill was unanimous, even though there 
was ambivalence about the subsequent regulations which enforced the Bill.  It would take 
Parliament to change this act which was gazetted on 2 May 2003.  According to respondents, the 
MDI bill fulfiled several functions. It:  
 officially included poor people in the formal sector;  
 provided safe access to savings services for poor people due to BoU oversight and;  
 gave MFNGOs that transformed into MDIs access to commercial financing.274 
 
                                                     
274
 This focus on the MDI Act must be seen in the context of a legal framework that did not enable the 
expansion of microfinance. The options were either NGO or Coop or Company. There was no option for 
something like VSLAs which are a semi-legal hybrid. The SACCO law was designed for producer coops 
not financial coops and was not indigenous either. The producer coops failed because of lack of 
accountability and lack of skills and this was the law that was supposed to work for FIs. (PS3) 
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Respondents agreed that in addition to the MDI Bill formalizing poor people’s savings, it also 
recognized that microfinance needs to be prudently managed and controlled and that formalization 
and regulation is a good thing. The Bill (and the subsequent regulation) forced the leading NGOs 
to make changes to improve their strength. There is much more transparency in MDI operations 
and they are financially stronger than the other Tier 4 NGOs. It improved their ability to serve 
their customers and their financial viability (F5).  From an MDI’s perspective “becoming an MDI 
showed we were a more serious organization to our clients. We have been able to intermediate our 
clients savings and provide money transfers since 2004” (MDI2). Banks also understood the role 
of the MDI to ‘mop up’ the savings where they cannot go and they get more out of the relationship 
(MDI4). The conclusion was that everyone benefited from the MDI Bill: the BoU had oversight; 
the clients had better products and; the MDIs had more capital (PS2)  
 
The passing of the MDI bill was underpinned by the social norm of the importance of saving in 
Ugandan community life as identified in the previous two chapters and discussed below. Three 
other of the social norms identified by respondents that undergirded the importance given to 
supervision of poor people’s savings was the recognition of pervasive corruption, the agreed role 
of the government to regulate financial services, as well as a lack of trust in banking sector.  
MFNGOs were managing millions of shillings of poor people’s savings and they needed to have 
rigorous oversight. These are a powerful set of norms as the foundation for this formal institution. 
But this is a static analysis – it needs to be complemented by an understanding of the dynamic 
processes that also led to these rules which will be discussed under change processes below. 
 
9.1.2 Stable, liberalized policies and rule of law
275
 
Those respondents who remembered Uganda’s political instability before Museveni and the NRM 
Government were keen to point out that the building blocks of the financial market in Uganda 
were dependent on a stable government, liberalized policies on interest rates and the rule of law – 
meaning that the country was safe for investors both financially and physically. They understood 
that instability resulted in high inflation and high risks, and had seriously detrimentally affected 
investment in Uganda in the past. Due to the government’s policies the economy is stable and 
growing, which gives investors confidence to enter the market. (B1, MDI3) ‘Investors need 
stability to be able to invest’ (GO1) ‘The Private Sector Investment Promotion Authority has 
conducted a significant marketing campaign to show Uganda has minimal risk for investors and 
the government is trying to cut red tape for investors. This is important for banks that are very 
conservative’ (F6).  
 
For the MDIs and MFNGOs the most important general functions of the stable government and 
liberal policies were: freedom on interest rate setting; provision of basic infrastructure and 
ensuring security in rural areas. On interest rates, “we were able to charge within acceptable 
norms. As we increase efficiency the rates go down. If rates were controlled in any way then MFIs 
would not have been able to grow. (MDI2). On infrastructure, ‘the physical infrastructure 
                                                     
275
 As one funder commented – the government may be fundamentally corrupt but it is stable and that is 
what matters more to investors in the financial sector. (F5) 
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including roads, electricity and mobile phones are all important to expansion of services’ (PS2, 
MDI2). On security,  ‘security has been very good. Even though we had money going to the banks 
and being paid, in seven years there was only one incident of our van being attacked (MDI3). This 
physical security is enforced by the power of the armed forces and is welcomed by the older 
generation who remember the violence of the past.  
 
There is a close connection between the importance of the government providing stability and 
basic infrastructure services, with the norm of the role of government to support expansion of 
financial access discussed below. 
 
9.1.3 Central bank and competent supervision 
There was also a general recognition that for the banking sector to effectively perform its 
functions within the Ugandan economy it needs a strong and independent central bank – the Bank 
of Uganda. Even MFNGOs that work with the lowest income groups identified the importance of 
the strong Independent Central Bank which provided oversight of the banking sector. The most 
important function it performed for microfinance was to provide confidence to investors in the 
sector in the way it regulated the sector (MDI3). There is risk based supervision and clear 
management guidelines which are enforced and leads to confidence in the sector. (GO1). There 
was respect for the Governor - ‘The Governor is strong and set the standards and everyone 
follows, without him there would be a problem’ (F6). But there were divergent opinions in the 
banking sector about whether the BoU had been too strict in the overarching 2004 FIA (B6, PS3, 
B3, B2). Even this debate however, indicates that the BoU effectively enforces its power.  There 
appears to be a close connection between this recognition of the need for a strong, independent 
central bank and the norms discussed below of lack of trust in the banking system due to the 
history of banks and the prevalence of corruption in the government. 
 
9.1.4. Commercial court and land registry   
Those banks, MDIs, MFNGOs and money lenders that take some form of collateral, considered 
the Kampala commercial court an important building block because it effectively performs the 
function of contract enforcement. It can settle financial and smaller cases quickly and 
transparently’ (GO5). ‘It has a lot of flexibility to interpret the rules’, ‘they look for ways to solve 
problems and in most cases that is out of court’ (PS7) ‘It is possible to get a judgment in 60 days.’ 
in the commercial court, whereas the criminal court can take forever (PS10)  It is very important – 
but it is overwhelmed with hundreds of cases and only 3 – 4 judges (B6).However, the MDIs, MF 
NGOs and banks that operate in rural areas, do not use the Kampala commercial court, so did not 
consider it important. With the prevalence of corruption, to have this court as much more effective 
enforcer of rules than the rest of the judicial system, was important to respondents 
 
The Land Registry is considered a “museum” (B6), however land title was still the best security 
available. The registry only minimally performed the function of collateral registration. Although 
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it has legal status, banks and MDIs acknowledged that when it is community or hereditary land 
they cannot liquidate the collateral
276
 so there is no effective enforcement. But for clients to give 
the bank title, even if it is community held land it indicates their willingness to pay back the loan 
and there is a potential of taking them to court to attempt to enforce the collateral. Even money 
lenders take land title (MDI4) which shows that it has some real enforcement effect. But MF 
NGOs did not consider this important. 
 
9.2 Operational Institutions – building blocks for the microfinance market 277   
Ostrom (1990) and Williamson (2000) theorize that in addition to the constitutional or formal 
‘rules of the game’, there are more specific operational institutions for different sectors which 
determine ‘how the game is played’.  For example, the MDI Act is clearly a formal rule which 
needs an Act of Parliament to change, whereas the MDI Regulations are about how the MDI 
‘game’ is played and after an appropriate process, these rules can be changed by the BoU.. 
However, institutional development for microfinance in Uganda was in a state of flux between 
1997 and 2007 and respondents did not differentiate between types of rules that applied to the 
sector which is not surprising since institutions are “nested” (Ostrom 2005a). So it was the task of 
the researcher to analyze the data to see if any common categories or patterns were revealed using 
an inductive iterative process.  Table 12 below summarizes the institutional forms respondents 
identified which focused on the operations of the microfinance sector.  
 
The MDI regulations generally were noted by all respondents, whereas the specific rules were 
discussed by MDIs, banks and the private sector that operated under the regulations. The 
respondents from NGOs or government were more aware of the challenges of Tier 4 providers and 
tended to provide more detailed comments on what was missing in terms of specific incentives for 
the development of the microfinance sector as described below.   During the iterative process of 
categorizing respondents’ observations, it become obvious respondents had also differentiated 
between the form and function so this is also outlined below.  The frameworks for government 
action, such as the Microfinance Outreach Plan (MoFPED 2003) and “Bona Bagagawale” 
(Akandwanaho, 2006) are not included because there were no rules with enforcement 
mechanisms, so did not fit North’s definition of institutions. Those building blocks with 
ineffective enforcement mechanisms and the “missing” building blocks were, however, included 
because respondents identified their significance. 
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 There is a World Bank sponsored project to ‘rationalize’ land title but because there are complex norms 
about different types of rights to community owned land it is a volatile political process. 
277
 These are Williamson’s Level 3 institutions. 
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Table 12 Operational Institutions – building blocks of Ugandan microfinance market 
Forms 
 
Intended Functions for the Form Comments 
 
1. MDI Regulations -  
enforced by the  
Competent Banking 
Supervisor  - the BoU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IAS Compliant 
Financial Statements 
required for Banks, 
MDIs 
 To manage the risk of bringing low income 
people’s savings into the formal sector 
 To bring significant numbers of more low 
income people’s savings into the formal sector  
 Setting standards for governance, performance 
and public financial reporting (transparency), 
high enough to encourage equity investors to 
the country bringing more capital and technical 
capacity  
 Registering financial institutions that meet 
standards  
 Enforcing performance standards, including 
sanctioning non-performers.  
 Ensuring competition in the market to improve 
client services.  
 
 Internationallystandardized independent 
information about financial performance  
 Transparent and comparable information  
 Consistent reports on financial performance 
over time to track trends  
 
 Five of the six 
functions have been 
achieved.  
 The one that has not 
been achieved is 
bringing significant 
numbers of low-
income people’s 
savings into the 
formal sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All these functions 
were achieved 
2. Foreign investors 
and smaller banks 
allowed  enforced by 
BoU 
 encourage expansion of the sector (by 
increasing competition) 
 competition between 
banks is increasing but 
MDIs are unable to 
compete effectively 
3. Car registry – 
enforced by courts 
 Non-land collateral for loans 
 Standard  information about collateral taken by 
lenders 
 Public information about to whom collateral 
has been pledged e.g. cars/trucks 
 Functions achieved 
but only relevant for 
clients who have cars 
4. Microfinance 
Funders’ standards –
no  enforcement 
mechanism 
 To ensure MF NGO’s met performance 
standards by making funding performance 
based. (The funders did not act as a group for 
the benefit of the sector so this function was 
not achieved.) 
 Most funders goals 
were spending money, 
not building a 
sustainable sector.  
5. Rating agency – no 
enforcement 
mechanism 
 Independent high quality assessor of the 
governance and financial performance of  MFI 
/ Bank/ NGO for a fee 
 Results respected by investors and funders 
 Without enforcement 
it could not achieve its 
function.  
 Missing - effective 
Tier 4  regulation and 
support for the 
development of the 
sector 
 None of the functions needed for the prudent 
development of Tier 4 were in place. Including: 
no formal performance standards for 
registering or maintaining registration, only 
transparency required is submitting financial 
statements (unlike for MDIs they are not IAS 
compliant, not public etc.) and no effective 
accountability to members or the boards.  
 No govt. organization had a clear mandate and 
resources for capacity building for the sector. 
 Without effective Tier 
4 regulation it leaves 
the sector open to 
mismanagement of 
funds and fraud  
 Without any support 
for the sector it will 
not grow 
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Missing – a formal 
credit registry until 
2007  (or informal 
sharing of bad clients) 
 no standardize information about borrowers,  
from a complete range of lenders, 
 no information about bill paying from a 
complete range of utility companies, 
 no way to identify and share information about 
bad clients  
Missing - a national 
ID system 
 
 no standardized information about all clients, 
 no government verification of identity,  
 no ability to use ID number to cross check 
information with other data sources 
 In 2008 the BoU 
started giving each 
new client an 
individual ID and to 
set up a credit registry  
 
9.2.1 MDI regulations  
The MDI regulations are very similar to the bank regulations in the 2004 Financial Institutions Act 
and, apply to all MDIs and banks making small loans and (B5). There was considerable division 
regarding the effectiveness of the regulations in building the microfinance sector.  According to 
respondents who participated in the preparation of both the MDI Bill and regulations, the original 
functions intended for the MDI regulations were to: 
a. register MDIs that meet appropriate performance standards and ensure they keep those 
standards (and keep the number of MDIs to a manageable level for the BoU  (MFNGO6) 
because they cannot regulate what they cannot supervise (F2)  
b. safely manage low income people’s savings (MFNGO2)  
c. safely bring significant numbers of low income people’s savings into the formal sector 
(GO5)  
d. enforce standards that would encourage equity investors to the country bringing more 
capital and technical capacity (GO1). 
e. ensure competition in the market to improve client services, without saturation (GO5)  
 
There was recognition by many of the importance of the MDI Regulations in providing financial 
accountability to the government and professionalizing the sector. It provided a stark contrast to 
the accountability of SACCOs and NGOs. In particular, requiring IAS compliant financial 
statements which should be published in the newspaper was seen as very important. They 
provided internationally standardized financial performance information, which is transparent and 
comparable, conducted by an independent and recognized auditor, and provides consistent reports 
over time to track trends.   
 
But - there were also many negative comments about the regulations not being appropriate for 
building the market for financial services for the poor. Examples noted by respondents included: 
(MDI3, GO5)  
 Requirement to treat client deposits required for access to loans as ‘cash collateral’ which 
cannot be intermediated. Only voluntary deposits can be intermediated. Respondents 
considered this not only a breach of promise made by the BoU, not only denying them 
access to funds for growth but doing so in the name of risk management when the 
SACCOs could lend savings with no oversight. 
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 High provisioning for micro loans – 100% after 90 days (which is much higher than was 
common practice) Even Centenary Bank found this very strict because their experience is 
that small loans do get paid back, even if they are late. This regulation originated in other 
countries and cultures and is not appropriate for Uganda. 
 Requirement to have guards for cash in transit.  Before they became MDIs, NGOs had 
moved a lot of cash from rural branches and never had guards and never had trouble. This 
was appropriate for banks in cities not NGOs in rural areas. 
 Requirement to have offices on the ground floor like banks. Many NGOs before 
becoming MDIs has offices in much less expensive locations such as the third floor which 
was not a problem for clients. In addition, mobile branches are not permitted unless all the 
formal transactions savings and deposits are recorded at the branch. 
 Requirement to buy generators for every office so that when there is no power we can 
open every day! Again for MDIs with many branches in rural areas this is very expensive 
and not necessary. 
 Requirement to report every Monday on the Friday closing. This means that MDIs have to 
send people from up country with zip disks over the W/E to get to the city for Monday! 
 Requirement to have a dedicated customer care officer and dedicated cashier at every 
branch. This is clearly not necessary for the small rural branches and increases costs. 
 
The BoU chose to be risk averse by treating client deposits required for access to loans as ‘cash 
collateral’ which cannot be intermediated and many of the other MDI regulations are almost the 
same as banking regulations and are strictly enforced. “The BoU is very tough” (MDI1) 
Respondent across the market from government officials to MDIs to NGOs agreed that by making 
the regulations very tight they achieved all of the intended functions but one – to bring hundreds 
of thousands more low income people’s savings into the formal sector (GO1, MDI1, MDI3 
MFNGO2 MFNGO6, PS 3, PS 5). By not allowing the best providers of microfinance to 
intermediate their savings and forcing compliance with the regulations above MDIs costs rapidly 
increased. These increased costs have meant that MDIs have not been able to expand as projected. 
Furthermore, they are structured like banks so compete directly with the banks and report having 
their good staff poached by banks (MDI3, PS5).  “[T]he key lesson from Uganda’s experience 
with microfinance regulation is that prudential regulation should not be expected to automatically 
result in greater outreach and more advantages for poor people” is what a DFID study found 
(Friends Consult 2007b. p.46). Many respondents had reflected a similar opinion.  By 2008, two 
of the original MDIs, CMF and UMU, have merged with banks.  They could see no future as 
MDIs which is why some respondents said the regulations have ‘killed’ microfinance in Uganda. 
(PS5, MDI3)   
 
Respondents recognized that the BoU was reacting to the earlier banking collapses and wanted a 
“no risk” approach to regulation (PS3, B5).The BoU would have gone against common mistrust of 
banks and concern over corruption discussed below, if they had allowed this new form of quasi-
bank greater leniency compared to the rest of the banking sector; they would have gone against 
the commonly recognized mandate of the government to carefully regulate the sector. Finally, 
there was also the issue of what the BoU could effectively supervise using its current approach. 
Supervising microfinance was a totally new exercise and they had to keep the number of MDIs 
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low to learn about the sector if they were to have effective supervision (GO1). If many MFNGOs 
were able to transform to MDIs then the BoU would not have had the capacity to supervise them 
effectively and enforce the regulations, thus jeopardizing the credibility of the sector.  
 
9.2.2 Foreign banks  
Respondents noted two other BoU operational rules and enforcement mechanisms that have 
resulted in the expansion of the sector. First, liberalization in the 1990s allowed smaller banks into 
the market such as Nile, Orient, Allied and Crane Bank’ (MDI4). Nile Bank in particular was 
noted as an exceptional local bank that made a difference to the sector because it was prepared to 
lend money to MFNGOs. Second, the lifting of the moratorium on new foreign banks entering the 
market in 2006. As of 2007, seven new banks have been licensed and entered the market with lots 
of capital to establish branches, do marketing and pay staff.  With the sudden influx of new banks 
in addition to the MDIs, the established banks also expanded fast to beat the competition. All are 
pushing further into the formerly unbanked market with new branches and new products being 
offered (B6, GO5). The MFNGOs are moving further into rural areas where the MDIs and banks 
cannot compete (F3). For example, in 2008 ‘the banks were competing with loans as low as 
$15,000 – because they have learnt that the ‘unbanked’ are not ‘unbankable’ any more (N1) ‘Their 
focus was to get a return for international shareholders, so expanding access is happening, but is 
not their primary goal (N3). This was great for clients who need better services– e.g. an ATM 
close by (B1).  (See Annex 3 for a discussion of this competition) 
 
9.2.3 Car registry 
A car registry provides the function of registering cars and trucks as mobile collateral, so they can 
be taken as collateral by lenders. Standard information about the collateral is taken by lenders and 
it is public information to whom collateral has been pledged e.g. cars/trucks. Respondents with 
clients who could afford cars or trucks found this to be a useful form that enabled the function of 
recognizing transferable collateral. For the microfinance market this was unusual.  
 
9.2.4 Funders’ failure to set performance standards 
In the late 90s “there was a “torrential rain of donor funding” (PS2) for MFNGOs. There were few 
incentives to improve performance or get commercial financing (PS7). Each funder had a pot of 
money that they had to spend, but they did not understand microfinance and were not focused on 
building viable MFNGOs (PS3). As a result, during this time, many funders gave money to 
MFNGOS for lending and paid all their costs, and typically did not require that they meet 
performance indicators for sustainability. They did not hold people to account for the funds (PS6). 
The focus was on numbers of loans disbursed (particularly to women) and sometimes repayment 
rates. Donors were giving capacity building for things that looked good, like motor bikes, but 
which did not build sustainability (PS3).  Donors even gave grants to MFIs that were already 
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receiving grants from other donors for the same activity (F3)
 278
. Eventually, a few funders started 
to maintain close financial oversight and provided technical capacity building for a few top tier 
MF NGOs e.g. USAID’s SPEED project in 2001.279 But a focus on sustainability was hard for MF 
NGOs that had been awash with funds” (PS3), 
 
In 2001 the microfinance funders group recognized that some MFNGOs were not transparent 
about their multiple sources of funding (F3). So the funders developed the Donor Principles for 
Support to Uganda’s Microfinance Sector (Uganda Donors 2001). Donors had quarterly meetings 
to coordinate their actions, but there was no enforcement mechanism for the donor principles. The 
donor culture in Uganda was to spend money so any action that might prevent spending targets 
would not be embraced, so they failed to improve performance. Furthermore, there was no 
standard reporting, with each funder requiring individual reporting in its own reporting format that 
was no consistent with good practice in microfinance . In March 2003 the PMT was agreed by the 
funders to be managed by AMFIU (Duval 2003) but, because the data was self-reported and 
accuracy was never enforced, it again did nothing to improve the performance of the sector. In the 
worst cases, it gave a veneer of credibility to reports that were falsified. 
 
Furthermore, the establishment of an independent high quality rating agency which can assess the 
governance and financial performance of MDI or Microfinance NGO (MFNGO) for a fee was 
thought by donors to be an important building block for the sector as it is in more developed 
financial markets. So a microfinance rating agency was supported by funders and their rating 
reports were respected by investors and funders. But, unlike the reports of rating agencies in 
developed financial markets, there was no enforcement mechanism. Rating agencies could report 
a negative rating and the MFNGO would still get funding. Funders were not prepared to make 
decisions based on the rating agency’s assessment, so without that enforcement, it was unable to 
fulfil its function. 
 
9.2.5 Credit Registry and Tier 4 regulation. 
It was not until 2007 that the BoU initially approved the establishment of a credit registry using 
biometric data, because there is no national ID system for lenders of any kind to ascertain if 
people are who they say they are. The functions a credit registry will perform include: 
standardized information about each individual or company borrower; information about payment 
performance of borrowers from a complete range of lenders and utility companies; and sharing 
information about bad clients. Because there is no national ID system a credit registry is all the 
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 For example, the first USAID project, PRESTO, just gave funding to people who had completed training 
– they did not require them to meet performance standards. NORAD required performance of PRIDE in 
maximizing outreach – so they expanded very quickly but not cost-effectively. NOVIB provided a long 
term consultant to UWFT but her fees were not accounted for on UWFT’s books and there were no 
performance standards that UWFT was required to reach using her input. EC SUFFICE I and II gave grants 
with simply a report on expenditure required. 
279 SPEED provided substantial training and international technical inputs in the areas including liquidity 
management, asset and liability management, market research and product development, ownership and 
governance, internal controls, and information systems (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004  p. 15) 
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more important, as lenders reported borrowers establishing multiple identities and not being able 
to cross check potential clients’ identity with any government authority. 
 
Respondents contrasted the tight regulation of MDIs with the lack of serious regulation for 
SACCOs and MFNGOs, but which, in total, served many more people and their savings. The 
Parliament had asked to be sent a Tier 4 Bill within six months of the MDI Bill but by 2008 this 
had still not happened.(GO6).  The functions and enforcement mechanisms, which respondents 
considered missing for SACCOs and NGOs included: 
 registering only those SACCOs and NGOs that meet appropriate performance standards 
 enforcing performance standards by de-registering those that do not perform so there is 
clear accountability 
 in particular, safely managing low income people’s savings  (i.e. not allowing them to be 
mismanaged) and 
 ensuring competition in the market to improve client services, without saturation.  
 
With no standards being enforced, the SACCOs’ and MFNGOs’ lack of capacity did not become 
apparent to the rest of the sector until there were severe problems.  In 2004 the ‘strongest’ 
MFNGOs attempted to transform themselves into MDIs but needed massive amounts of technical 
assistance. It cost a astonishing USD 4.7 million to convert four MF NGOs to MDIs (GO1, 
MFNGO10).  The lack of skilled capacity also became apparent in the cases of fraud discussed 
above which happened in 2006 and 2007 and there were regular unconfirmed reports of SACCO 
mismanagement.  Lack of skilled human resources at the Board and Management level was the 
most frequently mentioned need for capacity building (F4, N5, N1, MFNGO6, PS5, PS3 etc.). 
There was a Capacity Building Committee under the Microfinance Outreach Plan but there it was 
not clear who was responsible for building the capacity of the whole sector and reducing fraud. 
(One of the lead funders had a large capacity building fund but it only supplied hardware, such as 
motorcycles, not technical rigor, and the manager was found to be corrupt.) It was apparent that 
(after PRESTO closed), neither funders nor the government were taking effective steps to set up 
and enforce performance standards or build the capacity of the sector.  
 
9.3 Social norms – building blocks for the microfinance market  
This section will explore the (until now), largely unexplored (Granovetter 2005) social norms 
which were the building blocks for microfinance in Uganda. Respondents referred to traditions, or 
common attitudes across communities which supported the provision of financial services or that 
hindered or undermined market development. The researcher followed up by asking how each of 
these norms worked and if they had changed at all over the past ten years. These issues arose 
much more in discussion with practitioners (MFNGOs, MDIs, and Banks) who work closely with 
clients, than government officials The term ‘everyday life’ norms will be used, (as in the Bosnia 
chapter), because they were described as part of everyday life regardless of background or status, 
as long as people can remember. No value judgments were being made about the culture or 
society; this was simply an analysis of the development of the sector. The NVivo analysis of the 
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respondents’ descriptions clustered around six ‘everyday life’ norms280 which are part of the way 
people behave, regardless of community background or status. To represent particular voices I 
have also included a quote or incident that typifies the discussion of the norm. It is important to 
note that many of these social norms are directly reflected in the characteristics of the sector in 
2007 as described at the end of the previous chapter and also that several of them are foundational 
for every one of the constitutional and operational institutions. Five of these norms were 
specifically identified as underpinning formal and operational ‘building blocks’ and the first 
provides more general support for the development of microfinance in Uganda. 
 
9.3.1 Economically active women 
MF NGOs reported that across Uganda women are involved in economic activity outside the 
home, they have some mobility and some control over their own limited resources. However, even 
though women are economically active, they are still expected by the husbands and community to 
balance their economic life with social and family commitments. There are social practices which 
‘enforce’ women to balance economic activity and family commitments. In rural communities, it 
is typically women who make the money and men who spend it (B6, PS5).  But even though 
women do much of the farming
281
 they rarely have land title which they could use as collateral and 
the majority are poor and/or illiterate, so they are not able to access credit from formal providers, 
even MDIs.  An irony was noted – that although women find it very hard to get loans from the 
formal sector because of collateral and poverty issues, they pay back their loans better than men 
(GO1, B1) and that because they also typically take smaller loans there is less risk if one defaults.  
Women’s economic activity and the need to balance family commitments together with their 
exclusion from formal finance has meant that there was a natural fit for financial services targeted 
at these excluded women. But only one of the leading MF NGOs, BRAC maintains a policy of 
100% women clients because they want to specifically serve these women. (BRAC, has the lowest 
portfolio at risk of all the NGOs as shown in the previous chapter.) Other MF NGOs and MDIs are 
finding their percentage of women clients is decreasing as they become more formal and increase 
their average loan size in a bid to increase efficiency (MDI4, PS5).  In contrast, VSLAs target 
rural women and design their product to meet rural women’s schedules (F3). VSLA meetings are 
local and are finished within 45 minutes so they are not away from their work/children for a long 
time, they gain both economic status and social capital. When they pay their children’s school fees 
they are recognized by their husbands. (MFNGO5)   
 
This norm provides an important understanding of why there is only one large NGO that focuses 
exclusively on women and none of the MDIs focus on women. The former Uganda Women’s 
Finance Trust has dropped its focus on women and is now just Finance Trust (FT). (There are 
small women led and women focused NGOs like the renamed “Success” MFNGO but they are too 
small and unsustainable to be significant to the sector.). As the MDIs have had to focus on 
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 I am sending this chapter to key respondents who offered to give feedback, to address the validity of the 
findings. 
281
 The Board of the Iganga General Farmers Assembly has 11 people of whom 30% are women. 
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meeting banking regulations they have less ability to reach out to poorer and more excluded 
clients – namely women.  
 
9.3.2 Saving as a Ugandan tradition 
Respondents discussed the many different ways people in Uganda have traditionally saved 
together for a range of purposes, including burial societies, ROSCAs and gift societies (as 
discussed in the previous two Uganda chapters.) Typically, each member of a group commits to 
pay a fixed amount each week or month to the group and because of the groups’ social importance 
and the inbuilt enforcement characteristics they keep this commitment
282
 (PS6). Many are 
women’s groups but men also have versions of the same group based approach to saving, such as 
drinking groups. One respondent told of how he and a group of his friends allocate USD 10 per 
week to both drinking and saving. They give it to a different leader each week who spends USD 6 
of it on their drinking together and the remainder is for his family (PS2). The Governor of the 
Central Bank estimates that three quarters of the cash is in circulation and is being saved in ways 
other than the formal sector banks (MFNGO1).  The culture of savings with a purpose also shows 
itself in a common preference for saving in chickens, cows and land. (B3)  It was evident to many 
respondents that the importance placed on savings in Ugandan culture was one of the norms which 
facilitated the passage of the MDI Bill through parliament. Since everyone saves in some way for 
specific purposes such as school fees or larger expenditures, there was a basic understanding by 
politicians of the importance of saving and an awareness of the importance of protecting savers. 
 
The importance of savings for a purpose can be seen in the performance of the microfinance 
market as a whole with at least double the number of savers to borrowers. Savings-based local 
microfinance providers built on this culture, such as the PRIDE, Uganda Women’s Finance Trust, 
FINCA etc. which originally used a women’s savings group approach and Centenary Bank which 
has many more savers than borrowers (B2). Many expatriate microfinance providers were not 
aware of the Ugandan culture of group based savings, but benefited from it when they replicated 
Grameen methodology using a ‘forced’ savings methodology (PS3, PS6). Some consider that 
there has been too much of a focus on credit instead of saving in Ugandan microfinance not 
recognizing this tradition (F2). Others argue that MF NGOs did not do enough to more closely 
adapt international microfinance methodologies to rural Ugandan savings practices which is what 
has hampered growth (PS3) and that the process to regulate savings in MDIs and SACCOs has 
also not properly recognized this tradition. However, the VSLAs are tapping into this culture of 
saving together for a purpose and saving to ensure access to lump sums in an emergency, to give 
them confidence to learn to manage their savings (MFNGO5).   
 
 
 
                                                     
282
 One participant commented that the social pressure to conform was greatest at the time of the Kabaka. 
There was much greater enforcement of cultural norms at that time because of the power of the Kabaka, but 
now there are fewer effective social enforcement mechanisms (PS10) 
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9.3.3 Loan repayment  
Consistent with the community focus of savings, when people borrowed from each other within a 
community, there was a commitment to pay back, but there was not often a time frame given 
when the loan would be paid back. The borrower would pay when they could – there was not a 
schedule or deadline. Within the savings groups if people borrowed, there was a “social norm of 
willingness to pay” because of the cohesiveness of the group (PS6). For example, in Iganga “the 
norm of on-time payment in the villages is very tough to establish. Usually they will pay when 
they are ready and not before.” (MFNGO7).  Historically, when the Kingdoms were strong, the 
Kabaka had a hierarchy to keep control. He appointed the village heads and if people did not keep 
their social commitments they were in big trouble with the village head. The social structure 
ostracized people who did not follow social norms (PS10).  
 
Several respondents noted with frustration that since the rule of President Amin the norms that 
constrained people in financial transactions started to erode. Amin took away shops from the 
owners without paying and gave them to his followers.  People started to expect free things 
without working for them. As one older former banker noted, in 1971 there was looting, then there 
was plenty of looting, finally there was more looting. The government removed thousands from 
our money in the 80s and a 30% surcharge was imposed overnight. The Ugandan people have 
been consistently looted and then their money made worthless by their leaders, why should they 
keep the social norm of paying back what you owe? (PS10) When Entandikwa and most recently 
Bona Bagagawale came – people thought the loans were a “thank you” for supporting the 
politicians– they had no intention of paying back. And the government had little ability to enforce 
repayment (PS10). The culture of repayment was not easy to build up, but was quickly knocked 
down (F2).   
 
Since many stakeholders were aware of the erosion in the culture of paying back loans, this 
contributed to the desire to regulate a growing microfinance sector and was part of the BoU's 
desire to impose stringent regulations on MDIs to ensure that there was no opportunity for poor 
performance. This changing norm can be seen in that the portfolio quality of leading MFIs in 
Uganda is not as high as in Bosnia. To have such well established MFIs still experiencing 
repayment problems may reflects these changes in the society and they are having difficulty 
managing them. 
 
9.3.4 Honesty and corruption  
The increasing prevalence and acceptance of corruption was one of the most frequently mentioned 
norms that affected the development of financial services for poor people in Uganda. It is included 
as a norm because four well established MF NGOs have serious corruption problems that in three 
cases closed the organizations, as well as a regulated bank. This is not a minor trend.
283
 
                                                     
283 ADD this is how respondents saw it not: A particular concept of rationality is assumed and real 
societies are analysed by reference to it. Thus we develop a series of derived concepts like 
corruption….nepotism…secrecy and so on through which to conduct a critique\ with the implication that 
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Participants discussed it with a combination of sadness and resignation but also anger.  Many 
participants explained that the existence of fraud in banking and microfinance is symptomatic of 
broader changes in the culture such as: cheating is OK (MDI3); prevalence of corruption in 
government and business (MFNGO10); an attitude of grab what you can and you won’t get 
caught, comes from the top and has permeated the whole society. (F5)
284
. A retired banker 
commented that ‘We have become a nation of thieves”. (PS10)  According to one of the raters 
(PS1), corruption is able to occur because there is no culture of transparency in the Ugandan 
financial sector as a whole. For example, banks have resisted the Credit Reference Bureau because 
it will require them to disclose their customers to other banks. It will then be obvious that a person 
has multiple loans and is not credit worthy and so they have probably bribed loan officers to get 
their loans.  Respondents could not identify general social enforcement mechanisms which ensure 
honesty (only individual values). In the words of one respondent: “There is no man that God has 
created that is not tempted in the face of temptation and does not need supervision” (N1); meaning 
that fraud is not surprising unless there are strict controls to check honesty – and those controls are 
rarely in place. 
 
In the previous chapter fraud was identified as a characteristic of the microfinance market in 
between 1997 and 2007. The following five specific examples given by respondents of how 
MFNGOs have been affected by fraud, were reported as symptoms of the systemic wider social 
practices.  
 SOMED collapsed due to the CEO’s fraud. The CEO took money from the MF NGO and 
disappeared. He controlled too much, the board could not provide effective oversight and he 
could not resist the temptation (N1).  
 MED-Net nearly collapsed due to loan officers’ fraud, when it found it had thousands of ghost 
clients (N1).  
 Cowe microfinance was specifically formed in 2006 to deprive clients of money. They asked 
people to save and then deliberately took their money. (PS2)  
 FOCCAS was sent into receivership due to fraud. The Board members and Freedom from 
Hunger believed the CEO’s reports, despite evidence to the contrary. He was a CPA and 
managed the auditors to report only the information he gave them. FOCCAS was well funded 
and the staff knew it and took a ‘let's get it’ attitude. They set up fictitious groups to meet the 
projected targets without oversight and disbursed the money to themselves. The CEO had 
three people from his family working in the organization, which was another form of 
corruption. There were also allegations that one of the bank officers colluded in the fraud by 
preparing false bank statements about payments received from clients. (MFNGO4).  
 Likewise Development Finance Company of Uganda (DFCU) had to sack staff members 
because of misappropriation of Global Fund monies and Greenland Bank and the Coop Bank 
were all ethical failures. (MFNGO10) As one disillusioned former banker and microfinance 
lender said ‘in Uganda, banking is an industry of fraudsters’ (PS10)  
                                                                                                                                                            
they are all bad things which must be overcome as a precondition for achieving good or better governance  
Wood 2000 p. 222 
284 For example it is the norm for SMEs to have three sets of books:  Books for the Tax authorities; Books 
for Banks and Management Books. They often undertake multi-banking deliberately so no bank can see 
their full transactions - as well as keep cash under the mattress. (B3) 
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This social norm of corruption and fraud has clearly undermined the growth of the microfinance 
sector, both in the collapse of the MFNGOs and in the seed of the lack of trust it has sown. It was 
one of the broad-based underlying motivations to regulate a fast-growing microfinance sector that 
was clearly open to corruption. It was also behind the BoU's desire to impose stringent regulations 
on MDIs to ensure that there was no opportunity for corruption.  
 
9.3.5 Limited trust in the banking system 
Corruption and a litany of bank failures would have given rise to the norm of limited trust in 
formal banks. In addition respondents noted that low income people will not put their money is 
banks because it ‘disappears’ (MFNGO1). They think the bank “takes away our money”. 
(MFNGO8.)
285  Bank fees were perceived as high - with a minimum charge just to hold savings 
and an account admin fee and if you have no account activity for three months they close the 
account! (MFNGO1). These fees are the main characteristic that enforces this norm and low 
income clients are entirely justified in not wanting to save in formal sector banks (MFNGO5). 
Other reasons include: 
 In the ‘80s the Building Societies were unregulated, had massive losses and collapsed 
(PS10, PS7) 
 In the 90s Tefe Bank associated with the Buganda Kingdom was very popular but failed. 
(PS5) 
 In1999 the Coop Bank failed and it had a lot of branches up country. It left a huge 
clientele without services.  (Centenary purchased six of its branches in the north and east 
and took over those clients.) (B2)  
 UCB was failing and closed several of its branches before it was bought out by Stanbic in 
2001 (B2). 
This mistrust however does not extend to clients who have stayed with the MDIs they have known 
since they were struggling NGOs. They trust those institutions which are committed to serving 
them.  The strict regulations of the 2004 Financial Institutions Act may have prevented more bank 
failures, but they have not resulted in reduced costs for poor clients. It will take more than short 
term strict regulations to gain their trust again.  
 
9.3.6 The Government role in regulation and expanding financial access 
Respondents largely believed that the Government is responsible for regulating financial services, 
especially in preventing further banking collapses and to take action when unscrupulous people 
take poor people’s savings (B5). This would be consistent with the history of the banking sector 
discussed in the last two chapters whose foundation was a flawed colonial banking system that 
had serious collapses both as a result of its own ineptitude and lack of government action.  It is 
recognized that there were weaknesses in the banking system before 2004 FIA which were 
mitigated by the 2004 Act (N2). Many financial sector respondents thought the BoU erred on the 
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 This is one of the reasons for a key VSLA principle: members’ money is never taken away – it is either 
in the box or lent out. 
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side of too tight regulation (PS10, PS3, B3, B2 etc.) suggesting that they should have given guides 
to risk management and how to prevent fraud in the banks instead of only very tight restrictions 
(B5). However, the social norm which appeared in these discussions is that is it the government’s 
role to regulate the financial sector, not the banks themselves or the general population.  
 
But, there was also an increasing belief amongst respondents, that the government should also 
support the expansion of access to financial services. Respondents explained that this attitude has 
been stimulated by a series of government initiatives in financial services outreach, which in turn 
has been based on the conviction within government and the society that access to finance is a 
‘public good’ (F1).  Starting in 1994 with the “Entandikwa” government loan scheme, then the 
Microfinance Outreach Plan in 2002 and most recently the “Bona Bagagawale” scheme in 2006 
discussed in the previous chapter, the government has consistently engaged in promoting outreach 
of financial services.  The people are saying to parliamentarians “where are the benefits of voting 
for you, we do not see it here?” (F2)  Effectively the enforcement of this norm would be the 
removal of the government through democratic means, as access to finance had become part of the 
government’s social contract with the people. The (former) Minister for Microfinance Salim Saleh 
put it this way: “Our people need all forms of infrastructure, roads and electricity and financial 
infrastructure too.” He went on to say that private sector led MF has become too profit oriented 
and not socially oriented enough and current avenues are not reaching the poor so it is up to the 
government to step in (GO3)
286
.   
 
The subtext is that the large MDIs which were NGOs serving low income clients, now look like 
banks and have not expanded rapidly into rural areas as expected. (The MDIs would probably 
agree, but it is the government’s own regulations which have caused the MDIs to move in this 
direction.) This illustrates the tension between the government’s role to both regulate and expand 
financial services. So the government has responded in the manner consistent with its previous 
efforts and as now expected. It will establish a SACCO in every sub county and each of these 
government sponsored SACCOs has been promised a line of credit from the government but with 
no regulatory oversight as yet.  As a result, the rural majority now think that the government has 
promised to give them money (N1).
287
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These six social norms were identified by respondents as providing the building blocks for the 
constitutional and operational institutions and are also the key to unlocking an understanding of 
the characteristics of the microfinance sector in Uganda. But this has been a static analysis or 
rather social norms change only slowly over time. So what I also examined was the processes of 
institutional change to find out how they built on these norms to contribute to the characteristics of 
the market. 
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The commercial banks have largely been left to themselves and the BoU because they do not affect the 
large number of voters. 
287
 Government ministers do not like to be publicly criticized but will often change their mind if spoken to 
privately. However, in this context there is a very public dilemma (N1). 
288
 The inconsistency in tight regulation for the commercial financial sector and no regulation for 
government sponsored SACCOs is being addressed by pending Tier 4 regulation. The Parliament had asked 
to be sent a Tier 4 Bill within six months of the MDI Bill but by 2008, four years later, this had still not 
happened 
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9.4 Institutional change processes - MDI Bill and MDI Regulations 
As discussed in chapter one Chang (2011) and others have identified that the dominant method of 
trying to change institutions has been institutional transfers. In Uganda there were two different 
processes of institutional change which led to the MDI Bill and MDI regulations. We will analyze 
these processes, as described by respondents, to try to understand whether either of the two 
frameworks is useful.  
 
9.4.1 Institutional change process for the MDI Act 
To improve the enabling environment for microfinance, there was an intense collaborative effort 
by microfinance stakeholders in the GoU, under the leadership of the Microfinance Forum 
(chaired by MoFPED). All types of microfinance funders and MFNGOs between 2001 and 2003, 
focused on introducing a bill in Parliament to provide oversight for poor people’s savings.  These 
groups were united in the goal of providing safe (i.e. supervised) deposit services for poor people 
and integrating them into the formal financial system. It came to be called the Micro Finance 
Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Bill. The main functions of the 2003 legislation were: 
including poor people in the formal sector; providing safe access to savings services for poor 
people and access to commercial financing for MFNGOs that transformed into MDIs. The Act 
was a win for everyone: BoU would have oversight; clients would have better products; MDIs 
would have more capital (PS2)  
 
Over those years between 2001 and 2003 there were long technical consultations between 
AMFIU (for the MFNGOs), donors and the BoU (managed by GTZ staff who were providing 
technical assistance to the BoU) as well as negotiations with parliamentarians. In 2004, 
participants in the process analyzed why this change process was considered highly successful by 
all involved (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004). Their conclusions were: 
 A clear agreed goal shared by all microfinance stakeholders to draft a good practice MDI Act 
and get it passed into law. The goal was the main concern, not the timeline.  
 Wide stakeholder participation with government leadership gave shared ownership: MFNGO 
practitioner involvement, both directly and through AMFIU was considered to be important 
because direct MFNGO involvement led to a broader acceptance of the final outcome.  Local 
funder representation - DFID, EC, USAID and GTZ all had separate, independently managed 
projects dedicated (in part) to microfinance. The Ministry of Finance’s chairmanship of the 
MFF gave that forum an official standing as a place for discussion and feedback where 
MoFPED shared its power with the stakeholders. The GoU was represented at a senior level in 
the MFF. The GoU was also remarkable for its level of accessibility to MFNGOs and donor 
agencies in this process and vice-versa. The MFF gave the BoU the authority to draft the 
legislation consistent with the agreed purposes (i.e. institutional functions).  
 Qualified and committed participation, with champions. Stakeholders of all types had 
qualified staff that made collaboration a high priority.  In Uganda, several donors explicitly 
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incorporated collaboration into the TORs of their staff and/or project staff and funds were also 
allocated. Key individuals were identified early on as champions of certain issues and play a 
key role in moving the issue forward.  For example AMFIU was the champion of getting 
political support for the MDI Act. 
 Open transparent process, without time pressure.  The MFF as a collaboration mechanism had 
clearly understood rules of operation and decision making which was a key to success. 
Participants defined how the group made decisions, monitored progress and held each other 
accountable for results. “Donor-only” or “government-only” discussions often result in 
misunderstanding or miscommunication by other respondents.  
 
Translating this process into the terminology used in the participatory development literature 
explored in Hickey and Mohan (eds) (2004a), the GoU, through the MFF, shared power with 
microfinance stakeholders, the MFNGOs and microfinance funders, so that the unjust exclusion of 
poor people from the formal financial sector could be addressed. Both the open structure of the 
GoUs consultative MFF and the agency of the MFF Chair, AMFIU President and leading funder 
representatives were essential to the achieve a consensus position. This participatory process was 
“beyond the individual and local” and “encompassed the institutional and the structural” (Hickey 
and Mohan 2004b, p.12). Therefore, this process overcame common critiques of participatory 
processes, that had become “mainstreamed” into development practice (Tandon, 2008).289  
  
To use Boettke’s framework to analyze this process requires identifying how the institution was 
introduced and who was responsible for the content of the institution (the design). It was 
introduced to Parliament by Ugandan microfinance stakeholders so was indigenously introduced.  
The design of the Act appears to have been primarily by Ugandans (with international technical 
advisers) because it was clearly owned by the parliament and microfinance stakeholders. 
Therefore it was endogenously designed. It appears to be an example of an Indigenous 
Endogenous (IEN) process and so it has ‘stuck’. One respondent who had worked with donors, 
bankers and MF NGOs over the years put this analyis in his own words:  ‘The MFF mechanism 
was very successful.  Everyone who was involved contributed to the development of the sector. 
The partnership between the private sector and the government was in itself a critical building 
block for the sector.  (PS2).  
 
However, Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) framework does not appear to hold for this process. A 
large number of stakeholders supported the Bill passing Parliament including the government, the 
BoU and microfinance practitioners – so in the end there was only a weak veto possibility.  There 
was a high level of enforcement discretion by both the Parliament who passed the law and the 
BoU who would implement. Mahoney and Thelen therefore predict, understandably, that the 
outcome would be “conversion” where there is a “change in function of existing rules”. Instead 
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 Another critique of participatory processes by Robins, Cornwall and von Lieres (2008 p. 1078) is that 
“the idea of participatory or deliberative democracy is profoundly middle-class in its overall conception and 
aspiration” thus rendering it inappropriate in many development contexts. However, in this particular 
context in Uganda that critique is not applicable because the participants were all educated middle-class 
bureaucrats or leaders of civil society organizations, who shared aspirations, they were not illiterate rural 
farmers. 
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the result was a new law with which stakeholders were largely satisfied. This raises several 
questions which will be explore further in the next chapter including, what is an appropriate scale 
and timeframe for applying Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) framework. (Perhaps this is too minor 
an issue and too short a timeframe?) As they referring to institutional forms not functions how 
does that change their analysis? Or, is it that a new law is not appropriate to use a theory that 
focuses on gradual change? 
 
9.4.2 Institutional change process for the MDI Regulations  
After the euphoria of the MDI Bill, there was a loss of momentum. It was not until a year later that 
the BoU focused on the regulations and there was a new Executive Director of Supervision. By 
then, the MFF was no longer functioning effectively and was not a place for engagement by 
stakeholders. There were new staff at MOFPED, a new head of AMFIU (who did not have the 
same types of relationships and skills as the previous incumbent) and many new donor 
representatives, (typically less skilled and not so collaborative). There was also time pressure with 
the major donors (GTZ/SIDA and USAID) wanting the BoU to move quickly (MFNGO9, GO1, 
PS1, MFNGO2). For example, USAID had a project target to hit of getting an NGO formally 
registered before the end of their project, so needed the regulations passed quickly (PS5). In other 
words, almost all of the major elements respondents identified as key to the success of the 
participatory and indigenously designed MDI Act (above), were not in place.  
 
According to those close to the process (MFNGO 2, PS 3, PS 5, GO1) there were just two 
meetings between the BoU and a few non-representative stakeholders before the regulations were 
promulgated. The BoU did not appear to be willing to share power in this regulatory design 
process. At the second meeting it was agreed that clients' savings taken by MDIs as part of the 
requirement for access to loans would not be at risk if they were intermediated, so they would 
simply be regarded as typical deposits and not “cash collateral”.  When the regulations were 
promulgated the agreement on clients’ savings “had not been kept” (MFNGO2).  There were no 
draft regulations circulated for discussions and no opportunity to question the BoU’s decision. The 
MDIs would NOT be allowed to intermediate their clients savings – they would have to hold them 
as cash collateral. The other regulations applied the tools of banking to microfinance (PS5).  
GTZ/SIDA were advising the BoU (MFNGO9) and assured other donors  that these were global 
best practice regulations, so the donors did not grasp the implications of the banking regulations 
for Ugandan microfinance
290
. AMFIU did not pay attention to the details in the regulations (PS1) 
or was unable to understand them – they wanted them passed quickly too and did not challenge 
the process.  No-one appears to have grasped the implications of the regulations for microfinance 
before they came out. (PS5). The focus was simply on getting the regulations quickly, not on the 
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 In 2004 discussions with many of the donors who were subsequently involved in pushing for the MDI 
regulations – they acknowledged that ‘they had an insufficiently broad vision of financial system 
development’ in Uganda. (Goodwin-Groen et al  2004). Birdsall’s (2007) observation seem entirely 
accurate: “outsiders are unlikely to help if they try to push institutional forms and norms that have worked 
for them, in one place and time, as the solution for others at another place and time”. (ibid p.7) 
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process or even the content of the regulations. Immediately the regulations were out, the donors 
formed a Transformation Committee and created a basket of funds to provide support to the MF 
NGOs able to transform into MDIs. Power had not been shared. It had not been a transparent 
broad-based collaborative discussion process in operation, there were not qualified people from all 
stakeholder groups engaged, and there were no champions and no time.  
 
The contrast between these two processes is radical. The first had power sharing to address an 
injustice using an open, transparent process involving major stakeholders, with the key 
representatives having the technical capacity and time to debate the issues with colleagues and 
arrive at a result that all stakeholders were happy with. These seem to be the key factors which 
allowed the creation of an innovative MDI Bill. Whereas, for the second, the power was in the 
hands of the BoU, without a clear justice goal, without a transparent, inclusive participatory 
process, so the regulations were little different from the BoU's other bank regulations. 
 
Using Mahoney and Thelen (2010), the process to agree the MDI Regulations was one with a 
weak political veto possibility, because the Bill had already been passed and everyone was 
anxiously waiting for the regulations, and a high level of enforcement discretion on the part of the 
BoU. This meant that “the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic 
redeployment” which (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p. 16) define a “conversion” was the most likely 
outcome. There could not be a better description of the MDI regulations – they were effectively a 
modification to the function of the existing Banking regulations.   
 
To use Boettke’s language , the design of the regulations was a combination of BoU and external 
advice but the primary effort in the design was exogenous. The regulations were introduced 
indigenously by the BoU although there was not an inclusive process, unlike the MDI Bill. Other 
indigenous stakeholders such as the parliament, the private sector and NGOs were not involved at 
all.  So with this analysis it should be classified as an Indigenously introduced, Exogenously 
designed (IEX) process although it is closer to a foreign introduced exogenously designed process. 
This  helps explain why the regulations have been enforced but are not considered to have 
achieved their goals.  
 
The analysis of this Ugandan case using Boettke et al ’s (2008) framework indicates that an 
indigenous process is more important than whether the institution is endogenous or exogenously 
designed.  This appears to support Boettke et al ’s conclusion that “any path to progress with a 
reasonable probability of success must ultimately be rooted in indigenous institutional order.”  
(Boettke et al  2008 p. 354)   But this analysis goes further by showing that for institutional 
change to be rooted in the indigenous institutional order, the process of the change must include 
all major stakeholders. Indeed, it appears that an inclusive indigenous introduction process is the 
means by which exogenous institutional forms are negotiated to become endogenous.  In Uganda 
where the lengthy process of designing and introducing the MDI Bill included all major 
stakeholders, this process was effectively a negotiation so that the final institution was indeed 
endogenous and indigenous. Logically then, an inclusive indigenous introduction process, would 
be consistent with social norms and as a result, would enable the functions of the institutional 
form to be fulfiled as designed.  Since all key stakeholders were involved in the design process 
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they would have agreed on both the new institution’s form and function and would be working to 
support them, not against them. These issues will be explored further in the following chapter. 
 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the findings of the ethnographic research with microfinance 
stakeholders to answer the research questions about how rules and norms in the Uganda 
microfinance market changed between 1997 and 2007 and the role of development agents in 
catalyzing this change.  At the level of social norms the findings showed how everyday norms 
such as: saving in groups; women’s economic activity; increasing corruption; and the loss of trust 
in banks; were foundations for the microfinance market. In turn they then also became embedded 
in the constitutional and operational institutions critical to the expansion of the microfinance 
market.  
 
The constitutional and operational institutions which changed in this market in the study period 
were the MDI Act and the MDI regulations respectively. The MDI Act fulfiled the functions of 
bringing poor people and their savings into the formal sector, making them safe and providing 
MDIs access to commercial financing. The MDI regulations fulfiled all of the functions there were 
designed for except perhaps the most important – bringing significant numbers of poor people’s 
savings into the formal sector. This highlights another important finding: that it is not the form of 
the institution but the functions it plays and the enforcement characteristics which are critical for 
market development.  The right form for a particular context is one that enables the key functions 
required in the financial market to be carried out. Two other operational institutions which have 
changed and which function to support the expansion of the microfinance market is the licensing 
of foreign banks in the market and the establishment of a car and truck registry. 
 
For institutional change to occur the process by which new rules or institutional forms are 
developed requires both that they are close enough to the underlying norms to be accepted but also 
different enough to offer a break with path dependence so do not just repeat existing rules and 
norms. In the Ugandan case, this process occurred for the MDI Bill when Government shared 
power with a broad cross-section of stakeholders in a transparent, inclusive participatory process. 
Support from a wide range of Ugandan stakeholders meant that the new institution was close 
enough to underlying norms so it was accepted. Using Boettke’s language the process was 
indigenously introduced and endogenously designed so it “stuck”. But, in the case of the MDI 
Regulations, just two donors (development agents) and the BoU made the decision, so the process 
was not transparent and inclusive. There was no process of adapting the exogenous regulations 
promoted by the donors to fulfil the intended functions. The MDI regulations have therefore 
achieved all but the most important intended function of including significantly more poor people 
in the formal sector. The regulations have so far “stuck” but there are now only three MDIs left 
and no more expected.  Looking back, respondents are questioning the development agents’ 
decisions. The next chapter compares and contrasts both Bosnia and Uganda case studies and 
draws out the common findings. 
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Chapter 10: Comparative institutional analysis  
 
Financial sector reforms that promote inclusive access to financial services need to be at the core 
of the development agenda (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008 p.2) but research has not yet 
systematically examined the institutional functions critical for the financial market to include poor 
clients. Institutional change is also at the core of the development agenda but current theories are 
either “simplistic” or ”extremist” (Chang 2011 p.495) and need to be more richly informed by real 
world experiences. Furthermore, the place of social norms in inclusive financial market institution 
building has also not been systematically explored. This chapter now comparatively reviews the 
findings from both the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets to identify which institutions 
matter most for increasing financial inclusion; how the rules and norms in the Bosnian and 
Ugandan microfinance markets changed between 1997 and 2007 and what the role of 
development agents has been in catalyzing this change.  A study of institutions in two comparable 
microfinance markets is not an adequate basis to make definitive statements about theory or 
policy. However, it is a sufficient basis to identify promising avenues for further endeavour. 
 
A careful historical analysis of each of these financial markets including relevant political, 
economic and social factors to 1997 was undertaken in Chapters 4 and 7. The growth of the 
microfinance market between 1997 and 2007 was then detailed in Chapters 5 and 8.  Clients of 
self-defined microfinance providers grew from very few clients to approximately 360,000 
borrowers in Bosnia or about 11% of the economically active adult population, and approximately 
1.7 million savers in Uganda or about 13% of the economically active adult population.  
Corresponding changes in the rules and norms were carefully researched through micro-
ethnographic methods, as explained in Chapter 3.  The empirical findings of the institutional 
analysis of the Bosnia and Ugandan microfinance markets have been carefully set out in Chapters 
6 and 9 respectively. This Chapter 10 now discusses the significance of these findings in the 
context of current empirical and theoretical debates in financial market development and 
institutional theory.  
 
The structure of this chapter follows a similar logic to Chapter 2. The Williamson (2000) 
framework is used as a heuristic tool to compare the common empirical findings from both 
markets on what institutions matter most for financial inclusion and to relate them to the pertinent 
financial market literature. The contribution of these research findings to the theoretical debates 
about institutional form and institutional function, the characterization and significance of social 
institutions and institutional change processes, are subsequently discussed. Specifically, the 
institutional change theories of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al  (2008) are 
interrogated based on the institutional change processes revealed using micro-ethnographic 
methods, as is the role of development agents in those processes. The chapter concludes with a 
brief assessment of whether the post – 2007 developments in the Bosnian and Ugandan 
microfinance markets appear to support or contradict these findings. 
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10.1 Institutions that promote financial inclusion 
Amongst microfinance practitioners there is an increasing understanding of the importance of 
“rules” made by governments including both laws and regulations (CGAP 2011).  Williamson’s 
(2000) framework identifies four different related levels of institutions, laws and regulations are 
given separate levels, as have the informal institutions which are identified as the foundation. The 
names given to the different levels of institutions are: Level 1 - Social Norms, Level 2 - 
Constitutional Institutions (which include both constitutions and laws, Level 3 - Operational 
Institution (which determine how the ‘game’ is played) and Level 4 – Pricing (Joskow, 2003).   
Joskow (2003) observed that Williamson’s division was somewhat arbitrary. None the less it has 
proved a useful framework for analyzing institutions in financial and microfinance markets. The 
detailed breakdown of institutions for financial market development according to Williamson’s 
framework in Chapter 2 was useful to start to show how the multiple layers are nested (Ostrom 
2005a) and then the complexity of the relationships between levels became more evident in the 
comparative case studies. Therefore, in addition to using this tool to present the literature on what 
institutions mattered for financial market development, it is also used to frame the empirical 
findings on what institutions matter most for financial inclusion in Table 13 below.  
 
Table 13 identifies the institutional functions common to both cases and reflects the precision in 
terminology advocated by Chang (2006, 2007), Rodrik (2004) Tebaldi and Mohan (2010). The 
respondents distinguished them from the institutional forms, which has have often, mistakenly, 
been assumed as the meaning of institution in financial market development. (The differences are 
discussed subsequently.) It is also worth noting that there was more than one institutional function 
for each of the institutional forms discussed, which supports Chang’s (2006 p. 2) statement that 
“no institution performs only one function”.  Each of the levels will be discussed in the same order 
that respondents discussed the building blocks of the sector (a different order to Table 13). 
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Table 13 Institutional functions which matter most for microfinance market development – those 
common to both markets 
 
 
Levels 
 
Institutional functions found to matter for microfinance market 
development and increasing financial inclusion   
 
Level 1:  
The Social Norms 
Informal foundations    
 
Social norms embedded in the microfinance markets included: 
 Women’s economic role   
 Local financial practices e.g. saving or paying back loans 
 Lack of trust in the banking system 
 
 
Level 2 
Constitutional Rules. 
Laws which set the rules 
of ‘the game’ 
 
 The inclusion of poor people in the formal financial system. 
 
 The constitutional level institutional functions which the rest of the 
financial market needs to operate efficiently also support microfinance. 
 
Level 3  
Operational Rules.  
Regulations about how 
‘the game’ is played 
 
 Appropriate supervision of the microfinance market  
  
 Support for the development of the microfinance market  
 
 Foreign banks encouraged to increase competition 
 
10.1.1 Constitutional rules which matter for increasing financial inclusion 
The inclusion of poor people in the formal financial system at a ‘constitutional’ level i.e. a law 
was an essential institutional foundation for the development of financial inclusion. The 
institutional functions which the rest of the financial market needs to operate efficiently are also 
essential for financial inclusion. There was also consistency between markets on the importance of 
the functions of competent supervision of the financial sector, a stable independent central bank, 
working courts for basic contract enforcement (although in both cases they were not frequently 
used), enough security for daily operations, a payment infrastructure and flexible interest rate 
policy
291
. These institutional functions are widely regarded as important for the whole of the 
financial market to work effectively as detailed in Table 1 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, Honohan 
and Beck 2007, Fergusson 2006, Platteau 2000). It is, perhaps, a mark of the maturity of the 
microfinance markets in Bosnia and Uganda that most respondents recognized that the institutions 
which the rest of the financial system needs to operate efficiently also support microfinance. 
Property rights are not on this list because the land registry was not used by microfinance 
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 These comparative findings are consistent with the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) Governance 
Indicators on the Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality which rank both Uganda and Bosnia around the 40% 
percentile and 45% percentile respectively. These are not high, but indicate that both countries have the 
basics in place. 
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providers in either market (and did not effectively perform its function) so was not considered a 
critical institution for financial inclusion. (This is also consistent with recent research that has 
found effective contract enforcement more important than property rights (Guirkinger 2008, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008)) discussed in Chapter 2.)   
 
Respondents in both markets recognized that the law, with the function of recognizing poor 
people’s access to financial services, was decisive in the development of the sector. The laws in 
both markets were typically the first building block that respondents identified and the most 
frequently identified building blocks, because without them poor people’s exclusion from the 
formal sector would have continued. In Bosnia it was the MCO Law and in Uganda it was the 
MDI Law. Respondents in Bosnia saw huge flaws in the law but still acknowledged its 
importance, whereas respondents in Uganda were satisfied with the law (but saw huge flaws in the 
regulations). It is essential to note here that in each market these constitutional institutional 
functions both had underlying social norms embedded in them and were dependent on those 
norms for their effectiveness (see section 10.3 below).  
 
Such a law has not been previously identified as critical to financial market development and is 
not present on the list in Table 1 in Chapter 2, so this finding is breaking new ground. Also, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, a law has not generally been considered critical by microfinance 
practitioners, as the focus initially was on how to ensure microfinance was financially sustainable. 
However, the G20 Principles of Innovative Financial Inclusion in 2010 highlighted both the 
importance of national leadership and rules that promote financial inclusion (Goodwin-Groen 
2010), generating changes in priorities by microfinance global leadership such as CGAP and the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion (Ndungu 2012)
292
. It is worthwhile noting that the function of 
“support for the development of the microfinance market” was categorized as an operational 
function, similar to regulation. However, the importance given to that function by participants in 
both markets appears to suggest that it should be a constitutional function written into the laws.  
 
10.1.2 Operational rules which matter for increasing financial inclusion  
Appropriate supervision of the microfinance market, together with support for the development of 
the microfinance sector were found to be essential institutional functions at the regulatory level. 
Both were essential. The supervision function was to hold microfinance providers accountable to 
meet standards, perform transparently and to honestly serve poor clients.  In addition, the 
development function (including capacity building and advocacy) was to ensure the expansion of 
appropriate financial services for poor and excluded people. Both were of equal importance.  
 
The importance of the supervision function is shown in Uganda by the difference between the 
MDIs that were supervised by the BoU, which attracted international funding and could be trusted 
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 As a result of my work with the Australian Co-Chair of the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group 
(FIEG) in 2010, I was able to influence the report and G20 FIEG implementing partners, CGAP and AFI, so 
my research findings are being implemented. 
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by clients
293
 and the unsupervised Tier 4 NGOs which were not supervised, did not attract funding 
and several collapsed due to fraud. The microfinance sector development function (which 
included supporting NGOs transformation into MDIs) lapsed after the MDI Bill and was not 
effectively picked up again until 2006 when the government launched its ‘Bona Bagagawale’ 
program promoting SACCOs. This lapse was noted by respondents as a major problem for the 
development of microfinance.  In Bosnia both operational functions of supervision and 
development of the sector were established at the outset of microfinance and according to 
respondents were critically important, but did not continue after 2005 when the LIP stopped. The 
LIP supervised the MCOs they funded and trained all MCOs together to reach performance 
standards. The good practice of accountability and financial sustainability became the microcredit 
market norm. When the LIP project stopped, there was both a supervisory vacuum and a 
development vacuum. As a result, the microfinance sector experienced great difficulties in both 
managing the problems of the global financial crisis (Chen, Rasmussen and Reille, 2011) and 
curbing its own excesses. When the Banking Agency took over supervision functions, there was 
still no development function in place to help MCOs focus on the financial services which would 
better serve poor clients financial needs.  
 
One other operational institutional function was identified in both markets as a building block for 
microfinance, and that was allowing new or foreign banks to enter the financial market. In Bosnia, 
new banks entered the market and brought much needed credibility to the financial sector but also 
brought new skills to the market, such as cash-flow lending and so proved to be the financial life-
blood of MCOs who could not collect savings. In Uganda new banks entering the market also 
financed the MFIs. Opening up the market to new players looking for new opportunities has 
contributed to increasing financial inclusion. 
 
The finding that both appropriate supervision of the microfinance market and support for the 
development of the microfinance sector were both essential operational institutional functions at 
the regulatory level, breaks new ground. As discussed in Chapter 2, the importance of a regulatory 
framework with adequate enforcement for sound financial sector development has been 
extensively researched.  However, in microfinance, following the lead of Christen and Rosenberg 
(2000) there was initially a hands-off approach to regulation, and subsequently there was a focus 
on commercialization. Karnani (2009) and Bateman and Chang (2009) argue that microfinance 
was too focused on commercialization and insufficient emphasis was given to the duty of the legal 
and regulatory environment to protect and serve clients
294
.  The MDI and MCO regulations and 
lack of ongoing investment in the development of both sectors seem to reflect this bias. The 
appeal of microfinance, that it was financially self-sustaining and did not need ongoing subsidy 
(see Chapter 1), appears to have distracted both donors and governments in these markets from 
keeping focused on the original goal, which was overcoming financial exclusion. These findings 
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 For example, the Finance Trust in Uganda has grown consistently after it became a regulated MDI as 
shown in its audited financial statements (Uganda Finance Trust, 2011). Furthermore, as of Dec 2010 it 
provides a range of savings and other financial services to over 116,408 low income clients (MIX Market, 
2012). 
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 Bateman (2011 p. 4) has recently advocated that that microfinance regulation should ensure “local 
financial institutions act in a manner conducive to sustainable local economic development” which is 
entirely consistent with these findings. 
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bring back the focus on challenging governments to both set up appropriate supervision of 
microfinance markets and to ensure continued support for the development of the sector in pursuit 
of financial inclusion.  
 
10.1.3 Social norms which matter for increasing financial inclusion 
Social norms consistent across both markets for the development of microfinance market included 
norms about women’s economic role; saving and / or paying back loans and a lack of trust in the 
banking system. Notwithstanding the recognition that there is ambiguity in social institutions and 
gaps between a rule and its enforcement (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p.14), 
 
there were three 
clearly identifiable similarities in the social norms in both markets which provided positive 
incentives for the development of the microfinance markets and for increasing financial inclusion.
 
295
  As described in Chapters 4 and 7, these social institutional functions had a different origin in 
each market, but during the 1997 – 2007 study period, the functions were similar. One was the 
economic role of women. In Chapter 5 it was discussed how Bosnian women were typically 
literate and in urban areas had completed secondary education, expected to work outside the home 
and participate actively in the formal sector, but there were few jobs and many female headed 
households post war. As a result, many women became micro-entrepreneurs to earn an income. 
But the banks were typically focused on serving international relief agencies and the government, 
so women (and other poor people) effectively had no access to finance. Serving poor women and 
other excluded groups was a major incentive for the development of microfinance.  In contrast, in 
Uganda the majority of women were barely literate and worked in agriculture although they often 
had farm based micro-businesses. They too had no access to finance, (although more for cultural 
than economic reasons as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8); so again, there was a major incentive for 
development of microfinance.  In both cases, respondents reported it was the economic activity of 
women which drove their engagment with MFNGOs as the only providers reaching poor women. 
It would appear, then, that the common issue for the development of microfinance in these 
markets is women’s exclusion from access to financial services. This is consistent with Johnson’s 
(2005a) research on gender norms in the Kenyan microfinance markets. However, to get a more 
complete understanding of women’s exclusion, more research would be needed on why for 
example, in Bosnia women had to rely on microcredit and could not get government jobs 
(Pupavac 2006 p.92) and why, in Uganda, women do not have equal ownership of the family 
residence (Waring 2010 p.8).  
 
Another common norm was the loss of trust in the banking sector. In Bosnia many people had 
trusted the banks before the war and lost their life savings. Their savings had been taken by 
corrupt politicians, by inflation and an economic system that failed. In Uganda, the history of 
banks being used for political ends, being nationalized and others closed for fraud and 
mismanagement had also left many with deep suspicion of banks. In both markets this provided an 
incentive for the growth of financial services providers that were not banks. The importance of 
                                                     
295
 It is important to emphasize that these norms are not neatly defined catechisms of practices and that there 
was a degree of messiness surrounding the labelling of these norms which is discussed under the assessment 
of methodology in the following chapter. 
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trust in financial contracts cannot be underestimated in both the formal sector (Fergusson 2006) 
and in the informal (Woolcock 1999, Van Bastealr and Leathers 2006). 
 
There were significant differences in the social norms around financial practices between the two 
microfinance markets but the point of commonality is that the norms provided clients a basis for 
engaging with microfinance services. In Bosnia there was the norm of paying back on time with 
strong enforcement characteristics and in Uganda the norm of saving in groups. Although they had 
different expressions, social norms about financial practices were critical to the development of 
the microfinance sector. In Table 1 some examples of other social financial practices are noted 
such as “loyalty” (Wood 2003 p. 455) and “ethics” (Argandona 2004 p. 200). In Bosnia and 
Uganda, financial practice norms became embedded in the laws and regulations of each market 
through processes of institutional change, which will be discussed in 10.4 below. 
 
These norms have had a positive effect on increasing financial inclusion in the view of 
respondents. But, in contrast, the norm of corruption common to both markets has had a negative 
effect. In Bosnia the government and leaders were seen to be corrupt and in Uganda it was also at 
the leadership level, but appeared to have become more pervasive with the collapse of several 
microfinance NGOs. The application of these findings to development agents undertaking 
institutional change is discussed in section 10.5 below. In addition, these findings also contribute 
to the theoretical discussion about the form and function of institutions and the understanding of 
social norms as rules with enforcement characteristics which are discussed respectively in sections 
10.2 and 10.3 below. 
 
 
10.2 Institutional function and form 
There are several findings about the relationship between institutional functions and forms, 
common to both the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets that could contribute to 
institutional theory. These include that institutional forms had more than one function, that there is 
no unique mapping from institutional function to form across markets, and that effective 
institutional functions are what matters, and the form has to be fit for that function.  These 
findings also appear to address several of the weaknesses in North’s definition of institutions 
discussed in Chapter 2. These included that it was a vague concept, (Sachs 2003, Portes and Smith 
2009), without clear differentiation between the rules and the players, and there was a 
preoccupation with defining “best practice” institutions, which are, by definition, non-contextual 
(Rodrik 2008a, Bardhan 2005, Evans 2004).  
 
First, Table 13 shows one function common to the microfinance laws in both markets - the 
inclusion of poor people in the formal financial system, but each law also had at least one other 
function. In Bosnia the MCO Law’s second (more prosaic) function was to provide a legal basis 
for NGOs to lend. In Uganda the MDI Act’s two other functions were: to provide safe access to 
savings services for poor people due to BoU oversight and to give MF NGOs that transformed 
into MDIs access to commercial financing. Therefore the laws in both markets had multiple 
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functions, supporting Chang’s (2006 p.2) assertion that “no institution performs only one 
function”.  
 
Second, the function of developing the sector, including capacity building for microfinance 
service providers, has been undertaken by different institutional forms, de facto and de jure, 
sequentially and in parallel, in both markets so there was no unique mapping from institutional 
function to form across markets. In Uganda, USAID’s PRESTO project had de facto responsibility 
for the development of the sector from 1997 (and also supported the drafting process for the MDI 
law) together with the government’s Microfinance Forum which provided guidance to the sector. 
The government’s Microfinance Outreach Plan started in 2002 and then in 2006 the government 
launched its ‘Bona Bagagawale’ effort, and a Minister for Microfinance was appointed. Finally 
IFAD funded the Rural Financial Services Project under the Bona Bagagawale effort and UCSCU 
was contracted to implement the national development of SACCOs in 2007.  So there have been 
several forms - donor projects and at least four different government agencies - with responsibility 
for the function of developing the microfinance sector between 1997 and 2007, with varying 
degrees of success.  The supervisory function was also undertaken by more than one form in 
Bosnia. In Bosnia, the two different entity Local Initiative Departments were de facto supervisors 
with either the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Social Services in each entity having de jure 
accountability, over MCOs which worked in both entities. These are not described as good 
practice examples, but simply real world examples (as Chang 2011 stated was needed) which 
provide evidence that one function does not map onto one form and nor does one form have only 
one function.   
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008a p.2) note that “it does not matter who provides these 
functions” i.e. the functions necessary for financial development; what matters is that they are 
being performed. But clearly in the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets that was not 
always the case. The forms have to perform the institutional functions effectively, the form has to 
be fit for that function. So an overall conclusion is that developing appropriate financial market 
institutional forms to fulfil critical financial inclusion functions is more art than science and so 
more cases are needed explore this challenge (Recent theories around institutional change 
processes will be discussed in section 10.4 below.) 
 
These findings on the importance of institutional functions challenge the weakness in North’s 
definition of institutions. With respect to the “vague concept”, a focus on assessing an institutional 
form or organization such as the Central Bank or Banking Agency could indeed be vague, but it is 
difficult to have a vague assessment about whether an institutional function is being achieved or 
not.  In fact, identifying discrete institutional functions as undertaken in Chapters 6 and 9 and 
addressed in this chapter requires a specificity which can then be assessed. Moving towards such 
precision in defining institutional functions has enabled me to start to make generalizations across 
markets. Indeed, without attempting such precision it is hard to envisage any meaningful cross 
market comparisons. Regarding the “best practice” issue, given that a similar institutional form 
may have multiple different functions in different contexts, attempts to define global best practice 
institutional forms become redundant (another critique of North). It may not be too great a step to 
assert that defining precise institutional functions better represents North’s recognition that 
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institutions provide the incentive structure of economies. These examples also demonstrate the 
difficulty of building sustainable new institutional forms. So what has been learned about the 
process of institutional change will be discussed in section 10.4 below. 
 
10.3 The embeddedness of social norms  
Although social norms feature in Williamson’s framework he publicly states that social 
institutions have been taken as “given” (Williamson, 2000, p. 596).  Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Greif (2006 p.380) recognizes that they have been treated as a “black box” and other 
new institutional economists have taken the same approach. This is despite the earlier work of 
Granovetter (1985, 1992) and others who have demonstrated that markets are embedded in local 
cultures and that institutions in markets are “cultural embodiments” reflecting the value systems 
and historical antecedents of the societies (Platteau 2000, p. xvii). Also despite the ground 
breaking analysis of the ways social rules constrain economic opportunities in rural financial 
markets in Bangladesh (Wood 2003), China and India (Tsai 2004), and Kenya (Ensminger 1992
296
 
and Johnson 2004b, 2005a), one major barrier to a greater focus on understanding how social 
norms provide incentive structures for economies has been the methodological challenge of 
operationalizing research into informal institutions and discerning causality. In this study a micro-
ethnographic methodology allowed market participants themselves to identify social institutions 
which they experienced as having provided the incentives for market expansion and, furthermore, 
allowed comparison of significant social institutions across two microfinance markets, addressing 
a sui generis critique (Shirley 2005).  
 
The first finding on social norms from the microfinance markets of Bosnia and Uganda is that 
they provide the foundation for other institutional functions. This substantiates the way in which 
social norms underpin the development of markets as theories of social embeddedness suggest.  
However, these findings also go further than the rather static approach such analysis often uses, to 
highlight how this happens in a dynamic way through the social norms becoming embedded in 
new constitutional institutions for financial inclusion.  It becomes clear that this happens most 
clearly when the change process is itself embedded in processes which engage local stakeholders 
and not solely by external actors (see Eversol 2010). This finding also relates to the institutional 
change processes discussed in section 10.4 below but it is important to include it here because it 
shows that social norms have been integrated into constitutional and operational institutional 
functions. 
 
A discussion of the different social norms in each market will better illustrate the ways they are 
foundational and have become embedded in other institutions. As described in Chapters 7 and 8, 
saving was part of everyday Ugandan culture and was integrated into the ways that both genders 
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 For example, Ensminger (1992) describes changes to economic and social institutions occurring between 
1981 and 1987, including institutions that decrease transaction costs such as “the simple notarizing of 
legitimate traders and property rights by third party agencies, security forces that reduce banditry, banking 
facilities that extend credit and reduce the dangers of travel with cash...courts that enforce contracts and 
property rights" (ibid p. 27); as well as the changes to "gerontocracy, clan, lineage, patron-client relations, 
and, marriage." (ibid p.169). 
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interacted in both urban and rural communities. So when the Ugandan microfinance network, 
AMFIU, started working with the Microfinance Forum, and members started lobbying for the 
MDI Bill there was a broad-based understanding of the importance of saving across all sets of 
stakeholders from politicians and senior officials to rural voters. When the MDI Bill was being 
drafted, therefore, the provision of a safe place for poor people to save in the formal sector was 
accepted as an important function of the Bill.  
 
In contrast, savings was not an informal norm in Bosnia. As described in Chapters 4 and 5, paying 
back loans on time was important to the way people interacted socially, as they did not want to 
lose status within their communities. Another difference was that as Bosnia had been part of the 
former-Yugoslavia, there was still a residual fear of the financial police and norm that 
governments regulated all financial services, including those delivered by NGOs. Therefore, when 
the LID was lobbying for a law on microfinance, the only function accepted by politicians and 
bureaucrats for the Micro-Credit Law was to make lending legal for MCOs (NGOs or 
Foundations) in amounts less than 10,000KMs. So there was no recognition of the importance of 
saving in the Bosnian law, consistent with the social norms.  These two examples in very different 
markets show how the prevailing social norms provided the foundation for and became become 
embedded in new constitutional institutions
297
.  
 
These findings are a challenge to many donors (like myself now with the G20) and even 
practitioners who want to be able to follow ‘best practices’ in microfinance because they mean 
there is no such thing as global best practice financial inclusion institutions, only local good 
practice financial inclusion institutional functions. Only institutions which are built on the 
foundation of social norms and have social norms embedded in them will last. These findings are 
consistent with the findings of researchers like Crook and Booth (2011 p.101) who have identified 
the importance of a “much more encompassing role to social embeddedness” in the development 
of effective institutions. In conclusion, what now matters is building institutional functions for 
financial inclusion which have congruence with social norms.  
 
10.4 Assessing institutional change theories 
The dominant method of aid donors trying to build institutions in developing economies has been 
institutional transfers (Moore 2001), transplants (Gibson and Woolcock, 2008), or the imposition 
of uniform institutional blueprints on the countries of the global South without recognition of the 
role of underlying social norms (Evans 2004 p. 30 – 31). In financial markets the story is no 
different. “Much of what is held to be good practice for the development of financial markets still 
amounts to a transplant of models that have been successful in advanced economies” (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al  2008 p.147) without regard for local  norms. (In microfinance there has also been 
transplanting of supposedly successful models such as the Grameen Bank model into other 
markets (Grameen Trust, 1989). This is largely because of the predominance of a “best-practice” 
mindset at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which presumes it is possible to 
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 At the time, working as an expert, I was very disappointed that no savings option had been agreed since 
at the time it was regarded as “best practice” – this analysis has offered new insight! . 
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determine a unique set of appropriate institutional arrangements ex ante, and those arrangements 
are inherently desirable (Rodrik 2008a p. 100)
298
  But according to Bräutigam and Knack (2004) 
and Djankov et al  (2008) this approach to institutional change has failed, as foreign aid had 
resulted in institutional weakening and had a negative impact on institutions. Conyers and Mellors 
(2005), Collier (2006a) and Birdsall (2007) are in general agreement with these findings that the 
donor approach to institutional change needs to change. Chang (2011) has aptly identified two 
“absurd extremes” in donors’ approach to institutional change with most assuming that institutions 
can be easily changed (like the transplant approach above) and others that it takes generations to 
change. But there does not yet appear to be a robust theoretical debate about the temporal 
perspective of institutional change to inform the global development agenda. 
 
The historical, sociological and rational-choice institutional theorists’ approach to institutional 
change have, in the past, depended on a combination of path dependency, punctuated by 
exogenous shocks (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Clearly as more research is undertaken about the 
role of institutions in economic and financial market development these theories need revision. 
The institutional change theories of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al  (2008) take 
elements of all three approaches and address incremental institutional change. The two theories, 
however, have very different purposes. Mahoney and Thelen aim to predict the type of change 
that can be expected, and Boettke et al  at predicts whether the change will “stick”.  So each set 
of researchers have pared down the variables they focus on to two very different key drivers of 
change: Mahoney and Thelen on veto possibilities and enforcement characteristics; and Boettke 
et al  on where the change is designed and how it is introduced.  
 
However, consistent with the findings above about the foundational role of social norms, they 
both specifically include social norms as critical to the institutional change process, but 
Mahoney and Thelen do this rather less directly. Boettke et al  include the metis or culture 
directly in their theorem, recognizing that unless the institutional change is close to the metis it 
will not ‘stick’. In contrast, Mahoney and Thelen take time to identify the attributes of 
institutions which create the spaces for change all of which apply to both informal norms as 
well as formal rules. Furthermore, they state that the two major variables which affect change 
apply to both “formal or informal” (ibid p.19) rules. So although there is less overt reference to 
social norms they are integrated into the theory. However, Mahoney and Thelen and Boettke et 
al  substantially differ on addressing the role of external agents. Boettke et al  recognize that 
institutional change can be foreign designed and exogenously introduced, but Mahoney and 
Thelen are silent on whether change agents are internal or external. (Although their discussion 
about agents’ “short-run behaviours” and “long-run strategies” (ibid p.22) appears to refer to 
internal agents.)  Conveniently, they have also both provided diagrammatic representations of 
the key elements of their theories. When the institutional change theories of Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al  (2008) (discussed in Chapter 2) are assessed against the two 
real world case studies, to find points of commonality, there are some surprising results. 
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 This mindset presumes the primary role of institutional arrangements is to minimize transaction costs 
without paying attention to potential interactions with institutional features elsewhere in the system. 
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10.4.1 Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of incremental change 
This theory identifies the result of incremental institutional change as being in relation to the 
existing or old rules as summarized in Table 14 below. The drivers of institutional change are the 
effect of political veto and the enforcement characteristics of the target institution on the 
establishment of new institutions
299
.   
 
Table 14 Applying Mahoney and Thelen’s typology of institutional change 
  
Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
 
 
 
Characteristics 
of the Political 
Context 
 Low level of interpretation/ 
enforcement  discretion  
High level of interpretation/ 
enforcement  discretion 
Strong Veto 
possibilities 
Introduction of new rules on 
top of old ones – Layering 
e.g. MCO laws in Bosnia 
Neglect of existing / old  rules 
- Drift 
 
Weak Veto 
possibilities 
Removal of old rules and 
introduction of new ones - 
Displacement 
Change in functions of existing 
rules – Conversion 
e.g. MDI regulations in 
Uganda 
 
Applying Mahoney and Thelen (2010) to the introduction of the MCO Laws in Bosnia, there was 
a strong political veto possibility (because of the dysfunction of the government) and a low level 
of enforcement discretion by the Departments of Social Welfare / Finance and the Banking 
Agencies as the target institutions. So “Layering” of the MCO law on top of the banking law was 
the result as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) would have predicted. Applying it to the introduction of 
the new MDI Bill in Uganda, there was a weak veto possibility (because of the consensus building 
process that had been undertaken by AMFIU and the MFF) and high level of enforcement 
discretion by both the Parliament who will pass the law and the BoU that would implement the 
law. So according to the theory the result should be “Conversion” when there is a “change in 
function of existing rules”. But it was a totally new law, which raises the question about whether 
the theory is limited to situations where there is change in existing institutions, but perhaps does 
not apply to totally new institutions. In fact, Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory does apply in 
this case because they are referring to institutional forms, not institutional functions. There was 
“Conversion” because there was “a change in functions” of existing form of the Parliament and 
the BoU, reinforcing the empirical power of their theory.  However, it also usefully highlights the 
need to explore whether Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory could usefully be adapted to be 
address changes in institutional functions.  
 
These examples raise a further question about what is an appropriate time-frame within which to 
apply Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory. If the time frame for this research considering the 
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 In addition they identify four different types of change agents who either seek to preserve the 
institutional rules or abide by the institutional rules. As discussed in Chapter 2, although useful to identify 
different types of change agents, this part of their theory only “calls attention” to the different types of 
change agents, in contrast to the “crucially important” (ibid p. 31) focus given to the two other aspects 
described above. Therefore, the change agent aspect of their theory will not be used in this discussion. 
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MDI Bill had started in the early to mid 1990s, intead of 1997, then there would have been strong 
veto possibilities as this was before awareness had been raised of the importance of microfinance 
for poor clients, and particularly savings in the Ugandan context. It identifies what appears to be 
missing from their chapter, a discussion of time frames within which their theory operates. This 
study used a ten year time frame but that may not be long enough to identify changes in social 
norms or to effect changes in laws. Furthermore, the discussion about change agents is clearly too 
limited to be useful in these cases as it does not does not address the multiple different 
stakeholders involved in institutional change, nor any process for them to be engaged which 
would translate into changed institutions and nor does it identify what role external development 
agents could usefully play.  
 
10.4.2 Boettke et al ’s theorem of institutional stickiness 
This theorem has social norms (the “metis”) at the centre and has the design and introduction of 
the institution as the drivers of institutional change.  Either the institution is designed 
endogenously or exogenously and it is introduced  either through an indigenous process or by a 
foreign agent. The theorem explains whether the institutional change will “stick” or not 
depending on how close it is to the local culture. This theory appears to embody Chang’s 
(2007) and Woolcock’s (2009b) views that the effectiveness of ‘institutions’ depends crucially 
on their legitimacy in the eyes of those living under them (Woolcock 2009b p.13). In order to 
gain legitimacy, “the new institution has to have some resonance with the existing 
culture/institutions,” (Chang 2007 p.30) Chang sees this as limiting the possible scope of 
institutional innovation, but it still gives room for innovation within these parameters. 
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Figure 3 Applying Boettke, Coyne and Leeson’s theorem of institutional stickiness 
 
 
Source: Boettke et al  2008 p. 344 
 
Applying Boettke et al ’s (2008) theorem, both the performance standards the Bosnian MCOs 
followed and the Ugandan MDI law were both endogenously emergent (from the MCOs and 
MFIs) and indigenously introduced (i.e. an IEN process); so according to the theorem the changes 
would “stick”, which indeed they have done. In contrast, both the MCO Law which was 
indigenously introduced by the LID and exogenously designed by World Bank experts and the 
MDI regulations which were indigenously introduced by the BoU but exogenously designed by 
donor experts (IEX) were more likely to ‘stick’ than not stick, but not as well as one that was 
endogenously designed, as it was not expected to be close to the metis. But there is not such a 
simple dichotomy between the two Bosnian examples as there appears to be. In practice, to get to 
standards being set by the Bosnian MCO’s, the World Bank project experts had to teach the MCO 
leaders first raising the issue of whether it was really an endogenous or an exogenous design 
process. The theory appears to be unable to problematize the complex nature of the relationship 
between the endogenous and exogenous design (nor between indigenous and foreign 
introduction). Furthermore, it is clear from these cases that institutional change closest to the metis 
will “stick” and that change furthest away is unlikely to “stick” but it is not clear what will happen 
to the majority of institutional changes which result from processes between these two extremes. 
Unlike Mahoney and Thelen (2010), Boettke et al  (2008) do include an element of process in 
their theorem and have differentiated the roles of internal and external agents, but there is still no 
discussion of what process will result in an institutional change closer to the metis, what the time-
frames are for such change nor recognition of how power relations affect outcomes; so much more 
work is needed on these issues.  
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10.4.3 Assessing the usefulness of institutional change theories  
Evidence from the institutional change processes in the two microfinance markets indicates the 
usefulness of both Mahoney and Thelen’s and Boettke et al ’s institutional change theories. They 
both accurately predicted the institutional change outcomes according to their parameters. By 
showing ways in which institutions change, these findings challenges the theoretical position of 
path dependency and exogenous shocks and the primary way institutions change (discussed in 
Chapter 2). These findings also seriously question the basis for the blue print approach commonly 
practiced (discussed in Chapter 1). However, as noted above, neither theory appears to be complex 
enough to theorize multiple sets of stakeholders / agents or multiple institutional functions of an 
change process that has the potential to “stick” (as identified in the Bosnian and Ugandan cases).  
Grindle (2007) has recommended that the process of institutional reform (or change) be 
understood as the “process is a complex one that unfolds over time” (ibid p. 569) and  Bebbington 
(2004) recommends that “theory workers and practice workers ought never to lose touch” (ibid 
p.281). So perhaps a deeper engagement between theorists and participatory practitioners (some of 
whom are trying to theorize their experience e.g. Crook and Booth, 2011)
300
, could provide useful 
input to both Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke, Coyne and Leeson’s (2008) theories.  301 
Such engagement, however, might need to be facilitated to enable communication between two 
the different languages. 
 
In addition, both theories would benefit from the insights of the other theory to arrive at a a three-
dimensional approach. Boettke et al (2008) has the potential to predict whether an institutional 
change will “stick” and therefore challenges change agents to modify their approach accordingly, 
but it does not help change agents prepare for a particular change option as Mahoney and Thelen’s 
theory does. This theory has the potential to predict what type of change option can be expected 
given the political context and enforcement characteristics, but it cannot anticipate whether a 
change process will stick or not, as it is designed to frame incremental institutional change, and 
the multiple agents and institutional functions in the new microfinance markets overwhelm the 
theory.  Together, this would enable them to move them from being theories which have shaken 
off the limitations of both path dependency and blueprint approaches to institutional change, to 
being theories which can usefully frame analysis of complex institutional change processes. 
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 For example, Crook and Booth (2011 p. 101) state their “research is suggesting that the institutions most 
likely to contribute to development in low-income Africa are ‘practical hybrids’, combining the 
authoritative coordination which can come from a developmental neo-patrimonial state with an enabling 
environment for local problem-solving and a constructive use of culturally legitimate ways of working.” 
This is consistent with both Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al  (2008) and the processes 
arriving at these types of institutional forms and functions could very usefully be mined. 
301 Bebbington (2004) recognizes that some participatory practitioners view theoretical abstraction as” 
tyranny that obstructs change-oriented action” and “privileges elite form on knowledge” (in Hickey and 
Mohan (eds) 2004 p.278) and so engagement is not an easy process. 
 222 
10.5 The role of donors as institutional change agents 
Boettke et al ’s (2008) theorem challenges the idea that any external change agent (including 
donors) can drive institutional changes that are endogenously designed and indigenously 
introduced and sufficiently close to the metis that it will “stick”. This is consistent with Shirley’s 
(2005 p.631) observation that “absent a powerful local supporter [i.e. indigenously 
introduced]...there are few instances where aid or advice alone has made enduring improvements 
in another country’s embedded institutions”.  Birdsall (2007) also found that in Africa “outsiders 
are unlikely to help if they try to push institutional forms and norms that have worked for them, in 
one place and time, as the solution for others at another place and time” (ibid p.7).  These and 
similar findings are starting to be put into practice by Kelsall (2008) and Booth (2011) in Africa.  
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) also provide change agents with the ability to anticipate what type of 
changes can be expected given the veto possibilities and enforcement characteristics so that they 
can prepare for the ensuing changes, but they do not address the issue of external agents. 
However, neither theory explicitly addresses the strengths and weaknesses that external agents, 
such as donors, bring to institutional change. Evidence in the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance 
markets points to the importance of better theorizing the role of external agents in the process of 
institutional change.  
 
The contrasting processes undertaken in Uganda (described in detail in Chapter 9) to get the MDI 
Bill passed and to write the MDI regulations illustrates this importance of better theorizing the 
role of external agents. The Microfinance Forum in Uganda deliberately gave power to a wide 
range of stakeholders in the microfinance sector including clients, MFNGOs, and to donors, to 
become engaged in the design process, and the role of external funders was to provide financial 
support to AMFIU to undertake an extensive consultation process with stakeholders and to 
provide expert opinion. This took approximately two years as the process started in 2001 and 
ended in 2003. The result was that all stakeholders endorsed the institutional functions of the MDI 
Bill, including the BoU. This participatory process overcame common critiques of mainstream 
participatory practices as its focus was “beyond the individual and local” and “encompassed the 
institutional and the structural” (Hickey and Mohan 2004, p.12) by including all the organizations 
with a stake in the outcome both powerful and not so.  However, when ready to draft the MDI 
regulations the BoU had just one meeting with a small number of NGOs about the MDI 
regulations, and then did not keep the promise they made about permitting cash collateral savings 
to be lent out, instead the regulations said the savings could not be lent out. Furthermore, the 
external funders and experts were pressuring them to promulgate regulations not to delay any 
longer with a consultation process.  Clearly the donors as external agents had key roles but in the 
later example, did not support a transparent, inclusive participatory process. 
 
Other findings from this study also have direct application to external change agents such as 
donors.  The findings (in section 10.3) that social norms provide the foundation for other 
institutional functions, is a direct challenge to change agents to invest time and resources in 
identifying and understanding social norms before embarking on change processes. The finding 
that there was no unique mapping from institutional function to form across markets (see Section 
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10.2 above) reinforces the position of Evans (2004) and others that to attempt to undertake change 
by imposing an institutional “blue print” from another market, will ultimately fail. For change 
agents this means there will need to be a process for deciding what the most appropriate forms 
should be for the desired functions. The finding that the institutional form has to be fit for that 
function in the particular market, together with being congruent with social norms, reinforces the 
need for a process in which a wide range of stakeholders are engaged.  
 
The application of the findings for change agents creates a dilemma when it comes to timeframes. 
In each of the markets the withdrawal of external change agents too early, in the view of 
respondents, meant the institutional change process was not complete. In Bosnia the Local 
Initiatives Projects ended in 2005 after seven years, but it was too early because the revised MCO 
laws had not been passed and there was still no legal option for safe savings designed for poor 
people. Respondents reflecting on the change process noted that the external agent, the World 
Bank, had been critical to the change process until that point, so to withdraw then meant the 
change process as planned was never completed. In Uganda the SPEED projects needed to meet 
its five year deadlines for getting the regulations passed and a minimum number of NGOs 
upgraded and registered as MDIs, hence the pressure to pass the regulations. In both cases it was 
the timelines of external agents that derailed the change processes. The apparent conclusions for 
change agents is either only to engage in institutional change process that they are prepared to 
continue with until the local stakeholders can stand alone, or to ensure that there are endogenous 
design methods and indigenous introduction processes that will last. 
 
10.6 Developments post 2007 
Since 2007 there have been significant challenges faced by the Bosnian and Ugandan 
microfinance markets. For the purposes of this study what matters most, however, is whether the 
institutional function findings in section 10.1 are still correct.  The two constitutional institutional 
functions found to be critical to microfinance market development - laws which included poor 
people in the formal financial system and laws which enabled the financial sector to work 
efficiently - were still in place. What is particularly interesting though is what happened to the two 
operational institutional functions or regulations which were found to be critical for financial 
inclusion.  
 
By 2007 in Bosnia only the supervision function was being undertaken by the Banking Agency. 
There was no government agency de jure responsible or donor project de facto responsible for 
supporting the development of financial inclusion. The global financial crisis hit the country and 
region very badly and exposed the serious problem of client over-indebtedness. Up to 40% of 
clients had loans from more than one MCO, and MCOs had to aggressively write off loans (Chen, 
Rasmussen and Reille 2011 p. 7). When the crisis hit, the Banking Agency was focused only on 
the financial performance of the MCOs not on the plight of the clients or the future of financial 
inclusion. The MCOs were eventually able manage their balance sheets and none collapsed, but 
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from a high of over 360,000 clients as of December 2007 (reported in Chapter 5) five years later 
by December 2011, there had been a 25% reduction in clients to only 273,247 clients reported 
(MIX Market, 2012) So the supervision function succeeded but financial inclusion had contracted. 
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence of practices which, although legal, would not have been 
permitted under the LIP’s ethical practices, such as a Christmas bonus of BMWs for Board 
members and the highest monthly salary in the country of KM240,000 (approx. GBP 95,000) 
being paid to an MFI Director (Radio Sarajevo, 2011). On a positive note, it is better that this 
information is transparently available than hidden. However, because there was no government 
focus on clients, a new donor project started in 2011, which is helping over-indebted clients and 
improving the regulatory options for MCOs
302
. These results appear to reinforce the importance of 
the research findings that both the supervision and the developmental institutional functions are 
critical for increasing financial inclusion and that development agents need to be prepared to stay 
for the long term when engaging in institutional change processes.  
 
By 2007 in Uganda the supervision function of MDIs was being undertaken by the BoU and the 
government’s Rural Financial Services Programme (RFSP) had the institutional function of 
developing the microfinance sector - with a narrow focus on the establishment of a SACCO in 
every sub-county. This programme was a means to provide a national financial infrastructure 
under the “Bona Bagagwale” or “Prosperity for All” programme (Mbaguta 2007), launched by the 
President in 2007. The Rural Financial Services Programme (funded by IFAD) with UCSCU had 
responsibility for the capacity building of SACCOs. According to the RFSP website, as of 
December 2010, the total number of functional SACCOs in Uganda is 2,063. Of these, the 
Government has enabled the establishment of 1,085 SACCOs in the same number of sub counties 
(between 2008 and 2010) which represents 64% of the sub counties (Rural Finance Services 
Programme, 2012) This is an impressive expansion, but no financial performance information has 
been released, and there is no official explanation for this lack of transparency
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. This shows that 
a development function for the microfinance market in Uganda is in place with support from the 
national leadership, (albeit narrowly focused for apparently political purposes).  The growth of the 
rest of the Ugandan microfinance market has significantly slowed as major donors have 
withdrawn support and MDIs have not expanded as rapidly as projected. The number of savers of 
microfinance organizations reporting to the MIX has almost doubled in five years from 776,778 to 
1.6 million, but mostly because of the growth of Centenary Rural Development Bank increasing 
savers from about 400,000 to over 1 million. Many microfinance NGOs have stagnated and are 
desperately in need of capacity building to better serve clients and manage their organizations. 
The MDIs have seen slow growth but have increased profitability. For example, FT MDI has only 
increased clients from 86,000 to just 116000 as of December 2011 (as their profit almost doubled 
(Uganda Finance Trust, 2012)). Stakeholders’ assessment of results in Uganda since 2007 
continues to support the research findings that without both appropriate supervision and sector 
development institutional functions, increasing financial inclusion will be compromised.  
 
                                                     
302
 A former colleague now working on that project reports that politicians are still mad at LID for leaving 
them this mess to deal with.  
303
 Several solleagues have reported that many SACCOs have failed but no triangulation of this evidence 
possible. 
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10.7 Conclusion   
This research shows that institutional functions are more important than institutional form, and the 
four institutional functions found to matter most to increase financial inclusion were: a law 
including poor people in the formal financial system; institutions which the rest of the financial 
market needs to operate efficiently; appropriate and competent supervision of microfinance; and 
support for the prudent development of the sector. A law that specifically includes poor people in 
the formal financial system has not previously been identified as critical to inclusive financial 
market development, so this finding breaks new ground. Likewise, the finding that appropriate 
supervision of the microfinance market and support for the development of the microfinance 
sector were both essential institutional functions at the regulatory level also breaks new ground as 
the trend is for donors to move out and commercial financiers move in to the sector.   
 
Perhaps more challenging to those working on financial market development is the finding that 
local social norms were critical to the effective functioning of these new constitutional 
institutions. Social norms were both the foundations for them and then became embedded within 
each of these laws.  
 
The interrogation of institutional change theories in these comparative contexts shows the 
inadequacy of dominant theories of institutional change: either transplanting institutional 
blueprints from developed economies; or immutable institutions that are path dependent and will 
only change with exogenous shocks. Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) institutional change theory 
and Boettke’s et al (2008) institutional change theorem each move beyond path dependency and 
provide a useful contribution to explaining the success or failure of change efforts. Each have 
weaknesses exposed by the other theory which, if addressed could make them more powerful and 
enhance their usefulness. The apparent conclusions for change agents is either: to only engage in 
institutional change process that they are prepared to continue with until the local stakeholders can 
stand alone, or, to ensure that there are endogenous design methods and indigenous introduction 
processes that will last. The theoretical and policy implications of each of these findings is 
discussed in the following final chapter. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions  
 
This study set out to understand which institutions mattered most for increasing financial 
inclusion, as “getting institutions right” (Rodrik 2008a p.100) has been emphasized as critical to 
both economic development policy and financial market development. This study also sought to 
understand how institutional change happened and the role of external development agents as new 
theories of institutional change have been called for to incorporate progress in institutional 
understanding (Chang 2011). Two comparable real world cases of the microfinance markets of 
Bosnia and Uganda, which rapidly expanded between 1997 and 2007, were studied to respond to 
these calls. This final chapter will summarize the empirical findings from chapter 10 and then 
assess the research for its contribution to theories of institutions and institutional change and to 
financial inclusion policy and discuss its limitations and the additional research needed. In 
addition, the micro-ethnographic methodology will be evaluated.  The chapter concludes by 
discussing the potentially far-reaching implications for financial inclusion policy. 
 
11.1 Empirical findings 
Defining institutional functions rather than forms has enabled greater precision in identifying what 
functions matter most for financial inclusion, as well as allowing comparability across markets. 
The institutions which this research has found mattered most for increasing financial inclusion in 
the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets go beyond the widely accepted emphasis on 
appropriate supervision and regulation, and the institutional functions which the rest of the 
financial market needs to operate efficiently.  This research has particularly identified a 
constitutional level function (i.e. a law) of including poor people in the formal financial system, 
appropriate supervision for microfinance service providers, and a separate function of supporting 
the development of microfinance.  
 
In addition to the microfinance markets being embedded in social norms, this research found that 
local informal norms were embedded into the microfinance laws and regulations, adding to 
critiques of externally imposed ‘best practice’ institutional blueprints. Examples of the local 
informal social norms included saving and / or paying back loans and a lack of trust in the formal 
banking system. Thus the different levels of institutions were nested in each other.  All the 
constitutional and operational institutional functions for microfinance in these markets were new 
and either were part of new forms or had the new functions added to existing forms; so there was a 
lot to learn from those processes. Two of the main institutional change processes used carefully 
structured participatory approaches which facilitated the embedding of social norms into the 
constitutional and regulatory institutional functions. Two other processes were not participatory 
and the ensuing institutions did not reflect local social norms.  
 
Arising out of these findings, it is most important that similar field work be undertaken in other 
countries where microfinance has also expanded rapidly such as Bangladesh, the Philippines or 
Bolivia, as well as where is has not expanded so rapidly, to test these results. If the findings about 
the constitutional and operational institutional functions needed for financial inclusion; the 
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importance of social norms; and participative change processes are not uniquely important for 
Bosnia and Uganda; but are found to be consistent in other markets too, this will fundamentally 
change the way governments and donors address financial inclusion. 
 
These are the cross-cutting institutional findings from two microfinance markets which means that 
they are not sui generis (Shirley 2005) and can begin to contribute to the theoretical discussions 
below. This study chose to undertake research that had not been done before at the intersection of 
institutional analysis, financial market development and microfinance. This choice meant that 
some of the complexities in these markets could not be explored in greater depth, including some 
of the the historical and ethnic discourses discussed in chapter 4 and 7, nor the wider financial 
market and economic reforms discussed in chapters 5 and 8. So it is particularly important to be 
clear about the theoretical implications of this research. These findings will be assessed for their 
contribution to theories of institutions and institutional change, particularly two new institutional 
change theories, issues of timeframes and processes for institutional change. 
 
11.2 Reflections on institutional theory 
The next three sub-sections will reflect on what the findings mean for the definition of institutions 
and on the importance of informal institutions or social norms for market development 
11.2.1 Definition of institutions and institutional functions  
While North’s contribution to our understanding of the role of institutions in economic 
development is lauded, his definition of institutions has faced criticisms. These include that it was 
a vague concept, (Sachs 2003, Portes and Smith 2008), there was a preoccupation with defining 
“best practice” institutions, (Rodrik 2008a, Bardhan 2005, Evans 2004), and that there was an 
unfortunate tendency to assign a single function to each institutional form (Chang 2007). Given 
that an institutional form may have multiple functions and different multiple functions in different 
economies it is not surprising that institutional forms are considered vague.  
 
This research has shown that identifying discrete institutional functions for markets allows a 
specificity which can then be assessed across markets. There is little that is vague. Indeed, without 
attempting such functional precision it is hard to envisage any meaningful cross market 
comparisons. In these cases, defining institutional functions for markets meant that attempts to 
define global best practice institutional forms became redundant, because forms varied across 
markets, but the functions were consistent.  There was no consistent mapping from institutional 
function to form across these markets. The form only mattered in that it had to be fit for the 
purpose of the function. 
 
This research then supports Chang’s (2006) argument that the same function or purpose can be 
served by different institutional forms in different societies (or in the same society at different 
times). But Chang also recognizes that it is a challenge to “clearly distinguish between the forms 
and the functions of institutions” (Chang 2006 p. 3). The ‘micro’ ethnographic methodology is 
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able to overcome this particular challenge because it was the market participants who defined the 
functions (not an external “objective” researcher). This is consistent with North’s (1994 p. 360) 
definition that institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”  
 
These empirical findings show that Chang (2007) and Rodrik (2008a) are right; institutional 
functions are what matters, not institutional form. Further defining of institutional functions in 
both financial and other markets will need to be undertaken to test this further, specifically testing 
to see if there can be comparability in functions across countries in similar markets. 
 
It may not be too great a step to assert that institutional functions better represent North’s 
definition of institutions, recognizing that institutions provide the incentive structure of 
economies. This assertion is clearly very preliminary but has the potential to usefully reframe 
institutional theory. Further research and analysis to test this assertion would enable progress to be 
made in arriving at a common useful definition of an institution. 
 
11.2.2 Social norms embedded in financial markets.  
New institutional economists have typically treated social norms as “given” (Williamson 2000) or 
in a theoretical “black box” (Greif 2006).  Financial market institutionalists have also assumed 
that the development of international good practice required standard institutions, independent of 
cultures (Demirgüç-Kunt et al  2008, Fergusson 2006). There has been a focus on comparable and 
quantifiable data for institutional development (Knack and Keefer,1995), on institutional forms, 
not functions as discussed above, and social norms were not addressed. This was despite 
Granovetter (1985, 1992) and others demonstrating that markets are embedded in local cultures 
and that institutions in markets are “cultural embodiments” (Platteau 2000, p. xvii) reflecting the 
value systems and historical antecedents of the societies. Grindle’s (2007) definition of good 
political economy analysis supports the importance of understanding local culture, recommending 
that “both context and content” be combined that analysis should be brought to bear on the 
process of reform (ibid p. 569). Such analysis would identify different levels of institutions and 
particularly the underlying social norms.   
 
This research, has shown clearly that microfinance markets are embedded in the local social 
norms and so supports the embeddedness position.  Perhaps more importantly, unpacking the 
social norms in that theoretical “black box” has lead to a more complete understanding of why 
those markets have developed as they have done. For example in these markets norms about 
paying back loans and corruption had different local meanings and had an influence on how the 
market developed. It means that social norms should not be taken as given, but in any institutional 
analysis of markets they should be identified and explained before any attempts at institutional 
change are made.  It is simply a lack of rigor to undertake financial market analysis without 
understanding relevant social norms.  
 
However, there is clearly still a need for longitudinal anthropological research on social norms in 
both the Bosnian and Ugandan markets, and in particular to understand them from the client 
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perspective. This would provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of those norms for 
future institutional analysis. This research, of necessity, did not do justice to the complexity of the 
social and economic systems and ways in which the major economic and social changes those 
countries have experienced over the last twenty years have created spaces for incremental 
institutional change. But as the demand for detailed institutional market analysis increases such 
longitudinal anthropological research will be a very useful foundation and could usefully be 
progressed in microfinance markets. 
11.2.3 Social norms integrated in laws 
There are clear commonalities between markets in the institutional functions that respondents 
identified as critical to financial inclusion. In each case there are additional very specific local 
institutional functions embedded within those institutions, based on their respective social norms. 
For example, microfinance laws have been newly promulgated in both countries and both laws 
have the function of including poor people in the formal financial system. But in Bosnia the 
Microcredit Organizations Law had only one additional function to provide a legal basis for 
NGOs to make small loans. This is in contrast to Uganda where the Micro-Deposit-taking 
Institutions Law had three additional functions of recognizing that poor people saved and needed 
safe access to savings services, as well as to give MF NGOs that transformed into MDIs access to 
commercial financing. The differences largely reflect the underlying social norms. In Uganda 
there is an informal social norm of saving in groups that is both rural and urban and is undertaken 
by both men and women whereas there is no such norm in Bosnia but a social norm that if loans 
are not paid back on time there is a loss of “face” or status within the community.  
 
These findings show that social norms not only provided the foundation for other institutional 
functions, but in turn had become embedded in the constitutional and operational institutions. This 
additional embedding highlights the importance of understanding social norms in institutional 
analysis and development. This also supports the focus on institutional functions, which can be 
market specific and can allow for additional local functions which best practice forms do not. It 
was largely as a result of the institutional change processes in both markets which ensured the 
social norms were embedded in the constitutional institutional functions.  
 
11.3 Theories of institutional change  
Shirley (2005 p.631) observed that institutional change appeared to fall through a gap in the 
literature but by 2011 Chang (2011 p. 494) was able to critically examine two main theories of 
institutional change. He identified two “absurd extremes”. One extreme was “hopelessly 
optimistic” that institutions can be changed easily. It had a “simplistic, linear and static” (ibid 
p.476) theoretical basis and was fundamentally at odds with everything we know about 
institutions. The other extreme was “unduly fatalistic” that only external shocks (like colonization) 
can change path dependent institutions. It was based on theoretical views of the immutability of 
institutions due to climate and culture. Chang (2011) concurs that path dependence “operates at a 
more fundamental level than we normally think”, and that “the constitutive role of institutions, the 
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inherent change resistance of designed institutions and the interdependence between institutions” 
(ibid p. 490) means that institutional change does not happen easily. But he does not agree that 
only exogenous shocks can change institutions. Chang (2011 p. 494) concludes: “[o]nly theories 
that take both structural constraints and real human agencies seriously can help us”.   
 
Two recent theories from Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al (2008) which attempt to 
meet this standard are critiqued in the following sections against the findings in the microfinance 
markets of Bosnia and Uganda. These incremental change theories were chosen although there 
had been civil conflict in both Bosnia and Uganda. As discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 7, the 
conflicts did not appear to create significant new space for social norms to change beyond the 
already existing endogenous spaces. Furthermore, it would seem important to question whether 
civil war can be categorized as an exogenous shock when its roots are internal.  
  
11.3.1 Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual institutional change. 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) set out to design a theory for gradual institutional change and 
identified the key drivers of change to an institutional form (not function) as the possibility of 
political veto and the enforcement characteristics of the target institution as well as the role of 
different types of internal agents of change. They also usefully identify the many spaces for 
change within institutions, often around social norms. When tested in the microfinance markets of 
Bosnia and Uganda this theory showed some predictive power but some limitations.  For example, 
the MDI regulations in Uganda which were operational level institutional functions, faced low 
veto power and a high level of enforcement discretion by the BoU, were indeed simply a change 
in function of existing rules. The MCO Law in Bosnia had strong possibility of veto by the 
parliament and low level of enforcement discretion by any agency and was indeed an introduction 
of new rules on top of old ones.  
 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) theory, however, has three limitations in these cases, in addition to 
addressing institutional forms, not functions.  First is a lack of clarity around the theory’s 
timeframes. It is possible to define the veto possibilities and enforcement characteristics at 
different points in time and so generate different results and it is not clear how one makes these 
choices. Second the theory assumes that given these processes, the changed institution will last, 
but there is no discussion about the other factors that would contribute to it lasting or not. Finally, 
although it recognizes the power dimension in the possibility of veto, it does not address process 
more generally and does not incorporate a role for external change agents, or multiple internal 
change agents and multiple institutional functions. Such cases would appear to overwhelm the 
theory. These limitations could arise because Mahoney and Thelen (2010) prefer to take a longer 
term view of institutional change in which case timing might not matter so much. Nevertheless, 
the examples Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) provide include shorter time frames similar to this 
study and they appear to want to apply their theory to a range of contexts, so therefore, it would be 
useful to address these limitations.  
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11.3.2 Boettke et al’s theorem of institutional stickiness 
Boettke et al ’s (2008) theorem also focuses on institutional forms and hypothesizes that when 
institutional change is endogenously designed (as distinct from exogenous design by external 
agents) and indigenously introduced (as distinct from an new form that is introduced by foreign 
partners) it will “stick” - i.e. will function effectively for the foreseeable future. Their theorem 
specifically includes social norms (but does not address exogenous shocks). When tested in the 
microfinance markets of Bosnia and Uganda this theorem showed some predictive power but also 
had limitations.  For example, the rules (performance standards) the Bosnian MCOs first followed 
and the Ugandan MDI law were both endogenously emergent (from the MCOs and MFIs) and 
indigenously introduced; so according to the theorem the changes would “stick”, which indeed 
they have done. 
 
This theorem usefully puts congruence with social norms as the focus and key to success of 
institutional change. There are, however, also three flaws in Boettke et al (2008) theorem, in 
addition to addressing institutional forms, not functions.  First is the lack of clarity of the 
parameters and timeframes. For example, when local consultants working for external donors 
design a new institution, is this endogenous or exogenous design? Or, when a local decision maker 
takes a external agent’s “expert” opinion without question, is that indigenous or foreign 
introduced? Second, it is clear that institutional change closest to the metis will “stick” and that 
change furthest away is unlikely to “stick” but it is not clear what will happen to the majority of 
institutional changes which result from processes between these two extremes. Are they simply 
ineffective institutions?  Finally, the theorem only takes a one-dimensional view of the process of 
institutional change without recognizing the complexity of the power dynamics in institutional 
change processes. This theorem, however, despite its flaws, was found to be a generally useful 
guide for predicting whether institutional change will “stick”.  
 
Both Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and Boettke et al  (2008) have provided useful contributions to 
theories of institutional change but if they are to be used to reach a mid-level theory of 
institutional change then the limitations identified will need to be addressed. Further iterations of 
these theories are needed, with subsequent additional empirical research to test them out. In 
particular they need to address the two common limitations of ambiguous processes and uncertain 
timeframes. Therefore, the challenge to institutional researchers is to take these theories forward 
to reach a mid-level theory of institutional change and engaging with participatory development 
practitioners (as discussed below) may be a useful part of that process. Grindle (2007) 
recommended that the process of institutional reform (or change) be understood as the “process is 
a complex one that unfolds over time” (ibid p. 569).  So the contribution of participatory 
development practitioners to this debate will be discussed and the challenge of appropriate 
timeframes will be discussed in the following sections. 
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11.3.3 Participatory development informing institutional change theory 
Six years before Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identified some of the spaces for change within 
institutions, Cornwall (in Hickey and Mohan (eds) 2004) was reflecting on how participatory 
approaches to development were explicitly “creating spaces where there were previously none, 
about enlarging spaces where they were previously limited opportunities” (ibid p. 77) to create 
“innovations in institutional design” and “styling new institutions” (ibid p.85). Surely there must 
be value in participatory practitioners like Cornwall, whose focus is changing the “rules of the 
game” (ibid p.86) to contribute to institutional change theory? In the opinion of Chambers, 
participatory practitioners “do not have time always to search and see whether what we do is new 
or a rediscovery.” (ibid p. 38).  Bebbington (in Hicky and Mohan (eds) 2004 p. 278) understands 
this “tense interface between theory and practice…. in discussions of participatory development” 
as between some who see the need to “theorize strategy carefully” and others who view such 
abstraction as” tyranny that obstructs change-oriented action” and “privileges elite form on 
knowledge” (ibid p.278).  Indeed, Bebbington recognizes that “the values that dominate academic 
assessment push academics away from practice” (ibid. p. 281) but despite these challenges he 
states that “theory workers and practice workers ought never to lose touch” (ibid p.281) and 
particularly in the field of participatory development. 
So, perhaps deeper engagement between the institutional theorists and participatory practitioners 
who are usefully beginning to theorize their experience could provide useful input to both 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010) and Boettke, Coyne and Leeson’s (2008) theory. 304 For example, 
Crook and Booth (2001 p. 101) state their “research is suggesting that the institutions most likely 
to contribute to development in low-income Africa are ‘practical hybrids’, combining the 
authoritative coordination which can come from a developmental neo-patrimonial state with an 
enabling environment for local problem-solving and a constructive use of culturally legitimate 
ways of working.” This is consistent with both Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Boettke et al  
(2008) and with Grindle (2007) The practices of participatory experience which have arrived at 
these types of institutional functions and forms, could very usefully be mined to contribute to 
theory development. 
11.3.4. Timeframes institutional change research 
There is remarkable silence on the issue of the appropriate timeframe for studying change in the 
literature except from Williamson (2000). His approach recognizes different time frames for 
different levels of institutions and puts social norms as the slowest taking from a hundred to a 
thousand years to change.  It is not clear on what basis he made that estimation but his point is that 
fundamental change of social norms takes generations. Given our understanding that markets are 
embedded in social norms then will it take at least a generation to carefully assess institutional 
change – a minimum of twenty years (which is approximately a generation). The time frame in 
this study was ten years but given that the constitutional change processes start before the actual 
                                                     
304 Bebbington (2004) recognizes that some participatory practitioners view theoretical abstraction as” 
tyranny that obstructs change-oriented action” and “privileges elite form on knowledge” (in Hickey and 
Mohan (eds) 2004 p.278) and so engagement is not an easy process. 
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institutional function changes, then ten years did not allow for a complete understanding of 
whether the institutional change would last or not. So it would appear more than a decade is 
needed. However, if a study were looking at smaller scale changes then there might be an 
argument for a shorter timeframe such as with operational institutions like the MCO standards. 
But this evidence suggests that such timeframes are still somewhat longer than project based 
interventions and required if institutional change is what is seen as at stake which will be 
discussed under the policy implications below. 
 
11.4 Reflections on methodology  
The strengths and limitations of two aspects of the methodology have had a direct bearing on 
these results. These are the ontological and epistemological foundations and the micro-
ethnographic qualitative method. 
 
11.4.1 The social constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. 
Under a social constructionist ontology, culture is not an inert objective reality but “social 
phenomena and meanings are constructed by the perceptions and actions of social actors and are 
in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2004, p.17) A social constructionist ontology is 
foundational to this particular research on institutions. This ontological understanding that social 
norms are in a “constant state of revision” (ibid) is more consistent with a path dependent view of 
change in these institutions, assuming that revisions are constructed by social actors and happen 
slowly. However, at a stretch, it could also be considered consistent with the institutional blue 
print approach if one assumes social actors are able to integrate institutional blueprints quickly, 
but an objectivist ontology is more closely aligned with the blue print approach. Therefore, even 
from the ontological foundation there is a presumption about how social institutions change. 
 
The interpretivist epistemology considers language to be one means of interpreting our experience 
of the world, so the respondents interpreted their experience of engaging in the microfinance 
sector to me, according to their mental models (North 1990). But this epistemology also “requires 
the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman 2004 p.13), so my 
role was to grasp how institutional functions including social norms, operated in practice by 
engaging with the meaning that the respondents gave to those functions. As discussed in Chapter 
3, a positivist epistemology would have had limitations in understanding social norms, because 
they are less open to verification independent of human perception, (although useful in relation to 
formal rules). Together, a social constuctionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology gave me 
the freedom to understand institutions from the perspectives of the participants in the microfinance 
markets. To be able to develop a qualitative methodology that recognized the lived experiences of 
those engaging with markets everyday was essential; there was no other reality.  
 
The great challenge of this ontological and epistemological foundation, however, is that the results 
are framed by the respondents, they do not conform to pre-designed academic categories, or frame 
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their answers in support or against a particular theory; they are not looking for similarities and 
differences between markets. This means that the respondents’ view of the market will be 
personal, sometimes contradictory or inconsistent, messy and framed according to their own 
mental models.  It is dependent on me to make sense of these complex responses. So the 
qualitative methods used had to be robust enough to “make sense of, or interpret, phenomena [i.e. 
institutions] in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005 p.3). To 
make sense of respondents’ perceptions of the social norms that were foundations for the 
microfinance market, required careful rephrasing or summarizing during the conversations (using 
facilitation skills) so that I was sure I understood their meaning. Then once all those perceptions 
were collated the next step was to see how they clustered together and make choices about what 
was a social norm and where the boundaries lay. 
 
For the majority of the norms, there was a clear clustering in respondent’s perceptions around the 
key norms reported in this study. However it is the ones that did not make the list where there may 
be questions. For example, in Uganda I was unsure how to treat the view held by a few that the 
entrepreneurial spirit of Ugandans was one of the building blocks for the rapid expansion of 
microfinance. In their opinion Ugandans had been traders and entrepreneurs since well before the 
British arrived and this was critical to the success of microfinance.  However interesting, there is 
no enforcement characteristic for this norm and only a few people mentioned it; so I decided it 
could not be considered an institution for this study, but I may have missed a critical mental model 
in their culture. Likewise in Bosnia some respondents felt that the painful loss of the quality of life 
for clients was a critical building block for the rapid expansion of the sector. In their opinion the 
desperation of clients was critical, but this desperation did not appear to be fundamental social 
norm across the culture with enforcement characteristics. In both cases I decided not to include 
these “norms” in the final list of social norms. However, another researcher might have made a 
different decision or might have chosen a different qualitative methodology to understand the 
social norms. I had chosen a ‘micro’ethnography within the self-defined subculture of the 
microfinance markets in Bosnia and Uganda, and this had strengths but inherent limitations too. 
 
As most institutional analysis does not take a social constructionist ontology and interpretivist 
epistemology, this raises the question of whether it is a useful avenue for further institutional 
research. The findings would appear to show that this ontology and epistemology indeed merit 
further exploration for institutional market analysis. 
 
11.4.2 Micro-ethnography methodology 
The strength of ethnography is its focus on the participant’s perspective, seeing it through their 
eyes and understanding the meaning they give to it all (Spradley, 1980). Lewis and Moose (2006) 
state that ethnographic research can “bring fresh insights into the social processes of policy, 
offering a “methodological deconstructionism” that draws attention to the nature of policy 
language (or discourse) that reveals how particular policy ideas….work to enrol supporters, … 
forge political connections and create common realities from heterogeneous networks” (ibid p. 15 
-16). A micro-ethnography is ethnography undertaken in this manner, but with tightly focused 
 235 
research questions and field-work limited to addressing those questions. This highlights one of its 
several limitations as a methodology, namely that the topic, time frame and respondents were 
restricted. With such restrictions, decisions had to be made about who would not be included in 
the research. My decision was to go for breadth across all types of self-defined financial service 
providers reaching low income clients, together with the relevant government officials, 
recognizing that this focus had not previously been tackled, whereas the client research had been 
undertaken before (Johnson 2004a, 2005a). Clients were not part of the self-defined sub-culture, 
and a robust survey in two markets was not possible, so clients were not included, but this 
potentially limited the market analysis and the findings on social norms. There was also not depth 
within organizations so loan officers were missed out, as were more government officials. (Less 
directly engaged but still potentially relevant political parties, women’s groups or financial 
education providers were not self-defined members of the sub-culture but that is an issue in itself.) 
The bias towards leaders of organizations and heads of government departments meant that as a 
group, their views were privileged as spokespeople for the sector. This appeared fair as they were 
the ones making decisions about the expansion of the sector, but with greater depth and diversity 
within organizations or departments, different results might have been found.  
 
Another limitation was the nature of the engagement with respondents. There had to be time for 
each person to tell stories, reminisce, consider, eat or drink and discuss shared experiences, as part 
of expressing their perceptions of the institutions in the microfinance market. The term institution, 
per Douglass North, was not known to respondents, so the term “building blocks” for the 
expansion of microfinance was used as a starting point instead. (Building blocks was the everyday 
term used by Grindle (2007, p. 567) and by Honohan and Beck (2007, p.7)  to refer to 
institutions.)  There were over a hundred respondents some of whom I had known for many years 
with whom the conversations were free flowing, many going in unexpected directions as they 
reflected on the past ten years, some with anger and frustration and others with gratitude and 
interest. But the assumption behind these conversations is that we understood each others’ 
meanings, particularly when it came to social norms. This may not always have been the case. 
There may have been religious, political or other attitudes that were too sensitive to discuss with 
me as a foreigner, a woman, a former colleague, or issues they themselves were not even aware of.  
Miscommunication may also have biased the result. To help overcome this bias there was a 
validity check of the findings in each market with representatives who spoke both English and 
local languages, who had worked with both clients and with international organizations and who 
had some academic background to understood the research methodology and its potential flaws – 
but again that profile brings its own biases.  
 
There were volumes of recorded conversations.  It was incredibly arduous to transcribe and then 
classify these accounts into themes and then to check back before grouping them together, 
compare the meanings of the conversations across markets. Without N’Vivo this would have been 
an impossible task. However, N’Vivo itself forces an element of bias into the results in the way 
that each comment by a person is effectively given the same weight, which may not be their 
intention, and each person is also given the same weight, which also may not be their perception 
of their importance. So N’Vivo was simply used to grapple with the volume of data and to help 
reveal the institutional “bricolage”, but not to provide any quantified reporting of results.  Rather, 
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the goal in creating  the ethnographic text was to write against the typifications of communities 
(Abu-Lughod 2000 p. 262) and instead express the “contextually bound and mutually created 
story” (Fontana and Frey 2005 p. 696) in ways that provided “fresh insights into the social 
processes of policy” (Lewis and Moose 2006 p. 15). 
 
The benefit of using this methodology was that, once the validity checks had been undertaken, if 
commonalities were to exist then they would have the power of the market voice from two major 
microfinance markets for financial inclusion institution building; (not an independent expert’s 
analysis.) There were indeed commonalities, but not ones that had been expected prior to 
conducting the field work. My experience was similar to that of Drinkwater (in Cornwall and Pratt 
(eds) 2003 p.61) who reflected that “conducting extended fieldwork taught me important lessons 
about the limits of what we take as truths, based either on our own convictions or on existing 
knowledge”.  When I came with an open mind to learn from the market participants as a 
researcher, I learned about local social norms which I had not understood before, the importance 
of constitutional institutions which I had dismissed before and why some processes of change had 
succeeded and others failed. These were revelations. 
 
In conclusion the methodology provided an opportunity for this set of respondents at the time of 
the field work to describe their understanding of local social norms and other building blocks for 
the expansion of the microfinance market, in terms they typically used. Accordingly, they are 
“socially constructed” building blocks, true for the respondents during my conversation with them 
and are given recognition as such.  
 
11.5 Implications for financial inclusion policy  
A study of institutions in two comparable microfinance markets is not an adequate basis to make 
definitive financial inclusion policy recommendations. However, it is a sufficient basis to reflect 
on what has been learnt and to tentatively suggest ways that policy might be progressed, so that 
the policy implementation can become part of the process of learning. 
 
On reflection there are four key messages for financial inclusion policy makers and microfinance 
practitioners from this research. First, there are basic constitutional and operational institutional 
functions which appear to support poor people’s participation in the financial market which 
deserve further examination in each country context. For example, The Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (AFI) (a network of developing country Central Bank Governors and Ministers of 
Finance) is implementing the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion (Goodwin-Groen 
2010). AFI may want to consider the appropriateness of these institutional functions under the 
Leadership principle.  Likewise the new Financial Inclusion Practice at the World Bank may want 
to engage with either their country partners or the World Bank Governance teams to consider how 
and whether institutional reforms might usefully consider these functions. Such an engagement 
approach would respond to the call for “good enough governance” (Grindle 2007) as applied to 
institutions in microfinance. 
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A constitutional institutional function of including poor people in the financial system has not 
been previously identified as critical to financial market development and is not present on the list 
in Chapter 2 Table 1 so the first step would be one of giving this evidence further consideration. 
This is not about a new microfinance law. Each country has its own unique mix of institutional 
forms but, this evidence is about where institutional functions to support poor people’s inclusion 
in the formal financial system might be appropriately included. For example, appropriate 
supervision of microfinance and the function of supporting the development of the sector, if 
considered more important than in the markets of Bosnia and Uganda, could be undertaken at the 
formal constitutional level.  
 
There are, of course, broader financial inclusion institutional issues not addressed by these 
findings such as consumer protection and private sector development more generally. So it is 
important to note that if national discussions about financial inclusion are being enjoined then 
questions such as what kind of institutional framework prevents profiteering from poor clients and 
what is the relationship between financial inclusion institutions and business development, should 
also be discussed.  
 
The second and third points are closely connected. Second, there is no such thing as a “best 
practice” institutional form for financial inclusion. There are only institutional functions congruent 
with local social norms which support poor people’s participation in the financial market.  Third, 
unless the institutional change processes to arrive at these institutional functions include market 
participants and either clients (or the perspective of clients) then the new institutions will not be 
congruent with local economic social norms and will not last. If anything this research has shown 
that the wholesale transfer of what are considered ‘best practice’ institutions from either Europe or 
Bangladesh to any other country is a recipe for failure. The underlying norms in each country are 
simply not the same and will not be able to support the operational or constitutional institutional 
transfer. The only way that new institutional functions can be embedded in local social norms is if 
the change processes are carefully structured to share power with key stakeholders to allow the 
social norms to be worked through into the new institutions. Experience has shown that this is a 
time consuming process and will require commitment to see the process through, but no short cut 
is possible. 
 
Fourth, there is, potentially, a role for external funders as catalysts for institutional change but it is 
a long term catalytic role and unless funders are prepared to commit to the lengthy process 
(possibly up to 20 years) and be facilitators (not leaders) then perhaps they should not start.  The 
Bosnia and Uganda microfinance markets show that donors can play a critical catalytic role in 
actively supporting the local institutional change processes that are transparent and inclusive of all 
key stakeholders, if they stay for the long term. It is by ensuring that all stakeholders have the 
skills to actively participate, that the process is understood by all stakeholders and to assure other 
stakeholders that the inclusive process will result in institutional functions that are congruent with 
social norms. The catalytic role by donors in Bosnia in engaging the MCO in the design of their 
own performance standards, and in Uganda by facilitating the inclusive stakeholder process prior 
to MDI Bill were examples of such success. There is greater awareness of the importance of a 
long term commitment beyond typical donor projects time frame of 3-5 years, and these were two 
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such examples. The importance of a long-term commitment can best be summed up by Henry 
Mbaguta an MoFPED official in 2007 and now the Ugandan Assistant Commissioner for 
Microfinance who said: “financial inclusion does not come easily – it is a long term issue”. 
 
 
11.6 Possible future research  
Although this research has started to address the gaps in knowledge at the intersection of 
institutional development, financial market development and financial inclusion, there are still 
many theoretical and policy questions to be answered. 
 
As discussed above, the conclusion that institutional function best represents North’s definition of 
an institution needs theoretical debate so that progress can be made towards a common definition. 
If institutional function is indeed a common useful definition, this would facilitate comparable 
empirical research on institutions which has been widely called for. Theoretical research and 
debate is also needed on the usefulness of a social constructionist ontology and interpretivist 
epistemology for institutional analysis. Most institutional analysis does not take such a 
perspective, yet the findings presented here show that this ontology and epistemology merit 
further exploration for institutional analysis. 
 
The two recent theories of institutional change examined in this thesis offer valuable insights 
beyond simplistic theorization (Chang 2011), in identifying spaces for change and how changes 
will ‘stick’.  Further iterations of these theories are needed to address their common limitations of 
ambiguous processes and uncertain timeframes. In particular, the theories need to be able to 
incorporate multiple sets of agents (including external development agents) and multiple 
institutional functions. In addressing these limitations and recognizing the complexity of 
institutional change processes, these two theories could be taken forward towards a mid-level 
theory of institutional change.   
 
Turning to the Bosnian and Ugandan microfinance markets there is clearly still a need for robust 
longitudinal anthropological research on social norms, and in particular to understand them from 
the client perspective. This would provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of those 
norms for future institutional analysis than was possible in this research.  
 
Finally, in order to test the financial inclusion policy findings similar institutional field work needs 
to be undertaken in other markets where microfinance has expanded rapidly such as Bangladesh, 
the Philippines or Bolivia. Subsequently, this evidence could then be used to develop research 
questions for institutional analysis of microfinance markets that have not expanded significantly.  
If results are consistent, this would start to build a compelling evidence base for fundamentally 
changing the focus of financial inclusion policy to developing appropriate institutional functions.  
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Appendix 
 
List of Bosnian organizations for which respondents worked, date of coded interviews and 
code numbers. 
 
Micro-Credit Organizations: code is “MCO” then the number below 
1. Mikrofin: May 2008 
2. Mikrofin: February & May 2008 
3. Sinergjia: May 2008 
4. LOK: May 2008 
5. MIKRA: May 2008 
6. PRIZMA: May 2008 
7. MI BOSPO Feb & May 2008 
8. MIKRA Feb & May 2008 
9. Women for Women: May 2008 
10. Partner: May 2008 
11. Sunrise: May 2008 
 
Banks: code is “B” then the number below  
1. Raiffeisen Bank: May 2008 
2. Hypo Bank Group Federation: May 2008 
3. ProCredit Bank (formerly Micro Enterprise Bank): May 2008 
4. Volksbank: May 2008 
5. Hypo Bank Group RS: Feb & May 2008 
 
Government Agencies: code is “GO” then the number below 
1. Federation Insurance Supervisor: May 2008 
2. Deposit Insurance Agency of Bosnia and Hercegovina, RS Branch: May 2008 
3. Office of the High Representative: May 2008 
4. Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina: May 2008 
5. Development Bank of RS: May 2008 
6. RS Ministry of Finnace: May 2008 
7. RS Banking Agency: May 2008 
8. Federation Banking Agency: May 2008 
 
Funders: code is “F” then the number below 
1. World Bank: Feb and May 2008 
2. USAID May 2008 
3. USAID May 2008 
4. European Fund for Southern Europe (EFSE): May 2008 
5. World Bank: Feb 2008 
6. World Bank consultant: Feb 2008 
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Private Sector: code is “PS” then the number below 
1. RS Insurance Company: May 2008 
2. LRC Kreditini Biro: May 2008 
3. VB Leasing:  May 2008 
4. Price Waterhouse Coopers: Feb and May 2008 
5. Faculty of Economics, University of Banja Luka: May 2008 
 
 
 
List of Ugandan organizations for which respondents worked and coding. All respondents’ 
coded interviews occured in August 2008. 
 
Microfinance NGOs – unable to intermediate savings: code is “MFNGO” then the number 
below 
1. Faulu Uganda Ltd. (Non-Bank Financial Institution) 
2. FINCA 
3. Success Microfinance Services Ltd. 
4. FOCCAS  
5. VSLA Program of CARE Uganda  
6. MED Net  
7. Three MSCL SACCOs in Iganga 
8. Iganga District Farmers Association 
9. BRAC Uganda  
10. UGAFODE 
 
Microf-Deposit taking Institutions: code is “MDI” followed by the number below 
1. UML (now Equity Bank) 
2. FINCA 
3. PRIDE Microfinance 
4. Finance Trust (formerly Uganda Women’s Finance Trust) 
 
Bankers: code is “B” followed by the number below 
1. Stanbic Bank 
2. Centenary Bank 
3. DFCU Bank 
4. Barclays Bank 
5. Post Bank 
6. Bank of Africa  
 
Government Officials: code is “G” followed by the number below 
1. BoU 
2. BoU 
3. Minister of State for Microfinance 
4. Henry Mbaguta, Assistant Commissioner for Microfinance – MOFPED 
5. BoU 
6. MOFPED 
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Funders: code is “F” followed by the number below 
1. African Development Bank 
2. Microfinance Support Cenre Lts. (MSCL) 
3. Stromme Foundation 
4. World Bank 
5. GTZ, BoU 
6. European Union 
7. DANIDA 
 
Private Sector: code is “PS” followed by the number below 
1. Planet Rating 
2. Microfinance Consultant  
3. Private Sector Consultant  
4. Microcare  
5. Money lender and Consultant 
6. Microfinance Consultant 
7. Financial Agent 
8. CAPITEC Investment CompanyUganda 
9. AIG Uganda Insurance 
10. Uganda Securities Exchange  
 
Networks: code is “N” followed by the number below 
1. Association of Micro Fiance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU) 
2. Uganda Bankers Association (UBA) 
3. Uganda Institute of Bankers (UIB) 
4. Uganda Insurers Association (UIA) 
5. AMFIU 
6. Uganda Cooperative Savings and Credit Union Ltd. (UCSCU) 
 
